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Abstract
This study examines the question of whether it is possible to enter into a 
psychotherapeutic relationship with a person diagnosed with dementia. A preliminary 
study focusing on providing short-term psychotherapy to a man diagnosed with severe 
dementia provided the opportunity to develop the case study approach used in this 
study, where the research design was constructed around an account of weekly 
meetings over three years.
The term ‘dementia5 is explored along with the current treatments that are available 
and psychotherapy is considered in relation to them. Research is presented suggesting 
that education and learning might have an inhibitory effect on the onset and 
progression of dementia; psychotherapy is considered as a form of therapeutic 
education.
The approach to the psychotherapy used in this study is explored, acknowledging the 
point that Freud highlighted with reference to psychoanalysis where he considered the 
technique to be individualised to each analyst rather than a generalised process. The 
therapist’s orientation is examined by referring to the theory that has been 
instrumental in formulating his approach to psychotherapy which includes existential, 
psychoanalytic and post-modern theoretical perspectives on practice in relation to a 
person with dementia. From this exploration an approach based on the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas emerges as the predominant influence in this study.
The preliminary study highlighted the difficulties in using case study as a means of 
generating psychotherapeutic knowledge especially in relation to scientific methods of 
research. The researcher examined a range of epistemological ideas, including aspects 
of the work of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger, in order to identify a basis for 
developing an approach to researching psychotherapy using a case study. A method 
emerged in the form of a psychotherapeutic case presentation from the therapist’s 
perspective utilising a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach. This approach is 
concerned with producing ‘meanings’ in relation to an observation rather than being 
preoccupied with producing ‘the’ specific meaning. The case study is presented as an 
illustration of an account of a series of meetings between a trainee psychotherapist
2
and a person diagnosed with dementia whereby the researcher and the reader can 
address the issue of ‘possibility’ raised by the research question.
The findings of the study identify a difficulty for the therapist in this relationship to 
overcome preconceptions associated with the diagnosis of dementia. The account of 
therapy also shows how the therapist appeal's to be representative of other significant 
relationships for this person and acknowledges what Levinas calls the non-intentional 
which refers to glimpses of the other that allow a recognition of separation and 
‘otherness’ that is not concerned with ‘knowing’. The findings were also found to 
have significant implications for the use of intentional research and the potential 
influence that it can have on what is being observed by excluding the non-intentional. 
The association of theory with intentionality is identified in the findings and the 
possible impact on the practice of psychotherapy noted, particularly in relation to the 
prohibition of the non-intentional.
The study concludes that the question of ‘whether psychotherapy is possible’ might be 
asked of anyone entering therapy. The diagnosis of dementia can have the effect of 
excluding a person from a relationship with another, and in these circumstances it 
becomes difficult to offer psychotherapy.
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C h a p t e r  O n e  -  I n t r o d u c t i o n
This study examines the question of whether it is possible to enter into a 
psychotherapeutic relationship with a person diagnosed with dementia. The literature 
on dementia is explored; this mainly focuses on the ‘treatment’ of the illness with 
very little consideration given to the ‘person’ who is the patient. This study is not 
concerned with evaluating the success or failure of psychotherapy seen as a treatment 
for the symptoms of dementia, but rather whether it is possible for a person with 
dementia and a psychotherapist to sit together and then to claim that this is 
‘psychotherapy’. An explanation of the term ‘psychotherapy’ is explored with 
particular reference to the context of this study. The method chosen for this research 
was influenced by the findings of a preliminary study (Greenwood and Loewenthal
1998) that used a case study method based on the work of Yin (1984). As a 
consequence of the findings from this earlier study the researcher examined a range of 
epistemological ideas, referring to work by Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Heidegger, in 
order to identify a sounder basis for developing a descriptive case study approach to 
researching psychotherapy. The case study method that emerged from this 
methodological discussion utilises a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach. A 
detailed case presentation is described, from a therapist’s perspective, of a 
psychotherapeutic relationship with a person living in a nursing home that lasted for 
over three years. The findings are presented and discussed with particular reference 
to some of the philosophical ideas of Emmanuel Levinas (1967, 1981, 1984).
The literature on dementia suggests that it is an illness that causes an apparent 
deterioration in a person’s cognitive functioning (Arendt & Jones 1992:9, Butters et al 
1997:33, World Health Organisation 1986, ICitwood 1997, Mckhann et al. 1984, 
Tortora & Anagnostakos 1990:419). The nature and severity of the cognitive 
symptoms depend on the neuropathology of the specific type of dementia present. 
Kitwood (1997) suggests that an increasing emphasis is being given to the socio­
psychological factors that can influence the onset and severity of symptoms associated 
with dementia. There is currently a significant impetus towards discovering an 
effective neuropharmacological treatment for dementia, and the research into 
Alzheimer’s disease in particular attracts considerable resources and attention (Cohen
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2001). These treatments are aimed directly at the cerebral pathology. There are many 
treatments that have been developed as a means of controlling and/or alleviating the 
externalised behavioural symptoms that are experienced by a person with dementia. 
There is research, explored in this study, which suggests that treatments aimed at 
influencing behaviour may have a direct physical effect in delaying the progressive 
nature of this illness by providing intellectual stimulation and educational 
opportunities (Ott et al. 1995, Snowdon et al 1996, Caramelli et al 1997, Snowdon 
1997, Baker et al 2001).
The researcher considered exploring the potential for psychotherapy as a treatment for 
the symptoms of dementia at the outset of this study. Loewenthal (1999) makes the 
case for considering psychotherapy as a form of ‘therapeutic education’ and this is 
discussed further in chapter two (2.2.8). If psychotherapy can be seen as a form of 
educational experience the researcher reflected on the potential for researching it as a 
treatment for the symptoms experienced by a person diagnosed with dementia and this 
is explored in further detail in chapter two (2.2.8). Despite the researcher’s interest in 
examining the potential for psychotherapy as a treatment for dementia he decided that 
there was a question prior to this concerned with identifying whether psychotherapy 
was possible at all with a person experiencing the symptoms associated with a 
diagnosis of dementia. The researcher felt that the issue of ‘possibility’ needed to be 
explored prior to researching psychotherapy as a form of treatment for dementia.
The present study highlights the problem of a definition of dementia and how it 
relates to the ‘possibility’ of therapy. The researcher is reminded, by way of 
illustration, of an incident described in a previous case study (Greenwood et al 2001) 
of an elderly man who had severe dementia. This patient was being cared for in a 
nursing home and as his symptoms became worse the placement in this care setting 
appeared to be becoming more inappropriate. The nursing home manager resolved, 
upon his return from three weeks holiday, to arrange for the transfer of this patient to 
a specialist unit. On entering the building for the first time, the manager'met this 
patient on the stairs and the patient said ‘Hello Old Boy, I haven’t seen you for a 
while, been away?’ At this moment symptoms associated with the term ‘dementia’, 
like memory loss and the inability to use language, that appeared to be part of this 
patient’s behaviour were set aside for a meeting of two people sharing a moment in
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their lives. The spontaneous statement made by the patient in response to meeting 
someone he appeared to recognise and had not seen for sometime and the apparent 
accuracy of this observation seemed to be in stark contrast to how a person labelled 
with the term ‘severe dementia5 might be expected to behave. This example illustrates 
a point made by Laing (1990:22) highlighting how the behavioural sciences excluded 
a consideration of a person’s experience, he states:
..behaviour seen as personal is seen in terms of that person's experience and of his 
intentions, behaviour seen organismically can only be seen as the contraction or 
relaxation of certain muscles, etc.
An assumption that a person labelled as having ‘severe dementia’ would normally be 
unable to make the type of spontaneous and appropriate observation described in this 
example could be seen as being influenced by what Laing (1990:22) terms the 
‘organismic’. The set of assumptions linked with the label of dementia leave little 
potential for surprise and spontaneity and appear to take up a definitive position in the 
same way as a physiological explanation of the ‘contraction or relaxation of the 
muscles’ mentioned by Laing in the quote above. Laing (1990) questions whether 
this definitive physiological world leaves any room for the type of personal 
experience described in the example of the patient and the nursing home manager 
meeting on the stairs.
The existing literature on the subject of psychotherapy and dementia appears to give 
the most attention to the illness at the expense of the person. So that when 
psychotherapy is offered it is to a dementia sufferer rather than to the person. Sinason 
(1992) outlines a case study of a man with Alzheimer’s disease; she describes ‘his 
degeneration, with the unpicking of the fine embroidery that had been his mind’ 
(Sinason 1992:110). Sinason sees the role for psychotherapy as ‘supportive’ in this 
case rather than the potentially ‘transformational’ experience normally associated with 
therapy, so the symptoms of the illness appear to enforce a re-evaluation of the 
therapeutic approach. This perspective would appear to develop because of the nature 
of the illness, where dementia affects the behaviour of a person so that others feel less 
contact with the person they knew and more contact with the symptoms that take their
place. Sinason (1992) suggests that ‘transformational’ therapy is beyond the 
capabilities of her dementia sufferer, the cognitive impairment associated with this 
illness is considered to reduce the aptitude of a person to relate to another, as a 
consequence therapy is realigned to take up a ‘supportive’ role. The symptoms of 
dementia seem to directly affect a person’s memory and use of language and in severe 
cases there would appear to be no grasp of either. This apparent reduced ability to 
relate to others, lack of memory and language skills associated with the diagnosis of 
dementia are problems that raise the preliminary question of whether psychotherapy is 
a possibility at all.
Hausman (1992) recommends developing the therapeutic relationship early in the 
progression of the dementia in order to ensure that psychotherapy is going to be 
possible at a later stage of the illness. Zarit and Knight (1996:7) see psychotherapy 
clearly as treatment for the early stages of dementia:
As diagnosis improves and people with progressive cognitive impairment are 
identified at the earlier stages of the disease process, a group ofpotential clients is 
created who still have sufficient cognitive functioning to participate in psychotherapy 
but who are at significant risk of depression and other psychological problems as they 
accept their diagnosis and learn to cope with more limited cognitive functioning.
These early-stage older adults with dementia may benefit from psychotherapy.
So psychotherapy for a person diagnosed with dementia is subject to an 
‘understanding’ of the illness in this literature; either the therapy is different (Sinason 
1995), needs to be commenced at an early stage of dementia (Hausman 1992), or is 
only possible at all during the early stages of the illness (Zarit & Knight 1996).
This study is concerned with exploring an approach to psychotherapy that does not 
prioritise the symptoms of dementia at the expense of the person who is the patient. 
The literature on psychotherapy and dementia, referred to above, appears to identify 
limitations and boundaries on practice with a person diagnosed with dementia, which 
inevitably focus on the illness. So can psychotherapy be inclusive of people with 
dementia? This researcher argues that where psychotherapy is only considered
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possible with individuals that retain certain intellectual capabilities then the priority 
has been given to the diagnosis of dementia at the expense of the person.
This study distinguishes between psychotherapy that gives primacy to the diagnosis 
(Sinason 1992, Hausman 1992, Zarit & Knight 1996) and an alternative that attempts 
to put the person before the diagnosis. Providing a working definition or description 
of this alternative approach to psychotherapy immediately creates a problem because 
psychotherapy is not easily definable. There are a large number of different 
orientations and as Freud (1911) pointed out even when the orientation has been 
defined it is likely that each therapist will interpret the approach in a different way. 
Freud (1911:356) states:
I must however make it clear that what I am asserting is that this technique is the 
only one suited to my individuality; I do .not venture to deny that a physician quite 
differently constituted might find himself driven to adopt a different attitude to his 
patients and to the task before him.
So not only are there many different orientations in psychotherapy there is also, as 
Freud states above, the possibility of individual interpretation by therapists in carrying 
it out in practice. So this study needs to provide a definition or description of 
psychotherapy that includes a consideration of the subjective interpretation of a 
therapeutic approach by the therapist.
This study is focused on the ‘possibility’ of providing psychotherapy to a person with 
a diagnosis of dementia and this is identified as a point prior to the examination and 
measurement of any potential benefits. It would appear inappropriate to examine the 
potential benefits that psychotherapy might offer a person diagnosed with dementia if 
the definition of the therapy excluded the possibility of working with this client group. 
Therefore an explanation and description of what is meant by psychotherapy in this 
study is attempted, while acknowledging the difficulties associated in doing this.
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Figure I Psychotherapy
Figure I illustrates a possible overview of psychotherapy seen as the focal point of the 
research in this study. The Psychotherapy can be seen from this diagram as taking 
place ‘between’ two people as represented by the boxes labelled ‘Person with 
dementia’ and ‘Therapist/Analyst’. The box labelled ‘psychotherapy’ illustrates a 
psychotherapeutic relationship between a person with dementia (patient) and a 
therapist; the diagram above shows the arrow from the patient entering into the 
potential psychotherapy area within the box or perhaps even entering a room to meet 
the therapist.
A consideration of the ethical questions relating to consent that are associated with a 
therapeutic relationship between a psychotherapist and a person diagnosed with 
dementia are discussed in chapter four (4.4).
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The therapist in the diagram above brings a ‘body’ of theory that equates to an 
‘approach’ or an ‘orientation’ into the therapeutic relationship. The therapist’s 
orientation frames the psychotherapy (represented by the arrow from the therapist box 
being in contact with the sides of the psychotherapy) or even dictates the nature of the 
‘between’ represented by the box that is labelled ‘Psychotherapy’. The ‘between’ in 
this context is the time spent in the room designated for the psychotherapy when the 
therapist and patient meet.
Figure I also illustrates an overview of how this study might be structured. If the 
psychotherapy, the therapist and the client/patient can be represented by boxes and 
then defined then it could be possible to develop a qualitative or quantitative research 
method as a means of answering the research question. But this task, as will be 
demonstrated in following chapters, is not as simple as compiling a definition for the 
three identified boxes. The attempt to define them is fraught with difficulties making 
the frame or the box far less definitive then it appears above. This problem is also 
confirmed by looking at the diagram and recognising that it is supposed to convey the 
meeting of two people in a room, one called a therapist the other called patient, and 
there is a sense that perhaps a painting might convey this more satisfactorily. There is 
a structure and form associated with the psychotherapy described in this study since 
the patient and the therapist have agreed to see each other for the purposes of 
psychotherapy at a certain time and location. However it would appear to this 
researcher unrealistic to attempt to conceptualise psychotherapy by means of defining 
the variables that make up this relationship as illustrated in Figure 1.
The body of theory that influences the therapist can be defined but it is difficult to 
integrate the therapist’s interpretation of this theory into a working definition of the 
psychotherapy that is described in this study. The theory does not describe the ‘what’ 
because it misses the part that Freud described above, that subjective element that 
affects the nature of ‘what’ is being offered. The description of the therapy in this 
study is developed further in chapter two.
The use of case study is an attempt to integrate the body of theory with a practical 
example of how the therapist has worked. Freud wrote extensively about the theory 
of psychoanalysis and its technique, which is discussed in more detail in the following
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chapter, and he produced a series of prominent case studies to give examples of how 
he interpreted this into practice. Freud might be seen as having outlined his 
orientation by writing about the technique of analysis and also as having linked it with 
his subjective interpretation by providing examples of how he put this approach into 
practice. Traditional researchers are critical of this approach since it incorporates the 
subjective element rather then explicating it. This issue is explored further in chapter 
three (3.2.4).
The methodological issues associated with using case study as an approach to 
researching psychotherapy are explored in chapter three. The researcher’s 
understanding of case study was influenced by carrying out a preliminary study based 
on the work of Yin (1984), where the focus was on ten sessions of psychotherapy with 
a person diagnosed with severe dementia. The findings from this earlier study 
(Greenwood & Loewenthal 1998) did not produce the type of data that was likely to 
provide the potential for a definitive answer to the research question. However, Yin 
(1984:106) suggests that research should strive towards an ‘ultimate goal’ of 
producing credible evidence, he further states that a researcher should do the 
following:
. ..treat the evidence fairly, to produce compelling analytic conclusions, and to rule 
out alternative interpretations.
The researcher presented the ‘evidence’ in this early study to provoke interest rather 
than to negate alternative possibilities. The findings were more descriptive compared 
with Yin’s apparent prescriptive ‘ultimate goal’. Yin (1984:107) did not exclude a 
descriptive approach and states:
A second general analytic strategy is to develop a descriptive framework for 
organizing the case study. This strategy is less preferable than the use of theoretical 
propositions...
Although Yin accepts, as identified in the above quote, that the descriptive approach 
has a place as a strategy, it is an inferior one to the theory generating method that is
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described as the main objective. The position Yin (1984:108) ascribes to a descriptive 
approach is further emphasised when he states:
...a descriptive approach may help to identify the appropriate causal links to be 
analyzed -  even quantitatively.
So Yin would appeal' to be suggesting that the descriptive approach might have a 
preliminary or illustrative role rather than be an appropriate end in itself. The 
‘ultimate goal’ of research, according to Yin (1984), is achieved by using a theoretical 
propositional approach.
The experience of carrying out a preliminary study had the effect of encouraging the 
researcher to question the inferior position that Yin had ascribed to the descriptive 
approach. Consequently, this study examines whether a descriptive case study 
approach can be used to research the question of whether it is possible to provide 
psychotherapy to a person with dementia.
The use of a case study approach has a long tradition in psychoanalysis and 
subsequently psychotherapy (Fonagy & Moran 1993, Spence 1993, Wallerstein 
1993); however, arguments are outlined in this study in chapter three that are critical 
of a clinical interpretation of case study (Kazdin 1982, Merriam 1998, Wallerstein 
1993). The broad interpretation of case study in relation to research necessitated a 
detailed examination of methodological issues so that the basis of the approach 
adopted for this study could be identified. Contrasting views of how one examines 
and describes the world are explored such as whether a description represents what is 
in the world or what is in the world as seen by he/she who looks. A 
phenomenological - hermeneutic approach to case study, influenced by the work of 
Heidegger and Gadamer (Gadamer 1985), emerged out of this methodological 
discussion as the chosen research method and is described in chapter four. This 
approach acknowledges and values the place of existing cultural understandings, 
potentially represented in this study by the medical discourse associated with the 
diagnosis of dementia, but attempts to look beyond the accepted explanations as a 
means of opening up other ‘possibilities’. It is hoped that as a consequence of using a
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phenomenological - hermeneutic approach to case study the possibility/ies for therapy 
with a person with dementia will be illustrated.
The method used to generate the findings of this study is outlined in chapter four and 
the ethical issues associated with researching and reporting a case of psychotherapy 
with a person diagnosed as suffering from dementia are explored. In chapter five the 
findings are presented in the form of a trainee therapist’s account of the 
psychotherapy. The findings are discussed in chapter six and it is suggested that this 
account of therapy provides a basis for acknowledging what Levinas (1981, 1984) 
calls the non-intentional which refers to glimpses of the other that allow a recognition 
of separation and ‘otherness’ that is not concerned with ‘knowing’, where ‘knowing’ 
and ‘understanding’ are associated with what Levinas describes as the ‘intentional’. 
The non-intentional is described by Levinas (1984:81) as a moment before the 
assimilation of an ‘understanding’ by a person; it is the glimpse and recognition of 
something separate and ‘other’ to that person before it is rationalised into an 
explanation. In reflecting on the ‘non intentional’ in terms of psychotherapy with a 
person diagnosed with dementia it is noted that the emphasis seems to be moving 
towards the person rather than remaining preoccupied with the symptoms of an 
illness. A summary of the study and suggestions for future research are outlined in the 
last chapter.
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C h a p t e r  T w o  -  T h e o r y
The research question in this study asks whether it is possible to enter into a 
psychotherapeutic relationship with a person diagnosed with dementia. This chapter 
explores the term’s ‘dementia’ and ‘psychotherapy’. Dementia is examined with 
reference to literature (Tortora 8c Anagnostakos 1990, Jobst 1994, Butters et al 1997, 
Fares 1997, Kasznialc and Christenson 1997, Willis 1997, Kitwood 1997) that 
explains the physiological understanding of this illness and describes the basis on 
which a person might be given this diagnosis. A survey of current treatments is 
outlined (Kitwood 1997, Derrington 1998, Giacobini 8c Michel 1998, Van Reekum 
1999, Feldman et al 2001, Lopez et al 2002, Bertoli 8c Stahelinl999, Cummings 
2001, Miller (1997), Van Reekum 1999, Pasinetti 2001, Breitner 2001, Veld et al
2001, Regland 2001, Yaya-Kelleher 2001, Bright 1992, Hattori 2002, Turner et al
2002, Ballard et al 2001, Innes & Suit 2001, Bowman 8c Stokes 2002, Mellies et al 
1998, Martin et al 2001, Hilliard 2001, Lou 2001, Waller 2002, Bayer 8c Reban 1996, 
Broxnan 2001, De-Vreese et al 2001, Woods 1992) which is divided into those 
focused on intervening in the neuropathology of the different types of dementia and 
others that attempt to relieve the behavioural symptoms of this illness. The suggestion 
is made that psychotherapy could be seen as a treatment to alleviate and contain some 
of the symptoms of dementia (Zarit 8c Knight 1996, Spayd 8c Smyer 1996, Hausman 
1992, Sinason 1992). However this claim is fraught with difficulties as the medical 
diagnosis of dementia implies a mental incapacity that may have implications for the 
provision of psychotherapy.
The association of the term ‘psychotherapy’ with the understanding of ‘dementia’ that 
emerges from the literature examined in this chapter might be seen to raise questions 
concerning the competency of a patient to enter into a therapeutic relationship. The 
following questions are possible examples: Does psychotherapy make requirements of 
a patient that automatically exclude a person with dementia? Do the symptoms of 
dementia define the absence of something that is a necessary characteristic for a 
person to enter into a therapeutic relationship? The possible answers to these and 
other similar questions would appear to depend not only on the explanation and 
account of the term ‘dementia’ but also on what is meant by the term ‘psychotherapy’.
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This study presents an account of a therapeutic relationship between a person who has 
been diagnosed with dementia and the therapist whose orientation is described in this 
chapter. By presenting this detailed account of therapy it is hoped that an answer to 
the question of whether psychotherapy is possible will emerge both for the researcher 
and the reader.
This chapter outlines a wide range of noil-pharmacological therapies that are aimed at 
treating people diagnosed with dementia on the basis of research suggesting that 
social and environmental factors may directly effect the onset and progression of 
symptoms associated with dementia (Kitwood 1997, Ott et al. 1995, Snowdon et al 
1995, Caramelli et al 1997, Snowdon 1997, Baker etal 2001). Psychotherapy is 
introduced as potentially one of these non-pharmacological treatments and reference is 
made to some of the limited amount of literature that has been found on this subject 
(Sinason 1992, Hausman 1992, Jones 1995, Zarit & Knight 1996, Kasi-Godley &
Gatz 2000, Cheston 1998, Greenwood & Loewenthal 1998, Spayd & Smyer 1996, 
Haupt 1996, Haupt et al 2000, Mansdorf et al 1999). The researcher noted that the 
literature referred to identifying psychotherapy as a potential treatment for dementia 
appears to emphasis a need for considering the severity of the symptoms of dementia 
prior to considering psychotherapy. The range of different psychotherapeutic 
orientations that are included in this literature confirmed the importance of illustrating 
what is meant by the term ‘psychotherapy’ in the context of this study. The theory 
that has influenced the therapeutic orientation of the therapist is then explored in order 
to illustrate the term ‘psychotherapy’ as it is used in this study
2.1 Dementia
Dementia in the United Kingdom is becoming a more widespread phenomenon 
amongst an ageing population and it is set to increase in real terms (Bayer & Ruben 
1996:23), doubling around every five years amongst the population over the age of 
60. Kmietowicz (1998) claims that there are an estimated 650000 people suffering 
from dementia in the United Kingdom, 60% of who have Alzheimer’s disease. This 
figure is predicted to increase to 850000 by the year 2020 (Alzheimer’s disease 
Society, 1997). This section will present some definitions of dementia and put these 
into perspective by summarising the basic structure of the brain. A summary of the
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neuropathology associated with dementia is outlined, and the potential significance of 
‘social-psychological’ factors is explored in relation to the progressive nature of this 
illness. Current treatments are explored and are divided between those treatments 
aimed at preventing/inhibiting the potentially primary causes of the disease and those 
secondary treatments aimed at symptom prevention/inhibition. Psychotherapy is 
placed in context with the range of existing treatments for dementia.
Kitwood (1997:23) states:
A person who has dementia is involved in two kinds of change, going on side by side. 
First, there is the gradually advancing failure of mental power such as memory, 
reasoning and comprehension. Much here can be attributed to the brain being less 
efficient; its function has declined, and usually there is degeneration in its actual 
structure. Second, there are changes in the social -psychological environment - in 
patterns of relationship and inter action... It is impossible, of course, to distinguish 
clearly between the two kinds of change - the one neurological and the other social- 
psychological. There can be no doubt, however, that the dementing process, as it 
actually occurs, is a consequence of them both.
Kitwood feels that there has been a considerable amount of work done on the first 
kind of change from the 'scientific disciplines related to psychiatry', but very little on 
the second.
The term dementia does not describe a disorder in its own right, ‘it is rather a 
syndrome or grouping of symptoms which can be manifested in variable combination’ 
(Arendt & Jones 1992:9). Butters et al (1997:33) defines dementia as:
A clinical syndrome characterized by deterioration in intellectual ability of sufficient 
severity to interfere with usual social or occupational functioning.
These authors go on to quote the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987) 
which states that the behavioural symptoms should include short and long term 
memory deficit along with a deficiency in the function o f 'abstract thinking ’,
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deteriorating judgement and other disturbances of ‘higher cortical functioning’ such 
as a personality change.
The World Health Organisation (1986) suggest the follow’ing definition:
Dementia is the global impairment of higher cortical functions, including memory, the 
capacity to solve the problems of day-to-day living, the performance of learned 
percepto-motor skills, the correct use of social skills and control of emotional 
reactions, in the absence of gross ‘clouding of consciousness’. The condition is often 
irreversible and progressive.
Kitwood (1997:21) quotes Mckhann et al. (1984) as providing the most 'widely 
accepted definitions' of dementia which was produced in USA by a group of 
neuroscientists and doctors:
Dementia is the decline in memory and other cognitive functions in comparison with 
the patient's previous level offunction as determined by a history of decline in 
performance and by abnormalities noted form clinical examination and 
neuropsychological tests.
A diagnosis cannot be made when consciousness is impaired or when other clinical 
abnormalities prevent adequate evaluation of mental state. Dementia is a diagnosis 
based on behaviour and cannot be determined by brain scan, EEG or other 
laboratory instruments, although specific causes of dementia may be identified by 
these means.
This definition makes it clear that the best assessment of a dementia diagnosis is a 
deterioration of cognitive performance from an earlier time. Kitwood (1997:21) 
suggests that if two areas of cognitive function deteriorate, such as 'comprehension, 
judgement or planning' then dementia is more than likely present. This initial 
behavioural observation still excludes the underlying cause of the problem. Kitwood 
goes on to states:
The primary dementia’s are those which are clearly associated with damaged brain 
tissue; the secondary dementia’s are those associated with other pathological or
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physiological disturbances... dementia is said to be mild if a person still retains the 
ability to manage independently; moderate if some help is needed in the ordinary 
tasks of living; and severe if continual help and support are needed.
2.1.1 The Brain
Dementia is an illness that affects the function of the brain, Tortora & Anagnostakos 
(1990:419) state:
Although there is normally gradual loss of neurons in the brain associated with 
ageing, the rate of loss in persons with AD (Alzheimer’s disease) is greater than 
normal, especially in regions of the brain that are important for memory and other 
intellectual processes, such as the cerebral cortex and hippocampus.
Tortora & Anagnostakos (1990) further state that the average adult has about 1000 
billion neurons (nerve cells that are responsible for conducting nerve impulses around 
the body. They provide the basic information-processing units of the nervous system) 
that make up the organ of the brain. Tortora & Anagnostakos (1990) illustrate through 
the diagram below that the brain is divided into four parts:
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1. The brain stem that connects to the spinal cord at its lower end.
2. The diencephalon that is situated above the brain stem
3. The cerebrum that spreads across the diencephalon.
4. The Cerebellum that lies at the back and below the cerebrum.
The cerebrum makes up about seven-eighths of the total weight of the brain. The 
surface of the cerebrum is covered by grey matter, a layer 2-4mm thick, and is called 
the cerebral cortex, below this grey matter is the cerebral white matter.
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The cerebral cortex contains approximately 10 million nerve cells (Fares 1997,Tortora 
& Anagnostakos 1990) is divided into four regions or lobes, frontal, parietal, occipital 
and temporal, that are related to function:
1. Sensory areas responsible for interpreting sensory impulses
2. Motor areas controlling muscular movement (including speech) and,
3. Association areas that are involved with emotional and intellectual processes.
Damage to any of the regions of the cerebral cortex will affect language, problem 
solving, and recognition of different forms and memory.
The limbic system is made up of certain components found in and around the 
diencephalon and is responsible for ‘functions in the emotional aspects of behaviour 
related to survival’ (Tortora & Anagnostakos 1990:400). The limbic system is 
involved in memory function and it is possibly related to the involuntary aspects of 
behaviour. The hippocampus forms a part of the limbic system.
2.1.2 Causes of Dementia
Dementia has been defined in behavioural terms due to the breadth of pathology that 
is included in the term, but by implication and the use of post-mortem research the 
symptoms can be identified with pathology associated with certain parts of the brain, 
some of which are described in this section. However, it is possible to be more 
specific about the neuropathology of some forms of dementia. Fares (1997:49) states:
The standard medical model of causes of dementia envisages a linear process 
whereby a degenerative process occurs in the brain, for example, factor ‘X ’ for 
example vascular dementia or Alzheimer’s which leads to neuropathic changes, as a 
result of which dementia occurs. The dementing process is seen as deterministic and 
progressive -  implying a process of no cure, no help and no hope. ’
This irreversible process is described as ‘Primary Dementia’. Where dementia occurs 
in treatable conditions they are known as secondary or reversible dementias. Although
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dementia can be caused by over 50 disorders (Katzman, 1986), Kitwood (1997: 22) 
identifies three main types of dementia: Alzheimer type, vascular type and 'mixed'.
2.1.3 Alzheimer Type
Kitwood stresses that the symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease lack any strict age related 
pattern, the most likely explanation for this 'is that Alzheimer's disease (in the 
technical sense) is an umbrella term, in fact covering several different pathological 
processes that still remain to be differentiated'. Salib (2000) states that Alzheimer’s 
disease accounts of at least half of the cases that are examined at necropsy. McKhann 
et al (1984) produced a set of criteria for diagnosing Alzheimer’s, which is cited in 
full:
National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke and the 
Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association Workgroup Criteria form 
Diagnoses of Probable and Possible Alzheimer’s Disease (AD)
A Clinical Diagnosis of probable AD is made when
1. Dementia is established by clinical examination and documented by performance 
on the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975), the 
Blessed Dementia Scale (Blessed, Tomlinson & Roth 1968), or a similar mental 
status examination, and
2. Confirmed by neuropsychological testing, documenting deficits in two or more
3. areas of cognition, and
4. Characterized by a history ofprogressive worsening of memory and other 
cognitive deficits, with
5. No disturbance in level of consciousness, and
6. Symptom onset between the ages of 40 and 90 years, most typically after the age 
of 65, and
7. There is an absence of systemic disorders or other brain disease that of 
themselves could account for the progressive deficits.
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The diagnosis ofprobable AD is further supported by evidence (Le., from 
neuropsychological re-examination) ofprogressive deterioration of specific cognitive 
functions, impairment of activities of daily living, a family history of similar 
disorders, and results of particular laboratory tests (e.g., a normal lumbar puncture, 
normal pattern or non-specific changes in the electroencephalogram, evidence of 
cerebral atrophy on computerized tomographical scanning).
The clinical diagnosis of possible AD is made when
1. The syndrome of dementia is present, and
2. There is an absence of other neurological, psychiatric or systemic disorders that 
are sufficient to cause dementia, but
3. There are present variations from criteria for probable AD in the onset, 
presentation, or clinical course
Possible AD may also be diagnosed when there is a systemic or brain disease that is 
sufficient to produce a dementia, but which (for various reasons) is not considered to 
be the cause of the patient’s dementia.
Kaszniak and Christenson (1997) state that in order to achieve a definite diagnosis all 
the probable criteria need to be met ‘and there must be histopathological evidence of 
the of the microscopic pathology of AD (i.e., particular anatomic distribution and 
sufficient accumulation of neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles;...)’ which is 
found after performing an autopsy or biopsy. Arendt 8c Jones (1992:17) state that 
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease is mainly a ‘systematic exclusion of other possible 
causes’, they go on to state that the confirmation can only be achieved with any 
‘certainty’ by a post-mortem which ‘confirms the clinical diagnosis in about 85 to 90 
per cent of all cases (Molsa et al., 1984)’.
Kmietowicz (1998) has produced a seven-stage scale of behaviourally based criteria 
for the identification of the differing degrees of Alzheimer’s disease outlined below in 
figure III.
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Stage 1
Person appears normal and can cover up lapses;
Stage 2
Forgets certain things, but still functions normally;
Stage 3
Difficulty at work, anxious when travelling in unfamiliar areas, family aware of
changes
Stage 4
Reduced ability to manage own affairs, remember current events, count or travel; 
Stage 5
Needs help getting dressed, forgets time or place, can not remember names of
grandchildren
Stage 6
Needs help eating and using the toilet, may be incontinent, disorientated in time, place 
and possibly person;
Stage 7
Severe speech loss, motor stiffness, incontinence.
Deterioration in Alzheimer’s Disease
*(Kmietowicz 1998:27)
Figure III
The neuropathology of the disease is associated with a general loss of neurones; with 
severe onset this can be as high as 40% in the cortex. There is also an overall atrophy 
of the brain, which is shown by a physical shrinkage of the outer volume and an 
enlargement of the inner ventricles, which were occupied by cerebro-spinal fluid 
(Tortora & Anagnostakos 1990, Fares 1997).
2.1.4 Neurofibrillary Tangles
There is also a change at cell level where neurofibrillary tangles are evident. These are 
bundles of fibrous protein and can be found in the cerebral cortex, hippocampus and 
brain stem. The more severe the disease the more wide spread is the presence of the 
neurofibrillary tangles that consist of dense bundles of protein called Tau that 
prevents the cell form working effectively by preventing communication form the 
nucleus to the dendrites (Fares 1997). Along the length of an axon in a nerve cell are 
microtubules that facilitate the transportation of essential components through the cell. 
Tubulin is a component of the micro tubules. In the absence of irregularity, Tau
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contributes to the healthy function of the cell by binding to tubulin. Alzheimer’s 
disease interferes with this normal activity and causes the Tau to form twisted 
structures called paired helical filaments that develop inside the cell, forming tangles. 
Tau protein has been discovered with significantly increased levels in the oral 
mucosal epithelium in AD patients, suggesting the possibility of a simple diagnostic 
test in the near future (Hattori 2002).
2.1.5 Neuritic Plaques
Willis (1997) states that ‘Amyloid precursor protein (APP) is an essential component 
of the brain’ but as a consequence of enzyme activity it is converted to beta-amyloid, 
leaving fragments to form the neuritic plaques. These plaques are found in the 
cerebral cortex, hippocampus and amygdala. Fares (1997) suggests that there appears 
to be a positive correlation between the number of neuritic plaques and tangles in the 
brain and the degree of dementia, so the more tangles and plaques the greater the 
degree of dementia and brain shrinkage (Alzheimer’s Disease Society 1996).
However, this correlation between dementia symptoms and the number of tangles and 
plaques is far from proven and research that challenges its significance is revealed in 
the Nuns study (Snowdon 1997), outlined later in this chapter.
Vascular pathology is associated with cerebral-vascular disease, which causes an 
interruption and reduction in blood supply to the brain (Kitwood 1997, Fares 1997). 
The vascular incompetence can be associated with different blood vessels. The 
blockage may occur in the larger or smaller arteries supplying the brain with blood or 
at the capillary level were Amyloid deposits cause occlusion and damage is sustained. 
Multi-infract dementia is one such condition where the person has experienced a 
sequence of small strokes. It is possible to identify the regions of the brain that have 
been damaged by a scan. As with Alzheimer's disease, the vascular pathology is 
associated with cerebral atrophy.
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’Mixed' pathology occurs where there has been an incident of both Alzheimer's 
disease and vascular incompetence and it is not possible to ascertain the primary 
illness. Kitwood (1997:24) states:
As a rough generalization, the older a person with Alzheimer's disease is at the point 
of death, the more likely it is that the brain will show signs of vascular pathology.
There are many other causes of brain damage other than these main categories that 
have been identified. Kitwood (1997:24) summarizes them as follows:
Degenerative (e.g. Pick's disease, Frontal lobe pathology), infective (e.g. Creutzfeld- 
Jacob disease, meningitis, neurosyphillis, Aids related dementia), toxic (e.g. alcohol- 
related brain damage, poisoning by metals such as lead, cadmium or mercury, or 
neuroactive organic compounds)... Finally, there is the loss of neurons as a result of 
gross brain damage, whether through a single major head injury or through repeated 
smaller injuries as in boxing.
Butters et al (1997:34) describes a distinction that has been made between neuro 
degenerative diseases associated with dementia involving the cerebral cortex like 
Alzheimer’s disease and those mainly involving the subcortical area of the brain such 
as Huntington’s disease and progressive supranuclear palsy (Albert, Feldman & Willis 
1994; Cummings 1990; McHugh & Folstein 1975). The typical “cortical” dementias 
are associated with amnesia both of events in the distant past (retrograde) and the 
more recent past (anterograde), also problems with language and semantic knowledge, 
abstract reasoning and other difficulties associated with visuospatial and constructive 
abilities. Subcortical dementias are associated memory disturbance, difficulties with 
maintaining attention, reduction in the ability to problem solving like arithmetic, and 
visuoperceptual difficulties. It is (Turner et al 2002; Kitwood 1997) suggested that 
the distinctions described above are misleading, as the main dementias are associated 
with cortical and sub-cortical involvement.
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2.1.6 Difficulties in diagnosis
The description and illustration of the pathology associated with these diseases is 
made more problematic by the discovery of people, through post mortem, who have 
neuropathological damage in the brain but who showed no apparent cognitive 
dysfunction prior to their death. This was demonstrated by the case of Sister Mary in 
the ‘Nuns study’ (a longitudinal study carried out in America focusing on a 
community of Nuns (Snowdon 1997)). The researcher stated in a previous paper:
She (Sister Mary) maintained high cognitive test scores up to the date of her death at 
the age of 101 years. These scores were achieved despite the discovery at post­
mortem of large neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques, the disease lesions 
associates with Alzheimer‘s disease. (Greenwood et al 2001:584)
Kitwood (1997:25) argues that as a consequence of the broad variations such as the 
case of Sister Mary, there is no possibility of Alzheimer or vascular dementia meeting 
the main criterion for a disease: ‘that distinct pathological features should be present 
in all cases where the symptoms appear, and in none of the cases where they do not'. 
There are problems also with the criteria for a syndrome:' there should be consistent 
association between symptom and biological markers of some kind’.
There is currently no standard by which dementia can be measured against, there is 
evidence of nerve tissue damage and cerebral atrophy as recorded by computer 
topography (CT Scan) scanning but no direct link to the degree of cognitive 
impairment that is evident in behaviour. Kitwood quotes two main hypotheses for 
this, firstly and the most established, is that there is a threshold effect, where there 
comes a point where the amount of neuron damage is to high to sustain normal 
function (Blessed et al 1968). Secondly that dementia should be measured against the 
rate of loss of neurones, a study by Jobst (1994) presented 'evidence from their 
scanning work that the rate of atrophy in the medial temporal lobe is about 10 times 
faster in people who have Alzheimer's disease than it was in controls'. Kitwood 
(1997:26) states that reasons for this change are not known:
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The suggestion is that the brain undergoes a kind of catastrophic change... Many 
people have suggested that psychological factors such as stress, or depressive 
reactions to loss, may be involved.
Kitwood suggests that evidence for this hypothesis is emerging and refers to a study 
by O'Dwyer and Orreil (1994).
The difficulty in accurately correlating physical pathology to actual presenting 
symptoms has made the diagnosis of the disease far from consistent. Kitwood 
(1997:26) states:
It is notorious that GP's, clinical psychologists, psychiatrists and neurologists tend to 
differ in their opinions. Much depends, of course, on the kind of evidence that is 
considered, and in particular how much weight is given to problems of memory.
There are psychological tests used which attempt to score a persons cognitive 
deterioration as has been outlined previously. There is an inherent problem with the 
accuracy of these scores as they depend on the identification of the previous levels of 
cognitive ability that is no longer there and is often ascertained from another person 
such as a relative.
2.1.7 Theories and Treatments
Derrington (1998) describes three waves of treatments emerging from research into 
Alzheimer’s disease. The first wave is described as ‘cognitive enhancers’ and is 
linked neurotransmission in the brain. Tortora & Anagnostalcos (1990) describe how 
AD patients have been observed with very low levels of an enzyme called choline 
acetyltransferase, which is required for the synthesis of the neurotransmitter 
acetylcholine (ACh) in the axon terminals. The nervous system depends on the normal 
activity of neurotransmission between neurones throughout the body. A 
neurotransmitter is released between neurons to allow the progress of a nerve impulse. 
ACh is one such neurotransmitter that is synthesised to facilitate the passage of the 
nerve impulse within the cortex and rapidly inactivated by acetylcholinesterase 
(AChE). The levels of ACh are quite low in the cerebral cortex and hippocampus
29
because of the decreased numbers of axon terminals, so a balance is achieved by a 
reduced transmission of the nerve impulses required for memory. Cholinesterase 
inhibitors (ChEI) are put forward as the ‘drug of choice’ by Giacobini & Michel
(1998) in the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease, with observed improvements in 
‘cognitive and noil-cognitive’ function during the first year of a three-year period 
following initial clinical observation, and in subsequent studies (Van Reekum 1999, 
Feldman et al 2001, Lopez et al 2002,). If the inhibitor is reduced in effect then there 
is improved opportunity for neurotransmission by the reduced amount of ACh. So 
reducing the effect/presence of the neurotransmitting inhibitor AChE enhances the 
performance of the existing neurones (Bertoli & Stahelinl999).
Cummings (2001) suggests that there is a growing consensus that AD results from an 
increase in the beta-amyloid (A beta), described previously in the formation of 
neuritic plaques.' It is thought that the A beta accumulation causes oxidation and 
inflammation. Thus it is suggested that a balance of antioxidants, cholinesterase 
inhibitors and psychotropic agents (drugs prescribed for depression) can slow the 
progression of the disease, improve cognition and reduce behavioural problems.
The second wave described by Derrington (1998) includes those treatments that have 
emerged as a result of being used for part of the treatment of another condition. 
Oestrogen (Miller (1997), Van Reekum 1999) is believed to have a neuroprotective 
effect on brain cells with studies demonstrating that hormone replacement therapy 
(HRT) in menopausal women is linked with a reduced risk of AD or with delayed 
symptom onset. There is also evidence of a reduction in the progression of the disease 
and improved mental function in patients diagnosed with AD who are treated with 
HRT.
Miller (1997) also describes the ‘Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging’ where 
people were talcing ibuprofen and some other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
for two year or more and were identified as having a 60% reduced risk of developing 
AD. It is thought that this may be due to the reduction in the inflammatory response 
cause by A beta described above (Pasinetti 2001), in order to be an effective 
preventative treatment it is thought that the should be taken several years before the
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disease onset (Zandi & Breitner 2001). Vitamin E and/or Selegiline are considered as 
a possible treatment to reduce the oxidation caused by A beta (Time 2002).
The third wave is derived from the link made between hypertension in middle age and 
the susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease (Veld et al 2001). Treatment designed to 
alleviate this hypertension in order to decrease the risk of a stroke, the underlying 
dynamic in vascular dementia, would appeal' to protect against the onset of 
Alzheimer’s disease.
Alternative hypotheses for the cause of AD suggest that loss of neurons is due to an 
inherited genetic disorder, an excessive accumulation of proteins in the brain, a virus, 
toxins (Regland 2001) such as aluminium and decreased blood supply causing a 
reduction in oxygen and glucose delivery to the brain tissue (Hager et al 2001) and 
inducing cell deterioration and cell death.
2.1.8 A case for Non-pharmacological therapy
This chapter so far has been concerned with presenting the main thrusts of current 
biomedical research into dementia. Kitwood (1997) describes how scientific research 
evolves within a paradigm, quoting the ideas of Kuhn (1966) that are explored in 
more detail in the methodology chapter. The hypotheses within this paradigm are 
developed from an acceptance of the principle of cause-^effect; Kitwood illustrates 
this more specifically in relation to dementia:
Figure IV
fac to r or factors x  ► neuropathic change-------- ► dementia
The paradigm developing the focus on the treatment of research is flawed according 
to Kitwood, who presents the inability for it to explain, without exception, any of the 
stages in the cause and effect chain. There are ‘three problematic features’ in this 
biomedical research paradigm, according to Kitwood. Firstly, a preoccupation with 
an ‘organic’ basis for the onset of dementia, it is concerned with the psychical 
structure of the brain and how this is effected by pathology. There is an apparent
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exclusion of the consideration of how ‘brain function is translated into brain structure; 
it ignores those aspects of nerve architecture that are developmental.. .related to a 
person’s experience and defences’.
The second problematic feature for Kitwood concerns the preoccupation with the 
lineal* nature ‘cause and effect’ in the biomedical approach. Kitwood states (1997:35):
The standard paradigm often works with a simple linear idea, along the lines of a 
billiard cue setting one ball in motion, and this colliding into another, causing it to 
move as well, and so on.
A linear* process starts and finishes at a specific point, the end point within this course 
for the standard paradigm is a post mortem confirmation of the diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease. The stalling point and therefore ‘ultimate cause is assumed to 
be genetic’. Kitwood argues that this line of reasoning is too simplistic because the 
gene theory does not sufficiently explain ‘biological systems’, he states (1997:35):
At the very least we need a view of causation that looks for the set of interacting 
conditions -  all necessary but none sufficient in themselves -  that are required for an 
event to occur.
The third problematic feature for Kitwood (1997) relates to its failure in addressing 
what he sees as the detrimental effects that specific experiences can have on the 
progression of this illness. The main example he uses to illustrate this is the negative 
effects that some clinical and care settings can have on a person with Dementia. The 
biomedical model, according to Kitwood does not explain the acceleration that can be 
associated with this type of experience. Bonn (2000) suggests that estimates indicate 
that 40 to 60 per cent of cases of late onset dementia are contributed to be the 
environment in which the person lives, these environmental factors may well have 
acted on a person in their childhood as this study also identified a link between 
intelligence and late onset dementia.
Kitwood (1997) argues for an approach that considers the diversity in potential factors 
that influence dementia. A reflection on the success of the biomedical approach in
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treating the major causes of death in the last 150 years strengthens this argument. Hart 
(1985:4) states that the rapid decline in the death rate observed from the middle of the 
19th Century through to the early part of the 20th Century was attributed mainly to 
improvements in living conditions rather than any medical innovation. The major 
reduction in death rates for tuberculosis (TB) took place prior to the introduction of 
drugs for its treatment in 1947 (Hart 1985:5). This does not deny the success brought 
about by the introduction of an effective medical treatment for TB, but puts it into a 
broader perspective in the same way as Kitwood is arguing for in the approach to 
dementia.
There is a growing body of research that potentially confirms the significance that 
Kitwood places on environmental and social factors that effect the progression of 
dementia. This research is not designed to produce evidence that excludes the 
potential benefits from medical interventions but is intended to open up a broader 
approach to exploring dementia.
Recent studies (Ott et al. 1995, Snowdon et al 1996, Caramelli et al 1997, Snowdon 
1997) have identified education and intellectual activity as potentially important 
determinants of the onset of Alzheimer's disease, thus confirming Kitwood’s assertion 
that a broader approach is advantageous. Snowdon et al (1996) using data from the 
'Nun Study' examined writing produced by the participants in the study when they 
were younger and compared this with the results of cognitive function tests some 
fifty-eight years later. The study concluded an association between linguistic ability 
and the susceptibility to Alzheimer's disease, where those participants who 
demonstrated a higher assessment in the first part in the wilting assessment where less 
likely to exhibit the types of symptoms associated with Alzheimer's disease. Findings 
from the Rotterdam study examined twenty-four patients who were subject to 
comprehensive neuropsychological evaluations finding that a higher level of 
education may lead to a greater potential to compensate for neuronal damage 
associated with Alzheimer's disease.
If these studies are correct in asserting a link between education and the susceptibility 
to the onset of dementia then they offer a potential explanation to the case of Sister 
Mary from the Nun study. Where the signs of dementia discovered at post mortem
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should have confirmed a diagnosis of dementia, however, this was apparently not 
evident in her behaviour before death. It would suggest that the onset of dementia 
could be prevented by a factor evident in the experience of Sister Mary. Observers, as 
reported in these studies (Snowdon et al 1996, Snowdon 1997), who knew Sister 
Mary suggest that the experiential factor that inhibited the onset of the symptoms of 
dementia was likely to be associated with some form of intellectual stimulation. 
Although this is a hypothetical association it does suggest a potential for therapies 
aimed at providing a ‘Sister Mary factor’, that attempt to provide an inhibition to the 
symptoms of dementia. There is insufficient evidence to suggest that these factors 
may promote the subject’s own internal cerebral response in defence of the onset of 
Dementia, but this could be seen as a possibility.
A study (Mellies et al 1998) utilising neuroimaging and neuropsychological tests 
concluded that there was a direct association between cognitive impairment in 
subjects with dementia and ‘hypoperfusion’ or poor blood supply to the frontal, 
temporal and basal ganglia. A further study carried out by Martin et al (2001) 
compared interpersonal psychotherapy and venlafaxine hydrochloride for the 
treatment of depressed patients. This study measured the changes in cerebral blood 
flow following either treatment. The blood flow to part of the limbic system was seen 
to increase following psychotherapy and both treatments brought about improved 
blood supply to the right basal ganglia. These studies suggest that the type of 
behaviour improvements that have been observed following varying types of 
cognitive stimulation are likely to be compensating for the blood supply inefficiencies 
that are inherent in a patient with dementia.
The social and environmental factors that Kitwood identifies as significant influences 
on a person’s susceptibility to dementia and also the potential for these factors to 
effect the onset of the symptoms associated with the illness has encouraged a range of 
therapies attempting to harness the ‘Sister Mary’ factor. Focusing on the external 
experience of the dementia sufferer as opposed to the internal neuropathology has 
resulted in an attempt to optimise the environmental factors that could influence their 
symptoms. The following section identifies some of the therapies that focus on 
influencing the experience and behaviour of a person diagnosed with dementia with 
the intention of alleviating the symptoms of dementia.
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2.1.9 Non-pharmacological treatments for Dementia
The Non-pharmacological treatments appear to be directed either to changing the 
behaviour of the person with dementia, or to changing their environment, which might 
then lead to a change in behaviour or an improvement in symptoms. The rationale for 
the place of Non-pharmacological therapies in the treatment of dementia has mainly 
been based on evidence gathered after the particular therapy, where observations 
might have noted a change in the behaviour of the participants. Woods et al (1992) 
and Graesel (2003) identify the need for research in these areas to measure the 
potential changes in behaviour immediately after such treatments before attempting 
any longer term evaluation. This data would appear to be essential if the success of a 
particular intervention is to be demonstrated as contributing to the type of disparity in 
behavioural symptoms and neuropathology observed in the case of Sister Mary. The 
research into cerebral blood supply (Martin et al 2001) suggests the possibility of a 
more physiological basis for the range of treatments. Some examples are outlined 
here, but there are many other therapies focused on treating dementia that have not 
been included. There are a variety of therapies that utilise cognitive and behavioural 
techniques in treating the symptoms of dementia. Graesel et al (2003:115) states that 
‘the principle aim of non-drug therapies is to influence symptomatic dementia 
beneficially and to improve the abilities remaining to the patient’. Some of the main 
cognitive and behavioural therapies are outlined in this section.
An observational method has been developed around the measurement of the ‘quality 
of Life’ from the service user’s perspective called dementia Care Mapping (Ballard et 
al 2001, Innes & Suit 2001, Bowman & Stokes 2002). This method focuses the 
observation on a set of measuring devices that make an attempt to measure the 
‘quality’ of care environment. Consequently, it is claimed that a care environment can 
be judged on its potential for providing the type of stimulation required to alleviate 
the symptoms associated with dementia.
Spaull et al (1998) evaluated the effects of individual sensory stimulation sessions on 
4 elderly male patients with dementia observing that there were changes in levels of 
interaction and concluding that it was a valuable therapeutic intervention with this 
client group. Recent evidence from a study of the effects of Multi-Sensory
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Stimulation (MSS) (selection audio-visual equipment) demonstrated that participants 
in MSS showed significant improvements in mood and behaviour following their 
treatment (Baker et al 2001). This treatment and the subsequent results also appear 
to imply a significant relationship between cognitive stimulation and an improvement 
in the symptoms of dementia.
Memory clinics and memory training is a technique used to treat people with 
dementia (Bayer & Reban 1996). Broman (2001) identifies Memory training, 
particularly a technique called ‘Spaced Retrieval which is conceived around the 
theory that repeated retrieval strengthens memory, as an alternative tool and 
supplement to pharmacological therapy, alternative approaches to memory 
rehabilitation are also seen as effective (De-Vreese et al 2001). Wilson (1991:249) 
states:
Behavioral therapy techniques are now well established in rehabilitation regimes.
The richness and complexity of multifaceted behavioral approaches make them 
ideally suited to the range and complexity of deficits shown by neurologically 
impaired people.
According to Woods (1992) Reality Orientation (RO) has been an active approach for 
over 30 years. There are two main types of RO, firstly a 24-hour continual process, 
where each interaction with a person is seen as an opportunity to present current 
information; the second is a group session approach. Spector et al (2001) describes an 
‘evidenced-based’ cognition therapy that has been developed out of the evidence 
produced for Reality Orientation. The pilot studies carried out have demonstrated 
positive results on the level of cognition amongst participants. Metitieri et al (2001) 
evaluated the impact of Reality Orientation therapy on 74 participants between 1994- 
98, which showed that cognitive decline and institutionalisation was less than a 
comparative control group.
There are a range of therapies that are not solely focused on treating dementia but 
have been reported as having a beneficial effect when working with this client group. 
Music and Art are referred to here but the potential for a therapy to engage a person 
diagnosed with dementia and promote intellectual stimulation provides the basis for a
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wide range of treatments. Music therapy is used in the treatment of people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia (Hanser 1999, Schieby 1999, Yaya- 
Kelleher 2001). Bright (1992:163) suggests that there has been an increasing 
recognition of the therapeutic importance of music in the care and treatment of people 
with medical problems and he defines music therapy as:
The planned use of music to improve the functioning in their environment of 
individuals or groups ofpersons who are suffering form intellectual, psychical or 
social disadvantage.
Hilliard (2001) illustrated the benefits of music therapy and dementia in a case study 
of 87-year-old man, Lou (2001) in reviewing the literature on music therapy 
concludes that it assists in the treatment of agitated behaviour in dementia but that the 
research designs being used to explore this area needed considerable improvement.
Waller (2002:1) reports that ail therapy has been used for some time with patients 
who have been excluded from verbally focused therapies, such as psychotherapy. In 
the last two decades there has been interest directed at the treatment of ‘elderly 
dementing patients’ with art therapy. Waller (2002:1) states:
...many of the positive effects of these therapies with people suffering from 
progressive or degenerative illnesses remain undocumented, known only to recipients, 
carers and the immediate health care team.
Since this study is concerned with psychotherapy the following section explores the 
basis for psychotherapy as a treatment for dementia in more detail.
2.2 Psychotherapy and dementia
One of the early ideas for this study was to examine the potential for using 
psychotherapy as a treatment for a person with dementia. Research, such as the case 
of Sister Mary in the Nuns study and others mentioned previously (Baker et al 2001, 
Bonn 2000, Ott et al. 1995, Snowdon et al 1996, Caramelli et al 1997, Snowdon 
1997) indicate the possible link between intellectual/cognitive stimulation and
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education with either an improvement or an absence from symptoms associated with 
dementia. The cognitive/behavioural approaches to therapy suggest a very strong 
relationship with education and learning where these approaches are intent on 
improving memory, developing coping strategies and reality orientation.
Loewenthal (1999) makes the case for considering psychotherapy as a form of 
‘therapeutic education’. Rose (2002) reviews the literature on learning and describes a 
view (Holford and Jarvis 2000, Jarvis et al 1998, Cell 1984, Rogers 1961) that 
education involves the person as a whole in their experience of life, making learning a 
life-long endeavour. Loewenthal (1999:278) states:
Building on the work of Gadamer (1976), individual therapy could be seen as a 
means of assisting with an interrupted process of education, enabling a return to 
learning from experience.
So the therapeutic relationship provides a chance for a person to identify where the 
ability to learn has been inhibited by the reality of their experience. By revealing 
these inhibitions Loewenthal (1999) is suggesting that a person will be better able to 
learn from subsequent experience.
The association between education and psychotherapy is further emphasised by 
considering the work of Stone (1970) who describes three broad categories for 
theories of learning: conditioning theories; imitation theories; cognitive theories that 
can be considered in relation to psychotherapy. These categories, according to Stone 
(1970:103) encompass the types of learning forces that are available to teachers 
attempting to bring about learning. Conditioning involves ‘arranging the stimuli so as 
to bring forth the desired responses and then providing a reinforcement as quickly as 
possible’. Modelling suggests that the teacher provide the learner with an example to 
imitate. Cognitive learning is concerned with the student understanding general 
principles so that they can apply these to ‘strange phenomena’, ‘ we can force him to 
understand it be showing him how it is merely an instance of a general principle’. In 
different ways the psychotherapeutic relationship can instigate ‘the kinds of force’ 
towards learning conceived by Stone (1970:103).
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Some forms of psychotherapy might be more inclined to utilise conditioning as a 
learning force than others, but reinforcing and rewarding a change in behaviour 
perceived as positive could be seen as a fairly common experience in therapy. The 
therapist as a potential model, in one way or another, for the patient/client to learn a 
different way of being in the world could also be a broadly acceptable aspiration of 
psychotherapy. What Stone (1970) calls cognitive learning might also be associated 
with psychotherapy. The learning that can be achieved by the patient/client exploring 
their relationship with the therapist might be conceived as transferable to other 
relationships in their life either past, present or future. The learning ‘force’ (Stone 
1970) might be seen to have a good basis in psychotherapy and a direct link to 
education.
This link between psychotherapy, education and learning made by Loewenthal (1999) 
raises the question of whether this therapy might facilitate a person to be more able to 
benefit from educational opportunities, by identifying where their personal experience 
has created barriers to learning. The therapy might be seen as the opportunity to 
overcome these barriers, therefore allowing the person to benefit more freely from 
everyday experience and to enhance the ability to learn. If therapy is seen as a form of 
therapeutic education not only does the psychotherapy provide a basis for intellectual 
stimulation by engaging the patient in a relationship with a therapist but also in 
addition an individual’s potential to learn from their experience is enhanced. The 
potential implication for this is to suggest that psychotherapy, based on the concept of 
therapeutic education, might provide a person with the opportunity to benefit more 
from the types of therapies outlined in this section.
The association between psychotherapy and education appears to provide the 
opportunity to identify a place for therapy as a treatment for the symptoms associated 
with dementia. Some of the cognitive/behavioural approaches focus on promoting 
direct learning opportunities where for example a person is assisted in developing or 
redeveloping memory function. The concept of therapeutic education (Loewenthal
1999) raises the possibility of other approaches to psychotherapy contributing to the 
treatment of dementia by enhancing a person’s ability to learn. The following section 
reviews the literature referring to psychotherapy and dementia.
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2.2.1 Literature Review
Haupt (1996) suggests that psychotherapeutic interventions can compliment the 
treatment achieved by psychopharmacology, cognitive enhancers and cognitive 
training. A lot of the behavioural psychotherapeutic interventions have been directed 
at the managing and alleviating the symptoms of the illness. Teri et al (1998) 
describes a study examining short term (11 sessions over 16 weeks) behavioural 
psychotherapy aimed at treating agitation in patients with dementia, the study 
concluded that a structured behavioural approach was successful in modifying 
agitated behaviour. Kipling et al (1999) reports the use of group therapy using a 
cognitive-behavioural model with mild to moderate dementia patients trying to 
change memory beliefs and behaviour; the findings suggested that participants had a 
greater understanding of how mood can affect memory functioning. Mansdorf et al
(1999) describes a study that considered whether behaviourally orientated therapy 
could be used as an alternative to psychotropic medication prescribed for specific 
behavioural problems that had been associated with a diagnosis of dementia. The 
researchers in this study concluded that psychotropic medication could be reduced 
when behaviourally orientated therapy is introduced and that participant’s 
demonstrated what was described as improved overall functioning. Haupt et al (2000) 
reported on a study carried out to treat behavioural and psychological symptoms in 
dementia using cognitive behavioural techniques, psychoeducative training and non­
specific psychotherapeutic strategies; the findings apparently indicated that the 
interventions were helpful in reducing agitation and anxiety.
Shoham & Neuschatz (1985:71) describe an ‘ego-supportive group’ approach based 
on six principles:
1. Creation of an emotional climate of acceptance and warmth that helps patients 
learn to accept themselves and each other‘s feelings
2. Frequent interventions by the social worker to help facilitate social interaction for 
patients whose communication is impaired
3. Opportunity for patients to ventilate feelings and rediscover mutual kinds of 
experiences
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4. Opportunity fo r  patients to experience the feelings o f  belonging, o f  being p a rt o f  a 
group
5. Opportunity fo r  patients to reminisce about past accomplishments and give new 
meaning to their current lives.
6. Creation o f  a p latform  fo r  the patients to re-achieve a sense o f  se lf by expressing 
personal opinions in an environment o f  respect and acceptance, which is the most 
important consideration.
The authors (Shoham & Neuschatz 1985:71) report that this group approach produced 
‘successful social interaction, meaningful relationships, and increased self esteem’.
Kasi-Godley & Gatz (2000:755) reviewed different orientations of therapy used with 
people suffering from dementia. The authors fomid that psychodynamic approaches 
appeared helpful for understanding ‘intrapsychic problems’ experienced by 
individuals suffering from dementia. Support groups and cognitive/behavioural 
therapy provided assistance in the early stages of dementia to encourage coping- 
strategies and reduce distress. Reminiscence and life review helped mild to moderate 
dementia patients’ with interpersonal comiections; behavioural approaches and 
memory training helped by optimising remaining abilities. Kasi-Godley & Gatz 
(2000) identify an important distinction between the cognitive/behavioural and 
psychodynamic approaches with the former being focused more on treating the 
symptoms of dementia and the later concerned with the problems specific to the 
‘individual'. The approach to psychotherapy used in this study, outlined in the next 
section, which draws on existential, psychoanalytic and post modern influences might 
be seen to be more concerned with the ‘intrapsychic problems’ of the individual 
patient as opposed to focusing on treating a set of specific behavioural symptoms 
associated with the diagnosis of dementia.
Much of the literature outlining psychotherapy described by Kasi-Godley & Gatz
(2000) as focusing on ‘individual intrapsychic problems’ appears to identify a need to 
exclude the more severe cases of dementia. Cheston (1998:213) reviews the literature 
and suggests that working with a person suffering from dementia can be inhibited by 
the progressive deterioration of cognitive capacity associated with the illness, which 
‘has been represented as a loss of ego functioning or strengths (Krebs-Roubicek,
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1989; Unterbach, 1994)’. This deterioration in ‘ego functioning’ has raised the 
question of whether there is a point at which psychotherapy is no longer possible? 
Zarit & Knight (1996:7) see a place for psychotherapy just in the early stages of the 
dementia:
As diagnosis improves and people w ith progressive cognitive impairment are 
identified at the earlier stages o f  the disease process, a group o fpo ten tia l clients is 
created who s till have sufficient cognitive functioning to participate in psychotherapy 
hut who are at significant risk o f  depression and other psychological problems as they 
accept their diagnosis and learn to cope w ith the more lim ited cognitive functioning. 
These early-stage older adults w ith dementia may benefit from  psychotherapy.
So Zarit & Knight (1996) emphasis the need for ‘sufficient cognitive functioning’ as a 
prerequisite of psychotherapy and identify a stage at which therapy is possible but 
make it clear that this does not embrace the duration of the illness. Spayd & Smyer 
(1996:247-48) state that ‘Insight-oriented psychotherapy’ require ‘good memory 
skills’ in order to integrate and organise the range of information that is discovered in 
the course of the therapy, ‘as well as good abstraction skills’ that may allow a 
working-through and comprehend the ‘complex data’. Patients with mild to moderate 
dementia, who do not have good memory and abstraction skills might benefit, 
according to these authors, from a ‘problem-solving focus or here-and-now-focused 
interventions’. Spayd & Smyer believe that this mild-moderate group may also benefit 
from behavioural intervention, ‘whereas residents with severe impairment are likely 
not appropriate candidates for individual psychotherapy’.
Hausman (1992:187) identifies ‘communication and defences’ as the two major 
obstacles in providing dynamic psychotherapy with a person with Alzheimer’s 
disease. She states:
The application o f  psychotherapeutic techniques needs communication channels, and 
the normal channels are impaired in A lzheim er’s patients. A fter all, the target o f  
psychological techniques is the brain, and the brain o f  A lzheim er’s patients is 
permanently impaired.
42
Hausman goes on to confirm, what has been previously stated above, that the ‘injury’ 
effects the cerebral cortex to which she attributes the ‘autonomous ego functions of 
thought, memory, speech and perception’, making the patient more likely to engage in 
‘primitive defences’ that will inhibit the therapy. Hausman (1992:188) states:
The Alzheimer p a tien t’s ab ility  to benefit from  psychotherapy w ill depend mainly on 
the relationship with the therapist. The earlier in the progression o f  the disease this 
relationship is formed, the better the chance o f  using it to help bring about movement 
toward other goals.
So the inclusion and exclusion criteria identified by Zarit & Knight (1996), Spayd & 
Smyer (1996) and Hausman (1992) creates the dilemma of either ending the 
psychotherapy at a particular stage when ‘cognitive functioning’ has deteriorated 
rendering the therapy not possible or not commencing the therapy with a person 
because their symptoms are to severe.
The recognition of the practical problems relating to ending therapy with a person at a 
stage when ‘cognitive functioning’ has deteriorated to a point when their participation 
in the therapy has become severely inhibited has encouraged some therapist’s to 
adjust the therapy to the severity of the symptoms. Sinason (1992) identifies the need 
to adjust the approach of the therapy in order to compensate for the patients failing 
mental functioning. Robie (1999) interviewed 9 doctoral-level psychologists about 
their work with elderly people with dementia and reported that clinicians had to make 
significant adjustments in their therapeutic approach in order to accommodate this 
client group. Among these changes were slowing the pace of therapy, reducing the 
demands on clients, simplifying communication and expanding the range of 
techniques used to achieve the goals of therapy.
In the following section the issue of how the patients’ abilities influence the 
psychotherapy is explored in relation to the theory that informs the orientation used by 
the therapist in this study. The existential ideas of Laing (1990) are seen to be very 
inclusive of a person with dementia regardless of the severity of the symptoms and 
this is compared with the more exclusive analytic approach of Freud (1923) where the
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demands made of a patient in the practice of ‘free association’ could be seen to inhibit 
a person from participating as the symptoms of dementia worsened.
Jones (1995) puts forward an approach to psychotherapy that actually identifies a 
greater need for the therapy as the symptoms of dementia progress. He (Jones 1995: 
602) describes an approach to psychotherapy with older persons with dementia based 
on the ideas of Sullivan (1953), reporting that a ‘ standard application of 
psychotherapy modalities is ineffective because it fails to take into account the unique 
needs and dysfunction’s of the individual with dementia’. Jones (1995:602) states the 
following in describing this approach to psychotherapy:
Its basic assumption is that Sullivan's One-genus postulate, his be lie f that 
commonalties o f  the human experience and condition fa r  outweigh individual 
differences, is as va lid  fo r  the person w ith dementia as fo r  those not so afflicted... the 
dementing process is superimposed on the pre-existing personality.
Jones (1995:605) maintains that a person with dementia increasingly loses the ability 
to cope with anxiety, ‘the therapeutic task is to find a balance between stimulation- 
environment press and whatever internal resources remain for the patient’. The 
therapist, according to Jones (1995:605), is therefore allied with the patient in order to 
cope with the unresolved anxiety, ‘ As the patient’s language skills diminish, the 
therapeutic contacts will be briefer and come to focus more on therapist input rather 
than on the patient’s association’. So in effect the therapeutic approach advocated by 
Jones (1995) changes as the patient’s symptoms worsen, so that the length of the 
therapy reduces and the role of the therapist increases. This approach closely 
associates practice to the symptomology of dementia.
Despite the fact that Jones (1995) outlines an approach that establishes a basis for 
psychotherapy with dementia the researcher decided that he could not accept this 
approach because of the underlying assumptions that were attributed to Sullivan 
(1953), and quoted above. This researcher would maintain that all human experience 
is different, which is the opposite position to that stated above, and that it is this that is 
‘ as valid for the person with dementia as for those not so afflicted’ (Jones 1995:602). 
By assuming, as Jones does (1995), that there is a ‘commonality’ in experience
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enables the therapist to create a rationale for superimposing the will of the therapist to 
talce the place of the patient as the symptoms of dementia progress. This would 
explain the reduction in the therapy time described by Jones (1995), since there would 
be less time required for listening to the patient as the therapy would become 
increasingly focused 011 the will of the therapist. The relationship between ontology 
and experience is examined in detail in the next chapter. The claim made by Jones 
(1995) that the ‘dementing5 process is superimposed on the personality of the patient 
is also problematic for this researcher, as it would assume that there was a unique and 
identifiable progression to dementia. Kitwood (1997) argues against the possibility of 
producing a neat linear description of dementia that could be superimposed on a 
personality as was stated earlier in this chapter.
So if the approach described by Jones (1995) is not accepted the question raised 
concerning the relationship between psychotherapy and the severity of the symptoms 
of dementia remains. If the relationship is better developed in the early stages of the 
dementia it implies that a therapeutic relationship is difficult to form at the later stages 
of dementia. The researcher’s own experience of working with a patient with severe 
dementia (Greenwood & Loewenthal 1998) noted a difficulty for the therapist in 
establishing a relationship but no such apparent difficulty for the client.
The implication for this researcher of specifying the need to assess the symptoms 
experienced by a person with dementia before considering psychotherapy is to raise 
the question of the possibility of therapy prior to examining its potential as a 
treatment. So much of the literature referred to in this section (Zarit & Knight (1996), 
Spayd & Smyer (1996), Hausman (1992)) qualifies claims about the potential benefits 
of psychotherapy by specifying who can meet the requirements to enter into a 
therapeutic relationship. Sinason (1992) and Jones (1995) adapt the approach of 
psychotherapy to the symptoms exhibited by the person diagnosed with dementia. In 
all the literature referred to in this section the context of therapy is dictated by a 
reflection on the symptoms of dementia. So there would seem, to this researcher, to be 
a question prior to measuring the potential of psychotherapy to treat a person with 
dementia, which relates to the symptoms of dementia and how they might affect the 
therapy. This question might include the issue of whether a person with dementia can 
meet the demands of the therapy or if the therapeutic approach should be specific to 
the stage of the illness. It is these issues that embrace the term possibility as it is used
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in the research question. This study is concerned with examining possibility in 
relation to a specific example of psychotherapy with a person diagnosed with 
dementia. It is hoped that research into the potential for psychotherapy as a treatment 
for dementia will benefit from a detailed illustration of how the question of possibility 
affects a therapeutic relationship with a person diagnosed with dementia.
It is difficult to reflect on whether a person is capable or incapable of participating in 
a therapy without a detailed consideration of that therapy. The term dementia has been 
explored and the following sections outline the term psychotherapy as used in this 
study.
2.3 Exploration of ‘Psychotherapy’ as used in this study
In order to address the question of whether psychotherapy is possible with a person 
diagnosed as having dementia it would seem appropriate to provide a detailed 
explanation of what is meant by the term ‘psychotherapy’ as used by the 
researcher/trainee therapist in this study. The term psychotherapy embraces a wide 
range of different theoretical approaches and consequently it is difficult to provide a 
definition. A further complication in describing the term psychotherapy was 
highlighted by Freud (1911:356), and described in chapter one, where he states that 
the psychotherapist’s practice has a unique quality particular to his/her constitution or 
experience. There is an acknowledgement in this point made by Freud that 
psychotherapy is difficult to define. A theory might be put forward to describe what 
psychotherapy is, however there is no guarantee that this represents a therapists 
practical interpretation of this theoiy. The point made by Freud emphasises the 
importance of giving a specific description to the term ‘psychotherapy’ as it is used in 
this study, as opposed to giving a general definition of psychotherapy, in order to 
establish a basis for making a judgement on whether therapy is then ‘possible’ with a 
person suffering from dementia. Freud wrote extensively on the theory that informed 
his approach to psychoanalysis and he supported this with case studies that illustrated 
how his interpretation of the technique of psychoanalysis was carried out. An 
implication of Freud’s argument (1911:356) could be to suggest that psychotherapy is 
something psychotherapists ‘do’ as opposed to a particular definitive process. Seiser 
& Wasted (2002:1) make a similar observation:
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Psychotherapy is both a cra ft and an art. The psychotherapist develops the craft 
through the practice o f  the specific interventions and techniques, according to the 
tra in ing  o f  the different schools...The a rt comes from  the creative process inherent in 
each o f  us. However well we learn the craft, it  is the way the a rt is practised... that 
probab ly counts fo r  most.
There is a further consideration that has influenced how the term psychotherapy is 
explored in this study and this emerged to a certain extent when describing some of 
the existing literature on psychotherapy and dementia in section 2.2.11 (Hausman 
■1992, Sinason 1992, Zarit & Knight 1996, Spayd & Smyer 1996). The symptoms of 
dementia are assumed to influence the possibility of providing psychotherapy to a 
person diagnosed with dementia in this literature; as the symptoms progress the 
potential for therapy is described as diminishing. Consequently the theory that is 
explored in order to illustrate the orientation to psychotherapy used in this study is 
also examined in relation to working with a person diagnosis with dementia, in effect 
asking the question: does the theory provide a basis for the practice described in this 
study?
By providing a detailed examination of the theory that has informed the therapist’s 
practice and then presenting a case study illustrating his approach it is hoped that an 
understanding of what is meant by ‘psychotherapy’ will emerge in order to address 
the research question. The different approaches that are discussed are not intended as 
an exhaustive examination of the different methods and orientations that are used 
under the label of psychotherapy, since there are too many to make this a manageable 
proposition. The choice of theory that follows reflects the therapist’s training and 
highlights the main influences on the psychotherapeutic orientation presented in this 
study.
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A. Person diagnosed with dementia
to dementia
Figure V
The therapy that takes place between A, the person diagnosed with dementia and B, 
the therapist in this study, is illustrated in chapter 5, this section is concerned with 
exploring the orientation of the therapist in relation to the prospect of working with a 
person diagnosed with dementia. The format illustrated in Figure V is derived from an 
interpretation of Freud’s approach to describing and illustrating psychoanalysis. So 
the following section will deal with what Seiser & Wastell (2002:1) describe as the 
‘craft’ and the account of the case study in chapter 5 will illustrate the ‘art’ of the 
psychotherapy carried out for this study.
2.3.1 Existential phenomenology
This section considers an existential phenomenological approach to psychotherapy by 
looking at the work of Laing, Buber and other existential theorists.
Laing (1990) speaks of an approach to psychotherapy that allows for the possibility of 
meeting a patient without being overwhelmed by theory, since this ends up 
objectifying the individual. Laing (1990:21) differentiates between a relationship 
with an object of science and with a person, in that there is a difference in listening to 
what a person is saying and trying to understand as compared to ‘studying verbal 
behaviour in terms of neural processes’. The two accounts of ‘personal’ and 
‘organismic’, according to Laing, are separate but exist together, ‘Both are quite 
possible methodologically but one must be alert to the possible occasion for 
confusion’. If a person is seen as an organism they become definable, according to
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Laing, as a set of cit processes’, which misses the potential contact with the person 
and their experience of being in the world. Laing (1990:23) writes:
I t  seems extraordinary that whereas the physical and bio logical sciences o f  it- 
processes have generally won the day against tendencies to personalize the w o rld  o f  
things or to read human intentions into the animal world, an authentic science o f  
persons has hardly got started by reason o f  the inveterate tendency to depersonalize 
or re ify persons.
In a later chapter on methodology, some of the ideas that form the basis for the 
potential ‘authentic science of persons’ mentioned by Laing are explored as a basis for 
this study. Laing does not challenge the importance of the mechanistic approach but 
rather highlights the importance of recognising the difference so that psychotherapy is 
conceived as a reflection 011 experience and not the mechanistic.
This is a potentially significant observation in relation to the focus of this study, since 
the client group is identified by a medical diagnosis. A scientific explanation of the 
underlying pathology of dementia has been incorporated in this chapter. Laing 
appears to be opening up the question of whether it is possible to see the person in 
association with a medical diagnosis, or at least the real humanness of the person.
The person as seen through diagnosis is like the organism that is being studied for 
disease. Laing suggests that psychotherapy needs to look at the person and how they 
are in the world, which is more than just an organism with a disease.
Laing (1990:25) states:
When the other is a patient, existential phenomenology becomes the attempt to 
reconstruct the pa tie n t’s way o f  being h im self in his world, although, in the 
therapeutic relationship, the focus may be on the pa tien t’s way o f  being-with-me ...it is 
the task o f  existential phenomenology to articulate what the o ther’s ‘w o r ld ’ is and his 
way o f  being.
Laing (1990:26) felt that it was important that a person in therapy heard how they 
appeared to the other, who in this case is represented by the therapist, he states:
49
...it is o f  considerable p ractica l importance that one should be able to see that the 
concept and/or experience that a man may have o f  his being may be very different 
fro m  one’s own concept or experience o f  his being.
An individual, according to Laing, should be able to recognise themselves in the 
others picture of the world rather than always positioning them as an object in their 
own world. It is the therapist’s task to ‘effect this reorientation without prejudging 
who is right and who is wrong’.
Laing (1972:15) makes an important distinction between experience and behaviour:
We can see other peop le ’s behaviour, but not their experience... The other person ’s 
behaviour is an experience o f  mine. M y experience is an experience o f  the other... I  
see you, and you see me. I  experience you, and you experience me. I  see your 
behaviour. You see my behaviour. But I  do not and never have and never w ill see 
your experience o f  me. Just as you cannot ‘see ’ my experience o f  you. M y experience 
o f  you is not ‘inside ’ me. I t  is simply you as I  experience you.
According to the explanation put forward by Laing it is not possible to know what is 
the others experience of being in the world by observing their behaviour, this is 
beyond the observation of another. The experience of a person is unique to them and 
is formed in relation to their contact with the world in the past, the past in the present 
in them and the past in the present in them in the context of future possibilities. An 
observation of a person’s behaviour is just a moment in the making of this experience 
and so cannot hope to comprehend its complexity.
Sanborn (1968:70) states that Kierkegaard believed that it was impossible for the 
individual to speak of subjectivity; the subject ‘is an individual, but not just one entity 
among a multitude of others. He is a particular unique reality’. In speaking of 
subjectivity the individual enters the world of language, culture and comparison and 
subsequently becomes crowded out. The spoken words and the established culture 
become the oppression of ‘they’, which inhibits the potential for the subject, 
Kierkegaard describes the individual being lost in the ‘crowd’ and its amalgamation.
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The ‘crowd’ could be seen as a representation of the ‘it processes’ described by Laing, 
with the subjectivity encompassing the individuals’ unique experience being lost in a 
term that describes the many. Kierkegaard (1991:177) states:
A crowd in its very concept is the untruth, by reason of the fact that it renders the 
individual completely impenitent and irresponsible, or at least weakens his sense of 
responsibility by reducing it to a fraction... For “crowd” is an abstraction and has no 
hands: but each individual has ordinarily two hands ...The crowd, in fact, is composed 
of individuals; it must therefore be in every man’s power to become what he is, an 
individual.
In a previous paper the researcher (Greenwood et al. 2001) outlined some of the ideas 
of Martin Buber that are relevant here. Buber (1987) described two potential 
relationships that were part of a person being in the world, the ‘I-if and the ‘I thou’. 
The ‘I-If relationship speaks more of the person’s relationship with Kierkegaard’s 
‘crowd’ and the ‘it-processes’ of Laing. In the realm of every day life Buber observed 
the need for a relationship, termed ‘I-It’, that was concerned more with the business of 
getting on with the practicalities of living based on cultural assumptions about the 
world around the individual and the things in it. Diamond (1960) described Buber’s 'I- 
i£ relations as more concerned with ‘knowing’ than relating. Buber describes his 
conception of the more intimate ‘I-Thou’ relation by using the example of an 
inanimate object, a tree. He describes how the tree takes up a different position in 
relation to the T in an ‘I-thou’ relationship. It is not just a biological structure 
carrying out osmosis and transpiration, it moves closer to the T and becomes part of 
the T, there is a living intimacy ‘between’, talcing the place of the inanimate 
description. The researcher (Greenwood et al 2001:585) described the ‘I-thou’ 
relationship as:
Buber’s 'I-Thou ’ is concerned with aclmowledging another person and considers a 
relationship based on mutual acceptance. This relationship is not seen as a routine 
consequence of being with another, but is based on a unique quality, a potential, 
rather than as assumption.
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This I-Thou relationship appeal's to be similar in nature to what Laing is describing 
for the therapeutic relationship, an opportunity to meet in proximity, to sense the 
unique experience that is the other in this relationship. This is not about knowing 
about the other it is about being close and knowing that there is a lot to know about 
the other and being content and held together with this knowledge or lack of 
knowledge. Medard Boss (1991:429) states that ‘the analysand-analyst relationship, 
like any other, is grounded in the primary being-with of one man and another’. He 
(Boss 1991:432) later expands on this:
The analyst must realize that there can he no psychoanalysis without an existential 
bond between the analyst and the analysand. Analysis without countertransference is 
an illusion in a double sense. An emotional relationship with the analysand can never 
be avoided by the analyst; it can only be denied him...second, ''countertransference ” 
is not transference at all, but a genuine emotional interhuman relationship between 
the analyst and his patient, distorted as it may be.
The existential ideas identified have stressed the importance of the therapeutic relation 
in helping the analysand to achieve a more realistic contact with the world around 
them. The struggle to find an I-thou relationship with a therapist becomes the 
example for other relationships that are part of being in the world. Rollo May (1991: 
443) states:
...the patient, like all other beings, is always in process of relationship. Concretely, 
that is, he has the need and possibility of going out from centredness to participate in 
other beings. He is now struggling with the possibility of participating with the 
therapist.
Whether it is ‘being’ with the therapist or ‘being’ in the world, according to these 
existential ideas outlined, ‘being’ emerges as a phenomenological consequence of 
being in the relationship with another. ‘Being’ is potentially more than a scientific 
explanation given by an T about an ‘If or an object. It is -being in its potential for 
being- meeting another or T meeting another T. But it is not quite ‘F to T, for 
Buber has called it ‘I-thou’. As May stated above, being goes out from 
‘centeredness’, the T goes to the ‘thou’ and if the ‘I’ is the subject than the ‘thou’
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must be something other than a subject. Buber saw the possibility of the ‘thou’ being 
a tree; so the T becomes an object that may, if it is human, have the potential for 
subjectivity.
The T-thou’ basis for therapy appears very inclusive, open even to an inanimate 
object, so a ‘tree’ can be a ‘thou’. Sample criteria based 011 cognitive abilities, used to 
identify suitable participants in a study about dementia and psychotherapy need not be 
conceived as necessary if the example of the - I-tree - is used as a comparison. 
However, this - I-tree - example clearly demonstrates a difference between an I and a 
thou. If therapy is concerned with opening up the possibilities for ‘I -ness’ and a tree 
appears to have all the qualities associated with a potential ‘thou’, the question of 
what is needed to move from a thou to an I still remains. It is clear that a tree would 
not benefit from a therapeutic relationship, so this still leaves the question of whether 
an ‘it’, such as a person diagnosed with dementia, can ever aspire to becoming an T.
Laing (1990:20) appeal's to see the objective of therapy as no less then assisting the 
analysand to define their world since *.. .man does not exist without ‘his’ world nor 
can his world exist without him’. This conception appears to allow for the possibility 
of another aspiring to their own definition, but does not allow for the existence of 
another T in this definition, there is only room for a ‘thou’. An ‘I’ world, from 
Laing’s perspective, defines otherness in an intimate relationship in terms of‘thou’. 
The ‘thou’ exists because T said so and this thou-ness is clearly not I-ness. The 
definition of one’s own world would appeal* to be a considerable commitment and still 
leaves the question of whether someone who’s thinking is impaired is likely to be able 
to achieve such a task, so they are inevitably stuck at the ‘thou’. They are the 
therapist’s ‘thou’ but are unable to achieve or aspire to there own T. If they are stuck 
at the ‘thou’, being unable to aspire to I-ness there appears to be no difference 
between this and ‘it-ness’, for them at least since Buber identifies a tree as capable of 
thou-ness.
This section began with the ideas of Laing, the implications of which appeared to be 
suggesting that therapy should be about allowing a patient diagnosed with dementia to 
meet the therapist without a preoccupation with the diagnosis, that this was entangled 
with ‘it processes’. This has potentially signification implications for this study since
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it would provide the basis for therapy without any concern for the cognitive 
capabilities of the participant/s. The research question explores the potential for 
psychotherapy and Laing appears to be suggesting that scientific criteria should not be 
involved in the therapeutic relationship. Laing bases this description of 
psychotherapy on a consideration of the T, of the subjectivity in the world in contrast 
to objectivity, a term he feels is misused. It is the therapist that opens up possibilities 
for the analysand by entering into a special relationship that appears to be similar to 
Buber’s ‘I-thou’ relationship. Laing perceives psychotherapy as the opportunity for 
the analysand to become a true subject in the world through the experience of an 
intimate relation with the therapist, to experience a relationship that is not subject-less 
and impersonal like the ‘I-it’ relationship.
2.3.2 Psychoana lys is
This section considers psychoanalysis and the question of whether it could be offered 
to a person with dementia is explored and the implications for analytic technique are 
discussed. It begins with an outline of Freud’s structural theory of the psyche and goes 
onto describe some of Freud’s ideas on technique. The relationship between technique 
and the competency of the patient’s ego are shown to be the main determinate in 
considering psychoanalysis with a person with dementia, and this is illustrated by 
describing the work of Freud, Klein, Balint and Lacan.
Freud (Freud 1925:41) conceived psychoanalysis as both a therapy and also as a basis 
for human science, he states:
...the word 'psycho-analysis3 has itself become ambiguous. While it was originally 
the name of a particular therapeutic method, it has now also become the name of a 
science-the science of unconscious mental processes. By itself this science is seldom 
able to deal with the problem completely, but it seems destined to give valuable 
contributory help in the most varied regions of knowledge.
So the technique of psychoanalysis begins with a meeting between a therapist and 
patient. Freud conceived analysis out of a pursuit for the basis of fact in relation to
54
being, and a scientific approach formed the basis of this process. Freud (1927: 721) 
states:
We believe that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the 
reality of the world, by means of which we can increase our power and in accordance 
with which we can arrange our life.
Freud (1927: 721) outlines five points that confirm the importance of the scientific 
approach:
In the first place our organization - that is, our mental apparatus - has been 
developed precisely in the attempt to explore the external world, and must therefore 
have realized in its structure some degree of expediency; in the second place, it is 
itself a constituent part of the world which we set out to investigate, and it readily 
admits to such an investigation; thirdly, the task of science is fully covered if we limit 
it to showing how the world must appear to us in consequence of the particular 
character of our organisation; fourthly, the ultimate finding of science, precisely 
because of the way in which they are acquired, are determined not only by our 
organization but by the things which have affected that organization; finally, the 
problem of the nature of the world without regard to our percipient mental apparatus 
is an empty abstraction, devoid of practical interest.
So Freud is identifying our place in the world and as such the way the world appeal's 
to us is indicative of our own internal structure. He is also recognising the impact that 
experience can have on this internal ‘organization’, so the world is subject to 
scientific inquiry and so are the people in it.
Freud felt that psychoanalysis provided the basis for exploring the internal 
‘organization’ of a person. The technique of analysis, as Freud conceived it, was 
intended to allow the recipient of the analysis, called the analysand, to freely express 
their thoughts and experiences in the hope that this would reflect the internal 
‘organization’ that had originally initiated it. Thus, as Freud reflects above, the 
internal becomes definable by focusing on the external for this becomes reflective of 
our mental apparatus.
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The focus of analysis in this meeting between the analyst and the analysand is for the 
later to speak and the former to listen. Gay (1995:356), in the introduction to an 
extract from a set of papers Freud wrote on the ‘technique’ of psycho-analysis, says 
that ‘Freud was not just being polite’ when only offering suggestions rather than 
dogma in writing about technique, as ‘Variations in technique are inescapable, given 
the differences among analyst and analysand
So although Freud conceived psycho-analysis as a means of identifying and defining 
the ‘mental apparatus’ of the person and by inference persons, he acknowledged to 
begin with a meeting between two subjects that are capable of such difference that it 
is not appropriate to define strict and rigorous guidelines. Freud (1911:358) states in 
making these ‘recommendations’:
My hope is that observance of them will spare physicians practising analysis much 
unnecessary effort and guard them against some oversights. I must however make 
clear that what I am asserting is that this technique is the only one suited to my 
individuality; I do not venture to deny that a physician quite different constituted 
might find himself driven to adopt a different attitude to patients and to the task 
before him.
Freud went on to recommend that an analyst ‘should simply listen’ (Freud 1911:357), 
and not be too preoccupied by a concern that the material would not be remembered, 
this included the advice not to take written notes. Freud also advised analysts not to 
go into therapy with the intention of achieving a cure through their interventions, as 
this would interfere with the simplicity of listening and the potential progress to be 
made as a consequence rather than as a result of this experience. The analyst should 
‘turn his own receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient’ 
(Freud 1911:360), so the analyst’s own unconscious becomes a receptive tool in order 
to ‘reconstruct’ the analysand's unconscious. So the analytic setting, for Freud, is 
conceived as a microcosm of the external world, which as was stated earlier becomes 
the expression for a potential definition for being. Analysts should have their own 
analysis to assist the process of identifying this unconscious transmittance, Freud 
(1911:360) states:
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.. .everyone who wishes to carry out analyses on other people shall first himself 
undergo analysis hy someone with expert knowledge. Anyone who takes up the work 
seriously should choose this course, which offers more than one advantage; the 
sacrifice involved in laying oneself open to another person without being driven to it 
by illness is amply rewarded.
The unconscious processes that are potentially to be identified in analysis form the 
basis of what is later described as counter-transference.
Freud felt that the analyst should not share any personal information with the 
analysand and that this had the potential for distorting the treatment,c the doctor 
should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but 
what is shown to him’ Freud (1911:361). The analyst should also refrain from an 
attempt to steer the analysand in a certain direction even if it is clear to them that this 
would be advantageous.
The use of the technique of psychoanalysis demands a specific type of relationship 
between the analyst and analysand. According to Freud (1926:11-12), psychoanalysis 
imposes specific responsibilities on the analysand:
We call on him to be completely straight forward with his analyst, to keep nothing 
back intentionally that comes into his head, and then to put aside every reservation 
that might prevent his reporting certain thought’s or memories ...If now he accepts the 
demand made by analysis that he shall say everything, he will easily become 
accessible to an expectation that to have relations and exchanges of thought with 
someone under such unusual conditions might also lead to peculiar results.
If the external world was witness to the expression of the internal apparatus of being, 
the process of exploring this was not a simple task, according to Freud. Freud (1915) 
believed that a great deal of the understanding of these processes for an individual lay 
beyond their immediate comprehension, and he developed a theory that assumed the 
existence of an ‘unconscious’. Freud appeared to develop his theory of the psyche 
from the analysis of his patients. By ‘listening’ to the free expression of their inner
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world, the expression of the internal into the external, Freud developed a picture of 
their ‘internal apparatus’. The admission of an unconscious meant that this internal 
picture was not immediately available to the analysand. As a consequence of this 
rationale, Freud saw psychoanalysis as a potentially vigorous research tool, a theme 
that will be explored in more detail in chapter 3.
The structure of the psyche described by Freud and the relationship that this had with 
the technique of psychoanalysis, particularly in relation to the ego, became important 
for Freud in identifying who could or could not avail of analysis. The criteria that 
Freud conceived for deciding who could or could not enter analysis has important 
implications for the potential for psychoanalysis with a person with dementia and is 
the basis for looking at the work of Klein, Balint and Lacan later in this section on 
psychoanalysis. Freud elaborated and amended his theory of the psyche, a summary 
of which is included in order to assess the potential for psychoanalysis as a treatment 
for a person suffering form dementia. The relationship between the patient’s ego and 
the technique of analysis becomes a key feature in considering psychoanalysis in 
relation to an illness like dementia and explains why the works of Klein and Balint are 
explored.
2.3.2.1 F r e u d ’ s E go
The construction of a theory of the psyche gave Freud a basis for identifying who was 
able to benefit from the technique of psychoanalysis. As a consequence this section 
provides an explanation of Freud’s conception of the psyche. It should be noted that 
that this conception was an evolutionary process for Freud, and at different times in 
his life his overview of the psyche changed. For the purposes of this study a summary 
view is presented. The developments to analytic theory made by Klein and Balint 
appear to open up a potential for analysis with a person with dementia that was not 
possible with Freud. However it is difficult to comprehend this possibility without 
providing an explanation as to why Freud felt some individuals were not suitable for 
entering psychoanalysis.
The summary begins with an explanation of the unconscious; Freud (1915:159) states:
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The nucleus of the Uncs. (Unconscious) consists of instinctual representatives which 
seek to discharge their cathexes; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses. These 
instinctual impulses are co-ordinate with one another, exist side by side without being 
influenced be one another, and are exempt from mutual contradictions.
Freud later called the Unconscious part of the mind the ‘id’, from which the instincts 
exerted a constant pressure for satisfaction. The instincts could be differentiated into 
two main types, the life and the death instincts, the later of which was the subject of 
much controversy with the psychoanalytic community (Freud 1930: 754). The life 
instincts (Eros) being associated with sexual desire and directed towards the 
proliferation of the species. Of the death instinct Freud (1930:754) stated:
Starting from speculation on the beginning of life andfrom biological parallelism I 
drew the conclusion that, besides the instinct to preserve living substance and join it 
into ever larger units, there must exist another, contrary instinct seeldng to dissolve 
those units and to bring them back to their primeval, inorganic state. That is to say, 
as well as Eros there is an instinct of death, The phenomena of life could be explained 
form the concurrent of mutually opposing action of these two instincts.
Freud conceived the instincts as an internal pressure exerting a driving force on the 
person to act in response to the demands they were making for satisfaction. The 
competitive nature that is described above between internal life and the death forces 
portrays an uneasy cauldron of potential.
Mediating these instinctual internal forces and the outward social interaction of a 
person in the world was positioned a structure called the ego. Freud (1923:630)
We have formed the idea that in each individual there is a coherent organization of 
mental process; and we call this his ego. It is to this ego that consciousness is 
attached; the ego controls... the discharge of excitations in the external world.
The ego exerts a repressive barrier To exclude certain trends in the mind’, which as 
described above, are the instincts being initiated in the id. In his early work Freud 
believed that the ego was associated more with consciousness. However, the
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operation of an automated repressive force that was associated with the ego and that 
was outside of any sense of consciousness meant that the ego was repositioned in and 
on the boundary of the id, with the major part of the ego being acknowledged as 
unconscious.
Stafford-Clarlc (1965) summarises the functions of the ego as ensuring self- 
preservation. In the external it performs the task of mediating the awareness of 
stimuli, recording experiences about them (in the memory), protecting against 
excessively strong stimuli (through flight), coping with moderate stimuli (through 
adaptation). In relation to the id, internally, it performs the task of achieving 
supremacy over the demands of the instinct. The ego should decide whether an 
instinct is allowed satisfaction and whether to postpone that satisfaction to times and 
circumstances favourable in the external world or to suppress their excitations 
entirely.
Freud (1920) felt that the dynamics involved in the operation of these different 
structures within our mental life were regulated by the ‘pleasure principle5. He 
associated pleasure and ‘unpleasure’ with an ‘economic factor’ described as:
We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is 
present in the mind...and to relate them in such a manner that unpleasure 
corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure a diminution. 
(Freud 1920:595)
The excitation is associated with a raising of tension within the mind, and the 
assumption is that the individual will automatically prefer to return to a state of 
homeostasis. The preference for homeostasis is the dynamics that Freud associates 
with pleasure. In conjunction with the automation associated with the pleasure 
principle, Freud felt that a person could suspend, or act against, this principle in 
response to the demands of circumstance. The mechanism that he describes for this 
suspension of the pleasure principle is called the ‘reality principle’, described as:
Under the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure principle 
is replaced hy the reality principle. This latter principle does not abandon the
60
intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries 
into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of 
possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as step 
on the long indirect road to pleasure. (Freud 1920: 596)
Freud went on to describe a further process that went ‘beyond the pleasure principle’ 
and was the repetition compulsion. He came across instances where the economics of 
the pleasure principle appeared to fail to give a satisfactory explanation. Freud (1923) 
describes two very different examples of this compulsion to repeat. Firstly, the 
account of the ‘Da-Forte’ games that his grandson had been seen to play, where he 
appeared to re-enact the departure and return of his mother. The second the incidence 
of traumatised soldiers who continually re-experienced the particular events in dreams 
and ‘flash backs’. Freud (1923) felt that some of these types of experiences could be 
explained by a simple application of the pleasure principle, the game played by his 
grandson provided the opportunity for the repeated experience of pleasure on the 
return of his mother. But this did not explain the repeated re-experiencing of the 
‘unpleasure’ of the departure or the repeated reconstruction of a traumatic event. 
Stafford-Clark suggests (1965:158):
But where the repetition was obviously far from pleasurable Freud saw in it the 
working through of an instinct for self-desfruction, This led him to his concept of 
‘Thanatos ’, the ‘death instinct'. ’
The death instinct became representational for Freud (1930:756) of ‘ man’s natural 
aggressive instinct’.
Symington (1986:148) suggests that the ego, as Freud describes it, develops as a 
consequence of being in the world between the interaction of the internal and the 
external. Freud (1930:724) states:
An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external world as 
the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns to do so, in 
response to various promptings.
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Freud (1930:769) conceived of another structure that exerts a significant impact on 
the development of the ego, and this was the ‘super-ego’. The first conception of this 
is seen as the parental influence on a person to do and behave in a certain way. 
According to Freud (1923:651) the ego is formed from ‘identifications which take the 
place of abandoned cathexes by the id’. The super ego represents one of the first of 
these identifications; the internalisation of the Oedipus complex represented the 
formation of the super ego for Freud. The sexual desire that has its object as the 
parent, being prevented from satisfaction by the presence of the other parent was the 
experience that Freud identified for the development of the super ego and ego in a 
child. The child is forced to abandon the sexual cathexes originating form the id due 
to the presence of an omnipotent authority. The recognition of these parental object 
cathexes made Freud (1923) re-evaluate the ego and identify it as the source of the 
libido as it develops out of the Oedipal complex along with the super-ego. The desire 
for the parent as object for the satisfaction of the libidinal pressure originates in the id, 
and it is from this place that the ego develops.
The super ego represents a turning back into himself of the same aggressive 
tendencies that the destructive instincts had focused on the external as a child this can 
be seen as the desire to kill the Father in the Oedipal struggle.
Freud (1930:756) states:
His aggressiveness is introjected, internalized... sent back to where it came from.
The dynamics of Freud’s instinctual system remain similar to that outlined in the 
Oedipal scenario, an internal pressure originates from the instincts, and Freud gives 
primacy to the Libidinal or sexual instincts, for satisfaction out into the external in the 
form of behaviour. The external world exerts a pressure for behaviour to be 
‘appropriate’, where appropriate is defined by the dominant discourse or culture. The 
parents are the representation of the culture for the developing child and ego, and the 
super-ego forms a part of the person’s psyche. Freud (1930:759) outlines the process 
behind the ‘control’ of the instincts:
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First comes renunciation of instinct owing to fear of aggression by the external 
authority. (This is, of course, what fear of the loss of love amounts to, for love is a 
protection against this punitive aggression). After this comes the erection of an 
internal authority, and the renunciation of instinct owing to the fear of it-owing to 
fear of conscience. In this second situation bad intentions are equated with bad 
actions, and hence come a sense of quilt and a needfor punishment. The 
aggressiveness of conscience keeps up the aggressiveness of authority.
The means by which this internal authority attempts to harness the instincts, as was 
stated previously, is by means of repression. The instincts are prevented from 
reaching the object that will bring about satisfaction. Freud states (1915a)
...the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a 
distance from the conscious
But he goes on to say in this paper,
...we are inclined to...forget too readily that repression does not hinder the 
instinctual representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious, from 
organizing itself further, putting out derivatives and establishing connections.
And further Freud indicates the potential implications of this process,
...the instinctual representative develops with less interference and more profusely if 
it is withdrawn by repression from conscious influence. It proliferates in the dark, as 
it were, and takes on extreme forms of expression, which when they are translated and 
presented to the neurotic are not only bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by 
giving him the picture of an extraordinary strength of instinct.
Freud emphasises that the instincts are not extinguished by repression rather they are 
deflected, and it is the potential that this process can cause for neurotic behaviour that 
becomes the focus for analysis.
Freud (1930:632) conceived the Unconscious in non-linguistic terms. The word 
presentation of psychic material was associated with memory traces, if unconscious 
material found its way into consciousness in any form it would be susceptible to 
memory traces and consequently word presentation. Freud (1911a) saw dreams and 
slips of the tongue as the windows into the unconscious, opportunities while the ego 
had relaxed its repressive influence on the id. Once these incidents had been 
perceived and became part of the memory they were open to word presentation and 
analysis. The analytic technique that was outlined earlier, where the analysand is 
required to speak what ever comes into the mind, is intended to trawl the conscious 
part of the mind for the memory traces that would open the exploration of the 
unconscious processes at work. The assumption was that resistance from the ego 
would impede this process. Freud (1925:24) conceived the technique of‘free 
association’ as means of working against the resistance by developing the analysand’s 
word presentation with the help of the analyst. Where ‘free association’ involved this 
intense commitment to speak as the thoughts emerge and then to explore those 
thoughts and dreams with the analyst in order to develop a coherent picture of what 
had previously been unconscious. Freud put considerable responsibility on the 
Analysand in the process of analysis. The expectations outlined above might be seen 
to limit the effectiveness of psychoanalysis with subjects whose intellect was 
impaired, without necessarily referring to the symptoms associated with a presenting 
illness.
Freud (1925:26) also emphasises another integral aspect of analysis that is essential if 
treatment is going to be successful and this is the emotional relationship that exists 
between the analyst and analysand called the transference. Freud states that the 
analysand is:
.. .re-experiencing emotional relations which had their origin in his earliest object- 
attachments during the repressed period of childhood.
The provocation of this type of transference relationship in analysis provides an 
opportunity, for what is initially a form of resistance (Freud 1915b: 380), ‘is used 
instead to induce the patient to perform a piece of psychical work’ (Freud 1925:26).
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Freud (1916:590) states:
Psycho-analytic work is continually confronted with the task of inducing the patient to 
renounce an immediate and directly attainment yield of pleasure... in other words, 
under the doctor’s guidance he is asked to make the advance from the pleasure 
principle to the reality principle by which the mature humans being is distinguished 
from the child.
So by harnessing the positive feelings and bringing them into tire analytic process they 
become potentially open to conscious recognition and also become an incentive for 
the analysand to experience and explore the reality principle and consequently 
develop and enhance the powers of the ego. So analysis is seen to evoke transference 
in the relationship with the analyst, a patients neurotic symptoms are experienced in 
this setting and by combining this with a therapeutic commitment using free 
association, understanding and control have the opportunity to develop.
Freud (1925:26) saw no potential for analysis where this transference potential did not 
exist,
When there is no inclination to a transference of emotion...or when it has become 
entirely negative, as happens in dementia praecox (schizophrenia) or paranoia, then 
there is also no possibility of influencing the patient by psychological means.
According to Freud a person suffering from these forms of mental illness had 
problems with the relationship between the ego and the outside world. As a 
consequence of this loss of the grasp on reality the patient would not be able to meet 
the type of commitment associated with analysis. Freud (1923:656) believed that 
‘Psychoanalysis is an instrument to enable the ego to achieve a progressive conquest 
of the id5. To achieve this the treatment requires an expression of a persons inner 
thoughts to an analyst where the individual is predisposed to investing in an 
enhancing, positive transference relationship. The symptoms associated with the 
diagnosis of dementia outlined previously would suggest that the progressive nature 
of this illness and the cognitive impairment that appears associated with this, might 
affect a persons ability to enter the type of commitment required by Freud. Freud’s
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conception of the psyche and the positioning of the ego in its construction appears to 
assume that analysis takes piace by a form of engagement with the analysand’s ego 
and subsequently enhancing its development. However, the demands Freud’s 
technique makes of an analysand in order to overcome the rigors of repression by the 
use of free association appear* to impose a barrier to entry into psychoanalysis. This 
barrier is potentially significant to people that have an illness like dementia that is 
likely to effect a persons ability to enter into the type of relationship conceived by 
Freud for psycho-analysis.
The boundaries for entering into psychoanalysis were broadened by the work of Klein 
and the use of play technique; this has important implications for this study.
2.3.2.2 K le in  and P la y  techn iqu e
The issue of a patient’s intellectual capacity and suitability for psychoanalysis was 
explored further through the work of Melanie Klein, who began by investigating the 
potential for child analysis. Klein (1926:138) states:
...the primitive peculiarities of the mental life of children necessitate a special 
technique adapted to them, consisting of the analysis of their play. By means of this 
technique we can reach the deepest repressed experience and fixations and this 
enables us fundamentally to influence the children’s development.
Klein developed a method that allowed a child the opportunity to play freely in her 
company, and she claimed that this provided the child the opportunity to convey 
unconscious repressed material through the expression of their play. She states in a 
later paper (Klein 1927:146):
...probably everyone who analyses children agree that they neither can nor will give 
association in the same way as grown-ups and so sufficient material cannot be 
collected by means of speech alone.
Hinshelwood (1994:38) suggests that Klein ‘thought she could find a consistent 
unconscious content in the anxious play’. As her relationship with the child
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developed she felt able to link this anxious play to ‘deeper (unconscious) meanings in 
the child’s mind’. Klein (1927:148) argued that a child was more dominated by the 
Unconscious, as the ego was not developed enough to institute repression, and states:
We can establish a quicker and surer contact with the Ucs (Unconscious) of children 
if, acting on the conviction that they are much more deeply under the sway of the Ucs 
and their instinctual impulses than are adults, we shorten the route which adult 
analysis takes by way of contact with the ego and make direct connection with the 
child’s Ucs.
Klein was suggesting that through her experience with a child she witnessed, on 
occasion, heightened anxiety in their behaviour as they played with the toys she 
provided for them. She believed that this anxiety was being produced by what Freud 
described as a libidinal cathexis from the id. She found that the interpretation of these 
observations to the child brought about a dramatic reduction in the anxiety being 
witnessed by her in their play. A child, according to Klein (1926:128), experiences 
pleasure when the libido is directed towards external objects, where previously it had 
been ‘attached exclusively to the child’s ego’. The reality of the outside world brings 
the child in contact with the experience of ‘deprivation’. If the child is deprived of the 
object of their libido, anxiety will be produced. Freud outlined the explanation for 
this using the pleasure principle, where an instinctual cathexis raises tension and the 
satisfaction reduces this tension. The ego is seen as imposing self-deprivation in the 
implementation of the reality principle. However, a child whose ego is not developed 
to mediate the reality principle, experiences the deprivation imposed by a super ego, 
which involves the Oedipal scenario.
Klein (1926:129) explains:
...the criterion of all later capacity for adaptation to reality, is the degree in which 
they are able to tolerate the deprivations that result from the Oedipus situation.
Klein’s child analytic technique although engaging with the child’s unconscious 
anxiety still involves a transference relationship with the analyst, although Amia
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Freud (Klein 1927) felt that analysis with children should not involve any investment 
in transference since the child’s relationship with their parents was not developed 
enough. Klein, on the other hand, bought forward the Oedipal scenario to the child’s 
very early experience so suggesting that by the time of about three the libidinal 
relationship with parents was quite well developed. So child analysis was very much 
involved in positive and negative transference in the relationship with the child, and 
that the analyst could provide an opportunity for the child to develop an improved 
relationship with their parents through the interpretation of the anxiety associated in 
the transference with the analyst.
Klein’s play technique challenged the criteria that Freud appeared to establish with 
regal'd to the degree of intellectual competency required for a person to enter analysis, 
the focus on play removed the need for the analysand to be able to participate in the 
testing examination required in free association. A child at the very early stages of ego 
development was seen as an appropriate participant in Klein’s play technique. If a 
young child could be analysed then the way was opened for other client groups to be 
considered. Why should this not include a person with dementia?
2,3.2.3 B a lin t and the ‘ B asic  F a u lt ’
Balint (1968:104) suggests that the consequence of Klein’s work, both in the theory 
and technique of psychoanalysis, was to create a school of thought that evolved a 
distinct approach to analysis. It was based on two main themes, according to Balint, 
firstly that the early stages of mental life are associated with a greater influence from 
instinctual pressures, and Klein gives far more emphasis to the death instinct than 
Freud (Hinshelwood 1994). Secondly, that the behaviour that is observable in adults 
‘should be assumed to be present in some form in very early childhood’ (Balint 
1968:104). Balint also suggests that this school maintains the link between the 
‘primitive processes in the child’s mind’ and language, as shown by the sequence that 
Hinshelwood (1994:38) ascribes to Klein’s child analytic technique, ‘anxiety - 
interpretation - response’. The central part of this process is interpretation; Klein 
perceived that her verbal responses to the child brought about a relief to the child’s 
anxiety. Balint (1968:104) points out that the language is different since the theory 
has been developed:
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While Freud’s language was mainly concerned with experiences at the Oedipal level, 
this school has set itself the conscious task of devising standardized expressions for 
the description of experiences that are more primitive than those belonging to the 
Oedipal level.
Balint goes onto to describe this as a 4 ‘mad’ language’ that is taken up and used by the 
analysand, as the analyst uses the language consistently within the relationship the c 
patients - and children - eventually give in, learn what they are taught, and adopt the 
language of their elders and betters’ (1968:106). Balint quotes Ferenczi (1932:279) 
who described the use of this type of interpretation as ‘super-ego-intropression’, 
where the analyst consistently presents themselves as the source of knowledge and 
benevolent authority, explaining all the experiences and fantasies presented to them. 
Balint (1968:108) states that eventually:
After overcoming the immense hatred and ambivalence - in my opinion, aroused to 
large extent by the consistent use of this technique - the patient learned the analyst's 
language, and pari passu introjects the analyst’s idealized image. In successful cases 
the result seems to be the acquisition of a fairly - though far from absolutely - 
uniform mental structure, no doubt highly efficient, though remaining, perhaps for 
ever, somewhat alien and artificial.
Balint develops the theory of the ‘Basic Fault’ out of his acknowledgement of the two 
‘levels’ to analysis described so far, an Oedipal level associated with Freud and a pre- 
Oedipal level described by Klein. Balint (1968:21) termed it a ‘fault’ because it was a 
term that he experienced people using to describe what was going on within them, that 
there was a fault that needed rectifying. Also that ‘there is a feeling that the cause of 
this fault is that someone has either failed the patient or defaulted on him’, and that 
anxiety surrounds this area of fault. He did not feel that this fault was associated with 
an ‘instinct nor of a conflict’. Balint (1968:22) further states:
In my view the origin of the basic fault may be traced back to a considerable 
discrepancy in the early formative phases of the individual between his bio- 
psychological needs and the material and psychological care, attention, and affection
available during the relevant times. This creates a state of deficiency whose 
consequences and after-effects appear to be only partly reversible. The cause of this 
early discrepancy many be congenital... or may be environmental, such as care that is 
insufficient, deficient, haphazard, over anxious, over-protective, harsh, rigid, grossly 
inconsistent, incorrectly timed, over-stimulating, or merely un-understanding or 
indifferent.
Balint felt that the analytic relationship, the meeting of two people focusing on the 
patient, might provide a reverse to the fault. Of the two most important factors in 
psychoanalytic, interpretation and object relationship (transference), Balint 
(1968:160) stressed the importance of the later in providing the appropriate reverse,
...in certain periods of the treatment, creating and maintaining a workable 
relationship, particularly with a patient in regression, is perhaps a more important 
therapeutic task that giving correct interpretations.
So analysis for Balint brought about the potential for a regression back to the events 
that have caused this fault in their psychological being. This regression is back to a 
primitive stage in development and consequently is not associated with language. 
Consequently, the importance of the object relationship, that induced the regression, is 
more important than any verbal interpretation that is offered by the analyst. Having 
identified this non-verbal basis for an analytic relationship, which is focused on the 
‘acting-out’ of the faults by the analysand, Balint (1968:174) goes on to state:
I hasten to add that all these non-verbal communications, the acting-out, will of 
course be worked through after the patient has emerged from this level and reached 
the Oedipal level again - not till then.
So Balint has described an approach to analysis that emphasises the relationship 
before any technique for revealing the Unconscious such as ‘free association’ or 
‘play’ and related interpretation. The regression that occurs to the area of the basic 
fault makes the analysis more about the way an analyst responds in a non-verbal way. 
There maybe very aggressive and anxious feelings being felt and expressed within the 
analysis, which Balint (1968:186) felt would not be assisted by dynamic, insightful
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interpretation as this had the potential to be seen as a dismissal and rejection by the 
patient. The interpretation would be seen as the analysts need to defend against the 
raw intensity of the patient’s emotional pain. The patient could not hear these 
interpretations because their emotions were not associated with language. Balint felt 
that analysis, at this stage, was more about relationship building and demonstrating to 
the patient that it was strong enough to take the aggression and the pain and still be 
their to hold them afterwards. Psychoanalysis conceived in these terms does not 
appear to have the same type of demands on a patient as appeared to be required for 
Freud’s use of ‘free association’. The dynamic use of interpretation as a means of 
anxiety relief are still dependent on the patients ability to comprehend and understand 
language and Balint appeal's to be describing a stage of analysis when this is unlikely 
to be what is needed. At this moment in the analysis it appears that Balint is 
describing a moment when there is no expectation on the analysand/patient other than 
to be with the analyst in a relationship. There seems to be no need to question the 
cognitive capabilities of a person diagnosed with dementia, as the only requirement is 
that they stay in the relationship with the analyst.
However, Balint (1968:132) describes the analysis around the ‘basic fault’ as a stage 
in a process that leads towards the possibility of personal integration and ego 
development:
The good result might have been brought about by: (a) forcing consciousness - the 
ego- to lift part of the repression and accept an instinctual urge as ego-syntonic and 
enjoyable; (b) strengthening the ego by extending its boundaries at the expense of the 
id; and (c) helping the patient to a new beginning or, if preferred, to a regression.
The symptoms that a person diagnosed with dementia experiences appear incongruent 
with the underlying process that Balint conceives for analysis.
2.3.2.4. S inason
Sinason (1992:87) describes a case study of person that she saw for analysis who was 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, which is the most common diagnosed form of 
dementia. She describes the disease as the progressive decline to not knowing and a
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return to periods of infancy before the education of experience. For Sinason, the 
difference between someone at the outset of the disease compared with a person with 
a severe case is like the difference between someone who is ‘normal’ and someone 
who is ‘profoundly handicapped5. The case study presented by Sinason outlines an 
analytic relationship that lasted for one year and during this time the analyst has taken 
a supportive role, compensating for the intellectual losses experienced by the subject.
The following are two examples of her work:
L It felt to me that one of the functions of working with a deteriorating patient was 
to hold their memory, their Imowledge, their choice of words. (Sinason 1992:99)
2. 'I’m stupid now. I can't read. I’m dumb. Me. I can’t read. Once, I told — boy- what 
do you say -student- he was an idiot. He did not understand - Derrida- if he know. I 
am nothing’. I told him that 4stupid’ meant numbed with grief and he was numbed 
with grief and he was realising what it was like to be mentally handicapped, to pick 
up a book and only know a few words and to have your brain hurt when you tiled to 
think more. (Sinason 1992:102)
It appeal's that all the functions that psychoanalytic theory attributes to the ego, such 
as consciousness, integrity and thoughtfulness are disintegrating in this relationship 
with a man with Alzheimer’s disease. The description that Sinason gives of her 
patient’s deteriorating condition provides a stark contrast to the expectations that 
Balint has for the progress of a patient receiving psychoanalysis outlined above. 
Sinason positions herself, as the analyst, in a place to compensate for the patient’s 
failing intellectual capacity by holding on to what she sees as being lost by her 
patient. In the second example Sinason appears to ‘know’ the meaning of the words 
being expressed by the patient and has positioned herself as the provider of meaning 
in the relationship. However, this example demonstrates how much that could be lost 
by the therapist taking up the position of ‘meaning-makerk The mention of ‘Derrida’ 
was ignored in the interpretation given by Sinason. Samp (1993:33) describes the 
work of Derrida as being associated with the non-specificity of meanings, ‘meaning is 
continually moving along a chain of signifiers, and we cannot be precise about its 
exact ‘location’. Sinason appears to want to ‘signify’ and give meaning to her
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patient’s words. However, she ignores the mention of a name, Derrida, synonymous 
with a critique of what she is trying to do with her patient.
Freud identified the requirements for a person to enter analysis, which have been 
previously stated. He defined broad areas of mental illness that could be treated by 
psychoanalysis and those that could not. Heaton (1998:40) suggests that the focus on 
illness is typical of‘the medical art which tends to be orientated towards illness’, 
which can lead towards an emphasis on the technical to the exclusion of the personal. 
The technique of psychoanalysis excludes a person before they have the opportunity 
to benefit from the meeting because they do not conform to the criteria for treatment. 
The primacy given by Balint to the relationship is only in the context of working 
towards a treatment aimed at ego integration and development. The person with 
Dementia does not necessarily conform to these criteria because the illness implies the 
onset of a disintegration of mental function. Sinason's response is to offer the 
integration for the patient; she was holding their memory and their words. She 
attempts to provide integration when maybe she should have been making it easier for 
the disintegration to take place. There is an assumption that integration is the healthy 
and only objective of the therapy, and since organic mental illness has bought about 
the incapacity in the patient, the analyst must compensate for this inadequacy.
There is defensiveness in the approach adopted by Sinason suggesting that as 
psychoanalysis created this concept of the ego that it does not want to witness its 
disintegration. The difficulty might be that psychoanalysis is associated with theory 
building, and a deconstruction could be seen as a challenge to the underlying, ethos of 
building; knocking down is not congruent with this process. But there is a side of this 
dissolving theoretical formulation, which speaks, of the experience of being with 
people with dementia. The researcher has witnessed in his role as a nurse, on 
numerous occasions the absence of this type of competent ego-like structure in a 
person with dementia, which appeal's to allow a person to move more freely in the 
realms of unmediated human behaviour. This might be in the form of dis-inhibited 
verbal or physical behaviour, a ‘change’ in character or a more open orientation 
towards sexuality. This has not always appeared as a negative experience for the 
person with dementia, it can appear to be associated with a ‘liberation’. The difficulty
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is often for others, like relations and friends; they are shocked at what they see before 
them, a dis-inhibited person, who once was something else for them.
It would appear that the person with dementia is losing many of the qualities that are 
attributed to the ego, by Freud, and many of the expressions of this are more difficult 
for others to accept from their perspective, than for the person with dementia. This 
reaction will be linked to their own experience and one might speculate that treatment 
often becomes a projection of these types of provocations in a health care 
worker/therapist rather than an attempt to consider the people, who in this case have 
dementia.
The psychoanalytic theory outlined in this section has been an important influence on 
the researcher/therapist*s orientation to psychotherapy. However, the examination of 
the psychoanalytic theory in relation to a person diagnosed with dementia has 
identified how a focus on ‘treatment’ and on an analytic process directed towards 
developing concepts like an ‘ego’ can create a rather exclusive approach to 
psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis seen as a process of ego integration and development 
might be seen to be more of an impersonal technical relationship that Laing (1990) 
associated with an T-If relationship in section 2.3.1. It is as if the psychoanalytic 
process or technique becomes the means for justifying the theory rather than theory 
providing an opportunity to develop a therapeutic relationship. So it is the potential 
for psychoanalytic theory to develop and enhance a relationship with a person 
diagnosed with dementia that has influenced the psychotherapeutic orientation in this 
study rather than a preoccupation with psychoanalysis as a form of treatment.
2.3.3 L a ca n
Jacques Lacan’s revision of Freud’s work did not ascribe the same emphasis to the 
ego and its development. Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986) suggest that Lacan 
developed an approach to analysis that saw the unitary and integrated qualities 
assumed in the work of Sinason as an illusion, as part of the imaginary order that is 
symbolised in the ego; they state:
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The ego for Lacan is thus formed on the basis of an imaginary relationship of the • 
subject with his own body. The ego has the illusion of autonomy, but it only an 
illusion, and the subject moves from fragmentation and insufficiency too illusory 
(Benvenuto & Kennedy 1986:56)
The concept of unity and wholeness intimated in the theory outlined to date is an 
illusion for Lacan (Miller 1988:146) borne out of the ‘Mirror stage’. The subject feels 
a sense of mastery over themselves that stays with them in the form of an ego, and 
influences how they interact in the world, but like the image they see in the mirror. 
According to Lacan, it is only a reflective image, and does not represent the ‘truth’ 
about them, which is immersed in the Unconscious.
Sarup (1993:10) suggest that Lacan emphasises the impact of Language on the 
person:
Lacan insists that we are all immersed in Language... We have to represent ourselves 
in language. Indeed, our only access to others is through language.
Lacan (Samp 1993) believed that the ‘subject’ and language could not be separated. 
Consequently, experience is submersed in the potential for misunderstanding that is 
inherently associated with the use of language. Thus the concept of meaning is paid of 
a continuum rather than a basis for certainty. Lacan uses the term ‘signifier’ to refer 
to meaning, and he felt that a signifier led on to another signifier in an endless chain 
of signification, but importantly, there was no place for the ‘signified5. The 
‘signified’ would reflect the position of proof and the end of the chain and this was 
not possible in a world described and lived in language. Finding the ‘signified’ in 
relation to the subject, the understanding of the self, is about a seduction of the mirror 
image that is an illusion of unity, which provides a powerful attraction in a world of 
the abstract.
The signifying chain and meanings for Lacan are interrelated to the concept of the 
unconscious. According to Lacan (Miller 1988) the unconscious is not the domain of 
instinctual drives described by Freud it is the embodiment of everything the subject 
says and does. Lacan (Miller 1988:50) identifies two types of speech which
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demonstrate this tendency of expressing the illusory and revealing the subject in the 
unconscious, that of full and empty speech:
...full speech in so far as it realises the truth of the subject, empty speech in relation 
to what he has to do hie et nunc with his analyst, in which the subject loses himself in 
the machinations of the system of language, in the labyrinth of referential systems 
made available to him by the state of cultural affairs to which he is a more or less 
interested party. Between these two extremes, a whole gamut of modes of realisation 
of speech is deployed.
Lacan felt that full speech spoke about what cannot consciously be recognised and the 
task of psychoanalysis was to ‘decipher a ‘structure’ in which the unconscious is 
represented’ (Benvenuto, 1986:167). The subject looks to someone else, an ‘Other’, 
to reflect back the truth about them, to act as a mirror. But just as the mirror reflects 
an image and not the real so the ‘Other’ can never reflect back the whole truth, 
Benvenuto (1986:175) quotes Lacan:
What happens when the subject begins to speak to an analyst? - to the analyst, that is 
to say, to the subject who is supposed to know (i.e., the absolute Other), but of whom 
it is certain that he still knows nothing. It is to him that is offered something that will 
first, take the form of a demand... But what does the subject demand? That is the 
whole question, for the subject Imows, very well that, whatever his appetites may be, 
none of them will find satisfaction in analysis, and that the most he can expect of it is 
to organise the menu.
Lacan felt the demand that the subject makes of the ‘Other’, originates from the 
demand for love made by the infant for its mOther, that is always beyond the scope of 
satisfaction and leaves a sense of ‘lacking’. The (m)Other will always fail to meet the 
full demands of the child. According to Lacan, it is in the experience of the lacking 
that desire is expressed, Benvenuto (1986; 130) states:
The basis structure of desire would follow the law of the signifier, in that it signifies 
something only in relations to another signifier, so desire is always desire for another 
thing.
16
Benvenuto (1986:85) suggests that the first difficulty for the analyst might be in 
recognising between full and empty speech, that which talks of desire and that which 
is tangled up with the ego. A second possible difficulty is not to get taken in by the 
empty discourse. Gans (1997) suggests that through psychoanalysis the analyst 
enables the analysand to recognise the empty speech for what it is, ‘bound up with 
unacknowledged images of love and hate directed at phantom formative others’ and to 
acknowledge the inhibitory nature of the imaginary order in its relation to reiatedness 
to the other. Gans (1997) states:
The job of the analyst for Lacan is to frustrate the analysand’s attempt to manipulate 
and control in order to remain in their fixed position, of either imaginary master or 
slave or to oscillate between these polarities. Fixed in this imaginary struggle the 
analysand’s desire is deadened and their capacity for reiatedness is undermined.
This view of analysis challenges the more traditional view that is conceived as 
a treatment aimed at mastering desires by focusing on the ‘ego’. This ‘ego’ will 
always evade definition and remain incomplete for the subject, since it is always 
based on a reflection from an Other and reflections, as in the mirror image, can never 
fully represent the ‘real’ as they always remain a ‘reflection’. So Lacan, according to 
Gans, conceives analysis as a process of frustrating the attempts of the analysand to 
obtain a reflection of their ‘self from the analyst, thereby allowing them the 
possibility of experiencing their ‘real’ desire. Therefore the analytic process is 
concerned with freeing up the subject to enable a more complete reiatedness to the 
world of others.
Benvenuto (1986:78) quotes Lacan:
Whether it sees itself as an instrument of healing, or the exploration in depth, 
psychoanalysis has a single medium: the patient's speech.
If the sole medium of Lacanian analysis is the patient’s speech this immediately 
imposes potential exclusion criteria for dementia sufferers’. If the subject has lost the 
ability to speak or it is impaired then the access to this type of analysis is denied by 
definition.
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2.3.4  D e rr id a
Sarap (1993 :44) suggests that Derrida, quoted by Sinason’s subject in her case study, 
was critical of Lacan’s emphasis on a spoken truth. Derrida, like Lacan, stresses the 
absence of a signified in language, and goes on develop a primacy to the written 
presentation of language rather than to speech. Sarup (1993:41) states:
Derrida argues that writing is, in fact, the precondition of language and must be 
conceived as prior to speech. Writing is the 'free play' or element of unpredictability 
within every system of communication.
Sarup (1993:42) maintains that Derrida conceived the role of writing from Freud who 
used the metaphoric writing pad to enable his subjects to trace inscriptions 
spontaneously, the surface being capable of speedy renewal. Freud believed that this 
was evidence of memory traces and were not part of conscious memory.
Sarup 1993:44) states:
In Lacanian analysis the truth (logos) systematically shines forth as spoken or voiced. 
Psychoanalysis remains the 'talking cure ’founded on spoken truth. Derrida cautions 
us that when we learn to reject the notion of the primacy of the signified (of meaning 
over word) we should not satisfy) our longing for the transcendence by giving primacy 
to the signifier (word over meaning). He feels that Lacan has done precisely this.
Derrida, according to Samp, would describe much of the discourse so far as based on 
a logocentric conception of being, where there is an emphasis on an essence, a centre 
where being originates. Lacan challenges the traditional view that this centre is in the 
ego, but he repositions it in the unconscious. Derrida deconstructs this structure and 
establishes the idea he calls 'difference', where the process is about deferment along a 
chain signifiers and language emanates from the differences, so there cannot be a 
spoken truth. There is no place for logocentricity, according to Derrida, meanings are 
seen as non-specific and motile and language speaks from the ‘between’ of one 
signifier to the next. Derrida (1996) illustrates the way that a focus on ‘the’ meaning, 
represented by an archive of knowledge, obscures the discourse that embraced its
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creation and also subsequent experience by examining the position given to Freud’s 
writing within psychoanalysis. Derrida (1996:79-80) states:
In other M’ords does one need a first archive in order to conceive of originary 
archiv ability? Or vice versa? This is the whole question of the relation between the 
event of the religious revelation (Offenbarung) and a revealability (Offenbarkeit), a 
possibility of manifestation, the prior thought of what, opens toward the arrival or 
toward the coming of such an event. Is it not true that the logic of the after-the -fact 
(Nachtraglichkeit), which is not only at the heart of psychoanalysis, but even, 
literally, the sinews of all “deferred” (nachtraglich) obedience, turns out to disrupt, 
disturb, entangle forever the reassuring distinction between the past andfuture...
Derrida is opening up huge questions in relation to the basis of knowledge, or more 
accurately why knowledge has a basis. These are important issues for this study, 
however in relation to the practice of psychotherapy the ‘differance’ introduced by 
Derrida suggests that Lacan’s focus on the spoken word in analysis is not justified and 
reopens the issue of whether there should be criteria for entering analysis.
2.3.5 T o w a rd s  ‘ E th ica l’ Psychoanalysis
According to Chalier (1993), Levinas described subjectivity based on responsibility to 
the ‘other’, so shifting the emphasis from the logocentric perspective criticised by 
Derrida, towards an external social position. Chalier (1993:64) states:
Man becomes a human subject on the condition that it answers for everything and 
everyone. Man does not choose to answer for everything and everyone, he has to if he 
wants to become a human subject...Levinas argues that the responsibility is at the 
basis of man’s life as a human subject: caring for the other is not an act offree choice 
but the very structure of his definitions of subjectivity.
According to Gans (1997) it was the introduction of the “there is” that enabled 
Levinas to free subjectivity from the constraints of logocentricism. The “there is” is 
prior to the self and essence; Levinas likened its perception to a night of insomnia, in 
which there is fear and susceptibility and an absence of the particular. Gans explains
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that this is not the oblivion of nothingness but rather the infinity of otherness and 
marks the conception and origin of reiatedness. It is the commonality of experience in 
the “there is” that provokes the immediacy of reiatedness to the other. The “there is” 
is not an internal, solitary experience it is present in the world full of others and as 
such represents the future.
Gans (1997) goes on to outline an approach to therapy based on the ideas of Levinas 
and linking this with psychoanalysis, calling it ‘Ethical Psychoanalysis’. This 
approach is conceived within a framework of four primal stages of ethical reiatedness 
developed by Levinas, which are 1. Living from 2. Dwelling 3. The face-to-face 4. 
Eros. Levinas conceives Ethics as a responsibility to others, and Gans (1997: 44) 
describes an approach to therapy that is seen as working towards as realisation and 
acceptance of this responsibility, and states:
The work of the ethical analyst is to accompany the analysand on his/her journey of 
discovery and realisation through the zones of reiatedness. Rather than interpret 
pathological symptoms genealogically in terms of Oedipal or pre Oedipal stages, the 
Levinasian analyst reads patterns of arrested development as primarily the failure to 
embody and thus pass through these zones of reiatedness in order to enter ethical 
reiatedness and well being.
The first of these stages or zones, according to Gans, is concerned with enjoyment of 
life and focusing on the satisfaction of basic needs. At this stage the subject is 
concerned with the gratification of these needs without consideration of the other, 
tending towards isolation.
By identifying and accepting this tendency toward self-gratification and linking it 
with recognition of the need for potential sacrifice in relation to the world full of 
others a person can move from ‘schizoid dissociation, (being only for oneself) to 
dwelling’. Dwelling, according to Gans, is an opening up to the potential of the other, 
and is a ‘prerequisite’ of reiatedness to the other.
The face-to-face is the position of encountering another, and is represented in this 
study by the meeting of the researcher and the subject. This is not about meeting
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another with preconceived ideas that might be associated with a medical diagnosis, 
but rather avoiding homogenising the other into a specific profile. Gans (1997:46) 
states:
Such totalising appropriation violates the singularity, difference and otherness of the 
Other person. Calling to their responsibility, Le. being in effect responsible for the 
other’s responsibility is the culmination of Levinas’s ethical practice.
The final zone is Eros and involves the experience of intimacy and sexuality, Gans 
(1997:47) states:
The intimacy of loving and the fecundity of regeneration’s takes us beyond ethical 
analysis, to ethical life which is ultimately the best therapy.
This approach to therapy is concerned with acknowledging and exploring the 
responsiveness of a person to others. However the packaging of Levinas’s ideas into 
‘four stages’ (Gans 1997:44) could be seen as a misleading interpretation. Gans 
(1997) describes an approach that is conceived around the response to otherness and 
relatedness. Levinas (1981, 1984) suggests that this quality of relatedness, in the form 
of a call to respond when face-to-face with another person, is an innate quality in an 
individual. This responsibility is inhibited or over rationalised by an individual’s 
consciousness or ego. Levinas (1984:79) suggests that the conscious description of 
another person is a product of the ‘intentional’ and this was more about ‘grasping’ and 
knowing the other rather than relating. Levinas was describing a form of relatedness 
based on the ‘non-intentional’, a moment or glimpse of the other that was just before a 
person was able to formulate and metabolise how they would see the other. It was the 
raw vision of the other before it was packaged up and explained by consciousness and 
the ego. The series of zones described by Gans (1997), its formulation into a staged 
process of relatedness with an analyst as the facilitator of a progression through the 
zones towards the goal of eros, would appear to speak from the therapist’s intentional. 
If it is part of a neat system then it inevitably is the product of egologieal processing 
and not what Levinas described as the non-intentional. The zones described by Gans 
(1997) consequently become more concerned with the therapist’s blowing rather than 
about the raw type of relatedness described by Levinas.
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So psychotherapy influenced by the ideas of Levinas is more concerned with 
exploring the issues that inhibit this responsiveness or responsibility in a person.
There is not a focus 011 developing a concept of self or ego since this inevitably means 
a turning away from the other back into oneself. Levinas’s philosophy opens up an 
approach to psychotherapy that is concerned with responding to the other rather than 
turning back into oneself. This approach to psychotherapy does not require any 
predetermined characteristic or qualities from the patient/client, for this non- 
intentional reiatedness revolves around a sense of otherness that precedes a focus on 
any such issues. Psychotherapy from this perspective is concerned with the part of 
reiatedness that comes before seeing the person, in this study, as someone suffering 
from dementia.
2.4 C on clu sion
The psychotherapeutic theory that is outlined in this chapter forms the basis of the 
therapist’s approach to practice as illustrated in this study. There are other theoretical 
approaches that are used as the basis for providing psychotherapy to a person with 
dementia as outlined earlier in this chapter (section 2.3.1) that could have been 
explored in detail. However this study is designed around an experience of 
psychotherapy, consequently the theory explored needed to provide a basis for 
presenting the research findings. The theories examined here are drawn mainly from 
the approaches that the therapist/researcher believes have exerted the most influence 
in developing his practice at the time of entering into the therapeutic relationship 
described in this study.
The existentialist perspective described by Laing (1990) suggests an approach to 
psychotherapy that goes beyond the constraints of theory to look for the other person 
in the relationship. There would appear to be no hesitation in adopting this 
perspective with a person diagnosed with dementia. Psychoanalysis would appear to 
be less inclusive in considering a person diagnosed with dementia for therapy. Freud’s 
approach to psychoanalysis would appear to exclude a person who was not able to 
meet the intellectual demands of free association. A psychoanalysis, as conceived by 
Freud, could prove problematic in relation to a person with dementia for not only
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might they struggle to meet the demands of free association but it would also be 
difficult for the therapist to see the person without assessing their ability to participate 
effectively. IClein’s (1926) work with children opened up an approach to 
psychoanalysis that is not dependent on the patient’s ability to free associate. There is 
a greater emphasis on the relationship between analyst and the patient with the 
increasing importance of transference and counter-transference.
Balint (1968) describes an approach that harnesses the potential for analysis to bring 
about regression back to an early stage in a person’s development, before the 
emergence of a powerful ego. Balint appears to describe a therapeutic approach that 
involves non-verbal communication by both therapist and patient; the therapy appears 
to be dependent on an unconscious means of communicating through transference and 
counter-transference. A therapeutic approach that is not dependent 011 verbal 
communication and would appeal' to provide a basis for working with a person 
diagnosed with dementia. As suggested previously, the progressive symptoms 
associated with dementia described in the first part of this chapter could well be 
described as a deconstruction of the functions associated with an ego. So this 
approach would generate the opposite relation between psychotherapy and dementia 
then that identified in the literature quoted on psychotherapy and dementia, where 
psychotherapy was seen as a potential treatment in the early stages of the illness 
(Sinason 1995, Hausman 1992, Zarit & Knight 1996). Dementia could be seen as a 
form of idiopathic regression suggesting a greater potential for unconscious 
communication the more severe the symptoms.
The potential for interpreting Balint’s approach as a possible treatment for a person 
diagnosed with dementia is significantly inhibited by the focus given to ego 
development. Balint suggests that the regression brought about be the therapeutic 
relationship is intended as a means to return to this earlier preverbal stage in order to 
repair a ‘basic fault’ in the ego’s development so that the ego of the patient will re­
develop from a stronger base. So perhaps the question should be whether this 
approach is compatible with an illness like dementia. The treatments for dementia, 
outlined previously, have been focused on preventing the onset or inhibiting the 
progress of the deteriorating symptoms associated with this illness. The focus of 
Balint’s approach is clearly on the development of a stronger ego; the work of
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Sinason (1992) demonstrated the apparent need to change the approach being used to 
compensate for the deteriorating condition of her patient. It would seem, to this 
researcher, important that if psychoanalysis is used with a person diagnosed with 
dementia then the approach should not vary depending on the diagnosis of the patient 
or the illness becomes the focus of the treatment and not the person.
The symptoms associated with dementia appear to demonstrate a loss of functions 
associated with Freud’s conception of the ego opening up a possible potential, if the 
psychoanalytic theory is accepted, for a therapist to engage with a patient at a more 
unconscious level. The resulting therapy is unlikely to reverse the damage caused by 
the dementia but perhaps there is a possibility of other favourable results such as 
improving the quality of life or the slowing down the progress of the illness.
It would appeal' to this researcher that the analytic preoccupation with ego 
development creates a difficulty in focusing treatment towards a client group that is 
likely to face the possibility of a disintegrating ego function. However, the form of 
analysis described by Klein and Balint does potentially open up the possibility of 
offering an analytic relationship that could engage a person diagnosed with dementia. 
It is the focus of the analysis that would appear to require re-evaluation in order for it 
to be used as a treatment for dementia. The ideas outlined by Levinas (1984) may 
provide the basis to reconsider the focus of analysis. The identification of ego 
development as the potential goal of an analysis can only ever be in the realms of 
what Levinas (1984:79) describes as the ‘intentional’. So any improvement in a 
patient’s ego might be described as a greater capacity to live and use the ‘intentional’, 
the ability to be able to grasp an understanding of oneself and the world. However, 
Levinas suggests that the ‘intentional’, which empowers a person to create their own 
view of the world, can suppress the possibility of experiencing the ‘non-intentional’, 
which is a potential glimpse of another person prior to them being incorporated into 
our ‘intentional’ world. If psychotherapy is conceived as an attempt to enhance a 
patient’s (and therapist’s) potential to experience the non-intentional rather than the 
intentional then it would be more inclusive. The therapy would not be concentrated on 
developing a patient’s aptitude for grasping a view of the world and interpreting their 
experience but rather the potential for seeing a world full of views of the world; a 
world full of ‘others’.
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The exploration of psychotherapeutic theory in this chapter has identified the 
importance of the ‘non-intentional’ in integrating the theory examined into an 
approach to practice with a person diagnosed with dementia. It would seem that this 
approach was quite inclusive in relation to a person with dementia, since the 
underlying focus is not on a preoccupation with self-development that would depend 
on a person’s aptitude for self-reflection. The approach to psychotherapy influenced 
by the philosophy of Levinas is not focused on ego development and an introspective 
process concerned with developing concepts of‘self; the emphasis is outward and 
onto relationships with others.
The existential ideas attributed to Laing identify a place for psychotherapy that is not 
preoccupied with labels like ‘dementia’. The psychoanalytic ideas discussed in this 
chapter appear to either exclude or otherwise create a compromise position for a 
person diagnosed with dementia. So psychoanalysis would seem to engage with the 
diagnosis in a way that Laing saw as detrimental to therapy and more associated with 
an ‘I-If relation. The psychoanalytic theory examined in this chapter was focused on 
treating and developing a patients ego and where a person diagnosed with dementia 
could meet the demands of analysis it would seem that it would be possible to use this 
technique. However, if psychoanalysis is dependent on the intellectual competency of 
the analysand it raises the question of when do you stop the analysis? And if you have 
to stop at a certain stage (when the symptoms of dementia become worse) is it ethical 
to start in the first place?
The account of therapy presented in chapter five is likely to be influenced by the 
range of psychotherapy theory that has been explored in this chapter. The therapist 
considered that the theory examined in this chapter provided sufficient justification 
for commencing the therapy examined in this study. The question of whether 
psychotherapy was possible with a person diagnosed with dementia has been 
considered in relation to the theory that has informed the therapist’s practice. The 
conclusion drawn from the reflection on the theory in this chapter is that the non- 
intentional provides a basis for commencing therapy with person diagnosed with 
dementia.
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This chapter has explored what is meant by dementia and psychotherapy in order to 
provide a theoretical basis for this study. The following chapter explores the issues 
associated in identifying an appropriate research method, which allows psychotherapy 
to be the focus of the design and can provide the basis for addressing the question 
posed in this study.
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Chapter Three -  Methodology i
This chapter outlines the basis for the decision to use a phenomenological- 
hermeneutic approach to case study as the means of researching the possibility of 
psychotherapy with a person with dementia. At the outset of this study the researcher, 
who is also a trainee psychotherapist, agreed to a weekly meeting with a person who 
had been diagnosed with dementia and these meetings developed into the empirical 
focus for this research. So this chapter is concerned with describing how the 
researcher decided upon a research method given the chosen subject area and the 
focus on the weekly meetings.
There are two interrelated themes developed in this chapter, the first of which focuses 
on the orientation of the researcher. Merriam (1998:5) suggests, referring to 
qualitative research, that reflection on the researchers c.. .orientations to basic tenets 
about the nature of reality5 is the starting point for any piece of research. The 
researcher’s ‘orientation’ is likely to determine both the choice of method and the way 
the data in the study is perceived. A researcher reports what has been 
seen/experienced/counted and presents the findings of this process. The findings 
might be in the form of a description or a set of statistics and represent the end result 
of a research process. These findings are about knowing in relation to the subject 
chosen for the study, the research process is concerned with producing ‘know’-ledge.
Scheurich (1997:29) states:
Epistemology is the study of how we know or of what the rules of knowing are. From 
my perspective how I see (my epistemology) must precede what I see (my ontology) 
because how I see shapes, frames, determines, and even creates what I see.
The suggestion that is made by Merriam (1998) concerning the orientation of the 
researcher is therefore raising epistemological questions that Scheurich (1997) 
confirms effect the way a researcher will choose and carry out a research method.
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In the last chapter the orientation of the therapist could be seen to exert a significant 
influence on any description of psychotherapy. Merriam (1998) and Scheurich (1997) 
would appeal- to be suggesting that this is equally important in describing research.
The second theme of this chapter concerns the emergence of the phenomenological- 
hermeneutic approach used in this study. A considerable emphasis is given to 
examining the researcher’s orientation since much of the discussion and choices 
associated with methods of research appear to be dependent on the orientation that the 
researcher has adopted. The decision to use a phenomenological-hermeneutic 
approach emerged from a reflection on the philosophical arguments that are presented 
in the first theme of this chapter. Although there are two themes in this methodology 
chapter they are inextricably linked.
A reflection on the philosophical stance of the researcher in this study is seen as an 
important pail of the methodology. What the researcher sees and records is 
significantly influenced by what he/she believes it is possible to see. It is at this point 
that the role of therapist and researcher converge in terms of how a person’s 
orientation effects what is seen and reported. The individual understanding of the 
therapist and/or researcher in relation to what is ‘there’ either in the therapeutic setting 
or in terms of field work in a research study is likely to exert a significant influence on 
the reporting of that experience.
Arthur (2001: 45) explores the potential influences that determine ‘a psychotherapist’s 
choice of theoretical orientation’ by reviewing the literature. Two variables are 
identified as exerting an effect on orientation:
...(1) the influence of training, colleagues, supervisors, initial clinical experience and 
(2) the effects ofpersonality traits and epistemological values, beliefs and philosophy.
Arthur (2001:45) further suggests:
The weight of evidence from the reviewed studies of cognitive 
behavioural/behavioural and psychodynamic psychotherapists, and analysis of the 
data, suggests that personality and epistemic traits are significantly involved in 
orientation choice.
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The issue that is considered in this chapter is the influence that the psychotherapeutic 
researcher’s orientation on epistemological questions has on the design and 
application of a research study. The underlying explanation for the researcher’s choice 
of orientation is not explored in this chapter, although it is acknowledged as a 
potentially interesting and important question relating to the researcher’s individual 
experience. The link between a researcher’s personality and orientation (Arthur 2001) 
might also suggest that Freud’s (1911:360) recommendation that psychotherapist’s 
should pursue their own analysis with an experienced psychotherapist should be extended 
to those carrying out psychotherapeutic research.
The epistemological orientation of this study will influence the type of data and the 
overall findings that are presented. As a consequence of carrying out this research 
exercise the researcher has offered a contribution to ‘knowledge’, in this case 
psychotherapeutic knowledge. However, the understanding of what might actually 
contribute to ‘knowledge’ and how ‘knowledge’ is conceived is strongly influenced 
by the underlying philosophical arguments that have influenced the researcher’s 
orientation. This might suggest that the first question that needs to be addressed by a 
researcher in psychotherapy is: ‘what constitutes psychotherapeutic knowledge?’
Erwin (1997:61) explores this question of psychotherapeutic knowledge identifying a 
contrast between ‘objectivism’ and ‘constructivism’, which is considered in more 
detail later in this chapter, he states in relation to the later:
...if reality does not exist independently of our constructions, it may be pointless to 
try to validate Imowledge claims by appeal to empirical evidence.
If a person believes that an object seen in the world does not exist independently of 
their description of it then it would appear pointless to toil in the pursuit of evidence 
to verify what has been seen since the image of the object will always depend on how 
the person sees it. This constructivist view contrasts with the objectivist position 
outlined by Erwin (1997), which is also explored in more detail later in this chapter, 
where objects are assumed to exist and consequently validation becomes a process of 
confirming the existence of what has been seen.
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So it would seem that by examining a psychotherapeutic researcher’s epistemological 
orientation questions related to the nature of psychotherapeutic knowledge are 
inevitably raised. A research method developed to produce ‘knowledge’ should have 
assumed an understanding of what was meant by ‘knowledge’ prior to producing 
findings. Consequently, this chapter examines the researcher’s understanding of 
epistemology and the orientation that dictates the direction of this study.
An examination of this researcher’s orientation to epistemology begins with a 
comparison between Plato and Aristotle. The reason for beginning here is related 
more to the influence of the researcher’s learning experience and it’s content then to 
any attempt to suggest that this is where such a discussion should begin. The contrast 
between Plato and Aristotle provides a convenient place to begin this reflection, 
where Plato looked to an internal source of knowledge in what he described as the 
‘soul’, Aristotle looked for knowledge in the experience of the external world 
(Cushman 1976).
The contrast between the epistemological perspectives of Plato and Aristotle provides 
the basis for developing a comparison of idealism and realism in relation to 
psychotherapeutic knowledge, which is considered important to the researcher in 
developing an understanding of the potential influence that his orientation has exerted 
on this study. The epistemological questions that emerge from the comparison of 
different approaches to conceiving and attempting to understand the world provide a 
basis for identifying the work of Polanyi (1983, 1998) as a significant influence 
underlying the choice of method to cany out this study.
The pragmatic approach to research advocated by Polanyi (1983, 1998), and described 
in more detail later in the chapter, leads the researcher to favour a qualitative approach 
to research. The practical focus on a case of psychotherapy influenced the researcher 
to examine a case study approach to research. The literature on case study is examined 
and the interpretations and arguments used to justify and critique different approaches 
to case study have been directly influenced by the researcher’s orientation. An 
approach to case study grounded in phenomenology emerges as the method for this 
study. The distinction between a case study ‘approach’ and a ‘method’ is particularly 
significant for this study.
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The focus of a study on a particular ‘case’ of psychotherapy raises practical questions 
relating to how and from what direction the researcher is going to develop the 
research. The case of psychotherapy chosen for this study could be examined from 
either the patient’s, the therapist’s or even a ‘neutral’ observer’s perspective of the 
therapy. The choice of one of these research directions is likely to be influenced by 
the philosophical orientation of the researcher. Rennie and Toukmanian (1992:235) 
describe some of the ‘directions’ that might be considered in psychotherapy research 
calling them ‘vantage points’. The fact that the researcher and the therapist in this 
study are the same person appeared to favour the adoption of the therapist’s vantage 
point as the direction for this study. However, in choosing this vantage point the 
researcher inevitably raises epistemological issues that need to be considered in 
formalising the method for the study. This is illustrated by considering the approach 
to case study used by Freud, who was committed to the use of the therapist’s 
observations as a means of research. Freud (1927:708) conceived psychoanalysis as a 
means of research in itself and presented his clinical case studies as illustrations of 
analytic technique that relied on repetition to provide validity:
In point offact psychoanalysis is a method of research, an impartial instrument, like 
the infinitesimal calculus, as it were.
This view expressed by Freud is contentious and is based on the assumption that what 
the therapist observes corresponds to what is really in the world. It makes the 
inherent assumption that the world exists and that a researcher (or psychoanalyst in 
this case) can observe a ‘thing’ and that the subsequent description is representative of 
what is ‘there’ in the world. In making this assumption Freud was identifying his 
‘orientation’ to reality, which has been noted as a rudimentary stage in the process of 
carrying out research (Rennie & Toukmanian 1992, Merriam 1998). The assumptions 
made by a researcher on the issue of the relationship of observation to reality, shown 
here in relation to Freud, is a key issue in determining the research method chosen by 
a researcher (Merriam 1998).
In the previous chapter the following quote from Freud (1911:358) was used to 
demonstrate the importance of exploring the theoretical background of a therapist in 
order to identify psychotherapy as a focus for research:
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I must however make clear that what I am asserting is that this technique is the only 
one suited to my individuality; I do not venture to deny that a physician quite 
differently constituted might find himself driven to adopt a different attitude to 
patients and to the task before him.
As Freud conceived psycho-analysis as a means of research in itself the point made in 
the above quote suggests that the individual ‘constitution’ of the analyst influences 
what is seen and how they will carry out the research process (psycho-analysis). This 
argument appears to confirm the point made by Scheurich (1997) and Merriam (1998) 
at the begimiing of this chapter, who identify the need to examine the epistemological 
orientation of the researcher in order to better understand the research process being 
pursued.
This epistemological starting point, advocated by this researcher, could be overlooked 
in favour of a reflection on the choice of method that provides the best practical 
solution to managing the data produced by the study. So the choice of method 
becomes more an empirical decision rather than a philosophical one. For as McLeod 
(1994:31-32) states:
There are many traps surrounding the subject of research design. It is easy to 
become preoccupied with the need to come up with the perfect design. However, the 
hope offinding a perfect research design is viewed as an irrational belief - all 
research plans have their weaknesses and limitations. It is often helpful to look 
closely at studies that have already been published, and borrow design features from 
studies that appear to have been successful in producing knowledge that is relevant 
and appropriate.
The point made by McLeod is meant as practical advice to a student of research. 
However, using or ‘borrowing’ other researcher’s methods of successfully 
‘...producing knowledge ’, terms used in the quote above, may have significant 
epistemological implications for this or any study that could easily be overlooked if 
the focus is on carrying out the process, producing the findings and writing the 
conclusions. Scheurich (1997:30) suggests that much of the research carried out in the 
social sciences is based on naive realism, where the assumption is made ‘that
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conventional social science research methods unproblematically ensure accurate or 
valid representations of reality’. Therefore very little attention is given to how a 
researcher’s orientation towards questions of reality (Merriam 1998) might influence 
the study. A researcher is adopting another person’s orientation towards issues 
relating to concepts of truth and knowledge by borrowing ‘design features from 
studies that appear* to have been successful in producing knowledge’ (McLeod 
1994:31-32).
Rennie and Toukmanian (1992:234-5) illustrate the issue of orientation by 
distinguishing between what they describe as paradigmatic and narrative approaches 
to research and identify that they draw on very different philosophical perspectives 
with regard to observation and exploration in research. These authors state:
...practitioners of paradigmatic explanation generally adhere to a realist 
philosophical attitude. It assumes that there is a world external to the observer that 
can be understood objectively ...whileparadigmatic explanation is deductive, 
demonstrative, and quantitative, narrative explanation is inductive, hermeneutical, 
and qualitative ...narrative explanation is constructive rather than objective and is 
more in keeping with an idealist than a realist philosophical orientation.
Rennie and Toukmanian (1992) are suggesting, in this reference, that a paradigmatic 
or quantitative approach lends itself more to realism and a narrative or qualitative 
approaches have more in common with idealism. The distinction made by Remiie and 
Toukmanian (1992) has been adopted in this study in order to explore the underlying 
epistemological basis for quantitative and qualitative methods in research. In choosing 
a method of research the researcher is adopting a particular way of seeing the world.
If the researcher sits looking out of his window and observes a tree, the description is 
likely to be effected by whether it is thought possible to describe and represent the 
tree or whether this is ever possible since there is no way of knowing that the tree is 
really there and whether someone else will see it in the same way. The contrast 
between idealism and realism in relation to psychotherapeutic knowledge, that is 
introduced here, marks an important distinction in terms of research that influences 
the way a study might be conceived and structured. The differing inteipretation of a 
persons relationship with the external world and the implications of this, has a long
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tradition of engaging philosophical speculation demonstrated by the contrast between 
Plato and Aristotle, who’s ideas will be explored in further detail later in this chapter. 
The ‘orientation’ of a psychotherapeutic researcher in relation to the basic 
philosophical questions posed by a contrast between idealism and realism become 
important determinants of a decision to use either qualitative or quantitative methods 
of analysing and presenting research.
The following quote from Russell (1978:87) suggests that the examination of the 
philosophical basis of knowledge is appropriate if methodological issues are to be 
subjected to an appropriate critique:
Philosophical Imowledge ...does not differ essentially from scientific Imowledge; there 
is no special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science, and the 
results obtained by philosophy are not radically different from those obtained from 
science. The essential characteristic of philosophy, which makes it a study distinct 
from science, is criticism (original emphasis). It examines critically the principles 
employed in science and in daily life...
The significance that Russell gives to philosophy in relation to science implies a need 
to explore the underlying arguments that form the basis for the two approaches 
described by Rennie and Toukmanian (1992). Terms like narrative and paradigmatic 
(qualitative and quantitative) will be considered later in this chapter, but the 
significant factor highlighted above is the identification of the philosophical basis for 
the choice of method. Scheurich (1997) suggests that a considerable amount of social 
research is carried out without any consideration of the underlying basis of the claims, 
findings are simply presented as if they are representative of truth and Imowledge. 
Underlying the different approaches to psychotherapeutic research are assumptions in 
relation to terms like truth and Imowledge or epistemology.
The researcher in this study embarked on an exploration of the philosophical 
arguments underlying idealism and realism so that the choice of method reflected his. 
understanding or position in relation to questions about knowing and knowledge. It 
would be possible to proceed with this or any study without exploring the 
epistemological arguments presented here, by simply producing a practical
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explanation as to why a particular method was chosen and then focusing on the 
findings. The application of a method and a subsequent focus on the findings might 
have much in common with the naive realism described by Scheurich (1997), referred 
to previously, which would appear- to marginalize the impact that a researcher imposes 
on a study. A researcher’s understanding of epistemological issues and how they 
affect psychotherapy research is an issue that this researcher considers a potentially 
important influence for this or any study. This chapter, therefore, reflects on this 
researcher’s understanding of the epistemological arguments that form the basis for 
his choice of research method. The philosophical ideas explored are presented as a 
means of identifying the influence the researcher exerts on this study (Scheurich
1997) rather than an attempt at a comprehensive examination of the epistemology of 
research methods.
3.1 E p is tem o logy  and the resea rch er
The first theme in this chapter, identifying the researcher’s epistemological 
orientation, starts with a definition of idealism and realism and then explores the work 
of Plato and Aristotle illustrating their contrasting views of how knowledge is 
generated. The epistemological questions posed by reflecting on the differences 
between Plato and Aristotle encouraged the researcher to consider the arguments of 
Descartes, Hume and philosophical scepticism. The work of Kant, Popper and 
Polanyi is discussed by way of exploring a philosophical response to the extreme 
scepticism attributed to Descartes and Hume.
3.1.1 Id ea lism  and R ea lism
Politis (1993:xxx) suggests that Idealism (Hume, Berkeley) developed out of the 
Cartesian dualism. With the separation of mind and its ideas from the world, Dualism 
still recognises the existence of the world separate to the mind.
It does so in the trust that we may know, by the sum of reason alone, that here exists 
such a world and what it is like.
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Politis describes Hume’s assertion that when you separate ideas from the world 
around you, it is only the ideas that you have contact with, and it is not possible to 
know this world that exists in separation. So according to idealism all that exists is 
our ideas and minds. Filmer et al (1998:27) states:
Idealism... is the view that the world exists only in so far as people think it exists. If 
our thoughts change, then so does the world. Idealism entered social science 
primarily through the work of Kant (1724-1804). For Kant, the mind introduces an 
order into sensory experiences, establishing their objective character... Taking up 
Kant's idealist position, social science developed the interpretative traditions, which 
argued that the social world is distinguished from the natural world.
Realism is defined by Stroud (1984:134) as ‘the view that objects exist in space and 
we have direct perceptual access to them’. Filmer et al (1998:26) state:
Realism is the view that the world has an existence that is independent of our 
perceptions of it, so that science is an attempt to explain in thought the things that act 
independently of thought.
3.1.2 P la to  and A r is to t le
The contrast between idealism and realism enters an epistemological discussion that 
can be traced back to at least Plato and Aristotle, where the differing conceptions of 
knowledge have a direct impact in the way a person can relate to the external world. 
According to Cushman (1976), Plato felt that a person’s senses interfered with their 
potential to interpret the world and could prevent them from accessing the potential 
knowledge of the world inherent ‘within’ any person. Politis (1993:xxvii) states:
Plato thought that if we want to know what it is for a person to be just or for 
something to be beautiful, and in general if we want to hww the unchanging nature of 
something, we must investigate the issue by means of reason alone, untainted by the
senses.
So Politis (1993) suggests that Plato saw knowledge formation as not simply a 
process of observation and recognition it was more associated with the facilitation of 
an internal expression of knowledge. The knowledge of the external world was inside 
a person and the potentially difficult task was trying to get in contact with this 
knowledge and associate it with what was being seen. The grasping of the knowledge 
was not a straightforward exercise for Plato, according to Politis (1993), a person 
could live their life and never really achieve personal contact with it; others might live 
there life governed by this internal knowledge of the world but be unaware of it in any 
tangible sense. Politis (1993) describes how Plato felt that individuals determined and 
focused on the pursuit of superficial pleasures inevitably inhibited their potential to 
discover the knowledge of truth that resides within them. Cushman (1976:64) states 
that Plato develops the theme of the passion of the senses ‘overthrowing the rule of 
reason’ in the Phaedrus and Republic. Cushman (1976:64) suggests that Plato saw 
the concept of the soul as the focus for a challenge between two principles,
Of the tw>o ruling and determining principles of the soul, one leads through 
intelligence toward what is best. The other is bent upon pleasurable satisfactions.
The two are sometimes in agreement within the individual; but, with most men, they 
are in perpetual strife.
The source of knowledge for Plato, according to Cushman (1976), was the ‘soul’; 
however there does not appear to be a detailed description of what this term might be 
only that it is allied to desire and the conflict between reason and superficial 
pleasures.
It would appear that Plato rejected the ‘container filling’ conception of education 
towards knowledge. There is not a large empty container waiting for things to be 
emptied in; knowledge is more of a recovery, and that this is not something that can 
be taught, rather it can only be facilitated by a ‘process of restoration’ (Cushman 
1976:87). Plato is seemingly asserting that truth is held within a person’s soul and 
that all that is required is to find a way to awaken it. Cushman (1976) describes how 
Plato differentiates between a person with knowledge and a person who is unwittingly 
motivated to live by the influence of virtue. The later encourages a man towards 
justice and truth but without a sense of understanding, Plato calls this true opinion.
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So it would seem that the person with true opinion might have a sense of justice and 
truth but will have no grasp of the understanding associated with concepts of 
knowledge. A ‘virtuous’ man could apparently hold true opinion, but unless it could 
be presented to another identifying ‘causal reasoning’ it would benefit the possessor 
of the true opinion and no other.
So a person might feel strongly that they should not drink too much alcohol.
However, when approached by an alcoholic for advice and a reasoned argument to 
assist them to stop drinking they might be unable to provide coherent and persuasive 
arguments. In this example the person who restricts their consumption of alcohol 
might be seen as having what Plato terms a ‘true opinion’; where they are seen to live 
a virtuous life but are unable to provide an explanation so that others can benefit from 
their understanding. It is the person that can provide the persuasive arguments when 
faced by the alcoholic that could be said to have what Plato describes as ‘Imowledge’.
In contrast with true opinion, there are two important characteristics of knowledge 
according to Cushman’s (1976) account of Plato’s ideas. The first is 
communicability, where Imowledge must admit to mutual corroboration; so people 
must be able to talk about knowledge. Secondly, Imowledge should speak of 
something seen to be true. It would appeal- that Plato was fully aware that some 
measure of communal, as distinguished from private, authentication is a necessary 
criterion of knowledge in contrast to an opinion. Cushman (1976:93) states that Plato, 
despite emphasising the distinction between true opinion and knowledge, still asserted 
‘the fact that every man must apprehend reality for himself. There is this personal 
‘re-covery’ that is affirmed in relation with others:
Knowledge... in contrast with true opinion, is a social, not a solitary attainment, 
(Cushman 1976:94).
Cushman (1976:97) suggests that Plato conceived that Imowledge evolved from the 
basis of true opinion by a process described as ‘dialectic’, stating:
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The fruit of dialectic is Jmowledge, for dialectic is a kind of alchemy capable of 
transmuting true opinion into defensible judgements ...All the language of Plato 
suggest it is presentiment of the Good and a consciousness of responsibility to it.
This ‘dialectic’ might be likened to a conversation between a group of people about a 
specific subject or a ‘true opinion’ with knowledge being located where the 
conversation generated a commonality of thought and understanding. The person 
confronted with the alcoholic who is unable to provide a reasoned argument to explain 
the benefits of restraint in drinking might find that a group of people discussing the 
subject of alcohol might be able to provide an explanation.
Cushman (1976:137) uses the following diagram to depict the three distinct features 
of Plato’s explanation of how a person achieves knowledge of the world around 
him/her:
A
A : The Experience
B: The ‘Form’ as it appears to the observer
C: The ‘Form’ that exists in the mind antecedent to the observation.
T r ia n g u la r  stru ctu re o f  P la to ’ s in te llig ib le  w o r ld  (F ig u re  V I )
So, according to Cushman’s (1976) account of Plato’s work, when all sides of the 
triangle are in place then empirical knowledge exists. When the experience (A) takes 
a form in the mind of the observer (B) and this corresponds to a pre-existent form 
already in place in the mind of this observer (C), the triangle is complete. It is
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possible, according to Cushman (1976), for C (the antecedent form) and A (the 
experience) to exist and for there to be no link to the immediate form (B) that results 
from contact with the experience; so someone believes something to be true but is not 
able to link this to what has been seen. Cushman (1976) suggests that Plato conceived 
the term ‘true opinion’ where the A-C side of the triangle is complete but A-B is not 
evident. The association with the immediate form or the completion of the A-B part of 
the triangle could be achieved, according to Cushman’s (1976) account of Plato’s 
work, by the process of a dialectic with others so that knowledge would emerge. So 
the A-C relationship or ‘true opinion’ requires a coherent and tangible link with the 
immediacy of the experience in order to illustrate the concept of Imowledge that 
Cushman (1976) associates with Plato and for the triangle to be complete.
Cushman compares Plato with Aristotle, stating that they agreed that ‘sense- 
experience by itself would never constitute Imowledge’ (Cushman 1976:138). They 
agreed that experience was identified by ‘forms’ and that once experience could be 
identified in this way that there was a potential for universality in any subsequent 
cognition. This is where the agreement ended for Aristotle who felt that the ‘universal 
is really in the particular substance being perceived’ (Cushman 1976:138). So that the 
object being observed possessed the potential for producing the ‘form’ in the observer 
that would lead to universal understanding. So this link between perception and reality 
would appeal* to suggest that if the perception the observer has of something in the 
external world corresponds to what is really there in the world, then the ‘the actuality 
of Imowledge’ is achieved. Thus Imowledge, from this perspective, is achieved by the 
perception of the data of experience, it is not the perception itself that is the 
knowledge but the embracing and working of that perception into a ‘Form’ that 
matches the inherent ‘Form’ of the observed substance. So the contrast between these 
two positions depends on whether Imowledge is confirmed from within a person, as 
suggested by Plato, or whether Imowledge and truth reside in the external world as 
maintained by Aristotle.
Aristotle will have nothing to do with a priori apprehension of Being such as Plato 
held to be possessed by the man of "true opinion ” ...A beginner in geometry has no 
previous Imowledge of the principles of that science, says Aristotle, (Cushman 
1976:138).
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The difference of the two positions, according to Cushman, stemmed from Aristotle’s 
determination to exclude non-theoretical influences from an explanation of 
knowledge. Desire and soul had no place in a conception of knowledge for Aristotle, 
for Plato they were its very determinants (Hawton (1956:28). So Plato’s triangle is 
reduced to a linear relationship between A & B, seen below:
A  
B
A : The Experience 
B : Perception of the Observer
Knowledge for Aristotle is associated with a unity between A & B.
A r is to t le ’ s L in e a r  P e rsp ec tiv e  (F ig u re  V I I )
The contrast between Aristotle and Plato serves to highlight how the differing 
conceptions of the internal to the external world may effect the way a researcher 
defines and positions an observation in relation to the subject area being examined.
If the researcher were to consider relating Plato’s triangle in relation to this study, the 
experience (A) would be the psychotherapy between the therapist and the subject of 
the case study. The ‘Form’ (B) that proceeds from these meetings is developed in the 
mind of the therapist and the triangle is completed by relating this to the therapist’s 
pre-existent understanding, an innate internal quality attributable to the ‘soul’ (Politis 
1993, Cushman 1976). Aristotle excluded the conception of the soul and its relation 
to knowledge; the research is left with the therapist’s perception of what is there in the 
meeting.
Hawton (1956) suggests that these different ideas highlight a serious philosophical 
debate between empiricism and rationalism, which leads this researcher to ponder the 
following questions: How do we know what things are truly like, by senses and 
experience or through reason? Does research focus on an examination of the world in
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order to discover knowledge or is it a process of confirmation and rediscovery? Did 
Freud ‘know’ before he observed or did he perceive as a consequence of observing 
repeating phenomena? Does the researcher already sense the answer to the question 
being posed and simply want to find an experience that enables him/her to be able to 
articulate it?
The completion of a study and its written presentation facilitates the possibility of 
speaking about it with others; it might be seen as the researcher’s ‘true opinion’. The 
potential discussion associated with others engaging with this ‘true opinion’ might be 
seen to encapsulate the dialectic process that Cushman (1976) attributes to Plato. 
Knowledge, in form that Cushman (1976) attributes to Plato, emerges from the 
ensuing dialectic in the form of a communal understanding. Knowledge from this 
perspective is not obtained by searching for additional external evidence to confirm 
that what is seen corresponds to the truth. Knowledge, in this form, appeal's reliant on 
a process of internal reflection and dependent 011 others to provide a commonality of 
interpretation. Cushman (1976) states that Aristotle did not agree with Plato’s 
emphasis on the internal source for knowledge, knowledge was to be found in the 
external world not by turning back into an internal source of knowledge. This 
researcher would find knowledge when their understanding corresponded to what was 
being seen, so that the psychotherapy being observed was real and explainable, the 
only thing required of a study was the right explanation. The explanation would 
appear to be found by attention to the observation of the psychotherapy, according to 
Cushman’s (1976) account of Aristotle’s ideas, a reflection back into the observer’s 
potential for internal understanding appears to characterise Plato’s position.
These two distinct positions exert a considerable potential to influence the way a 
researcher might approach a study, that is, knowledge as an internal process or as a 
perception of the ‘real’ in the external world, a perception of what is assumed to exist. 
The linear relationship between experience and perception that Cushman (1976) 
attributes to Aristotle opens up the potential for exploration of the external world in 
the pursuit of knowledge. However it also raises the dilemma of how an observer 
demonstrates that what is perceived corresponds to what is actually there in the world.
The following section explores a scientific approach to achieving knowledge of the 
external world and identifies some of the criticisms directed at this approach.
3.1.3 A  ‘ P o s it iv e ’ Science
Auguste Comte, the eighteenth century French sociologist suggested that all 
phenomena could be explained by a single set of natural laws (McLeod 1994, Crotty 
1998), this being the conception of a ‘positive5 science. These ideas have been 
influential in behavioural psychology. The positivistic approach measures research 
and enquiry against the exact natural sciences, McLeod states:
Positivist thinkers are only satisfied hy explanations that are framed in terms of strict 
'cause-and-effect and reject any explanatory models that employ any notion of 
‘purpose’. (McLeod 1994:8)
Travers (2001) describes how Emile Durkheim argued that sociology should be based 
on a scientific approach employing quantitative methods to identify causal 
connections between variables in the same way as the natural sciences. His best- 
known study on suicide compared the official statistics on suicide in various countries 
in Europe and related this to variables such as religion and family structure (Lazard
1998). According to Travers (2001), Durkheim’s approach emphasises large-scale 
research and that ‘common sense’ knowledge should be disregarded as a potential 
threat to the study.
Crotty (1998) suggests that Positivism is essentially something ‘posited’ thereby 
creating a foundation for building further knowledge, which is not formulated on 
speculation but rather direct experience.
For many adherents of positive science (positivists, therefore) what is posited or given 
in direct experience is what is observed, the observation in question being scientific 
observation carried out by way of the scientific method (Crotty 1998: 20)
(
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So this researcher suggests that a scientific approach would appear to base its claims 
on what is in the external world and uses scientific method to ensure that what is seen 
is actually what is to be found in existence. There appeai-s to be a direct link between 
the relationship attributed to a scientific approach and the relationship between an 
observer and an experience, shown in Cushman’s (1976) depiction of Aristotle’s view 
of perception and reality. This view of Aristotle’s work suggests, as was described 
previously, that the potential for knowledge and truth about an object in the world is 
contained in that object and it was for the observer to find. It would appear that 
scientific method is intent on identifying this external meaning and to ensure that the 
relationship is ‘real’. So the scientific approach embraces not only the observation 
(identified as A-B in Figure VI) but also the presentation of‘proof to solidify this 
observation. The following section explores this scientific method further.
3.1.4 S c ien tific  m ethod
Sjoberg et al (1991:29-30) suggest that sociology has been dominated by the ‘natural 
science model’ since the war, this model having been strongly influenced by 
‘philosophers (originally mathematicians and natural scientists) identified with the 
Vienna Circle:
This school of thought, often termed logical positivism or logical empiricism,
...structured intellectual discourse, not just in philosophy but in the social sciences 
more generally.
Crotty (1998) states that the Vienna Circle was responsible for identifying the 
verification principle, where no statement is meaningful unless it is capable of being 
verified.
Sjoberg et al (1991:29) also stress the influence of John Stuart Mill in the British 
empiricist tradition ‘and his analysis of experimental design’, and this is linked 
closely with the statistical approach to research. These authors also describe how the 
Vienna circle led to the development of a logical-deductive method where,
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Quantitative data are used to test propositions. In some instances these data are 
derived from surveys or other kinds of 'official statistics' e.g. data on the money 
supply); in other instances they are products of social experiments. (G. Sjoberg et al 
1991:30)
So it would seem that the deductive method begins with a potential law in the form of 
a ‘hypothesis’, which potentially speaks of something that exists in the world, a study 
will be carried out to demonstrate the truthfulness of the hypothesis. An example of 
the deductive process would be an experiment; so the investigator has a hypothesis 
(theory about a potential truth relating to an aspect of the world) carries out an 
experiment to test the hypothesis and then judges whether the truth has been 
discovered and can be related to the general, (Russell: 1978).
An alternative to the deductive method is the inductive approach favoured by some 
behavioural psychologists like Skinner (1982). Induction is seen as a method that 
produces facts and contrasts with the deductive method, which is concerned with 
testing them. The facts evolve from the study rather than an experiment being used to 
demonstrate an existing generalisation. Induction can also be seen as a process of 
developing inferences from a particular example or instance and subsequently places 
the investigator in a pivotal place in relation to theory and findings. Knowledge 
formation for positivists is determined by verification of findings. Crotty (1998) notes 
that according to positivists verification takes place via two routes, analytic and 
synthetic, and these two routes are considered in relation to the philosophy of Kant 
(1993) later in the chapter. The analytic route is where the subject is verified by the 
predicate, (The red bird is a bird, all man are mortal (Russell 1978:45)). Beck 
(1960:20) states:
Such judgements (analytic) are important in organising and expressing our 
knowledge-but it does not extend knowledge... it does not tell us anything whatsoever 
about the existence of the subject it mentions... “God is a perfect being” is such a 
judgement, and we do not need to know whether God exists in order to Imow that the 
concept of God contains the concept of perfection as one of its predicates.
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Synthetic is where the predicate is not linked to the subject, according to Beck (1960), 
a judgement is synthetic where the identified truth is not included logically in the 
concept. (All men are under 200) the only way this can be demonstrated as true or 
false is with reference to experience (there are no men over 200). Beck (1960:20): 
states:
Such synthetic judgements, whose truth can be judged only in light of experienced 
facts (induction), are called ‘a posteriori ’ in distinction to the analytic judgements, 
which are a priori.
Verification takes place in relation to experience 'not surprisingly it is in synthetic 
statement that logical positivism is primarily interested in' (Crotty 1998:25). This 
means sense data that we experience through our senses becomes verified knowledge 
and then becomes 'factual'. Therefore the synthetic judgement that there are no men 
over 200 becomes verifiable by using various methods to demonstrate that there is no 
incidence of men living over the age of 200. Crotty states (1998:25):
A clear disjunction must be maintained at all times between fact and value. If we 
want to deal in human Imowledge that has validated meaning, the pathway is that of 
observation and experiment evoking the evidence of the senses. We need to be 
thoroughgoing empiricists.
The positivist position maintains, according to Crotty (1998:27), that ‘objects in the 
world have meaning prior to, and independent of any consciousness of them5. This 
would imply that in relation to the synthetic judgement being used as an example 
here, inherent in man as object is a meaning, which dictates that they should not live 
to over 200. An observer has discovered that no man lives over 200 by searching the 
population of men and not finding any example of one that does not meet this 
judgement. Consequently according to this researcher’s understanding of the positivist 
position, since experience of the world shows no example of a man living over two 
hundred the claim is made that a fact, inherent in the object being examined, has been 
discovered.
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The inherent assumptions to the positivist argument are questioned by logic, 
according to Russell (1978), who restates the argument presented by Hume, that just 
because something has been seen to happen any number of times it does not mean that 
it will happen again in the future. This is a leap too far for logic and the best that can 
be attained is a high probability that something will happen again because as it has 
always been observed that way and probability, according to Russell, is not fact.
Crotty (1998:30) describes the work of Werner Heisenberg who spoke of the 
'uncertainty principle’:
...it is impossible to determine both the position and momentum of a subatomic 
particle (an electron for instance) with any real accuracy not only does this preclude 
the ability to predict a future state with certainty but it suggests that the observed 
particle is altered in the very act of it being observed, thus challenging the notion that 
the observee and the observed are independent. This principle has the effect of 
turning laws of physics into relative statements and to some degree into subjective 
perceptions rather than an expression of objective certainty.
Crotty (1998:30) also describes the work of Niels Bohr who suggests that we should 
not succumb too readily to the tyranny of prevailing concepts for there is a growing 
chasm between the claims made by science and the reality of what it can do. Crotty 
(1998:30) states:
Many of the so-called facts that serve as elements of those theories are not directly 
observed at all. Instead, they have been quite purposefully contrived and introduced 
as mere heuristic and explanatory devices. This is true of alleged 'entities' such as 
particles, waves and fields.
Crotty (1998) maintains that a picture of scientists actively constructing scientific 
knowledge is replacing the image of science being built on a process of controlled 
observation of the world. This critique of the positivists position identifies the 
impossibility of ever ‘blowing’ what is independent of consciousness when the only 
way to know this is through consciousness, which is the basis of the Kantian 
argument presented later in this chapter.
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Magee (1973:22) claims that Popper was successful in providing a solution to the 
dilemma by redefining the orthodox view of scientific method. He did so by 
identifying the logical difference between verification and falsification. Despite not 
being able to logically verify a scientific statement it was possible to logically falsify 
such a statement. According to Magee (1973:23) Popper considered it necessary to 
differentiate between logic and methodology when considering falsification,‘ a 
scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable, 
(Magee 1973:23). In practice this would provide no basis for scientific endeavour for 
it is possible to doubt any observation the attempted to falsify. It would also be 
inappropriate to change the scientific statement every time a falsification was 
observed.
Popper therefore proposes, as an article of method, that we do not systematically 
evade refutation, whether by introducing ad hoc hypotheses, or ad hoc definitions, or 
by always refusing to accept the reliability of inconvenient experiment results, or by 
any other such device; and that we formulate out theories as unambiguously as we 
can, so as to expose them as clearly as possible to refutation. On the other hand he 
also says we should not abandon our theories lightly, for this would involve too 
uncritical an attitude towards tests, and would mean that the theories themselves were 
not tested as rigorously as they should be. (Magee 1973:23)
Popper conceived this controlled scepticism as an approach that would broaden the 
depth of knowledge. But Magee goes on to stress that Popper saw no place for ‘truth’ 
within scientific method:
At no stage are we able to prove that what we now 'know' is true, and it is always 
possible that it will turn out to be false... So it is a profound mistake to try to do what 
scientists and philosophers have almost always tried to do, namely prove the truth of 
a theory, or justify our belief in a theory, since this is to attempt the logically 
impossible. What we can do, however, and this of the highest possible importance, is 
to justify our preference for one theory over another. (Magee 1973:26)
Popper felt, according to Magee, that theories did not have to emerge through any 
formal observation, that they were the consequence of psychological processes and
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were not associated with logic. A theory could emerge from a dream or some other 
human process the scientific process was associated with trying to defend this theory 
from a rational attempt at refutation through testing.
Lazard (1998:9) suggests that Popper rejected 'inductivist empiricism’, where 
scientific theories are claimed to derived from observation using induction. Popper 
believed this process of moving from observation to general law was not valid and 
that scientific theory is not derived from observation. Popper preferred a view of 
science based on ‘conjectures and refutations’. For Popper, according to Lazard 
(1998:10), theorizing is prior to observation, he explains:
Popper advocates a rational epistemology, that is, he believes that knowledge is a 
product of the mind actively organizing and making sense of our experience of the 
world. This is in contrast to an empiricist epistemology, which claims that 
Imowledge, and scientific theories of the world are derivable solely from empirical 
sense, experience or observation.
Popper proposed a single model on which scientific explanations could be founded 
upon: Hypothetico-deductive scheme:
Popper represented this ‘pattern’ in terms of the following formula (Magee 1973:65):
PI ~>TS —►EE -> P2
PI = The initial problem
TS = The trial solution
EE = The process of error elimination
P2 = The resulting situation
F a ls if ica tion  P r in c ip le  (F ig u re  V I I I )
Popper’s falsification principle appears to emerge from the dilemma caused by the 
meeting of ontology, epistemology and science. The objective world can only be 
confirmed by reference to the subjective, so what effect does this have on the
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definition of ‘our world’? Popper has redefined the science in response to this and 
feels that philosophy has wasted its time struggling with issues of ontology and 
epistemology (Magee 1973). Popper appeal's to be saying that what is identified by 
the theory, given the process described above, is what is in the world until it can be 
proven by sufficient rigour not to be true.
Popper’s revised inductive approach, as is shown in the diagram above, begins with a 
theory, which is produced by a person and must reflect how they see the world or the 
particular part of the world that is the object of the theory. Popper describes an 
approach intended to challenge and demonstrate this theory to be incorrect. The 
rationale presented is that the longer the theory defends itself from falsification the 
more likely it is to be representative of reality. The starting point for this approach, 
according to this researcher, originates from an idealist perspective since the 
observer/researcher begins the process by presenting an internal view of the world, 
despite Popper’s claim that such philosophical arguments were irrelevant. The 
epistemological starting point for the inductive approach is the person/mind and the 
world is explored in relation to this, and so epistemologically it could be seen as 
having a close connection to an ‘idealist’ strategy. Popper’s falsification approach 
might be seen to have more in relation with Plato’s triangle of Imowledge, outlined 
previously, then the observation-based epistemology associated with Aristotle.
Crotty (1998:35) provides a further examination of a scientific approach by describing 
the ideas of Kuhn who suggested that scientists carry out their work within a set of 
accepted beliefs, which exert an influence on them. Kuhn calls this a paradigm:
It is an overarching conceptual construct, a particular way in which scientists make 
sense of the world or some segment of the world... Thus, the paradigm establishes the 
parameters and sets the boundaries for scientific research and in the ordinary course 
of events, scientific inquiry is carried out strictly in line with it.
The scientific activity within the paradigm is called ’normal science’. Kuhn suggests, 
according to Crotty, that there will be a time when the boundaries of the paradigm are 
challenged, by a vigorous reinterpretation bringing about a ’paradigm shift1. This 
becomes the era of’extraordinary science’. Crotty (1998:36) sees this description of
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science as distancing itself from a detached, objective process, ‘To the contrary, 
scientific endeavour, as Kuhn conceives it, is a very human affair. Human interests, 
human values, human fallibility, human foibles - all play a part'. Kuhn’s conception 
of science developing and evolving within a community of human understanding 
would also appear to challenge the belief that science provides the basis for 
discovering what is actually in the world.
Crotty (1998) goes on to describe the ideas of Feyerabend, who’s basic position is 
that, since science cannot be grounded philosophically in any compelling way, 
scientific findings are no more than beliefs and we should not privilege them over 
other kinds of beliefs - even voodoo. Feyerabend describes an approach that allows 
any ideas to surface and be explored. He describes as 'respectable thinker' anyone 
who is prepared to present their thoughts and challenge and explore these across the 
full range of different opinions regardless of the extravagance of the original ideas. It 
is the openness to thought and challenge that brings respect. Feyerabend felt that 
scientists could test their opinions by counter-induction. It is an attempt to challenge 
a theory not simply to falsify it in the sense that Popper spoke about, stepping outside 
the accepted norms, into other realms such as religion, mythology and indeed any 
source, to try and avoid the conditioning associated with the paradigm phenomenon 
described by Kuhn.
Science would appear, to this researcher, to be developed from the need to identify a 
provable link between an observer’s view of what is seen and the actual object that is 
being observed, as represented by Aristotle’s linear perspective on knowledge 
illustrated in Figure VI (page 53). However, the arguments explored in this section 
have demonstrated that the burden of providing the proof of this link between ‘what is 
seen’ and ‘what is there’ has been difficult to achieve without depending on the 
quality of description at the expense of the authenticity of ‘what is there’ in the 
external world.
The following section explores some of the philosophical challenges directed at a 
scientific approach in more detail. The ideas of Kant are outlined and are seen as a 
response to the extreme scepticism of Descartes and Hume. The epistemological
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basis for this study emerges from the researcher’s exploration of the challenge 
between the claims of science and the scepticism of philosophy.
3.1.5 P h ilo sop h ica l Sceptic ism
According to Stroud (1984), the philosophical challenge to positive science is 
provided by philosophical scepticism (Stroud 1984) with the idealism of Hume and 
the dualism of Descartes raising questions about the value of research. Research 
would seem to be formulated on the assumption that experience and thought could be 
brought together in some way for the purpose of producing ‘knowledge’. In order to 
explore some of the implications of philosophy on epistemology the ideas of Hume 
and Descartes will be discussed where the inherent scepticism outlined questions the 
possibility of being able to link thought and observation in a meaningful way. Kant’s 
(1993) attempt at challenging the scepticism of Hume and Descartes is explored in 
this section, where he attempts to produce a basis for bringing the observation of 
experience and thought/judgements back into the realms of human experience. Kant 
went on further to suggest the potential for an idealist science. The credibility of 
Kant’s ‘transcendental idealism’ (Stroud 1984) as a means of verifying objects in the 
external world is considered. The researcher identifies the epistemological ideas of 
Michael Polanyi (1983, 1998) as the basis for exploring case study method.
The question of whether a person or researcher can prove that what they see 
corresponds to what is there in the world brought about the assertion of Descartes’ 
‘cognito’. According to Russell (1978:7) he attempted to define the existence of 
‘being’ through the primacy of individual thought using ‘systematic doubt’, which 
forms the basis of the term ‘scepticism’. He set out to question the existence of 
everything until something could be established with a basis of truth; Russell (1978:7- 
8) states:
By applying this method he gradually became convinced that the only existence of 
which he could be quite certain was his own...his own existence was an absolute 
certainty for him. T think therefore I am, ’ he said (cognito ergo sum); and on the
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basis o f  this certainty he set work to build up again the world o f Imowledge which his 
doubt had laid in ruins.
Stroud (1984:32) writes of Descartes,
...we are confined to what Descartes calls 'ideas' o f  the things around us, 
representations... We are in a sense all imprisoned within these representations, at 
least in respect to our Imowledge
Stroud (1984) describes the challenge that Descartes provided to realism by reflecting 
on the question of whether we could be sure that our sensory experience did give a 
‘real5 reflection of the objective world and whether this could all be explained by a 
dream experience. This challenge becomes the basis for philosophical scepticism.
The consequence of Descartes method of systematic doubt and the resulting cognito 
would seem to create a separation between ‘being’, seen as an internal thinking, and 
‘existence’ conceived as the external world made up of what can be seen. So the mind 
becomes what you think with and the body is part of the external world, a part of what 
can be seen. The mind and the body, from this perspective, are 110 longer seen as 
integral parts of a whole person because the external could be doubted in terms of a 
potential for fantasy and dreaming. This argument suggests that if thoughts are 
provoked by looking at your own body, then you can perceive and have contact with 
the thoughts that are generated, but have no way of demonstrating that the body you 
looked at was anything other than a dream of even a nightmare. Thought would 
appear to be the only location for certainty according to Descartes.
According to Hawton (1956), Hume took scepticism further than Descartes did by 
questioning the reliance on a ‘self. Hawton (1956:76) states:
In other words, when we introspect we do not come across states o f  mind owned by an 
Ego; there is no timeless particular at the centre, but merely a succession o f  mental 
events which has the unity o f  a swarm o f  bees.
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So Hume, according to Hawton (1956:76), challenges the certainty that Descartes 
attributed to a unitary concept of thought since a process of introspection may reveal 
‘nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions’.
According to Hawton (1956:77) the implications of the arguments put forward by 
Descartes and Hume produced a great deal of concern amongst both philosophers and 
scientists, he states:
It was one thing to shock metaphysician and theologians; hut Hume also shocked the 
scientists. For what sort o f  science can he made out o f  bundles o f  momentary sense 
impressions?
Stroud (1984) quotes G. E. Moore who directed a simplistic challenge to the 
philosophical scepticism of Descartes and Hume. Moore suggests that there is no 
difficulty in refuting scepticism, for if the basis for the refutation is empirical it 
demonstrates that the argument that went before is wrong. Moore's main aim (Stroud 
1984:108) was to ' refute Hume's philosophy by relying on the procedure of retaining 
what is known or is more certain when it conflicts with what is less certain'. Moore is 
standing in front of us saying ‘this is my finger (or maybe two fingers for sceptics), I 
believe it exists and I am not dreaming, and you can see it’. It is this claim, he 
believes, that holds up against the abstract arguments presented by the sceptics. This 
argument has important implications for research for it is concerned with reasserting 
the potential for the world to be seen as existing without the dependence on a 
mediator to provide it with a basis for discussion and thought as in the conception of 
substance described by Kant. The finger (or the psychotherapy) is there it exists in 
the external world and is not dependent on my description of it to provide it with 
substance.
Stroud suggests that Moore's response does not refute the sceptic’s argument. He 
thinks that to refute this whole argument by reference to one piece of knowledge is 
not reasonable. Stroud (1984:113) states:
How could Moore have fa iled  to entertain the possibility that the philosophers' 
denials o f  knowledge might be based on general considerations designed to cast
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doubt on the adequacy o f  the very reasons Moore or anyone else thinks he got fo r  
claiming to Jmow such things.
Stroud suggests that the arguments presented by Moore concern an 'internal' 
explanation to the definition of external things. Moore’s reaction to the observation of 
his finger is 'internal' because it is a response from 'within' ones current knowledge; 
the question whether one knows a certain thing is just a question whether that thing is 
already included among all the things one knows.
Burnyeat (1977) also notices and laments, according to Stroud (1984), Moore's failure 
to extricate himself completely from the epistemological predicament. He suggests 
that Moore's philosophy set out to avoid the traditional route to scepticism by 
continually insisting on the certainty expressed in everyday experience. But the 
potential for this position would work only if Moore could explain the certainty of his 
examples and provide a consistent argument that explains and justifies his belief that 
actual examples of knowledge are the primary thing that a philosopher should focus 
on, like the finger before their eyes. Moore fails to provide this argument, and relies 
on the external to refute the challenge of scepticism. Stroud acknowledges that 
despite the failure of Moore’ argument to refute the sceptical questioning of reality, it 
does stand as an example of the differing positions, ‘There is a finger’ as opposed to 
‘we can not be sure that there is a finger before us’. Although Moore’s finger does 
not disprove the sceptics’ position, it does not imply that the finger did not exist. 
Furthermore, just because a person did not see Moore holding up his finger does not 
mean that he did not actually do this and, of course, it could not be proved that he did.
Hawton (1956:84) states:
Kant was keenly conscious that Hume had precipitated a crisis in philosophy. He 
declared that Hume had awakened him form  his dogmatic slumbers and he saw that 
the war between Rationalist and Empiricists had ended in stalemate. No further 
progress could be made until a more satisfactory account was given o f  those concepts 
that appear to independent o f  experience. They must be dropped, and all hope o f  real 
knowledge abandoned, or else they must be justified.
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According to Hawton (1956), Kant attempted to provide a basis for Imowledge drawn 
from experience that addressed the questions posed by the scepticism of Descartes 
and Hume.
Kant was critical of Descartes ‘dualism’, as Politis states (1993:xxix):
...the separation that Descartes creates between an external and material world, 
whose defining characteristic is extension, and an inner and immaterial world-the 
mind- which is extensionless and whose defining characteristic is thinking. Kant 
argues that there is ju s t one world, the world that we experience, and that we who 
experience it and think about it are ju st one o f  its ingredients-the fam iliar persons in 
experience rather than immaterial minds.
Kant challenges the perspective of separating the world and ideas, and the concept of 
whether, within this separation, we can know the external world (dualism) or whether 
you cannot (idealism). He felt this question was ill conceived, as Politis (1993:xxx) 
suggests
In K an t’s view the question should be: 'are we properly entitled to draw a distinction 
between the world and how the world appears to us? But while claiming that two 
things are distinct certainly entails drawing a distinction between them, drawing a 
distinction between two things need not amount to claiming that they are distinct.
Kant argues, according to Politis (1993:xxx), that distinguishing between ‘the world’ 
and ‘the world as it appears to us’ does not mean that you have to deny or completely 
separate from an acceptance of a real external world. According to Beck (1960:22), 
Kant was trying to identify an object in our experience by means of ‘judgement’ and 
not just an ‘appearance’. Some thing known to a person by an appearance to the 
senses might be described as a ‘phenomenal’ object, since its place in thought is only 
determined by its presence to the senses of the observer. If the phenomenal object 
disappears as a form of sense experience then the object, as defined by sense data, no 
longer exists, as it is no longer stimulating the senses of the observer. However, Kant 
would appear to be offering more than the concept of a phenomenal object by
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reflecting on the observer’s judgement in relation to what has been seen. The observer 
makes a judgement on what he/she sees based on a previous experience. The 
consequence of adopting this form of judgement in relation to objects in the external 
world was to suggest a place for ‘substance’. So this appears to suggest that if you 
see an object in the external world then it becomes possible for a person to make a 
judgement about this object based on the previous experience. The person will still 
receive the sense experience associated with a phenomenal object, but there is 
something else that the person brings to the sense experience, in the form of previous 
experience. This additional quality that is conferred onto the phenomenal object 
would appear to be the basis of the concept of ‘substance’ for Kant.
Politis (1993:xxxiv) states:
...by describing what we experience in terms o f  substances, we are not reporting how 
things, phenomenal objects, appear to our senses; we are judging how things, 
substances are. This notion o f  judgement is central to K ant’s criticism o f  
phenomenalism.
Kant would seem to be distinguishing between the world that appears to us in the 
form of experience, in phenomenal terms, and the world described in terms of 
substance. Russell (1978:48) states the following:
The physical object, which he (Kant) calls the 'thing in itself, he regards as 
essentially unlmowable; what can be known is the object as we have in experience, 
which he calls the 'phenomenon \
Phenomenalism is distinct from the term phenomenology, which will be described 
later in the chapter, since the former corresponds to the impression of sense data on a 
person in relation to an experience of the world and the later refers to a broad 
philosophical perspective.
The following diagram highlights the distinction between the ‘world’ that is assumed 
to be there and the world as viewed by as observer.
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‘World5 ‘World as it appeai-s to us5
Disputable concepts which Concepts that are
Cannot be shown to be indisputably valid
Objectively valid. as defined merely in terms
o f  the ‘appearance ’ to an observer.
The World (Figure IX)
It would appear, to this researcher, that Kant assumed that understanding and 
knowledge of the ‘world’ as described in the diagram above can never be shown to be 
true and consequently he directed attention to formulating an approach to 
understanding the ‘world as it appears to us’.
Human understanding is always in possession of certain knowledge a priori, 
according to Politis (1993) and referring to Kant, and it is this knowledge that allows 
for a judgement in terms of substance. It would seem that substance is conceived from 
where the observer appears to invest something in the object being seen that makes it 
more than just a formation of colours and other forms of sense data. The nature of the 
investment made by the observer into the object being viewed opens up the issue of 
‘apriori’ knowledge.
Russell (1978:46) suggests that before Kant all ‘a priori’ knowledge was ‘analytic’ it 
was ‘called analytic because the predicate is obtained by merely analysing the 
subject’. Hawton (1956:29) credits Aristotle with this:
Aristotle classified the working o f  reason, and thus founded the science ofform al 
logic. He made the basis o f  it the simplest kind o f  proposition, a subject with a 
predicate: “All men are mortal” or “The Rose is red. ”
An observation like - the red bird is a bird- incorporates a judgement that is part of the 
observation; to deny that the red bird is a bird would create a contradiction:
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Thus according to philosophers before Kant; the law o f  contradiction, which asserts 
that nothing can at the same time have and not have a certain property, sufficed to 
establish the truth o f  all a priori knowledge, (Russell 1978:46-7).
So the red bird cannot be a bird and not be a bird at the same time. In analysing the 
subject that is in this case a red bird an assertion that - this is a bird- might be made, 
which presupposes that the observer knew what a bird was prior to making the 
judgement. Russell (1978:46) suggests that in making an analytic judgement the 
subject identified is ‘given as having at least two properties, of which one is singled 
out to be asserted of if
Russell further states that Hume (1711-76) bought into question the reliance on 
analytic a priori knowledge. According to Hawton (1956), Hume raised questions 
concerning the basis of accepting the initial assumption or assertion in the analytic 
judgement. In the judgement that a red bird is a bird the assertion is dependent on the 
observer knowing what a bird is, as stated above, but if the observer is not in a 
position to provide this understanding of what a bird is, then the analytic judgement 
becomes redundant. Hawton (1956:74) states the following:
. ..this is the point o f  H um e’s criticism -  unless the complex concept substance can be 
shown to contain components that are experiences (impressions), the universes so 
constructed are like dream castles. To be actual they must be built up o f  something 
actual -  sense impressions. A universe made out o f  ideas, as it were, may be self- 
consistent, may be possible; but so fa r  from  giving us certain Imowledge, as the meta 
physicians claim, it does not even give us probable Imowledge. Probability requires a 
basis o f  fact.
So from this perspective the observer might think he knows what a bird is in order to 
say that ‘the red bird is a bird5, but there is nothing really to suggest that these 
understandings are anything other than ‘dream castles’, as described above.
According to Russell (1978), Kant provided a further revision to the understanding of 
an analytic judgement by suggesting that all the propositions of arithmetic and
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geometry were not analytic but rather synthetic, as examination of the subject does 
not necessarily give the predicate. Russell (1978:47) explains:
His stock (Kant) instance was the proposition 7+5 = 12. He pointed out, quite truly, 
that 7 and 5 have to be pu t together to give 12: the idea o f  12 is not contained in them, 
nor even in the idea o f  putting them together, (Russell 1978:47).
The potential implications of these findings were that it seemed to negate the 
possibility of using mathematical logic to demonstrate the existence of substance 
since although it might influence how substance is seen it does not assume its pre­
existence. Two pairs of red birds will be seen as a group of four red birds, but this 
fact does not necessarily assume the existence of the birds in the first place.
It appears that the arguments put forward by Hume bring into question the 
dependence on a priori analytic knowledge in the process of knowledge formation and 
understanding, they represent ideas (the bird is a bird because the observer has the 
idea that this is true based on a previous experience to the senses). Politis (1993:50) 
suggests that Kant develops a different conception of what ‘apriori’ principals of 
knowledge are, where they would be seen to be in place prior to an ‘appearance’ to 
the senses. By establishing these principles, namely space and time, Kant felt he had 
identified a basis for substance and they had to be ‘a priori’ because they could not be 
shown to be valid by reference to experience.
In the ‘Critique’ Kant (Kant 1993:51) describes ‘Space’ as an intuitive precondition of 
the representation of an object:
Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every concept must indeed be 
considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite multitude o f  different 
possible representations (as their common characteristic) which therefore, comprises 
these under itself; but no concept, as such can be so conceived, as i f  it contained 
within itself an infinite multitude o f  representations. Nevertheless, space is conceived, 
fo r  all parts o f  space, even to infinity, exist at once. Consequently, the original 
representation o f  space is an intuition, and not a concept.
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Kant (1993:54) felt that time also was a ‘necessary representation, lying at the 
foundation of all our intuitions.’ and was the ‘subjective condition’ for knowing.
These concepts are a priori, according to Kant (Politis 1993], but not in the sense that 
they do not relate/apply to experience. Without these a priori principles any thought 
of substance would not be possible and there would only be sense-experiences or 
transient impressions that would not allow thought processes to develop. The 
researcher’s understanding of how Kant conceived the emergence of substance is 
summarised in terms of the flow diagram below. It would appear, from a Kantian 
perspective, that the senses of an individual open up the potential for a space to be 
created in the thought processes of that person, and the sense data generated is then 
processed and considered in generating a concept. The process, as illustrated by this 
flow diagram (figure VIII), takes place over the time span of A to D.
This process, summarised in the diagram above, is initiated by the appearance of an 
object. The appearance is communicated by sense experience producing 
representational information or a description. This is associated with the term 
sensibility, and the description takes the term ‘matter’. However, prior to this there is 
something that exists in the mind, according to the researcher’s understanding of 
Kanf s ideas, the object that is the focus of the sensibility has taken a certain place up, 
a space. The process of forming a concept within a space in a person’s mind has also 
occurred within a continuum, and thus assumes a conception of time. The therapist, in 
this study, describing the psychotherapy of the identified ‘case’ is not just reproducing 
sense data in the form of a series of images but is providing these images with more
C: Thought
D: Concept
Space and Time (Figure X)
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than this. The images are given a place within the time continuum by the description 
and they are also given a place by the therapist allowing them to occupy a space in his 
comprehension. As a consequence it would seem that the therapist has provided them 
with a basis for comparison and discussion by giving the experience ‘substance’.
Beck (1960:21) states that Kant saw his new theory of knowledge in comparison to 
the Copernican system of astronomy. Before Copernicus it was believed that the stars 
circled the earth, but this explanation made it impossible to explain the apparent 
motions of the planets. Similarly, before Kant developed this theory, philosophy could 
not explain how there could be a priori knowledge of things on the assumption that 
knowledge is a passive conformity to an object. Copernicus inverted the assumption 
and hypothesised that the earth circulated the stars to see if this better explained the 
motion of the planets. By comparison Kant did the same thing by suggesting that if 
the characteristics of a phenomenal object is in some way dependent on our knowing 
them it is possible to conceive of a priori knowledge of some sort, through the process 
of being, observing and the process associated with this. Politis (1993: xliv) describes 
Kant’s theory as a form of idealism:
Kant sums up his distinct idealism by the metaphor o f  mind imposing order on 
nature... so Kant thinks we must explain our Imowledge o f things by assuming that at 
least part o f  this Imowledge is not something we derive from  things but rather 
something we ourselves supply and impose on them in order to be able to experience 
them... Kantian idealism is the claim that concepts which are necessary fo r  our 
experiencing things could not state how things are in abstraction from  us and our 
capacity to experience them, so such concepts are applicable to things only by virtue 
o f  our capacity to experience those things.
Kant argues that in order to avoid the separation of appearance and reality, the 
concepts of space and time should be linked to our capacity to experience things. 
Politis (1993: xlvii) summarises Kant’s position:
I f  in experiencing things one judges how things or substances are, then one conceives 
o f  what one experiences as a single unitary world -  a world that can be experienced 
from  different perspectives and at different times. It is precisely the conception o f
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what one experiences as being a world capable o f  being experienced from  different 
perspectives and at different times that provides one with a notion o f  oneself as 
experiencing different things at different times, namely as a subject capable o f  
occupying different perspectives at different times. And it is precisely because with a 
purely phenomenal description the notion o f  a single unitary world is lacking and 
what one experiences is ju s t a series o f  momentary andfleeting sense-impressions, 
that a purely phenomenal description cannot provide one with a notion o f  oneself as 
experiencing different things at different times.
Kant’s argument assumes that in experiencing things one can have a notion of oneself 
as experiencing things. Politis (1993) suggests that without the concepts of space and 
time there is just transient impressions of the phenomenon being observed, and when 
an experience passes out of the thoughts of the observer the objects that make up the 
experience no longer exist. The concept of substance consequently enables the 
conversation to go on. The observer creates the space and time for the objects of this 
experience to be part of an ongoing conversation and investigation, but without this 
apriori judgement there is nothing.
The reflection on the ideas of Kant began with posing the question of how could an 
observer prove that what they see corresponds to what is really there in the world. 
Kant appeared to acknowledge that the answer to this is that you can not be certain of 
what you see, this is not to say that the real world does not exist but that we can not 
demonstrate that what we see and comprehend corresponds to what is there. Kant put 
forward a compromise in the form of the concept of ‘substance’, which he claimed 
represented a form created by the observer of what has been seen in the world based 
upon his or her experience. So in relation to this study Kant’s argument might imply 
that the researcher would not be able to demonstrate that what he saw and reported 
was what actually happened in the psychotherapy described. The description 
produced by the researcher of the psychotherapy in this study might be seen as a 
representation of what he saw to be there in the therapy based on his experience, 
according to the arguments attributed to Kant in this section. The representation is 
given ‘substance’ by the researcher conferring space and time onto the observation as 
a form. This form may or may not be equivalent to what actually took place in the 
psychotherapy setting.
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It would appear that Kant set about developing an alternative epistemological basis 
for observing and discovering the world having acknowledged that an observer can 
never prove that what they see represents what is in the external world. So external 
objects could not be ‘known’ as there would be no possibility of proof. For the 
external world to be proved they must be immediately perceived. Stroud suggests that 
although Kant would agree with Moore that the hand in front of his face is the proof 
that scepticism is false, this was not enough, he wanted to produce an explanation that 
defined the ‘truth’ concerning the existence of external things.
Stroud states (1984:142):
Kant rightly regards it as a scandal that philosopher’s have always endorsed idealist 
conceptions o f  perception and knowledge and hence have been committed to 
scepticism. It leaves them unable to explain our Jmowledge o f  external things as 
anything other than an act o f  faith, and hence not as knowledge or reasonable belief 
at all.
For Kant we must have an experience of outer things first if we are to have any 
experience of outer things that exist in space. Kant feels that Descartes argument does 
not explore deeply enough into the conditions of our 'everyday and scientific 
knowledge', according to Stroud. It examines the credentials for knowledge without 
examining the details. Kant’s view was that we can know nothing of the world other 
than as an 'appearance' to the sense experience of the individual. Stroud (1984:166) 
states:
...the only explanation he (Kant) thinks we can give o f  our position is one in which we 
Imow nothing o f  any independently existing things...I therefore fin d  m yself restricted 
to something I  recognize to be merely subjective, with no possibility o f  learning 
anything about what is objectively the case.
Stroud finds this explanation as unsatisfactory as that of Descartes and states 
(1984:167):
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It would not enable me to see any o f  the assertions or beliefs in science or in everyday 
life as instances o f  Imowledge o f  an independent domain... From the transcendental 
point o f  view... everything we Imow in science and everyday life has turned out to be 
subjective or dependent on human sensibility after all. It is not Imowledge o f  how 
things really are, independently o f  us.
Kant’s theory begins with the acknowledging of the external in the form of an 
‘appearance’, the description and concepts of this appearance are seen as the process 
of knowledge formation, but reality is confirmed. According to Stroud, an 
explanation that avoided a dependence on human sensibility would need to focus on 
the empirical expression in the external world to confirm its legitimacy and avoid the 
complexities of Kant’s transcendental explanation. One version of this would be to 
suggest that some possible sense experience is relevant to the determination of the 
truth or falsity of all meaningful statements. Aristotle’s linear relationship between A 
and B illustrated in Figure VII (section 3.1.2), describes a direct relation between the 
object and the observer’s perception of it in the formation of Imowledge. Therefore 
we could understand or mean something in a sentence only if there was some sense 
experience available to verify it. Stroud (1984:170) describes this as 'The empirical 
verifiability principle of meaningfulness'. Stroud suggests that for empiricists and 
scientists, transcendental idealism is considered meaningless in the activity of the 
verification of empirical experience. The observer is required to confirm what is 
already a reality, the external exists, and the verificationalists’ suggest that this object 
world can be confirmed by a careful consideration of what has been seen. So this is 
not a construction it is a confirmation of the world and subsequently becomes the 
basis of knowledge for the verificationalist. According to the verification principle 
transcendental idealism is a pseudo theory and can verify nothing.
3.1.6 Polanyi and Tacit Knowledge
Polanyi (1983, 1998) conceived the idea of tacit Imowledge out of the epistemological 
dilemma of whether Imowledge is formed or just confirmed by an internal process. He 
maintained that certainty in relation to Imowledge was difficult in most areas of 
human experience but some form of Imowledge of ‘things’ and the world was a 
functional part of human experience. Polanyi described this type of working
125
knowledge as ‘tacit’, and it was founded by the direct contact of people with the 
external world and out of a need to find a way to live. Polanyi (1983:5) began from 
the premise that ‘we can know more than we can tell’, a position that identifies that 
there is more knowledge inside a person than they are able to express which has 
similarities to the position stated by Plato.
According to Polanyi (1983) a scientific approach attempts to map out the world as it 
'is' and he argues that this not possible and that there is always a gap between what is 
seen and what is there, the explanation never satisfies. He states (Polanyi 1983:5-6):
...any definition o f  a word denoting an external thing must ultimately rely on pointing 
at such a thing. This naming-cum-pointing is called "an ostensive definition"; and this 
philosophical expression conceals a gap to be bridged by an intelligent effort on the 
part o f  the person to whom we want to tell what the word means.
Polanyi (Brennan 1977) is trying to describe what this gap may be filled with because 
there is a significant part of this gap that appears to be spoken and lived in experience. 
It is in this place that tacit knowledge exists, according to Polanyi (1983).
Polanyi (1983,1998) uses the terms ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ to describe the process of 
tacit knowledge formation. He uses (1983:10) the example of a human face to 
illustrate this where the awareness of specific features (proximal) allow the 
interpretation of the characteristics of the face (distal). So there is a movement from 
the awareness of the features to the perception of the characteristic of the face (mood 
etc.). Tacit knowledge was conceived out of this ‘from-to’ dynamic. The ‘from-to’ 
makes up the ‘functional’ structure of tacit knowledge. Polanyi identifies a 
phenomenal structure out of the process of remembering. A person ‘knows’ that 4 
times 4 equals 16 as they are aware the knowledge is obtained by learning the 4 times 
table. Polanyi describes a third structure the ‘semantic’, where meanings are 
displaced away from a person in a process of externalising the internal perception. He 
states (1983:15-16)
...by elucidating the way our bodily processes participate in our perceptions we will 
throw light on the bodily roots o f  all thought; including mans highest creative
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power s.. .In this sense we can say that when we make a thing function as the proximal 
term o f  tacit blowing, we incorporate it in our body -  or extend our body to include it 
-  so that we come to dwell in it.
Tacit knowledge is therefore, according to this researcher’s understanding, concerned 
with indwelling, internalizing a ‘view’ of the external and determining its truth or 
falsity depending on the quality of the explanation. It is not concerned with the a 
focus on detail as shown by the example of the piano player who focuses on the 
accuracy of the notes played and ends up with a less effective performance.
Thus tacit knowledge appeal's to place the researcher in the pivotal role in relation to 
the problem, not as a guarantor of objective knowledge but as the source of the 
potential knowledge associated to the area identified for discovery. Polanyi (1983:25) 
states:
The discoverer is filled  with a compelling sense o f  responsibility fo r  the pursuit o f  the 
hidden truth, which demands his services fo r  revealing it. His act oflmowing  
exercises a personal judgement in relating evidence to an external reality, as aspect 
he is seeking to apprehend.
Polanyi seemingly accepts that the discovery and the discoverer may be delusory, but 
thinks this remains a more sustainable position. The concept of tacit knowledge 
presents a practical approach to epistemology. It is not an attempt to describe an 
approach to discovering objective knowledge, rather it is directed to a working or 
empirical conception of the use of knowledge. There would be more emphasis on the 
findings of a study than a preoccupation with the way the results were achieved. This 
would appeal* to be in stark contrast to a more traditional scientific approach to 
knowledge generation, where the focus on the means is what determines the 
objectivity of the findings.
This has important implications for deciding on the appropriate method for this study. 
A researcher who identifies research with discoveiy in the external world needs a 
method that includes some sort of demonstrable evidence that what has been claimed 
too exist actually does. The traditional scientific approach to research takes up this
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position of discovery, and attempts to integrate a means of authenticating the results 
within a definitive scientific method. However, the epistemological arguments 
explored here appeal* to challenge the possibility of ever being able to authenticate 
discovery sufficiently to remove the doubt about the claims of research in relation to 
the external world. Polanyi5 s concept of tacit knowledge appeal's to introduce a 
degree of pragmatism into epistemology. The risk of fallacious and imaginary claims 
associated with looking at the world and making a judgement could be seen as worth 
talcing since all that will result from such misunderstanding is that the observer might 
be shown to be wrong. The approach described by Polanyi identifies the primacy of 
the internal over the external in knowledge generation and therefore shares similarities 
with the idealism of Kant.
The description of tacit knowledge provides a basis for looking at the world, for a re­
search5 of what the researcher has seen, in order to provide a basis for a working 
understanding of experience and every day life. However, it has assumed the sceptics 
position, Polanyi would appear to have taken up a position that questions what has 
been seen and the possibility of saying that this is what is there in the world. This 
researcher’s understanding suggests that tacit knowledge is an attempt to move on 
from the stalemate created by claims of truth and the questions raised concerning the 
basis of these claims, acknowledging that scepticism does effectively challenge claims 
to lmow what is actually in the world. This is an important argument to acknowledge 
prior to exploring the method to be used for a research study, since most 
methodological arguments depend on the assumptions made in relation to the 
epistemological arguments described. The researcher in this study decided that the 
pragmatic position outlined by Polanyi represented the most sustainable 
epistemological position to take before considering which method to use in 
researching this study.
3.2 Towards a Method
This chapter has so far outlined some of the epistemological arguments that have 
influenced the researcher’s orientation towards a specific research method. The 
empirical focus of the study is a particular case of psychotherapy with a person 
diagnosed with dementia, where the researcher is also the therapist. So not only does
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the researcher’s epistemological orientation exert an influence on a potential method 
but also the issue of how the psychotherapy can be integrated into an appropriate 
research design. The researcher decided that a pragmatic view of how research can 
contribute to knowledge was the most sustainable standpoint from which to explore 
the methodological issues that might arise from trying to research psychotherapy.
The focus on a particular case is a well-established means of researching 
psychotherapy (McLeod 1994:103); Freud’s view of psychoanalysis as a research 
method in its own right has been previously identified. As this study was focused on a 
case of psychotherapy it appeared appropriate to begin with an exploration of a case 
study approach to research
3.2.1 What is Case Study?
The term case study originates from that of a case history (Hamel 1993:1) and so has 
a tradition in the clinical setting of medicine and psychology. Kazdin (1982:p3-6) 
states that research using a few subjects has a tradition in experimental psychology 
e.g. Wundt, Pavlov, Thorndike and Ebbinghhaus, particularly at the beginning of the 
1900’s through to 1920’s and 30’s. This research typically excluded the 
characteristics currently viewed as essential to experimentation, such as large sample 
sizes, control groups, and the evaluation of data by statistical analysis.
Merriam identifies the typical factor in case study research:
The single most defining characteristic o f  case study research lies in delimiting the 
object o f  study, the case... a thing, a single entity, a unit around which there are 
boundaries. I  can fence in ’ what I  am going to study. The case then, could be a 
person such as a student, a teacher, a principal; a program; a group such as a class, 
a school, a community; a specific policy. (Merriam 1998:27)
Kazdin (1982) states that within the experimental research tradition the identification 
of a single or few cases was seen as an effective way of being able to identify the 
independent variables which are those factors that could influence potential results or 
findings of the study. Something that can create potential difficulties in some areas of
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study, such as psychotherapy, as it is difficult to conceive of all likely influences on 
the findings.
Platt (1988:2) describes a ‘case study’ as:
One where more than one case may be used, but i f  more than one is used the 
individuality o f  each case is retained and/or the number o f  cases fa lling  into a given 
category is not treated as i f  significant...The unit case may be a person, a small 
group, a community, an event or an episode.
Hamel (1993:2) outlines the origins of Case study in anthropology (participant 
observation) noting that this appeal’s to have begun with the work of Bronislaw 
Malinowski. He lived in the Trobriand Islands during the 1st World war* in order to 
escape the conflict and recorded observations of the population Argonauts o f  the 
Western Pacific (1922/1953). This was the origin of modern anthropological 
studies/participant observation presenting the insight of the observer and the 
underlying knowledge of the group being studied. Hamel states (1993:3):
First-hand observation and information must be meticulously noted in fie ld  logs 
designed to faithfully reproduce the traits o f  the culture studied.
This type of anthropological study would seem to have methodological links with 
case study in psychotherapy where the therapist, as researcher, is a participant in the 
therapy.
Cowie and Salm (1996:15) refer to Coolican (1990) who suggests that case study may 
provide evidence of an ‘outstanding phenomenon’ which may open up new areas of 
research and investigation.
Stake (1995:2) gives the following qualification:
Custom has it that not everything is a case. A child may be a case. A teacher may be a 
case. But her teaching lacks the specificity, the boundedness, to be called a case...the 
case is a specific, a complex, functioning thing.
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Stake differentiates between three types of case study:
1. Intrinsic case study: Where the interest is in the specific case being examined, 
the researcher is intent on learning about this particular case. This could be a 
clinical case study of a patient demonstrating certain symptoms of interest.
2. Instrumental case study: Where a study is involved with a particular research 
question with the use of a particular case to gain an insight into this question. A 
study might highlight how a particular approach can be effective in treating 
particular symptoms.
3. Collective case study: When a number of cases are used.
When it comes to selecting one, Stake states the following:
We do not study a case primarily to understand other cases. Our firs t obligation is to 
understand this one case. In intrinsic case study, the case is pre-selected. In 
instrumental case study, some cases would do a better job than others... But many o f  
us caseworkers fee l that instrumental case study does not depend on being able to 
defend the typicality o f  the case. (Stake 1995:4)
Stake suggests that the real business of case study is not the formulation of 
generalisations, as other methods could be seen as more effective in achieving this; 
but rather the case study endeavours to modify existing theory. He goes onto to state:
We take a particular case and come to know it well, not primarily as how it is. There 
is an emphasis on uniqueness, and that implies knowledge o f  others that the case is 
different from, but the firs t emphasis is on understanding the case itself. (Stake 
1995:4)
Hammersley & Gomm (2000:1) quote Bromley (1986) who refers to case study as a 
clinical science, ‘in which the aim is not just to develop knowledge but also to search 
for a remedy to some problem present in the case5 (Hammersley & Gomm 2000:1). 
They also suggest that:
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The existence o f  close links between case study and various form s o f  occupational 
practice has sometimes been regarded as weakness, as indicating the less-than- 
scientific or even unscientific character o f  this kind o f  research. However, such 
criticism has become less common, and less widely accepted, in recent years. One 
reasons fo r  this is has been growing public suspicion o f  science, and increasing 
doubts about the possibility or desirability o f  a science o f  social life. (Hammersley & 
Gomm 2000:2).
These authors highlight the difference that distinguishes experimental research from 
case study, the fact that the direct variables are controlled with the experiment and 
also ‘the researcher creates the case(s) studied, whereas case study researchers 
construct cases out of naturally occurring social situations’ (Hammersley & Gomm 
2000:3).
Case study does not specify one form of data collection in preference to another, the 
research can be quantitative or qualitative and possibly a combination of both, the 
definitive feature is the focus of the specific study. This is evident from the 
experimental and anthropological approaches to focusing on a case. The different 
approaches raise important issues concerning the place for psychotherapy within a 
conception of case study research. There is no uniformity in the means of processing 
or analysing the data, and this often depends simply on the area being studied and/or 
the researcher’s views on the concept of ‘reality’.
Merriam (1998:4), in order to identify the full extent of the case study approach, 
highlights the different approaches to research from an educational perspective by 
describing the work of Carr and Kemmis (1986) who specifies three basic types of 
research:
1. Positivist: The object/phenomenon of study is clearly identified as 
education/schooling. Knowledge gained through experimental and scientific 
research is objective and quantifiable. ‘ “Reality” in this perspective is stable, 
observable and quantifiable’
2. Interpretative: ‘education is considered to be a process and school a lived 
experience. Understanding the meaning of the process or experience constitutes
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the knowledge to be gained from an inductive, hypothesis-or theory-generating 
(rather than a deductive or testing) mode of inquiry.
3. Critical research: Research in education drawn from this perspective sees 
education as a form of social engineering, perpetuating the social and culturally 
acceptable doctrines, ‘knowledge generated through this mode of research is an 
ideological critique of power privilege and oppression in areas of educational 
practice.
Merriam illustrates the difference between the three approaches by using the example 
of ‘dropping out of high school... or non-completion’
From a positivist perspective you might begin by hypothesising that students drop out 
o f  high school because o f  low self-esteem. You could then design an interventions 
program to raise self-esteem o f  students at risk. You set up an experiment controlling 
as many variables as possible and then measure the results. Merriam (1998:4)
From an interpretative perspective the experiment would not be of interest, rather you 
might be more interested in understanding the experience of dropping out from the 
individuals concerned. ‘You will need to interview students, perhaps observe them in 
or out school, and review documents such as counsellor’s report and personal diaries.’
From the critical research perspective, the researcher might be more interested in the 
underlying social issues that influence a particular social class to be disadvantaged 
and thus more susceptible to non-completion. This example highlights the place of the 
‘case’ within a case study approach well, as it is clear that it forms the focus yet the 
very process of the research requires definition. Case study embraces the full range of 
potential approaches to tackling a research question. Merriam (1998) suggests, as was 
stated previously, that a researcher should begin with a clarification of their 
understanding on epistemological questions and then design an approach to the 
identified question. In the context of this study the research began with the 
opportunity to provide therapy to a person diagnosed with dementia. Subsequently, 
the researcher has considered the possibility of using this experience to explore the 
identified question. In the first part of this chapter a range of philosophical ideas were 
presented which potentially influence the choice of the approach to be chosen by the
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researcher in this study. The need to make a decision about the underlying orientation 
of a study is common to all research endeavours (Merriam 1998, Rennie & 
Toukmanian 1992). The following section will outline the relationship between the 
psychotherapy, which is the focus of the research (described in chapter 2), and the 
research process. The research process is based on the therapist’s account as the 
vantage point for the data and dictated to by the researcher’s orientation that has 
already been shown to be influenced by the pragmatic position assumed by Polanyi 
(1983) and the concept of ‘Tacit knowledge’.
3.2.2 A Clinical Case Study
This study proposes to carry out the following process:
Is therapy possible with a person 
diagnosed with dementia?
I
An account/ 
description of the therapy from 
the therapist’s vantage point.
Therapist/
Researcher
Analysand
Patient
Inductive/deductive process attempting 
to discover an ‘answer’ from 
the researcher’s own observation 
of the world.
A Clinical Case Study (Figure XI)
The diagram above shows how the research cuts through the therapeutic relationship 
represented by the horizontal arrows pointing into a therapy space. The research
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process is dependent on the therapist’s view/account of the therapeutic relationship. 
This is a case study approach that depends on descriptive data to produce an answer to 
the research question. The data will be in the form of a qualitative description or 
interpretation of what the therapist has observed in the therapy. However, it is the 
orientation of the researcher carrying out the interpretation and their perspective on 
the philosophical issues explored earlier that will determine where the study relates to 
claims of knowledge and truth. This approach would be inductive if  it did not begin 
with a hypothesis and focused on an observation and leading onto theory generation. 
However it is possible for it to be deductive if the therapist is using the observation to 
confirm a pre-existent theory or hypothesis. So whether the researcher is generating, 
confirming theory or maybe even exploring theory determines the approach. There is 
also the question of what sort of ‘world’ is being observed or tested by the researcher 
in focusing on the therapy from the therapist’s vantage point. The question is posed to 
the researcher as to whether what is seen corresponds to what is external to him/her 
and in the ‘world’ or whether this view can only ever be the therapist’s picture of 
what might be in the ‘world’.
The data produced in this study is in the form of a therapist’s account or description of 
the psychotherapy being examined and Merriam (1998) claims that descriptive data is 
associated with qualitative research methods. The following section explores the link 
between qualitative research and case study, starting with a brief comparison between 
qualitative and quantitative methods.
3.2.3 A Qualitative Approach in Case study
Quantitative and qualitative methods are often distinguished by suggesting that the 
former utilises a numerically orientated and measured approach to research (McLeod 
1994) and the later works with more descriptive data (McLeod 1994, Merriam 1998). 
The following table is taken from Merriam (1998:9) and shows a comparison of the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to research:
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Points of comparison Qualitative Research Quantitative Research
Focus of research 
Philosophical roots
Associated phrases
Goal of investigation
Design Characteristics 
Sample
Data collection
Mode of analysis 
Findings
Quality (nature, essence)
Phenomenology, symbolic 
interactionism
Fieldwork, ethnography, 
naturalistic, grounded, 
constructivist
Understanding, description, 
discovery, meaning, 
hypothesis generating
Flexible, evolving, emergent
Small, nonrandom, 
purposeful, theoretical
Researcher is primary 
instrument, interviews, 
observations, documents
Inductive (by researcher)
Comprehensive, holistic, 
expansive, richly descriptive
Quantity (how much, how 
many)
Positivism, logical 
empiricism
Experimental, empirical, 
statistical
Prediction, control, 
description, confirmation, 
hypothesis testing
Predetermined, structured
Large, random, 
representative
Inanimate instruments 
(scales, tests, surveys, 
questionnaires, computers)
Deductive (by statistical 
methods)
Precise, numerical
Characteristics of Qualitative and Quantitative Research (Figure XII)
Merriam [1998:6) identifies some specific characteristics of qualitative research: -
- That it is based on the assumption ‘reality is constructed by individuals interacting 
with their social worlds’.
- It is interested in ‘understanding the meaning people have constructed’ and how 
they make sense of the world.
Directly concerned with experience.
-This is compared with quantitative research: -
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The examination of an identified phenomenon by focusing on the component 
parts-which become the variables in the study.
Qualitative research looks at the subject area as a whole, examining context and 
attempts to understand the situations in its entirety, Merriam (1998:6-7) states:
The key concern is understanding the phenomenon o f  interest from  the participant‘s 
perspectives, not the researcher’s. This is sometimes referred to as the emic, or 
insider’s perspective, versus the etic, or outsider’s view.
Another characteristic of qualitative research is that the researcher is the primary 
instrument of data collection and analysis as was highlighted in the anthropological 
case studies described by Hamel (1993). This is in contrast to the use of a 
questionnaire or other inanimate data collection tools. The implication of this is that 
the researcher is responsive to the particular set of circumstances that influences the 
data collection and can react to the specific circumstances of the moment. (Merriam 
1998:7)
A  third characteristic is that qualitative research usually involves fieldwork, being ‘in 
touch’ with the subject of the study, again typified by the anthropological studies, 
Merriam (1998:8) states:
Typically, qualitative research findings are in the form  o f themes, categories, 
typologies, concepts, tentative hypotheses, even theory, which have been inductively 
derivedfrom the data... The product o f  a qualitative study is richly descriptive. Words 
and pictures rather than numbers are used to convey what the researcher has learned 
about a phenomenon.
The choice of qualitative case studies, according to Merriam (1998:28), arises 
precisely because researchers are interested in ‘insight, discovery, and interpretation 
rather then hypothesis testing’. By focusing on a single phenomenon or entity (the 
case), the researcher attempts to discover the factors that influence the phenomenon. 
The case study focuses on a ‘holistic description and explanation’.
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A case study in qualitative research might be chosen because of the uniqueness, an 
atypical case that contributes to greater understanding and experience. Merriam 
(1998:34) states:
The qualitative case study can be defined in terms o f  analysis (the bounded system, 
the case), or the end product. As the product o f  an investigation, a case study is an 
intensive, holistic description and analysis o f  a single entity, phenomenon, or social 
unit Case studies are particularistic, descriptive and heuristic and not to be confused 
with casework, case method, case history or case report. As in all research, the 
choice o f  a case study design depends upon what the researcher wants to know.
The emphasis in this definition revolves around the descriptive quality that is seen as 
inherent in a qualitative approach. What becomes difficult to define is the 
relationship that this descriptive data has to a conception of knowledge and its 
relationship to how the researcher sees the world. Is the description seen as an 
interesting illustration or a microcosm analogous to the wider macrocosm? It is this 
reflection that encompasses the breath of what is described as qualitative research and 
centres around consideration of the relationship between research and knowledge 
creation. Merriam (1998:40-1) identifies a link between the descriptive nature of 
qualitative case study methods and knowledge formation:
Anchored in real-life situations, the case study results in a rich and holistic account o f  
a phenomenon. It offers insights and illuminates meanings that expand its reader’s 
experiences. These insights can be construed as tentative hypotheses that help 
structure future research; hence, case study plays an important role in advancing a 
f ie ld ’s Imowledge base. Because o f  its strengths, case study is a particularly 
appealing design fo r  applied fields o f  study such as education.
Frey et al (1992) describes ethnography as a research approach, within this qualitative 
perspective, that takes place in a social setting and attempts to describe and explore 
people’s behaviour and communication where it takes place. It is a method that is 
usually influenced by an approach called ‘symbolic interaction’, which suggests that 
people are largely influenced by ‘local’ factors that are often dictated by the situation 
itself. This contrasts with the positivist perspective that searches for universal laws to 
explain observations.
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Crotty (1998:41) suggests that the claims that positivism makes concerning the 
identification of a meaningful, objective world have been seriously questioned by 
Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, as explained earlier in this chapter. This critique has 
been successful, according to Crotty, in encouraging thought away form the elitist 
positivist position or to at least to be increasingly hesitant to accept the claims 
associated with findings. Crotty suggests that these claims should be linked to the type 
of assertion that is being made by the researcher of his results. Are they presented as 
truths or a set of interpretations?
...it is a matter ofpositivism vs. non-positivism, not a matter o f  quantitative vs. 
qualitative. It is possible fo r  a quantitative piece o f  work to be offered in a non- 
positivist form. On the other hand, there is plenty o f  scope fo r  qualitative research to 
be understoodpositivistically... fo r  even self-professed qualitative researchers to be 
quite positivist in orientation and purpose.
According to Crotty (1998), a study utilising a qualitative method and then 
performing a triangulation for reasons of validation and confirmation is taking a 
positivist form. It is not the use of quantitative methods that turns their study into a 
positivist piece of work, but rather the commitment to a scientifically orientated 
approach, striving for objectivity, validity and generalisability in the study. This 
observation by Crotty suggests that close scrutiny needs to be given to the position 
that the findings are given by the researcher in order to clarify the underlying basis for 
the claims of a study.
The following section explores a positivist critique of attempts to use a clinical focus 
to case study and identifies suggestions that have been made to improve this 
approach. The arguments explored in this section assist in providing a basis for the 
method in this study to emerge by demonstrating the limitations that are evident in a 
clinical approach from a scientific perspective.
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3 .2 .4  C r itiq u e  o f  a c lin ica l ca se  stu d y  a p p ro a ch
Despite acknowledging the prominence of clinical work in theory formation for 
psychology, Kazdin (1982) directs a comprehensive critique of this approach to 
research. He suggests that despite the clinical significance given to prominent case 
studies, investigative methods did not evolve to the same extent as the experimental 
methods,
In experimental research, the focus on one or few  cases often included the careful 
specification o f  the independent variables (e.g. events or conditions presented to the 
subject such as the particular pairing o f  stimuli [Pavlov] or the lists committed to 
memory [EbbinghausJ. And the dependent measures often provided  convincing 
evidence because they were objective and replicable (e.g. latency to respond, correct 
responses, or verbalizations o f  the subject). In clinical research, the experimental 
conditions (e.g. the therapy) typically were not really well specified and the dependent 
measures used to evaluate performance usually were not objective (e.g. opinions o f  
the therapist). Nevertheless, the individual case was often the basis fo r  drawing 
inferences about human behaviour. (Kazdin 1982:9)
Kazdin believes that validity is a significant obstacle for clinical case study method to 
overcome. The concept of validity in traditional terms is dependent upon the research 
design achieving internal validity in order to facilitate realistic external validity. 
Internal validity refers to the extent to which an experiment rules out alternative 
explanations of the results. Factors that influence the results other than the 
independent variable are described as ‘threats to internal validity’. (Kazdin 1982:77) 
So the internal validity identifies the explanatory power of the research design. 
External validity refers to the extent that research findings can be applied to a wider 
context and thus is associated with concepts of knowledge and truth. In traditional 
research terms the more reliable a study appears to be in terms of internal validity the 
more likely the claims are for external validity.
Kazdin suggests that there has not been sufficient rigour in the presentation of clinical 
work as a research study with inadequate attention to the potential of ‘extraneous 
factors’ having a significant influence on the findings of the study:
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The practicing clinician is confronted with the individual case, and it is a t the level o f  
the clinical case that empirical evaluation o f  treatment need to be made. The 
problem , o f  course, is that the prim ary investigative tool fo r  the clinician has been the 
uncontrolled case study in which anecdotal information is reported and scientifically 
acceptable inferences cannot be drawn. (Kazdin 1982:14)
Kazdin’s criticism of the clinical case study approach centres round the problems of 
internal validity and the implication this has for external validity. Spence (1997:79) 
affirms this position:
...the therapist is usually the only witness; i f  we don ’t trust his or her version o f  the 
clinical happening, we have nowhere else to turn. In the worst possible case, the case 
report is pure prim ary process -  a published dream.
Factors that influence the results other than the independent variable are described as 
‘threats to internal validity’ (Kazdin 1982:77). A clinical setting struggles to be able 
to identify all the variables that would be influencing the potential outcomes of the 
therapeutic process, and thus struggles to rule out alternative explanations for the 
findings of the treatment. As a consequence it becomes problematic to identify 
implications for a wider interpretation. As external validity is the main objective in a 
traditional scientific approach the issues raised by Kazdin pose significant problems 
for the use of a clinical approach in this study.
Hamel (1993:23) outlines the following criticisms of Case study:
1. its lack o f  representativeness, and especially the lack o f  representativeness o f  the 
case used to a point o f  observation fo r  the social phenomenon or issue 
constituting the object o f  study; and
2. its lack o f  rigor in the collection, construction, and analysis o f  the empirical 
materials that give rise to this study. This lack o f  rigor is linked to the problem  o f  
bias. Such bias is introduced by the subjectivity o f  the researcher, as well as o f  
the f ie ld  informants on whom the researcher relies to get an understanding o f  the 
case under investigation.
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Kazdin (1982) describes a range of measures that are about introducing more rigour 
and definition into the clinical situation to reduce the range and effect of the threats to 
internal validity.
Type of data: Case studies can vary in the type of data provided. At one extreme it 
is anecdotal-reports by clients or therapist. At the other extreme the data can include 
objective information such as self-reporting inventories, ratings by other persons and 
direct measures of overt behaviour. Objective measures have problems of reactivity 
and response biases but according to Kazdin (1982:89) provide a ‘stronger basis for 
determining whether change has occurred.. .Objective data serve as a prerequisite 
because they provide information that change has in fact occurred’.
Assessment Occasions: Number, timing and occasions of assessment. If the 
assessment is continuous rather than pre and post treatment then the threats to validity 
are reduced. Kazdin states (1982:87)‘Continuous assessment allows one to examine 
the pattern to the data and whether the pattern appears to have been altered at the 
point in the interventions was introduced’.
Past and Future projections of Performance: If performance changes when 
treatment is applied, the likelihood that the treatment caused the change is increased.
Type of effect: The immediacy and magnitude of change contribute to the inferences 
that can be drawn about the role of treatment. Usually, the more immediate the 
therapeutic change after the onset of treatment, the stronger a case that can be made 
that the treatment was responsible for the change. Any gradual changes or changes 
that begin well after treatment has been applied are more difficult to interpret because 
of the intervening experiences between the onset of treatment and therapeutic change. 
This is linked with the magnitude of the observed change. Rapid and strong changes 
provide a strong basis for attributing the effects to treatment.
Merriam suggests that you can use six basic strategies to enhance internal validity 
(1998:204)
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1. Triangulation: - using multiple investigators, multiple sources of data, or 
multiple methods to confirm the emerging findings
2. Member ‘checks’: - checking the data and interpretations out with the people 
who provided it initially.
3. Long term observation: - the validity is enhanced by the longevity of the study
4. Peer examination:-obtaining an opinion from colleagues. This might imply, in 
relation to this study, the possibility of testing opinion of the findings with a 
supervision group to improve the validity of the findings.
5. Participatory or collaborative modes of research: - which means involving 
others in every stage of the study.
6. Researcher’s biases: - attempting to limit the potential for the study to be over 
influenced by the motivation of the researcher by checking the assumptions and 
the basic concepts of the design with the acceptable ‘worldview’.
Clinical observation is one area of many that struggle to achieve a reliable degree of 
internal validity to persuasively conclude that the results of a study are as a 
consequence of an interaction with the subject of the study/experimentation and the 
identified independent variables.
The number of subjects included in the uncontrolled case study can influence the 
confidence in the study. If there are more cases that improve with treatment, it is more 
unlikely that extraneous events have been responsible for change. If the set of clients 
observed is heterogeneous the likelihood that a particular threat to internal validity 
could explain the results is reduced.
When objective assessment is conducted, continuous data are obtained, stable data 
before and after treatment are provided, marked effects are evident, and several 
subjects are used, it is difficult to explain the results by referring to the usual threats 
to internal validity. The results do not necessarily mean that the interventions led to 
change; even true experiments do not provide certainty that extraneous influences are 
completely ruled out. Hence, when case studies include several features that can rule 
out threats to internal validity, they do not depart very much from  true experiments. 
(Kazdin 1982:100)
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Kazdin maintains that case studies that include measures to offset the threat to 
internal validity are the exception rather than the norm, which tends to influence the 
general perception o f  this methodology. However, Kazdin concludes that even by 
adopting these measures a clinical approach can never achieve the status o f  
experimental design. The most that clinical case study can ever achieve is a pre- 
experimental status thus providing some insight into a specific area that would need 
to be explored with experimental rigour in order achieve any semblance o f  external 
validity.
The other concept in traditional research that is problematic in clinical case study is 
reliability, which is described by Merriam,
Reliability refers to the extent to which research findings can be replicated. In other 
words, i f  the study is repeated w ill it y ie ld  the same results?
Messer (1991) highlights the problem posed for qualitative research and a case study 
approach in psychotherapy research in particular, by presenting a case made up of two 
independent research groups using the same method that were found to produce 
different assessments for the same subjects. The findings from this study raise the 
methodological issues associated with validity and reliability explored in this section.
Merriam suggests that reliability is problematic in research based around human 
behaviour, as it is ‘never static’. Reliability is conceived form the perspective a single 
reality ‘which is a central concept of traditional experimental research’ which is 
intended to test hypotheses and develop causal laws. Qualitative is not conceived 
with this intention, and is involved in description and explanations.
The connection between reliability and internal validity from  the traditional 
perspective rests fo r  some on the assumption that a study is more valid i f  repeated  
observations in the same study or replications o f  the entire study have produced the 
same results. This logic relies on repetition fo r  the establishment o f  truth... (Merriam 
1998:205)
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______________________________________
The crucial basis for the critique presented by Kazdin is that external validity is a 
unique definable eternity that the world demands a single unique explanation and the 
task of scientific research is to provide this explanation. Hence the need for rigour in 
identifying variables within a study that influence the potential findings in a study. 
The precision in this identification is the determining factor in achieving a plausible 
unique explanation of the phenomena under observation. Reliability becomes the 
plausible test that the observations were accurate in that if rigour is maintained in the 
accuracy of the repetition in both the study and the findings, the credibility of the 
study is enhanced. The greater the number of repetitions the more legitimate the 
original findings become.
The critique by Kazdin of the clinical approach to case study highlights the potential 
difficulties that particular areas of study are likely to come across within this 
traditional approach to research. It is clear that the clinical setting will never provide 
the opportunity to achieve exact repetition; a treatment camiot be repeated in a way 
that allows the variables to be identified in precisely the same way that occurred on a 
previous occasion. Internal validity and reliability subsequently become inherently 
problematic in areas of human observation. Kazdin’s solution to this problem in the 
clinical setting was to introduce measures to improve internal validity such as clear 
explanations and descriptions of the nature and process of a treatment. Detailed 
description of the circumstances prior to the treatment and the nature of the changes 
that result as a potential consequence of an observed intervention. The 
recommendation was to be as rigorous as possible with the constraints of the study 
and reduce the threats to internal validity. Meyer (2001) suggests that the lack of 
specific methodological requirements in case study emphasises the need for case 
studies to be explicit about methodological choices which includes discussion about a 
the design, data collection procedures and data analysis which highlights the point 
made by Kazdin.
The position outlined by Kazdin (1982) presupposes that the positivistic position is in 
the ascendancy, it ignores the issues arising from the lack of opportunity for the 
findings to speak where they are overwhelmed by a need to conform to a strict 
research design. There are areas of human activity where it might be argued that the 
best way to ‘find out’ about something is to observe and this conclusion has its basis
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in ethnographic and anthropological studies. Qualitative researchers, as was discussed 
previously, have challenged the rigidity of positivistic approach. This traditional view 
of research positions qualitative research as an inferior approach, demonstrated by the 
conclusion made by Kazdin. The conclusions drawn form Kazdin’s critiques of 
clinical case study are clear, that this approach could only ever aspire to a ‘pre- 
experimental’ level. So that a clinical case study can only ever indicate a potential for 
external validity and an experiment would be needed to determine a basis of real 
validity.
Despite the limitations that are described by Kazdin, there is an acknowledgement that 
case study can have a place within a positivist paradigm. The criteria need to be 
strictly assessed but it can provide the basis for further deductive validation. The 
following section outlines some of the varying responses to the pre-experimental basis 
that Kazdin identified for case study. Kazdin has measured a clinical setting against 
an experimental environment, where the later is designed objectively to provide the 
basis to describe what ‘real-ly’ has been observed. ‘Real-ity’ is clearly separated 
from the observer in the scientific approach described by Kazdin. The alternative to 
this approach has its foundation, as described previously, in the idealist tradition of 
Kant, where it is assumed that the world can not be described in this objective way, 
since it eventually always depends on a subjective interpretation.
3,2.5 Redefining a Clinical Case study Approach
The critique described by Kazdin provides powerful arguments limiting the place of a 
clinical case study approach. If a study set out to produce valid findings that meet the 
rigour associated with a deductive experimental approach it is clear' that it would find 
the clinical case study approach problematic, a point acknowledged by Freud 
(1905:175). However, the following section explores some of the ways in which case 
study has been reconsidered in the light of the arguments outlined in the last section in 
order to re-establish it as a legitimate means of research.
The pre-experimental status opens up the possibility of conceiving clinical work as an 
inductive process, a point made by Hamel (1993:28-9):
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...a theory or theoretical fram ework f irs t emerges from  the study o f  an empirical case 
or object the approach to which cannot be deductively defined...All theories are 
initially based on a particular case or object. The in-depth study o f  this case or study 
w ill elicit one or more theories that could be validated by other objects or cases. This 
process w ill assess their general applicability.
Hamel (1993:29) emphasises the need for the theory to be in place prior to a scientific 
investigation, as described above, ‘ a theory must be constructed before it can be 
validated’.
Polanyi (1983,1998) takes this inductive process further, as was described earlier, by 
suggesting that it is a natural process linked to the every day concept of ‘common 
sense’, tacit knowledge is the natural social process from which knowledge emerges.
The implication of the argument outlined by Hamel (1993) is that the pre- 
experimental position described by Kazdin (1982) is not an inferior position. Theory 
must precede research into theory testing and the original idea must be drawn from 
experience. Consequently, case study provides a crucial opportunity to identify and 
observe theory in its natural perspective. Hamel maintains that the dominant place 
given to theoretical validation has neglected the recognition of its dependency on 
empirical observation.
Hamel (1993:31) goes onto to quote Claude Levi-Strauss who saw social reality 
dependent not on empirical representations, of what might described as ‘common 
sense’ views of the world, but rather should be constructed from evidence that has 
been challenged and tested.
...the meanings assigned directly by social actors o f  their own social experiences 
cannot serve in any form  as the point o f  departure fo r  theory, as these meanings o f  
representations will not reveal “ the concealed internal logic o f  the social reality. 
These direct meanings serve as a screen. Under such circumstances, theory must 
surpass such evidence to grasp the social reality that appears hidden beneath it.
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Hamel suggests that case study has been broadly criticised for its dependency on 
common sense, yet the issue remains that it is this type of material, which provides the 
starting point for ‘scientific’ studies. Edwards (1998) states that rigorous work with 
single cases or a series of cases is a basis for scientific investigation.. According to 
Hamel (1993:33) case study is an in depth and descriptive method that attempts to 
identify the meanings that are evident to the ‘social actors’ that are the focus of the 
study, he states:
The details and the depth o f  the description rendered by the case study perm it an 
understanding o f  the empirical foundations o f  the theory. (1993:33)
This description does not encompass an explanation in itself, it would have to be 
associated, according to Hamel (1993:33), with an ‘application of abstract and 
theoretical models.’ However, despite this distinction the description is a necessity, 
Hamel (1993:33) states:
The case study thereby attains a key importance in sociology and the other social 
sciences, in that it has proven to be a powerful descriptive study.
The major criticism of case study is concerned with stressing the inappropriateness of 
case study in being able to achieve a credible move from the ‘local to global’ (Hamel 
1993:34), as it is only concerned with a particular case. These difficulties are 
highlighted by Kazdin (1982) and Merriam (1998) by pointing out the problems of the 
‘local’, as measured by internal validity. The case does not represent, it could be 
argued, a valid picture to apply to the ‘global’. One way of shifting to a more global 
application of case study findings is achieved by the multiple of the studies carried 
out; Freud used this as the basis of psychoanalytic research validity. Hamel points out 
that in determining the number of cases that are necessary reference needs to be made 
back to the aim of the study, and that this will establish the appropriate nature of the 
study, if it is conceived appropriately. He states:
Because the objectives o f  a sociological investigation can help determine what 
number o f  cases are required, it would appear that such an investigation could be 
constructed from  a single case, as long as the latter proves adequate to meet this
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objective...The methodological qualities o f  the case thereby determine its 
representative value, in line with the aim o f  the study. The case’s representative value 
is further clarified by its description in the case study. (Hamel 1993:35-36)
If the case has been constructed with a specific theoretical issue involved then this can 
influence directly the representative nature of the case in question. Hamel suggests:
Representativeness is thereby ensured by the “sociological imagination ” displayed in 
the methodological tactics and selections employed in determining which case should 
be used, or more accurately, which subject should be investigated. The scope o f  the 
case study is based on such choices and tactics, the methodological qualities o f  which 
may be understood in action through the description provided o f  the object under 
study.
The step from local to global is linked to the nature of the study and its aim; if it 
allows for a single case to be representative, there appears no reason from the 
rationale outlined by Hamel, why it should not have global influence. If this is 
applied to the question posed in this study, ‘is psychotherapy possible with a person 
diagnosed with dementia?' only one demonstration is required to be able to apply this 
to the global situation. If psychotherapy is shown to take place in one case the 
‘possibility’ is demonstrated, consequently a global interpretation is produced. This 
could have wider implications for therapy research, as long as the question is 
formulated appropriately, there appears no reason why case study should not be used, 
from this perspective. But the issue that still remains is how to demonstrate this in the 
single case presentation. The therapy setting in the formulation suggested by Hamel 
could be said to be a pseudo-experimental setting and consequently raises the issues 
outlined by Kazdin.
The uniqueness of the ‘case’ highlights the potential, according to Hamel, for 
considering the process of inferring from the local to the global. The following 
discussion is used by Hamel to explore the issues of moving from local to global:
Jean Petitot: What relationship do you see between element/aggregate opposition and  
local/global opposition? How is the concept o f  singularity crucial in this respect?
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Rene Thom: The concept o f  singularity is important fo r  a very basic reason. It is one 
o f  tw>o tools a mathematician can use to go from  local to the g lobal Any deduction, 
in fact, requires a move form  local to g lobal These two tools go in the opposite 
direction. The first, which goes from  the local to the global, is that o f  the analytical 
extension. We must recognise that all existing methods o f  quantitative predictions are 
ultimately based on it. The second tool, which goes from  the global to the local, is 
specifically that o f  singularities. In a singularity, a global being is concentrated 
within a point. It can be reconstructed through deployment or desingularization.
Jean Petitot: This is a reversal o f  semantic connotations. Singularity has become the 
correct object, after having traditionally been the incorrect one. Thus you believe 
that singularities structure phenomena?
Rene Thom: Yes, I  believe that singularities are the skeletons o f  phenomena.
(Hamel 1993:37)
This interpretation suggests that other than the traditional ‘tool’ for generalisation, 
associated with quantitative analysis, there is also the reverse, the depiction be the 
specific that is representational of the global, that is as Hamel suggests ‘macroscopic 
through the virtues that selection and tactics display’ (1993:37). Hamel (1993:37) 
writes:
The case under investigation, through the methodological qualities assigned to it 
pursuant to the explanation o f  the recommended tactics and selections, becomes a 
sort o f  experimental prototype, to make an analogy with laboratory tests in the exact 
and natural sciences.
If a therapeutic relationship were representational of the issue under investigation, the 
selection of the case is appropriate to the aim of the study, and then through the 
implementation of ‘singularity’ the case becomes an experimental prototype. The case 
chosen for this study would need to demonstrate that it was representative of 
psychotherapy with this particular client group, and if this is achieved it becomes an 
experimental representation by inference. Hamel (1993:37) states:
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M atter is thus represented in miniature through this experimental prototype in the 
sense that, through its definition, and based on methodological and theoretical tactics 
and selections, it is globally reproduced on this scale. Such experimental prototype, 
fo r  example, condenses living matter, nature, and places to an extremely local 
reduced scale . This perm its an understanding o f  it and an explanation o f  its 
properties, which, on such a scale, become evident.
Thus the case becomes a microcosm to the global representation. The potential for 
being able to achieve this is dependent on how effective the aim of the study is 
associated to the case that is selected and the associated tactics.
Merriam (1998:202) questions the need to focus on the link between the local to 
global or the inverse:
One o f  the assumptions underlying qualitative research is that reality is holistic, 
multidimensional, and ever changing; it is not a single fixed, objective phenomenon 
waiting to be discovered, observed, and measured as in quantitative research.
This point made by Merriam (1998) marks a significant distinction between the 
argument put forward by Hamel (1993) to justify a case study approach by suggesting 
that it provided a rich vein of descriptive data in order to form the foundation of 
theoretical formulation. Hamel (1993) is still measuring the potential for case study 
as a research method against its facilitation of objective truth, that by re-conceiving 
the relationship between a case study and reality it might be possible to still use a case 
study as a means of direct depiction of the external world. Merriam (1998) is 
suggesting a descriptive approach that is about presenting possible meanings or a 
recognition that it is not possible to define a single objective representation of the 
world around us. This restates the epistemological arguments outlined in the first part 
of this chapter. The confusion and lack of clarity over this issue is a repeating theme 
in the methodological literature for case study.
Lincoln & Gubba (2000:32-33) describe how traditional positivistic generalisations 
are dependent on the conditions remaining the same in order for the law to be 
operative. This is unrealistic in relation to research into the human sciences, as the
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potential valiants are so great that it makes predictive generalizations inappropriate. It 
is questionable whether any research in the human sciences can achieve dependable 
and reliable results, as conditions will inevitably change over time to some degree. 
Consequently, Lincoln and Gubba (2000) suggest that generalizations ‘inevitably 
alter, usually radically, over time, so that, eventually, they have only historical 
interest’.
An answer to this problem, they suggest, is to build in a contextual consideration into 
the generalization. But this, according to Lincoln & Gubba (2000:32), makes the 
generalization ‘ too complex’, rather they suggest:
It is fa r  easier, and more epistemologically sound, simply to give up on the idea o f  
generalizations ...accepting generalizations (to whatever extent they may be possible) 
as indeterminate, relative and time- and context-bound,
This view acknowledges a place for the idealistic arguments described previously, 
where the external world can never be defined or described, all that can be represented 
is a personal representation.
Lincoln & Gubba (2000:34) refer to Godel’s theorem and restate it in the following 
way:
. ..there exists no consistent set o f  statements (reduced to their most basic 
undergirding axioms) that can ever hope to deal with all propositions; some 
propositions will inevitably fa ll outside its purview  ...That is, there can be no set o f  
generalizations, consistent with one another, that can effectively account fo r  all 
known phenomena.
Lincoln & Gubba present Stake’s ‘Naturalistic generalizations’ as an alternative:
Stake’s  posture seems to be that there are two kinds o f  generalizations. One kind is 
rationalistic, propositional, law like -  that is the meaning we usually attach to the 
term in scientific discourse. The other kind is more intuitive, empirical, based on
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personal direct and vicarious experience -  that is the meaning intended fo r  the term 
‘naturalistic generalization (Lincoln & Gubba 2000:36)
An inquiry is intent on producing a report or a description that is intended to enhance 
the understanding of people that may be working or living in this particular field of 
interest, ‘in a way that accommodates their understandings. Those people have arrived 
at their understandings mostly through direct and vicarious experience’ (Stake 
2000:19)
Stake places particular stress on the origin of knowledge and understanding about 
human affairs being ‘personal experience’. Subsequently, he states that a potentially 
effective means of developing this type of knowledge, and then disseminating it, is ‘ 
through the words and illustrations of our reports, natural experiment acquired in 
ordinary personal involvement’ (Stake 2000:19)
Wilhelm Dilthey was a philosopher who wrote at the turn of the last century claiming 
that the objective of ‘scientific’ studies did not prove effective in providing 
knowledge and understanding concerning human affairs. Stake (2000:20) states:
Dilthey was not urging us merely to pa y  more attention to humanistic values to pu t 
more affective variables into our equations. He was saying that our methods o f  
studying human affairs need to capitalize upon the natural pow ers o f  people to 
experience and understand.
Stake refers to Polanyi and his distinction between prepositional and tacit knowledge, 
described previously. The former is that which is formulated by hypothesis and 
testing, the later is that knowledge gained through living, and may contain 
prepositional knowledge if it becomes part of the experience of living.
Tacit knowledge includes a multitude o f  unexpressible associations which give rise to 
new meanings, new ideas and new applications o f  the old. Polanyi recognized that 
each person, expert or novice, has great stores o f  tacit Imowledge with which to build 
new understandings. (Stake 2000:20)
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Stake suggests that it is from ordinary understandings that ‘mighty explanations’ are 
made; understanding is linked with ‘intentionality’ and ‘empathy’.
When explanation, propositional knowledge and law are the aims o f  an inquiry, the 
case study w ill often he at a disadvantage. When the aims are understanding, 
extension o f  experience and increase in conviction in that which is Jcnown, the 
disadvantage disappears. (Stake 2000:21)
Stake (2000:22) suggests that the later type of Imowledge is a form of naturalistic 
generalizations and distinct from scientific induction. These types of generalizations 
are achieved by observing similarities in objects in relation to the context that they are 
seen in. ‘To generalise in this way is to be both intuitive and empirical’. Naturalistic 
observation, according to Stake, originates out of a response of a person to an 
observation of experience:
They derive from  tacit knowledge o f  how things are, why they are, how people fee l 
about them, and how these things are likely to be later or in other p laces with which 
this person is familiar. They seldom take the form  o f  predictions but lead regularly to 
expectation... These generalizations may become verbalized, passing o f  course from  
tacit knowledge to propositional; but they have not ye t passed the empirical and 
logical tests that characterize form al (scholarly, scientific) generalizations.
Stake suggests that the case study is better suited to ‘adding to existing experience and 
humanistic understanding, for working in and exploring a paradigm rather then 
recreating a new one.
Lincoln & Gubba (2000:39) explain that Stake’s claim is that if you carry out an 
investigation that emerges from an empirical and realistic location and pursue the 
study in the form of an explanation that speaks to ordinary people, then the 
conclusions are likely to mean more to the potential audience. They are likely to be 
more interested, understand the context and the findings and therefore the study is 
more likely to be a ‘useful extensions of their understanding’.
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Lincoln & Gubba felt it was not clear whether these ‘naturalistic generalizations’ were 
essentially tacit or whether they could be propositional. They quote Hamilton (1976 
&1979) who believed that it was based on tacit knowledge. He described ‘naturalistic 
generalization’ as a private interpretation of the world around the observer. As the 
observations move from the private to the public domain they engage into a possible 
transfer into the realms of the science. In this way he conceived the two concepts as 
having a symbiotic relationship.
Stake did not agree with this explanation, suggesting that it was not possible to make 
such a formal dichotomy between the two forms of knowledge, even acknowledging 
the symbiosis. He felt that the cognitive or private knowledge could not be separated 
from formalistic or scientific knowledge because the individual was subject to 
knowledge through previous experience based on formalistic knowledge. Lincoln & 
Gubba (2000:38) state:
Hamilton and Stake, while apparently disagreeing on whether naturalistic 
generalizations is all in the mind or whether it can be (or should be) shared publicly, 
nevertheless agree that there are two kinds o f  generalizations: ...neither is arguing 
that one is a replacement fo r  the other; they exist side be side, and each has its own 
arena o f  applicability.
The ideas shared by Stake and Hamilton around a case study approach are an 
expression of the epistemological questions explored in the first pail of the chapter.
As case study is associated with raw empirical descriptions they produce the type of 
‘down to earth’ observer reaction that Polanyi describes as an essential pail of a 
person experience. In epistemological terms this is an idealistic expression of internal 
perception bought about by a Kantian ‘appearance’. Hamilton is asserting a position 
not far removed from that expressed by Popper, where the origin of theory does not 
really matter, but it can take up a scientific status as long as it cannot be falsified. 
Popper acknowledges the possibility of a subjective and empirical context to theory 
and hypothesis formation, it is from this base and by the use of a process of 
falsification that the shift from the ‘naturalistic’ to the ‘scientific’ takes place, which 
appeai-s to be what Hamilton is suggesting. The argument presented by Kuhn, and 
apparently implied by Stake, is that this process is inhibited by the existence of a
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dominant discourse in the form of a paradigm of thinking that will exert a powerful 
influence or even distortion to the naturalness of the original experience.
Lincoln & Gubba (2000:38-40) attempt to harness this tacit dimension into a process 
of amalgamation using Cronbach’s theory of ‘The working Hypothesis’.
Cronbach ’s ideas are powerful; they suggest that there are always factors that are 
unique to the locale or series o f  events that make it useless to try and generalize there 
from. But, he notes, inquirers are in a position to appreciate such factors and take 
then into account.
But the suggestion is that the information can be drawn from a case and the findings 
will assist in future investigations. They state:
...the degree o f  transferability is a direct function o f  the similarity between the two 
contexts, what we shall call ‘fittingness Fittingness is defined as the degree o f  
congruence between sending and receiving contexts. I f  Context A and Context B are 
‘sufficiently ’ congruent, then the working hypothesis from  the sending originating 
context may be applicable in receiving context.
Lincoln & Gubba (2000:40) describe it as the inquirers responsibility to provide a 
‘thick description’ so that ‘anyone interested in transferability has a base of 
information appropriate to the judgement’. The problem with the concept of 
‘fittingness’ is that.it ultimately ends up in the same place that Lincoln & Gubba were 
being critical of the scientific approach. Fittingness has replaced validity as the 
determinant of the potential for using an observation as the basis for looking at a 
wider context. It is not ‘just looking’ its looking with the purpose of comparison.
Miller (1999) suggests the use of practical measures to improve the validity associated 
with case study such as a set of guide lines for writing up case studies drawn form an 
archive of existing published studies. When examining published material on 
Schizophrenia using case study, Miller found 386. Initial examination showed many 
were simply vignettes used to illustrate a theoretical point, which lack the detail that 
was being recommended. They found 60 that were comprehensive case studies of
156
which 44 lacked information considered to be important, such as ‘therapeutic 
framework and treatment setting, client’s familial and socio-economic background 
and history, therapists’ training, supervision, or dilemmas in working with the client’, 
by adding the criteria of the study being well written and illustrative, the sample was 
reduced to 2or 3 good examples. As well as making the case studies more detailed, 
Miller suggests the use of a judicial process to practically test the validity of claims 
using case study. Miller (1999:6) states:
The concern about the potential fo r  cognitive lapses in information processing, self- 
serving biases, etc, will not be silenced by philosophical arguments about 
hermeneutics o f  understanding, though these arguments are relevant and important. I  
will outline here a proposal that literally does justice to the case study method by 
taking the law o f  evidence and trial procedure from  the Western legal system as a 
methodological model fo r  evaluating conflicting truth claims about human behavior
Miller goes onto to recommend establishing a jury of eminent experts that would 
decide the truth, by meeting and discussing the claims made by case studies, as a 
practical attempt to improve validity. However this approach does little more than 
create a procedure for what currently takes place when research is published, a point 
that Miller acknowledges, but it also would potentially provide more power to the 
existing paradigm or culture and provide less opportunity for minority opinion.
The ideas described above may refute the possibility of producing an accurate and 
exact depiction of the external world through the use of observation and description. 
However, there is an emphasis on the creation of a ‘best possible view’, which is 
described as ‘fittingness’ by Lincoln and Gubba, and might be seen as an extension of 
the ideas of Kant. Kant, as was described previously, acknowledges the impossibility 
of describing the world but replaces it with the world as T  or ‘you’ see it in order to 
allow the conversation and the ‘science’ of discovery to continue.
3.2.6 Questions rather than answers
Donmoyer (2000) suggests that case study might have a place in widening the range 
of social constructions available, thus generating and formulating questions rather
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then being preoccupied with discovering answers. He observes (2000:52) that despite 
the recognition that ‘social purpose and social phenomena are too complex to provide 
definite answers’ there has been a hesitancy to open up and move towards alternative 
approaches to examining social phenomena. This is confirmed to him by the fact that 
despite the question marks surrounding assumption-constructed research it is still 
given a more prestige and recognition amongst the research community than 
alternative more question-generating observations that might be the place of a case 
study.
The classic hypothesis generation/verification distinction, however, ignore the fa c t  
that in fie lds such as education, social work and counselling -  fields in which there is 
a concern with individuals, not aggregates -  all research findings are tentative.
Domnoyer believes that the reason why researchers might cling on to outdated 
methods and assumptions might be the absence of an alternative language to ‘talk 
about the phenomena’. He is critical of Stake for having identified the problems of 
generalising but not describing something specific to replace it and remaining 
influenced by concepts of evaluation.
Donmoyer (2000:55) is critical of the concept of the working hypothesis put forward 
by Lincoln and Gubba, with the introduction of terms like ‘fittingness’ and 
‘transferability’:
The transferability alternative, however, is hardly a radical departure from  the 
traditional view. Although the notion o f  transferability accommodates the problem  o f  
complexity, it still assumes that the findings from  one setting are only generalizable to 
another setting i f  both settings are very similar.
Donmoyer sets about constructing a new language of generalizability rooted to 
‘experiential knowledge’. He describes a generalization gained through the years of 
experience that he had as a teacher that is conceived out of the ideas of Polanyi. This 
experience was not about conceiving a hypothesis that would be applicable to similar 
situations, rather it was about describing and illustrating a particular experience.
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Donmoyer (2000:59) saw the language of schema theory as more effective in 
recording this experience, where notions of assimilation, accommodation, integration 
and differentiation’ are taken from the work of Piaget (1971). Donmoyer states:
According to schema theorists, all knowledge o f  the empirical world must be filtered  
through cognitive structures, which shape what we know. Piaget calls this shaping 
process assimilation. Piaget also describes a complementary process, which he calls 
accommodation. This process involves the reshaping o f  cognitive structures to 
accommodate novel aspects o f  what is being perceived. After the dual process o f  
assimilation and accommodation have occurred, Piaget theory indicates, a cognitive 
structure w ill be both integrated (a particular structure will accommodate more) and 
more differentiated (a particular structure will be divided into substructures)
Donmoyer (2000:60) suggests that this theory promotes the advantages of the 
diversity of experience, ‘when diversity is dramatic, the knower is confronted by all 
sorts of novelty, which stimulates accommodation;’. Thus the divergent experience 
enriches the observer as it is integrated, ‘he or she can perceive more richly and, one 
hopes, act more intelligently’. This cognitive map does not take into account the 
influence of the dominant cultural discourse, that might be represented by 
prepositional knowledge and maybe exerting an unconscious influence according to 
psychoanalytic theory (Freud 1930). Donmoyer (2000:63) concurs with Stake’s 
comments ‘ that case study can provide vicarious experiences’, that is experiences that 
can act as substitutive illustrations that enhance understanding and suggests three 
advantages that case study can offer. Firstly, they provide the opportunity to benefit 
from a description of an experience that is unlikely to be open to most observers. 
Secondly they can provide a different viewpoint or perspective of seeing a set of 
experiences, this might be a feminist, Marxist perspective or other minority 
discourses. But most importantly for Donmoyer, the case study should be depicted 
emphasising its novelty and uniqueness rather than from some sense of a need to 
explain the observation in the light of what is ‘known’.
He also suggests that it has the potential to allow learning that might be inhibited in a 
situation where an individual might be intimidated by being confronted by 
phenomenon. Donmoyer (2000:60) states:
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...social scientists ’ traditional way o f  talking and thinking about generalizability is no 
longer adequate. I  have not suggested that traditional notion is useless. For policy  
makers who are interested in aggregates, not individuals, and fo r  whom questions o f  
meaning and perspectives have been resolved, the traditional notion o f  
generalizability will do ju s t fine. Practitioners in fields such as education, 
counselling and social work, however, are concerned with individuals, not 
aggregates, and, fo r them, questions about meaning and perspective are central and  
ongoing.
The arguments presented by Donmoyer appear to be suggesting an approach that is 
more about description and illustration and less influenced by a need to ‘know’. There 
is a greater emphasis on diversity and illustration towards a discovery of ‘meanings’ 
rather than a focus on ‘the meaning’. Al Rubaie (2002) suggests that the 
contextualisation of truth provides a post-modern emphasis to case study; however the 
explanation given of a post-modern approach by Al Rubaie is particularly definitive 
and consequently quite modern. The ideas described by Donmoyer (2000) have a 
great deal in common with phenomenology, so it would seems appropriate to explore 
case study in terms of phenomenology in order to identify a potential basis for this 
study.
3.3 Case Study and Phenomenology
The following section examines some the work of Dilthey, Husserl, Gadamer, Yorck 
and Heidegger in order to explore a phenomenological basis for this study. It is 
important to recognise that this is ‘a basis’ rather than an attempt to produce ‘the 
basis’ for a phenomenological approach to case study. The researcher is attempting to 
find a basis for this study rather than for a general approach for case study.
Friedman (1993: 69) states that phenomenology was developed into distinct 
philosophical approach by the works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), raising 
‘phenomenology to a separate method of knowing and a distinct approach to 
philosophy and the history of culture’. He drew a distinction between the position
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taken by the ‘knower’ in ‘social sciences’ and ‘human studies’ compared with natural 
sciences. Friedman states the following in relation to Dilthey’s work:
In the form er (social sciences and human studies) the knower cannot be merely a 
detached scientific observer but must also participate himself fo r  it is through his 
participation that he discovers both the typical and the unique in the aspects o f  human 
life that he is studying.I
As well as taking this more involved position the ‘knower’ should suspend the 
preoccupation for causality associated with natural sciences and focus on discovering 
what is unique within this particular experience.
Friedman (1993:70) goes 011 to suggest that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) developed 
phenomenology from ‘an approach to philosophy to a systematic philosophy’. 
According to Gadamer (1985) Husserl’s work is seen as originating and continuing 
from Kant. The mind is seen as determining the domain of experience and science in 
phenomenology, as Kant makes clear the place for science exists out of the world 
created by a priori knowledge. So the objective world of science exists as a 
consequence of the subjective (Friedman 1993). Gadamer suggests that Husserl 
looked to identify a place for 'transcendental subjectivity'. The world horizon 
describes ' the universe of what can be made objective by science'. The concept of 
immersion in a world horizon that never becomes objective is what Husserl calls 'life- 
world' according to Gadamer (1985:218). The concept of'life-world' is the antithesis 
of all objectivism.
Husserl was not describing an ontology of the world, as it would imply a structure:
'but by the life-world is meant something else, namely the whole in which we live as 
historical creatures... It is clear that the life-world is always at the same time a 
communal w orld and involves the existence o f  other people as well (Gadamer 
1985:218)
Husserl does not describe objectivity as the opposite to subjectivity when speaking of 
the difference between subjectivity and objectivity, because this concept of
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subjectivity would itself be conceived in objective terms. What is significant in his 
transcendental phenomenology is that the subject and the object are contained within 
the world. All debate concerning the separation of subjectivity from experience in the 
pursuit of the objective world becomes part of the phenomenological world rather 
then its definition. As Gadamer (1985:220) states:
Thus also the intelligibility o f  the subject's attitude to the world does not reside in 
conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous 'productions' o f  
life.
They are not tangible and ‘graspable’, and therefore capable of rationale/conscious 
illustration. For then they would be available for description and objectification.
A consequence of deconstructing the differentiation between subjectivity and 
objectivity is the problem of explaining inter-subjectivity and the understanding of the 
other T according to Gadamer. Husserl uses the terms T and 'thou', where the T is the 
first identification of another person and through empathy becomes a 'thou'.
According to Gadamer, Husserl would see this empathy as Transcendental - (a priori). 
But empathy describes the imposition of ones own understanding into the place of 
another and consequently seeing the other as an object. Klein describes empathy as a 
form of projective identification, as a forcing of part oneself onto another 
(Hinshelwood 1994).
Gadamer (1985:222) felt that the failure of Husserl to identify a convincing 
explanation for the other T, meant that his conception of phenomenology had more 
in common with speculative idealism then a ‘new experiential standpoint5. Hegel and 
subsequently Yorck, according to Gadamer, identified a mutual relationship between 
what was alive and the nature of self-consciousness. Gadamer (1985:223) writes:
Its being consists in its being able to make everything the object o f  its Imowledge, and  
ye t in everything that it knows, it Jmows itself
The experience of the world stimulates a process of objectification of experience in a 
person. Hegel uses the idea of desire to show how people come to experience
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themselves. The world has provoked a unique response from the person, an 
experience in relation to the world/life; the satisfaction of the desire extinguishes this 
contact. If one uses the example of sexual desire, the desire for sexual penetration or 
unity can bring alive a meeting, stimulating every aspect of a relationship in a 
spectrum of emotional provocations (anger, love), which speak about the reality of 
being alive, the satisfaction of this desire can deaden this heightened sense of being. 
This is not to exclude the 'enjoyment' that can be achieved in satisfying this desire, 
since Freud (1920) identified that satisfaction can be more associated with reducing 
stimulation towards a lesser state of arousal, but this may reduce the experience of 
life-ness. So the objective, in this rationale, is a response that reflects the subjective, 
speaks of who the person is in relation to the world more than describing the world as 
it is. The assumption here is that this can never really be known. So these reflections 
are very idealistic.
None of this speculation is a challenge to the natural sciences, since this is outside the 
realm of what is being explored here. The idealistic position is constructed around the 
assumption that we cannot know the world around us; it is an image/experience of 
which we can never be certain. Once this is assumed the speculation about the 
objective and the subjective, in the realms of natural science and the human science 
separates into two separate domains. Natural science is exploring the 'real world', and 
ignoring to varying degrees the epistemological issues in the name of relativism. 
Idealism does not really challenge the existence of a 'real world’; only that it is not 
possible to 'know' it. That science makes assumptions in order to continue to examine 
this 'real' world makes no difference or challenge to this, it is separate in principle.
The Human sciences are at the point of meeting between ontology and epistemology. 
The natural sciences exclude the ontological in order to examine the world; it assumes 
the existence of the external and is by definition committed to investigating it. 
Scientist’s appeal* prepared to accept, the historically verifiable prediction, that 
achieving a definition of -the objective- appears impossible.
Heidegger set out to demonstrate the basis of existence, ‘there-being’, independent of 
the T  (Krell 1993, Bleicher 1980). Husserl was committed to transcendental 
subjectivity with its grounding in the ideas of Kant. Heidegger challenged this 
transcendental assumption of essence in subjectivity returning to an ontological
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reflection on being and placing being in terms of the 'the fact that There-being is 
concerned about its being, that it is distinguished from all other beings by its 
understanding of being' (Gadamer 1985:228). Heidegger identified a distinction in 
this reflection that was not noted in previous ontological explorations and that is the 
'there', 'a clearing in being, i.e. a distinction between being and beings'
(Gadamer1985: 228)
Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology was directed at an examination of 
ontology and not a theory of the human sciences (Bleicher 1980), Gadamer states 
(1985:230):
Understanding is not a resigned ideal o f  a human experience adopted in the old age 
o f  the spirit, as with Dilthey; nor is it, as M>ith Husserl, a last methodological ideal o f  
philosophy over against the naivete o f  unreflecting life; it is on the contrary, the 
original form  o f  realisation o f  There-being, which is being in the world. Before any 
differentiation o f  understanding into different directions ofpragm atic or theoretical 
interest, understanding is There-being's mode o f  being, in that it is potential-of-being 
and “possib ility”.
Heidegger established a 'fundamentally new position' according to Gadamer, his 
ontological reflection were an attempt at the clarification of ‘there-being’ in its 
relation to the existence of ‘P. Heidegger conceived that the exploration of 
‘understanding’ formed the basis of a transcendence of the ‘there-being’, a movement 
beyond being.
Husserl, according to Gadamer, described the application of natural sciences concept 
of objectivity to the human sciences as 'nonsense'. Heidegger suggests that it is not so 
much the definition as the endeavour that establishes the ‘there-being’. The observer 
that trys to understand the tree may produce a contribution to the known, but for 
Heidegger it is not a case for focusing on the outcome in terms of this contribution to 
the known as the emergence of being in the process of attempting to understand.
The description that emerges in relation to the object is not the sole consequence it is 
not that 'knower' and 'known' resemble each other, as this would be a scientific 
method but it is that they are seen together over time. This is not relying on a
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definition of being it is saying that being defines itself through the time continuum, a 
past and future that defines the present.
Heidegger was right, according to Gadamer, to insist that what he called 'thrownness' 
belongs together with that which is projected. So there is no understanding or 
interpretation in which the totality of this existential structure does not function, even 
if the intention of the Tmower’ is simply to read 'what is there' and to discover from 
this source 'how it really was'. The observers findings in relation to the focus on a tree 
cannot be separated form the context of the observation. They are projected into the 
world together.
So in terms of a research approach the object (or maybe the focus of the research) is 
brought together with the observer or the researcher. There is no recognition of 
object-ivity, seen as an attempt at depicting the object free of the influence and 
interpretation of the observer. Florio-Ruane (1999) describes a phenomenological 
approach to fieldwork in teaching practice, where the emphasis is on the description 
rather than the explanation. The observations are not concerned with developing a 
given but as the product of human beings involved in a social event. Described in this 
way the novice is seen as a contributor to the description rather than an apprentice to 
the expert.
A distinction is made between the natural sciences, which seek to establish general 
laws, and the cultural sciences, which isolate individual phenomena in order to trace 
the unique development. Phenomenology, according to Crotty (1998:78):
...suggests that, i f  we lay aside, as best we can, the prevailing understanding o f  those 
phenomena and revisit our immediate experience o f  them, possibilities fo r  new 
meaning emerge fo r  us or witness at least an authentication and enhancement o f  
form er meaning
Crotty (1998:79) states that phenomenology speaks of trying to get past culturally 
asserted meanings, and trying to achieve contact with the object as best as possible. 
Lying behind this attempt to put our culturally derived meaning in abeyance and 
renew culture in this radical fashion is a deeply rooted suspicion of culture and the
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understandings it imposes on us. This concern about culture is based on a recognition 
that a body of meanings is necessary but a concern that it becomes oppressive and 
impairs freedom to think and experience. Phenomenology is about setting these 
meaning systems aside and opening up to the phenomena in that moment.
Crotty identifies two clear characteristics of phenomenology. Firstly, there is a focus 
on the objective in experience rather than the subjective description and secondly it is 
a critical exercise. It questions the existing assumptions within its area of focus. 
Crotty (1998:83) describes how an alternative interpretation of phenomenological 
research has emerged, where the focus resides on the presentation of the subjective 
experience of the respondents in the research:
In this attempt to understand and describe people's subjective experience, there is 
much talk ofputting oneself in the place o f  the other.
The emphasis is on common understanding and becomes an exploration of prevailing 
cultural understandings. Crotty feels this has been the consequence of American 
influence and the procedural inteipretation by Giorgi, Van Kaam and Colaizzi are a 
consequence of less then enthusiastic acceptance of phenomenological method in 
America and the need to adapt this approach to the more popular humanistic trends in 
established opinion. Crotty (1998 84-85) feels there is a price to pay for this 
reinterpretation of phenomenology. What has been lost is the objective character and 
the critical spirit, so strong in the phenomenological tradition and the opportunity to 
experience the confirmation or critique of existing meanings in relation to the object 
of study. Crotty (1998:86) states:
...thephenomenologist's world is also a world in which our received notions~the 
systems o f  significant symbols that make us human-are seen to hide that potential 
meanings from  us and hold us back from  bringing it to birth. Phenomenologists chafe 
under what they see to be a tyrannous culture. They long to smash the fetters and  
engage with the w orld in new ways to construct new understandings.
The tyrannous culture in this study is the medical model diagnosis that oppresses the 
therapeutic relationship, new meanings and potentials are opened up by focusing on
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the therapy in a different way, making the original question appear banal from this 
alternative perspective.
3.3.1 From Methodology to Method
This chapter has focused on finding the orientation of the researcher and the basis for 
a way of looking at the research question posed in this study. The reflection on 
epistemology identified Polanyi’s (1983, 1998) conception of tacit knowledge as a 
basis for the researcher’s orientation towards this study. The fact that the empirical 
focus of this study was a therapist’s account of psychotherapy led to a methodological 
examination of the case study approach. Case study was found to be an approach 
rather than a method since it embraced both qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
commonality appeal's to be the focus on a ‘case’, the specific object of study. If this 
case can be described and identified as the focal point for research then a case study 
approach can be developed. The attempts to define a particular case study method 
appeared to highlight the particular epistemological orientation that had been 
assumed, especially in relation to scientific method. The epistemological orientation 
in this study led the researcher to reflect on the relationship between the case study 
approach and phenomenology. If case study provides a basis for defining the object 
to be researched and phenomenology identifies a way of looking at the world, then the 
next methodological step is to identify the particular way that this study is going to 
look at the ‘case’.
The ideas of Polanyi (1983, 1998) and tacit knowledge suggest an approach to 
research that is concerned with a working knowledge rather than a preoccupation with 
truth. The emphasis here is on whether a description works in explaining what has 
been looked at rather than whether a researcher can prove that what is being said is 
true. This position is consequently less preoccupied by the particular method used 
and is more focused on the outcome. Consequently this would imply an arbitrary 
quality to decisions on alternative methods. Nevertheless, the researcher has 
considered some narrative based methods before deciding on a hermeneutic basis for 
the method of this study that will be defined in the next chapter. McLeod (2000:331) 
states:
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. ..this is a storied world; it is structured in terms o f  story-like sequences o f  action and  
evaluation: myths, oral narrative, fictions o f  many kinds. All o f  us, as active human 
agents, co-operate in the endless task o f  constructing and reconstructing a human 
w orld that resembles an interlocked set o f  narratives.
So research from this narrative perspective, as has been emphasised previously, is not 
about what Swift (2000:364) describes as ‘the ‘grand narratives”, and goes on to 
state:
These new ideas challenged the certainties and universal theories about what it meant 
to be a person. The constructs 'person, 'personal identity ‘ and 'se lf were seen as 
social constructivist as dependent upon social, cultural and historical fo rces and  
available narratives...
So ‘narratives’ from this perspective develop from social interaction and this would 
seem to be a dynamic process making a dependency on a ‘grand narrative’ potentially 
limiting and outdated. From this narrative position social research has developed a 
number of different approaches as the following sections describe.
3.3.2 Case study and Constructivism
For constructivist’s meanings are not created they are constructed. The constructivist 
endeavour is to bring objectivity and subjectivity together, and in this a term is 
borrowed from phenomenology and that is 'intentionality'. According to Crotty 
(1998:44) intentionality in this usage was taken from the Latin 'Tendere' meaning ' 'to 
tend' - in the sense of'moving towards'...Intentionality means referentiality, 
relatedness, directness, 'aboutness". What this means is that when the mind or 
'consciousness' knows of something it reaches out into that object. Crotty suggests 
that constructivism does not purport to identify true or valid interpretation. Some 
interpretations may appear more realistic then others but this is not intended to 
indicate a sense of‘truth’.
Research from the constructivist perspective, according to Crotty, requires that we do 
not remain inhibited by the conventional meanings associated with an object. Instead
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a researcher is invited to approach the object in a radical spirit of openness to its 
potential for new and richer meaning. The researcher is invited to re-interprete. 
However, Crotty (1998:52) notes that this phenomenological approach has been 
wrongly interpreted by some as the potential for free expression of subjectivity under 
the auspices of research, he states that 'Constructivism is not subjectivism. It is 
curiosity, not conceit'.
3.3.3 'Social' Constructionism
Crotty (1998:79) states that individuals do not encounter objects one by one and 
respond to try and make sense of them; they are influenced by their social situation. 
Social institutions and the culture of the time influence the meanings that are in every 
day.
Constructivism describes the individual human subject engaging with objects in the 
w orld  and making sense o f  them. Constructionism, to the contrary, denies that this 
what actually happens, at least in the firs t instance. Instead, each o f  us is introduced 
directly to a whole world o f  meaning. The melange o f  cultures and sub-cultures in 
which we are born provides us with meanings. These meanings we are taught and we 
learn in a complex and subtle process o f  enculturation. They establish a tight grip  
upon us and, by and large, shape our thinking and behaviour throughout our lives.
3.3.4 Interpretivism - contra-distinction to positivism:
The interpretivist approach (Crotty 1998, Lazard 1998) looks for culturally derived 
and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world and is often associated 
with Max Weber. Lazard quotes Weber as an example of how interpretative and 
naturalistic approaches can be combined, where subjective interpretations are 
combined in an attempt to demonstrate the explicatory qualities of an interpretation. 
Crotty feels that the differentiation between the interpretivism and positivism is 
commonly thought to be that of understanding as opposed to explaining and causality, 
which was the basis of Merriam's differentiation between qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. So interpretivism, according to Lazard (1998), is more concerned 
with a search for meanings that emerge out of the interaction of people in their
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commonality he further suggests that broadly speaking interpretativists' tend to favour 
qualitative rather than quantitative methods. On the whole because researchers find 
that people's words provide greater access to their subjective meaning than do 
statistical trends. Lazard claims that Weber's perspective opens up the possibility of 
using quantitative and qualitative methods in pursuing explanations adequately at the 
levels of both cause and meaning.
The terms constructivist, constructionist and interpretativist appear to be another level 
of speaking about the researcher’s orientation to a storied or narrative world rather 
than a method for carrying out research.
3.3.5 Heuristic Research
Moustakas (1990, 1994) describes heuristics as a phenomenological method where the 
study begins with a question of personal importance to the researcher, and a six-phase 
process culminating in a ‘creative synthesis’ provides the possible opportunity for the 
generation of new meanings. Rose and Loewenthal (1998:108) state:
This question should he one that has personal meaning fo r  the researcher; they 
should have direct experience o f  the phenomenon being studied.
The researcher is the therapist in the case that is being focused on in this study, which 
opens up the potential for using a heuristic approach as a method for analysing the 
data. However this heuristic approach was not used, as the researcher was not 
convinced that the question of whether psychotherapy is possible with a person with 
dementia really corresponded to the type of question implied by the reference above. 
Diagram XII illustrated the research process as being focused on the psychotherapy 
taking place between the therapist and the analysand/patient. A focus on something 
specific and the exploration of the meanings or narratives that result raises the 
possibility of using a hermeneutic approach.
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3 .3 .6  H erm en eu tics
Hermeneutics is identified as a method for deciphering meanings originally used on 
sacred texts (Kvale 1996), but people like Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer used it to 
explore the meanings that emerge in a world governed by language as human activity 
can be seen as constituted in language.
The hermeneutic approach developed out of two differing views of how meanings 
could be identified, stemming back to the Greeks. More recently the difference can 
be seen between Catholicism and Protestantism. The former believes that the 
meanings in the texts are determined by a spiritual quality that is represented in the 
text, this has a very Platonic explanation. The Protestant approach identifies the 
meanings as literally in the text and does not look for an external meaning. According 
to Bleicher (1980), Hermeneutics can be describes as the theory or the philosophy of 
meaning.
Bleicher (1980:1) says that it is possible to identify different ‘strands’ in the 
hermeneutic approach, two of which are, ‘Hermeneutic theory, and ‘Hermeneutic 
philosophy’.
Bleicher (1980:1) suggests that hermeneutic theory is focused on a general theory of 
inteipretation as applied to the human sciences and quotes Betti (1954,1962) who 
‘hoped to gain an insight into the process of understanding in general, how we are 
able to transpose a meaning-complex created by someone else into our own 
understanding of ourselves and our world’. Betti (1954,1962) states, according to 
Bleicher (1980: 1-2) that our intuitive capacity is facilitated by a set of what he calls 
‘canons’ which are formulated to ensure the ‘correct interpretation of objectivation of 
human activity or consciousness’. These canons effectively correspond to a set of 
hermeneutic rules for understanding a text. This use of a set of ‘canons’ introduces 
the influence of language on inteipretation. Bleicher (1980:2) describes language as:
... the universal medium o f  humanity which enters the ‘hermeneutic circle ’ as the 
whole in relation to which individual parts acquire their meaning. The understanding
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o fpast sources is impeded by the historicity o f  the subject, so that the task i f  
hermeneutics can be expressed as the avoidance o f  misunderstanding.
Bleicher (1980) links the work of Betti with Dilthey and Kant in the search for a base 
for knowledge, Basch (1993) describes this approach as the ‘science of hermeneutics5 
and that psychoanalyst’s are tinning to this and away from the meta-psychology of 
Freud.
The second ‘strand’ of the hermeneutic approach described by Bleicher (1980) is 
‘Hermeneutic philosophy’ which rejects the possibility of finding a basis for the 
‘scientific investigation of meaning’, Bleicher (1980:2) states,
A central insight of hermeneutic philosophy asserts that social scientist or interpreter 
and object are linked by a context of tradition -which implies that he already has a 
pre-understanding of his object as he approaches it, thereby being unable to start with 
a neutral mind.
So this conception of understanding sees the process as either a reproduction of a 
‘pre-given’ object or a repetitious process of comparison between past and present. 
Seen in this way Hermeneutics is as much an art as a science since it endeavours to 
recreate the original creative act, the conditions that facilitated the ar tistic creation. 
Bleicher (1980:2) goes on to state:
Hermeneutic philosophy does not aim at objective knowledge through the use of 
methodical procedures but at the explication and phenomenological description of 
human Dasein in its temporality and historically.
Hermeneutic philosophy attempts to embrace the possibility o f  knowledge but sees its 
acquisition determinant on the hermeneutic circle, 'which commences with the 
projective anticipation o f  meaning and proceeds through the dialogical-dialectical 
mediation o f  subject and object ’ Bleicher (1980:3). So this approach to 
understanding as directed at an object like a piece o f  text, as the author is exploring 
while writing this account, it is not to produce an objective re-cognition o f  the texts 
intended meaning, ‘but the emergence o f  practically relevant knowledge in which the
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subject him self (in this case the author o f  this study) is changed by being made aware 
o f  new possibilities o f  existence and his responsibility fo r  his own future ’. Bleicher 
(1980:3)
3.3.7 Hermeneutic Philosophy/Phenomenological Hermeneutics
The term hermeneutic philosophy used by Bleicher (1980) brings together the 
hermeneutic search for understanding with the phenomenological encounter with 
others and is mainly associated with the work of Heidegger and Gadamer.
Heidegger, according to Crotty (1998) does not set out to explore culturally 
determined meaning, he is wary of the oppressive influence of what he terms 'the 
they". Heidegger is interested in an ontological explanation that depends on 
phenomenology; he does not think that meaning is a consequence of cultural 
influence. Heidegger begins his phenomenology of dasein with the 'shadowy pre­
understanding of Being that we all possess and which he calls the 'forestructure' of 
Being. Heidegger describes the unfolding from this phenomenological beginning of 
meanings in relation to other phenomena. Crotty (1998:97) suggests that the unfolding 
process in discovering being 'is to talk in hermeneutical vein' with 'notions of 
inteipretation and description'. Crotty goes onto state:
Heidegger is bringing together in a unitary way not only ontology and 
phenomenology but through hermeneutics with its connotations o f  dialectic or 
rhetoric, the element o f  language as well.
Crotty (1998:97) states:
Heidegger's hermeneutics starts with phenomenological return to Being, which 
presents itse lf in a nebulous and undeveloped fashion, and then seeks to unfold that 
pre-understanding, make explicit what is implicit, and grasp the meaning o f  Being 
itse lf
In identifying a place for pre-existing knowledge a comparison with Plato’s ideas, 
outlined at the start of this chapter appeal's relevant. The discovery of meaning and
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truth, according to Plato, was facilitated by a dialectic experience in relation with 
others in which knowledge emerges from within; the phenomenological process is one 
of expressing and exploring the implicit. This explanation starts with a grasp at the 
‘existentials’ that are present and make up human existence and behaviour, which 
make up the ‘they’ and are present in the culture, and from this grasping emerges a 
grasp for being itself. Crotty (1998:98) illustrates this through Heidegger's 
hermeneutic circle.
Existential
Forestructure Being
Dasein
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle (Figure XIII)
Where this process begins with an innate conception of Being (Forestructure), and 
then the experience of the institutional and cultural influences (existential) that are in 
the world grasping out at the person and there need to exist in the world. There are 
opportunities in this process to experience a real sense of‘Being’; Heidegger felt that 
poetry provided one such opportunity where Being reveals itself (Dasein).
Thus when focusing on a bottle of wine, half empty, in front of us, there is a need to 
recognise this as a container that holds 75 cl of fluid, the contents contains alcohol 
and this is a substance that can cause certain side effects. But if the observer looks for 
a little longer there are a bevy of different meanings that are provoked in response to 
this object. They might be related to previous experience of drinking from this type 
of object, a multitude of meanings that define the observer as much as challenge and 
extend the established conception of the object. That is not to say that the two
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responses cannot exist together, but they are different. The T-ness’ is emerging from 
the grasping for meanings in relation to the object, rather than acknowledging of one 
‘true’ meaning.
The grasp and the assertiveness of the dominant discourse was experienced in 
constructing this study, tiying to integrate the medical discourse into a complimentary 
process, consistently left the researcher reflecting on the potential benefits of therapy 
for dementia. This might be seen as being drawn to an ‘existential’ focus (institutional 
and cultural influences) in response to this question rather acknowledging this as a 
response amongst others.
Gadamer, according to Bleicher (1980:3), was concerned with ‘achieving an 
agreement with somebody else about out' shared ‘world” . This shared view came 
about by a dialogue that facilitated a ‘fusion of horizon’. This process can be seen in 
comparison with the dialectic conceived by Plato in relation to the formation of 
knowledge. Plato acknowledged that a private opinion required the collaboration and 
examination of a community of people, but this process did not ‘obviate the fact that 
every man must apprehend reality for himself (Cushman 1976:93). There is this 
personal Te-covery’ that is affirmed in relation with others: -
Knowledge... in contrast with true opinion is a social, not a solitary attainment 
(Cushman 1976:94)
Where true opinion, fo r  Plato, was the understanding that em ergedfrom  within. 
Bleicher (1980:15) states that in the tradition hermeneutics individual differences 
are:
.. .acknowledged, which leads to the requirement of congeniality: the interpreter ought 
to approximate the intellectual -  ‘spiritual’ -  stature of the author as closely as 
possible...understanding the Other, being able to see things form his perspective, 
strengthens and emphasises the spiritual processes with oneself. As the poet -  Plugo 
von Hoffmansthal -  stated: the shortest way to yourself is around the world.
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Hermeneutics is the art of interpretation or understanding, and for Gadamer, always 
signifies an ongoing, never completed process of understanding, rooted in human 
finitude and human ‘linguisticality’.
According to Moran (2000:248), Gadamer follows Heidegger’s Being and Time in 
identifying understanding as the actuality of human being-in-the-world. Moran states:
Humans are essentially involved in the historically situated and finite task o f  
understanding the world, a w orld encountered and inhabited in and through 
language.
Gadamer, according to Moran (2000), recognises language as the medium in which 
understanding is constructed and it leads to conversation forming the basis for 
mutuality in the form of an experience. The act of conversing in speech is a potential 
experience of sharing understanding. Moran (2000:249) states:
For Gadamer, shared understanding is a genuine ‘event’ which brings something real 
into being. ..the ‘things themselves’ reveal themselves only in and through 
language...
Moran (2000:251) goes on to say:
...hermeneutics recognises that understanding is a prerequisite o f  human life as such, 
and is carried on within human life with its own structure and paradigms. The model 
o f  scientific understanding has always assumed the possibility o f  a timeless 
Imowledge, such as is possessed hy infinite intellect, whereas in fa c t all 
understanding, including scientific explanation, is historically conditioned, is partial, 
and always comes from  a poin t view.
For Gadamer, according to Moran (2000:251), understanding takes place within the 
limits of the time and place where it emerged, ‘understanding only takes place in the 
context of an existing tradition’. The moment of understanding is subject to 
‘presumptions and prejudices’ that are part of the function of living at that moment 
and are taken on trust. Moran goes on to say (2000:251-252):
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Gadamer, then, seelcs a form  o f  encounter with others which is at once wholly open to 
new possibilities, and indeed, to the truth o f  the other's position, while, at the same 
time, remaining deeply respectful o f  on e’s own starting point, one's inherited outlook 
and presuppositions
This approach to exploring understanding, associated as it is with human existence, 
has been influential in encouraging researchers to look to different approaches to 
social and human enquiry. The following sections highlight some examples that have 
been influenced by the ideas of philosophers like Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer.
3.3.8 Towards defining a method
The exploration of methodological issues in this chapter began with a focus on the 
question of this study. This question identified psychotherapy and dementia as the 
objects of the research exercise, both of which were described for the purposes of this 
study in a previous chapter. One interpretation of the question would be to suggest 
that this study is about demonstrating that psychotherapy, as defined, can exist in 
relation to a person with dementia. As an exercise in discovering existence this opens 
up the issues of philosophical scepticism outlined previously in this chapter. The 
presentation of a case study in response to the research question could be considered 
as a means of illustrating an example of psychotherapy with a person with dementia 
that works, so providing a direct answer to the question posed. This could be seen as 
a pseudo-experimental approach. There are arguments presented in this chapter, 
which suggest that this type of case study does not have the credibility to make any 
significant claims due to the lack of validity associated with an approach dependent 
on a therapists account for the data. Attempts have been outlined that try to address 
the problems with validity that have been highlighted, whether this is by improving 
the quality of the data or by redefining validity or other means. The focus of many of 
the attempts at redefining case study appeal* to be motivated towards creating a 
credible case study approach for identifying and describing an aspect of an objective 
world. They attempt to present findings that produce an answer in relation to what has 
been asked. So despite the problems highlighted with clinical material as means of 
research, by redefining or using another method to verify the findings the research 
will be able to make a statement as to whether psychotherapy is possible or not and
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relate this to the data collected. So the findings of a study are being presented as an 
independent source of knowledge that can be used to describe or explain a separate 
objective situation.
The potential difficulties that are associated with using case study, that is, small 
sample size, problems associated with validity along with the other issues raises a 
potential comparison between specific approaches and a conception of how ‘knowing’ 
is produced. The positivistic approach outlined clear criteria for how ‘knowing’ is 
created building on the definitive assumption that reality is subject to a set of finite 
Laws.
Scheurich (1997:30) emphasises that this positivistic perspective is unsustainable:
Though positivism  is now seen as a fa iled  attempt to create rigorous rules fo r  
mirroring reality, most social science research, including that in education, continues 
to take place within the general param eters derived from  positivism, though largely 
without the almost fanatical logical purity sought by positivists.
The epistemological arguments that have been outlined appear to suggest that 
observation does not provide the basis for presenting evidence of an objective world. 
These observations are always mediated through the observer’s perspective and 
consequently represent an internal or subjective description of the world. Polanyi’s 
description of tacit knowledge gives an example of a practical explanation of how 
everyday knowledge overcomes the subjective dilemma by incorporating it. However 
even Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge is concerned with providing a working 
explanation of experience and as such allows for the possibility of the emergence of a 
dominant explanation. So what was the focus on truth and fact becomes the 
identification of the tacit, where tacit is defined in the Oxford English dictionary as 
‘implied but not expressed’. Popper’s use of falsification promotes the value of an 
explanation that evades a potential challenge to its credibility. Although there is an 
acknowledgement of the inability to describe the world around us with certainty and 
truth there remains a focus on a specific answer. The Phenomenological arguments 
presented in this chapter appear to allow for the emergence of a tacit explanation, 
allowing for the potential cultural distortions, while encouraging alternative
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descriptions of what is seen. From this perspective diversity of meanings reflect a 
positive outcome to an observation rather than a threat to validity. The focus of this 
study from this perspective is on the possibilities that emerge when looking at therapy 
with a person with dementia, rather then producing a set of finding that identify 
whether therapy is possible or not. This inference may emerge but it need not be the 
only intent.
Freud provided detailed accounts of his work in the form of what have become classic 
case studies. Budd (1997:35) states:
Perhaps neither therapist nor intellectual take seriously enough Freud's se lf  
reflectiveness and self-doubts, which he expressed when he said  that his case material 
read  like a novel rather than a scientific treatise. One implication o f  this remark was 
that he was moving towards a hermeneutic understanding o f  telling a case history.
Freud was drawn to trying to find ‘a’ theory to explain the underlying phenomena he 
was observing, ‘Because... (He) started off from a biological perspective on man he 
assumed that his theory was a universal one’ (Budd 1997:32). But the prominence of 
these cases studies over time and the amount of interpretations that they have 
provoked other than Freud’s suggests that they have provided a basis for a wide range 
of meanings to emerge. This does not exclude the possibility of a dominant 
cultural/professional interpretation but allows for the potential for difference. These 
case studies demonstrate that on the margins of a preoccupation with a truth the focus 
on an account of therapy provides a basis for a hermeneutic study. This does not mean 
a subjective ‘free for all’ that Crotty suggested has been one interpretation of a 
phenomenological approach to research. The critique of psychotherapeutic case 
studies, outlined previously, identify the need to include considerable detail in the 
presentation if this approach is going to be used. The more vivid the depiction the 
greater the potential for meanings, rather than meaning, to emerge. The description 
will always be the expression of the observer’s view of what has been seen, but the 
more detail that is included allows for a potential for meanings to emerge from the 
margin of the description. It is this process of generating meanings that distinguishes a 
hermeneutic study from one that is focused on discovering truth.
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The next chapter describes the design and implementation of a phenomenological- 
Hermeneutic case study method in psychotherapy.
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C h a p te r F o u r - M e th o d
This study began with the decision to offer psychotherapy to a person with dementia. 
The research method is faced with the problem of incorporating the psychotherapy 
into a legitimate process. This chapter describes the method that has emerged from 
the thoughts and ideas explored in the methodology chapter. The psychotherapy 
offered to a person with dementia is identified as the ‘object’ or focus for a 
phenomenological case study. The design and data collection procedures used in this 
study are described. The chapter begins with an account of how the therapy began, 
along with details of the nursing home setting and other possible factors considered by 
the researcher as having a potential to influence this study. The process of generating 
and analysing the data is then described, drawing on the arguments presented in the 
methodology section.
4.1 Background and Beginning
At the early stages of this study, having identified the subject area, the researcher was 
asked to consider seeing a person for psychotherapy whose husband had died recently. 
The person concerned was resident in a nursing home, where the researcher had 
offered psychotherapy to other residents. She is referred to as K for the rest of the 
study. The meetings with K took place weekly for just over three years (December 
1998- February 2002) at the nursing home in which she lived. A spare communal 
room within the nursing home provided adequate privacy and comfort for the weekly 
meetings.
The meetings were not tape recorded because of the potential to adversely affect the 
relationship so the researcher recorded notes after each session. The notes were 
composed the researcher’s recollection of verbatim exchanges during the specific 
session and also related thoughts that emerged while reflecting on the session. These 
post session notes formed the initial data for the hermeneutic process described in 
section 4.8 (p200) and illustrated in figure XIV (page 200) and the notes were 
discussed with the researchers clinical supervisor forming the second stage of the 
hermeneutic process.
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The nursing home is registered to care for ‘elderly mentally infirm’ patients and the 
majority are diagnosed with various kinds of dementia. This home is part of a small 
family run company that owns two nursing homes and the researcher is manager of 
one them, but he has no involvement in any aspect of staffing or management in the 
other nursing home where he practises psychotherapy. It is the researcher’s family 
that own the company and members of which work in various capacities within the 
two nursing homes.
The referral originated from the care staff, and they obtained permission from K’s 
relatives prior to any consultation with K. The researcher was aware that to discuss 
this with the relatives before the client had implications for the study. The procedures 
and regulations within a nursing home (National Care Standards Act 2000) establish a 
requirement to inform patients and their relatives of any changes in care planning.
The expectation and interpretation of this within a care setting for patients with 
dementia is that this requirement is met by informing the relatives. The researcher has 
had personal experience of the regulatory authority making this interpretation in 
relation to another nursing home patient. Warner (1997:327) reflecting on ethical 
issues in caring for a person with dementia states:
In procedures to guarantee optimal respect fo r  the demented p erso n ’s preferences, 
partner and children are often referred to as important providers and representatives 
o f  that person.
The relative’s permission had been obtained before the trainee therapist had received 
the referral; however, the issue was noted for its potential to influence the findings.
The trainee therapist had been informed, prior to the first meeting with K, that she had 
recently lost her husband and been diagnosed with the early stages of dementia. The 
researcher met K and made an agreement to begin weekly therapy.
Although the subject of the research had been established prior to commencing 
psychotherapy with K the method had not been identified and the design of the study 
had not been finalised.
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4.2 Trainee therapist Supervision and personal therapy
The researcher started training as a psychotherapist in 1993 and at the time of writing 
had not submitted an application for accreditation with the United Kingdom Council 
for Psychotherapy (UKCP), therefore will be referred to as a ‘trainee therapist’ 
throughout this study.
The theory influencing the trainee therapist’s approach to psychotherapy practice has 
been described in chapter two. There are two further aspects with a potential for 
influencing the findings relating to practice that need to be identified. Firstly, the 
trainee therapist is committed to a point made by Freud (1911) in his 
‘recommendations’ to analyst’s in practice, that in order to practise an analyst should 
have their own therapy/analysis. The trainee therapist in this study has been, and 
continues to be, having a twice-weekly psychoanalysis. Freud identifies the potential 
dangers of not making this commitment to personal therapy, stating (1911:361), 
...anyone who has scorned to take the precaution o f  being analysed him self w ill not 
merely be punished by being incapable o f  learning more that a certain amount from  
his patients, he w ill risk a more serious danger and one which may become a danger 
to others. He will easily fa ll into the temptation ofprojecting outwards some o f  
peculiarities o f  his own personality.
The second issue concerning the trainee therapist’s practice that has a potential for 
influencing the findings is the provision of regular clinical supervision. Gilbert and 
Evans (2000:2-3) state the following:
...we regard receiving regular supervision as an import aspect o f  the supervisee’s se lf  
care. In the supervisory process the supervisee is enabled to gain a m eta-perspective  
on his psychotherapeutic work that he can reflect on it and consider ways forw ard  
with a client. The supervisor w ill encourage links between theory and practice: 
aspects o f  theory w ill be drawn in to highlight certain client dynamics or the nature o f  
the therapeutic relationship itse lf so as to enhance practice.
The trainee therapist in this study has fortnightly supervision of practice as both a 
means of self-care, as described above, but also to seek an alternative professional
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opinion as to the appropriateness of the psychotherapy for the client/analysand. The 
discussion of the therapy with K forms an important part of the practical process in 
formulating the trainee therapist’s perspective included in this study. Consequently, 
the trainee therapist’s (the trainee therapist and researcher refer to the some person in 
this study) view-point, as described and critiqued in the previous chapter, is 
constructed from an account of the trainee therapist’s experience that is explored and 
discussed with another psychotherapist (supervisor) and the result becomes identified 
in this study as the trainee therapist’s account of the therapy.
4.3 The Therapeutic setting
This study was subject to the influence that the therapy setting exerted on to the 
psychotherapeutic relationship. The nursing home cares for a wide range of residents 
that suffer from dementia. Spayd and Smyer (1996:245) provide the following 
observation and advice:
Finding an optimal place fo r  providing psychological services within the nursing 
home can be tricky... once the area is identified, it is also helpful to p o s t a “do not 
disturb ” sign on the door or otherwise notify nursing staff not intrude during the 
session.
The therapy took place within a lounge/utility room that was able to maintain a 
private boundary on most occasions, but despite implementing the above advice, was 
subject to the occasional intrusion from both staff and patients. The prevalence of 
dementia within this setting, both in terms of the number of sufferers but also the 
focus of everyone within the home, had a significant influence on potential for a 
therapeutic relationship. The influence a setting can exert on therapy is recognised by 
Duck (1999) who identifies the impact of activities such as ‘gossip’ on the nature of 
and the potential for psychotherapy. Hart (1985:107) writes about a phenomenon 
called the ‘sick role’ in a hospital setting:
Admission to hospital therefore, by isolating the individual from  a community o f  
social support...strips the social identity leaving the individual socially naked... This 
model, oriented to the physiology o f  anonymous human beings and hospital routines,
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seems designed to sweep away personal social characteristics which get in the way o f  
diagnosis.
Although this refers to a hospital setting it does suggest the potential for an individual 
to be significantly effected by the admission to any healthcare setting such as a 
nursing home. The social upheaval described by Hart (1985) is likely to be associated 
with all institutional care.
The attitude of the carer’s toward the therapy also exerts another potential influence 
on the setting. The Researcher had a long discussion with a trained nurse working in 
the Nursing Home where the therapy was taking place concerning the general issue of 
psychotherapy with people with dementia, without discussing the particular case that 
is the focus of this study. This person was overtly sceptical about the value of 
offering psychotherapy to this particular client group, basing this opinion around the 
lack of cognitive function to avail of techniques like psychotherapy. This argument 
has been explored in chapter two but it might be important to acknowledge that if the 
care environment is influenced by a sceptical preconception of the value of 
psychotherapy, that this can exert itself on the therapy either through the trainee 
therapist or K. Both are subject to this institutional view.
Evans (1998), in a study of brief therapy, claims that clinicians’ attitudes toward 
therapeutic approaches strongly influence their use of particular treatment modalities 
and the effectiveness with which they are conducted. The researcher found no 
literature relating to the potential for attitudes in a care setting and its effect on 
psychotherapy. Robinson (1998) looks at the literature relating to the potential for 
negative attitudes of carers to affect the quality of care given to people with human 
deficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and found very 
few references. This paper (Robinson 1998) identifies a need to investigate attitudes 
of patients and carers for the potential effect on the quality of care. So it would seem 
that despite the limited literature on the potential for attitudes in a care setting to 
influence therapy or care there is recognition that it might have a significant influence.
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4.4 Ethical Issues
The researcher considered that there were two distinct sets of ethical issues associated 
with carrying out a study focused on a trainee therapist’s account of psychotherapy 
with a person with dementia. The first set of issues is described by McLeod 
(1994:172) as ‘Ethical issues in practitioner research5 and surrounds the difficulties 
associated with using an account of psychotherapy, with all the issues of 
confidentiality, for the purposes of research. The second set of issues is associated 
with the trainee therapist’s dilemma in relation to consent to therapy where the client 
group consists of people that have been diagnosed with an illness with progressive 
symptoms that question a persons ability to make informed decisions.
McLeod (1994:172) states the following in relation to the first set of ethical issues:
Research carried out hy practitioners on their own clien t’s raises a distinct set o f  
ethical dilemmas. These issues have received little attention in the literature, 
probably because most discussion o f  research ethics has focused on large-scale 
studies... The main ethical problem  in this type o f  research arises from  potential 
conflict between the therapeutic and researcher roles taken up by the practitioner.
McLeod (1994:172) suggests that therapists’ have a duty of care in a relationship with 
a patient, which can conflict with the role of researcher where the requirements are ‘to 
collect data and make a contribution to knowledge and understanding’. The duty of 
care might be seen to begin with the issue of confidentiality. Bond (2000:150) states 
the following in relation to confidentiality in the counselling and psychotherapy 
setting,
Confidentiality is consideredfundamental to counselling because, by its very nature, 
counselling is an intimate relationship which often involves the client in divulging  
information about their current and p a s t situations, as well as their opinions and  
innermost feelings. This can only take p lace in a relationship based on trust. In 
particular a client needs to fee l that whatever has been disclosed w ill not be used in 
ways that will harm them... there are many parallels between counselling and  
psychotherapy.
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So confidentiality in counselling and psychotherapy is ‘fundamental’ according to 
Bond (2000), yet research appears to be focused on revelation as a means of 
contributing to knowledge. Freud (1905:173) describes an example of the potential 
ethical conflict between the roles of researcher and therapist and states his position in 
relation to this issue:
I f  it is true that that the causes o f  hysterical disorders are to be found in the 
intimacies o f  the patients ’ psychosexual life, and that hysterical symptoms are the 
expression o f  their most secret and repressed wishes, then the complete elucidation o f  
a case o f  hysteria is bound to involve the revelation o f  those intimacies and the 
betrayal o f  those secrets., .in my opinion the physician has taken upon him self duties 
towards the many other patients who are suffering or w ill some day suffer from  the 
same disorder. Thus it becomes the physician’s duty to what he believes he 
knows...and it becomes a disgraceful p iece o f  cowardice an his p a r t to neglect to do 
so, as long as long as he can avoid causing direct personal injury to the single patient 
concerned.
So Freud (1905) is acknowledging the possible conflict between the need for 
confidentiality in a therapeutic relationship and how this could be threatened by the 
need to report the findings of the therapy. However, Freud goes on to emphasis that 
the wider potential benefits out weigh the cost associated to a breach of confidentiality 
in reporting an account of the therapy.
Gravey & Braun (1997:400) reflect on the use of clinical case material in psychology 
and state:
M ost psychologists would probably agree that the incorporation o f  clinical material 
in the production o f  clinically relevant research or scholarship is o f  benefit to 
practising psychologists and their clients... it would appear that many clinicians have 
found it acceptable to publish anonymous case material that they believe is 
adequately disguised without seeking clients’permission (e.g. Clifft 1986; and see 
Lipton 1991).
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Gravey & Braun (1997) would appear to concur with Freud (1911) by suggesting that 
there are significant benefits for clinicians and psychotherapists in reporting on case 
material. Reporting case material would also be seen as part of practice supervision 
and would be regarded by many psychotherapists as an essential part of offering 
therapy (Gilbert and Evans, 2000). Gravey & Braun (1997:400) state:
Ordinarily, in such scientific and professional presentations, psychologists disguise 
confidential information concerning such person o f  organizations so that they are not 
individually identifiable to others and so that discussions do not cause harm to 
subjects who might identify themselves.
Bond (2000:191) concurs with view stating,
The legal and ethical emphasis is on protecting personally identifiable information. 
Therefore it is best practice to anonymize cases fo r  discussion in counselling- 
supervision.
So the reporting of clinical material is an established professional and academic 
procedure where the ethical priority is the maintenance of patient privacy and 
anonymity. The researcher decided that the use of the account of the therapy 
presented in this study would not compromise the confidentiality of the therapeutic 
relationship because specific details identifying the patient had not been included and 
that the presentation of the information in this study paralleled the use of clinical 
material in professional supervision. The researcher concluded that there was no 
conceivable possibility of the patient’s identity being revealed by the inclusion of the 
trainee therapist’s account of the psychotherapy presented in chapter 5.
A further related issue concerned the decision not to seek the permission of the patient 
prior to including an account of the therapy in this study.
Merriam (1998:215) raises questions concerning participant observation that could be 
seen to be pertinent to the psychotherapy setting and states:
188
On the one hand, the act o f  observation itse lf may bring about changes in the activity, 
rendering it somewhat atypical. On the other, participants may become so 
accustomed to the researcher's presence that they engage in activity they w ill be 
embarrassed about, or reveal information they had not intended to disclose.
Merriam (1998) appears to be suggesting that there is a potential for a distortion in the 
way people will act as a consequence of being aware that they are the subjects of 
observation for research. McLeod (1994:173) particularises this point in relation to 
psychotherapy and counselling by stating:
The client may strive to produce the ‘righ t’ (or ‘w ron g) material fo r  the counsellor, 
or may even fin d  a way o f  ending in time fo r  the counsellor to write up a dissertation. 
It could be argued that the emergence o f  such issues in a counselling relationship 
offers valuable material and the counsellor and client can work it through. It could  
equally be argued that these issues merely interfere with the therapeutic task...
So McLeod (1994) explores the issue of whether the patient or client should be aware 
that they are subjects of research, suggesting that the distortions that are likely to arise 
could be viewed as either a useful provocation as opposed to an unwanted 
complication.
Freud (1911:359) considered it inappropriate to work with a patient while pursuing a 
scientific enquiry:
Its not a good thing to work on a case scientifically while treatment is still proceeding  
-  to p iece together its structure, to try to foretell its further progress, and to get a 
picture from  time to time o f  the current state o f  affairs, as scientific interest would  
demand. Cases which are devoted from  the firs t to scientific purposes and are treated  
accordingly suffer in their outcome; while the most successful cases are those which 
proceed, as it were, without any purpose in view...
The account of therapy described in this study started before the researcher had 
finalised the method to be used in the research, however it is clear that the 
researcher’s.interest in dementia andjpsychotherapy was an important influence on the 
decision to accept the referral for therapy. So the case presented in this study was not
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set up to explore the research question, the referral was coincidental. The research 
question did not appear to provoke an incentive for the trainee therapist to influence 
the therapeutic outcome in any particular way other than would be present for any 
patient. The study did not set out to prove that therapy is possible with a person 
diagnosed with dementia but rather to ask the question of whether it impossible. So 
the researcher concluded that this study was not ‘devoted from the first to scientific 
purposes’ as Freud (1911:369) refers to in the quote above. The researcher felt that to 
discuss the research with the patient would have seriously interfered with the 
therapeutic relationship
The second ethical issue identified in relation to this study was the problem of 
obtaining informed consent for the patient to enter therapy. An important implication 
of the apparent deterioration of a person’s intellectual capacities identified in the 
literature outlined in chapter two describing the symptoms associated with a of 
diagnosis of dementia (Arendt & Jones 1992:9, Butters et al 1997:33, World Health 
Organisation 1986, Kitwood 1997, Mckhann et a l 1984, Tortora & Anagnostakos 
1990:419) is a concern over the ‘competence’ (Grisso 1997) of the patient to give 
informed consent to a treatment. Gisso (1997:120) states while writing about treatment of 
older adults in the United States:
If  there are concerns that he or she may not have the capacity to make the decision (e.g., 
about surgery or medication) for the purposes o f  informed consent, and if  the older 
person has no previous guardian, then a surrogate decision maker may be appointed to 
make the treatment decision on behalf o f  the person.
This reference highlights an important consideration for the psychotherapist treating a 
patient with dementia, however the case described in this study illustrates a relationship 
with a patient who appeared to be able to provide informed consent. Additionally, the 
circumstances surrounding the referral ensured that the patient’s relatives were aware and 
had supported the idea of psychotherapy prior to the trainee therapist being approached.
So this issue is not explored any further in the context of this study other than to note that 
it could be an important issue when providing therapy to a person apparently unable to 
provide informed consent. The evaluation of patient’s ability to provide informed consent 
for any treatment does ensure that the illness is considered before the person despite
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acknowledging the practical and legal importance of having to carrying out such an 
assessment.
4.5 A Case Study
The therapy with K was in place prior to the identification of the specific research 
design for this study. So K was not chosen for this study as a result of any specific 
sampling technique. The trainee therapist/researcher had not actively sought a 
research participant at the point of commencing the therapy with K. The referral 
came from care staff that were aware of the trainee therapist’s interest in the issue of 
working with clients with dementia but were not aware that he was developing a 
research project in this subject area that would be designed around a case study. So 
the design of the method emerged rather than being the consequence of pre-planning 
and then implementation.
An account of a ‘case’ is an established part of theory generation in psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy, as was explored in the previous chapter. Freud’s approach to case 
presentation relied on the extensive amount of work that he published on the 
technique of psychoanalysis to provide the basis for the claims he made in relation to 
the case material. Freud had identified what he meant by psychoanalysis prior to 
presenting his case studies as a research method. Subsequently, it was considered 
essential that the researcher gave a detailed description of the psychotherapy that is 
focused on in this study and the theory informing it.
The importance of providing a detailed description of practice was also emphasised 
by the critique of clinical case study described by Kazdin (1982), outlined in chapter
3. Kazdin (1982) suggests that the credibility of research findings is dependent on the 
amount of background detail that can be provided to explain the basis of the claims 
being made. This critique by Kazdin (1982) was particularly dismissive of research 
findings that were drawn from accounts of therapy that assumed validity rather than 
investing in an account of the detail involved in the process of therapy.
The possibility of the therapy with K being integrated into a research design emerged 
from the apparent stability of the therapeutic relationship and a reflection on the ideas
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of Yin (1984). Meyer (2001) states that there are virtually no specific requirements 
guiding case research. However, Yin (1984) describes an approach to case study that 
attempts to be sensitive to the different types of data that can be produced as a 
consequence of human observation, so the data can be descriptive or quantitative.
This approach was used to assist in the design of the method used for this study in an 
attempt to provide a more detailed and thorough design.
Yin (1984:17) begins with the research question and the need to categorise it in terms 
of:
“who, ” "where, ” “what, " "how, ” and “w h y”
The “who” and “where” type questions are associated by Yin (1984:18) with “how 
many” and “how much”, for which he recommends survey and archival search 
strategies. These types of categories did not reflect the researcher’s interpretation of 
research question.
Yin (1984:19) goes onto to state:
In general, “what" questions may either be exploratory (in which case any strategy  
could be used) or about prevalence (in which surveys or analysis o f  archival records 
would be favoured). “H ow ” and “w h y” questions favour the use o f  case studies, 
experiments, or histories.
The research question in this study is concerned with examining the possib ility  o f  
psychotherapy with a person diagnosed with dementia. The “what” in this question 
would appear to be the psychotherapy and this was described in chapter 2. The 
difficulty in providing an accurate description of “what” psychotherapy might be 
suggests that this “what” remains an active part of any research into psychotherapy. 
This leaves “how” and “why” which would appeal* closely linked to an assessment of 
‘possibility’. The “how” and “why” of psychotherapy with a person suffering from 
dementia could be seen as integral parts of deciding on “possibility”.
Associating the research question with aspects of “what”, “how” and “why” identifies 
case study as an appropriate research method according to Yin (1984)
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The next category to consider in relation to case study, according to Yin (1984:19), is 
the control that the researcher has over the events being studied.
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant 
behaviours cannot be manipulated. Thus, the case study relies on many o f  the same 
techniques as a history, but it adds sources o f  evidence not usually included in the 
historian’s repertoire: direct observation and systematic interviewing.
Psychotherapy cannot be described in terms of systematic interviewing, as this is 
made clear in earlier chapters of this study. However, it is clear that the therapy 
develops on from a ‘history’ that the therapist and the client bring into the 
relationship. The account maintained by the therapist reports on the history of the 
relationship from his perspective. So direct observation and recording a history are 
relevant to the process being carried out by the trainee therapist in this study thus 
making it complied with Yin’s description above.
After identifying the possible boundaries for case study method, Yin (1984:14) 
describes a strategy for ‘designing and analysing case studies’ .Yin (1984:29) 
maintains that:
For case studies, five  components o f  a research design are specifically important:
(1) A s tu dy’s question;
(2) Its proposition, i f  any;
(3) Its unit o f  analysis;
(4) The logic linking the data to the proposition; and
(5) The criteria fo r  interpreting the findings (Yin 1984:29)
The researcher conceived it possible to design this study using the framework outlined 
by Yin:
(1) The question for this research design has already been identified.
(2) The ‘proposition’ relates to areas that might be appropriate to study. This could 
be interpreted as the testing of hypotheses (Yin 1984). The underlying hypothesis
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could be - whether it is or isn’t possible to enter into therapy with someone with 
dementia.
(3) The psychotherapy.
(4) The data that is generated has a direct link to possible propositions described since 
the trainee therapist and the researcher is the same person.
(5) The criteria for interpreting the findings are outlined in the following sections.
The application of an established case study design, as described by Yin, provides the 
study with a structure that could form the basis for the presentation of the subsequent 
findings. However, even though the approach described by Yin does not dictate the 
criteria for analysing the data, there is clear indication that it is aimed at providing a 
basis for generalising to the external world. Yin (1984:14) states the following:
. . .case study contributes uniquely to our Imowledge o f  individual, organizational, 
social, and political phenomena... the distinct need fo r  case studies arises out o f  the 
desire to understand complex social phenomena.
The underlying assumption in this approach is that the external world exists and is 
capable of being discovered and described. Freud, according to the researcher, 
assumed this position for psychoanalysis; what was seen by the analyst, a specially 
trained observer, corresponded to universal reality. If the phenomena were subject to 
observed repetition by the therapist, either with one patient or several, then this 
formed the basis of a potential to generalise to an external dimension.
However it is clear that this approach does not achieve Kazdin’s (1982) fundamental 
requirements for a scientific approach described in the last chapter. The dependence 
on the subjective account of the trainee therapist makes the establishing of validity 
and reliability extremely problematic. Kazdin suggests that these problems are 
insurmountable, that this case approach would never be able to achieve the validity 
associated with a truly scientific approach. Detailed descriptions and information 
might provide the basis for a pre-experimental status for this case approach, but it was 
the experiment where Kazdin felt the real science began.
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Although there is a difference in conceiving and agreeing the appropriate method of 
discovery there is an underlying assumption, in the positions attributed to Freud and 
Kazdin above, that a single or generalised view of the external world can be 
determined. In the last chapter this assumption was examined by comparing realism 
and idealism.
The claims that scientists make about their research and its relation to the external 
world, its ability to describe what is ‘really’ there, are in essence ‘unrealistic’ 
according the idealistic arguments presented in the last chapter. According to this 
critical perspective, a description by an observer of what is in the world, regardless of 
the amount of detail that is included to persuade others, will only ever be a possibility 
or a good story as suggested by Polanyi’s (1983) conception of tacit knowledge. The 
arguments presented by Heidegger (Crotty 1998) appear to go even further, to suggest 
that a cultural preoccupation with a determinate view of an object prevented the 
possibility of the multiplicity of alternative meanings emerging when attention is 
directed towards an object.
The position taken by Heidegger (Crotty 1998) transfers itself to a research endeavour 
in the form of a search for a meaning or meanings rather than ‘the’ meaning. This is a 
different position than that accredited to Popper and Polanyi, as described in the last 
chapter, where they appeal* to be settling for a form of ‘the’ meaning but 
acknowledging that you can never prove it.
4.6 A Hermeneutic method
The researcher decided that the phenomenological-hermeneutic position described by 
Heidegger (Heidegger 1927,Bleicher 1980, Crotty 1998), and outlined in the last 
chapter, represented the best approach for this study. The object that would be the 
focus of the study is the psychotherapy between K and the trainee therapist. Crotty 
(1998) describes how this approach has resulted in research that simply articulates the 
thoughts of the researcher. As a consequence, this approach can become the 
justification for a lack of real endeavour in pursuing research. Crotty (1998) suggests 
that the real potential for originality in a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach is 
inhibited by research that lacks an investment in endeavour because of the
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misunderstanding of phenomenology. Phenomenological research has been 
interpreted as an -anything goes- approach (Crotty 1998) rather than the chance to 
explore possibilities confronting the researcher by focusing his/her attention on a 
particular object. So this phenomenological-hermeneutic research approach might be 
seen as a rigorous activity for identifying difference rather than an arbitrary subjective 
monologue.
Bleicher (1980:119), describing the ideas of Heidegger as hermeneutic philosophy, 
likens the ‘field of the imiversal hermeneutic’ to a linguistic game:
...where the subjectivity o f  the players is drawn into and subordinated to the game 
played  by language itself which addresses them, suggests questions, questions us... it 
would be absurd to try and transpose one that is being p layed  out in science onto 
experiences o f  the life world, or to legislate fo r  either.
Bleicher goes onto suggest that understanding is a process of allowing the subject- 
matter to address us, it is an event where something meaningful occurs, it takes place 
in a context which allows the subject-matter and the subject to meet. The context is 
seen as being formed by tradition and language. Gadamer (1975) states that all 
knowledge emerges from a historic situation in which the influences of tradition and 
language, identified above, are exerted, a point that Harari (2001) suggests is not 
reflected in scientific theorizing and practice. Christopher (2001) claims that Western 
understanding of the person based on ‘ontological individualism’, makes it difficult to 
comprehend how much a person is shaped by culture. This traditional/cultural 
influence is also the case in science and can exert itself within a scientific research 
study in very simple ways, such as the initial choice of the subject or topic. However, 
Bleicher (1980:120) offers the following interpretation of Gadamer’s argument:
...this fa c t cannot be extrapolated into a questioning o f  the scientificity o f  its results. 
Science fo llow s the laws o f  its subject matter and can only be ju dged  in relation to 
that. When it transgresses its legitimate sphere o f  activity -th a t o f  objectifiable 
objects -  and when it usurps the role ofpurveyor o f  all truth, hermeneutic 
consciousness w ill assert the legitimacy o f  a discipline o f  questioning and inquiry in 
which the methods o f  science cannot take hold; and it will re-affirm the fa c t that
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method cannot guarantee truth, hut only secure degrees o f  certainty about controlled 
processes.
The hermeneutic approach described by Gadamer acknowledges understanding to be 
an essential characteristic of existence, and it is not intended to hinder vigorous and 
disciplined understandings applied to research, rather it is concerned to free it from 
being overwhelmed by traditional and established pre-understanding. This approach 
attempts to provide an opportunity for alternative understandings to emerge by 
moving beyond the constraints of existing pre-understanding.
Bleicher (1980) makes a number of observations about the hermeneutic philosophy of 
Heidegger and Gadamer that have been summarised into the following method or 
approach:
1. Begin with a Hermeneutic situation.
2. The interpreter enters a situation with a comprehensive set o f pre­
understandings that dictate and influence the questions that emerge in relation 
to the hermeneutic scene and these are the cultural norms of understanding.
3. The initial response is to be determining. This is seen as a spontaneous 
response to the situation given the influence of the culturally conditioned pre­
understanding.
4. Additional reflection on preconceived understanding provides an opportunity 
for different meanings to emerge that have been drawn from direct contact 
with the immediate environment.
The main theme of this hermeneutic philosophy is the looking beyond the established 
meanings, as Bleicher (1980:121) states:
The fact that the interpreter’s technical concepts have to mediate between those 
apparent in the 'object ’ and his own pu ts the onus on him to subject them to continued 
reflection. He should avoid conception that may be current in his time and which 
express class or ethnic bias, and should allow him self to keep his own concepts open 
to correction in the course o f  his close acquaintance with the subject matter.
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While carrying out research in family therapy, Boss et al (1996) identifies some 
philosophical assumptions of phenomenology that appear to be closely associated 
with the points made by Bleicher (1980). Firstly that knowledge is socially 
constructed so it is always incomplete and remains a possibility. Secondly, that the 
researcher cannot be considered as separate to the study. Also, that knowledge can be 
obtained from the arts as well as science and that bias is inherent in all research. 
Finally, that the every day use of language is epistemologically important and that 
events or situations can have different meanings for different people.
4.7 Phenomenological Hermeneutic research in action
The following are three relevant examples of research utilising this or similar methods 
that provide the basis for refining the method as applied to this study. Firstly, Lazell- 
Ost (1995) described a study carried out for a dissertation, which utilized a case study 
approach and aspects of phenomenology in researching the understanding of the 
phenomenon of miscarriage. The findings in this study identify the ways that 
understandings about miscarriage differ and the researcher’s preconceived ideas in 
relation to miscarriage. The results of the study draw on a quality of understanding 
rather then a global interpretation.
Nakkula and Ravitch (1998) describe a self-reflective approach, using a framework 
influenced by hermeneutics, to preventive therapeutic intervention and psychosocial 
research with children and adolescents at risk of negative life outcomes. This 
approach acknowledges, as described previously, the effect of culture and related 
values in human sciences as projected by the researcher. One of the main 
assumptions of this approach is that therapists and researchers are not objective 
observers, but rather assert their values and pre-understandings to all interactions and 
aspects of enquiry. This approach is intended to provide a ‘transformative 
experience’ and a broader understanding of a mutual experience.
Linesch (1994) examines the place of hermeneutic interpretations in ait therapy by 
focusing on a series of drawings by a 12 year old girl and an interview with an art 
student, concluding that the direction the imagery points is more important than the 
‘meanings’ that lie behind it. The ‘meanings’ are likely to be more engaged with pre­
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understanding rather then open to the specific hermeneutic experience that is before 
the therapist in the form of a piece of art or a conversation.
4.7.1 Phenomenological Hermeneutic research and Psychotherapy
Hermeneutics and phenomenology have been used as a means of researching 
psychotherapy. Stancombe & White (1998) and others state that the ‘therapeutic’ 
industry has turned to a hermeneutic approach, with an emphasis on linguistics, due to 
the inadequacies identified in ‘logico-empiricism and naive realism’ (Anderson & 
Levin 1998, Berkley 1998, Frank 1987). Berkley (1998) identifies the therapeutic 
relationship as the essential part of the psychiatric nursing and used ontological 
hermeneutics as the mode of inquiry to explore the meaning of the human experience 
of nurse psychotherapist’s. These meanings were obtained from continuous dialogue 
from unstructured interviews and then reflection on the text generated. Yimt (2001) 
suggests that Jung’s ‘depth psychological approach’ is a relevant ‘hermeneutic 
device’ for understanding the psychic origins of ecological problems in the world and 
provides a research method that fills an epistemological gap in the ‘Western world’. 
Frank (1987) suggests that the use of inteipretation along with the exploration and 
transformation of meanings in the practice of psychotherapy ensures that it resembles 
hermeneutics. Reilly (1995) explored the understanding of women’s experience of 
depression using a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, with data being obtained 
from psychotherapy sessions with seven women. Walsh (1995) examined the 
interplay of values and psychotherapy and its relationship to understanding using a 
hermeneutic approach based on the writings of Heidegger and Wittgenstein.
4.8 The Research Design and Method
If the research approach in this study is dedicated to producing meanings in response 
to a focus on a particular object then the case approach advocated by Freud becomes a 
means of structuring this research study. The identification of psychotherapy as the 
object embraces the presupposition that this object contains the therapist and the 
client.
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A difficulty that is presented in this study is that part of the object that is being 
scrutinised is carrying out the observation. The trainee therapist, who makes up part 
of the object in the psychotherapy, is also the researcher who is in place to carry out 
the observation. However, there is a sense of inevitability in this dilemma when 
researching any aspect of human behaviour or humanness, since the observer 
inevitably finds him/herself associated with the object of study.
The research becomes focused on the Analyst/therapist’s description of the object. 
Freud suggested that psychoanalysis was a method of research in itself. However, the 
diagram below (Figure XIV) demonstrates that this is not strictly the case. The 
Psychoanalysis is the object of the research but the source of the data is the 
analyst/therapist. The inherent complication in this design is that the analyst forms a 
part of the object being described. It is not something that can be ignored, however, 
for it is likely to impose a significant impact on the findings of any study.
This method is formulated around the picture that is constructed by the researcher 
looking at the world or in this instance a particular* aspect of the world. The links with 
the philosophical arguments presented in the last chapter are clear. The description 
and account of the psychotherapy, that forms the data for this research, is an 
individual view of an identified aspect of the world around us. The construction of a 
view through the eyes of the researcher makes this in essence an idealist strategy.
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T
Stage 2 Stage 3
Analyse/
Reflect on data--------- ► Re-analyse/Re-interpret
Supervisor input
A Hermeneutic Approach to Case Study in Psychotherapy (Figure XIV)
The research data is produced in this study by an account by the trainee therapist. This 
account initially took the form of notes m itten following sessions of therapy. These 
notes reflect stage 1 of this hermeneutic method and are a record of the initial 
response of the trainee therapist to the hermeneutic situation provided by the therapy. 
It corresponds to the second and third points made in the model derived from work of 
Bleicher (1980) on hermeneutic philosophy outlined above. The expectation is that 
these early reflections are likely to be subject to considerable influence from the pre­
understanding that is inherent in an account of human observation. The trainee 
therapist, who is also the researcher, intends to review the notes and compile an 
account of the therapy that took place. The trainee therapist’s supervisor exerts a 
potential influence on this report by being involved in a process of reflection on the 
data from the sessions. This account forms the basis of the findings chapter in this
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study and corresponds to the second stage in this hermeneutic process. At this stage 
the initial data will have been subject to a re-interpretation so allowing for additional 
meanings to emerge.
The researcher will subject this therapeutic account to further scrutiny in the 
discussion chapter in order to provide a further opportunity for meanings to emerge 
and the possibilities to be explored. Stage 2 and 3 are intended to reflect the fourth 
point made by Bleicher (1980), described previously, where further reflection 
provides an opportunity for additional meanings to emerge that are potentially 
different to those that have been initially subject to the influence of the culturally 
dominant preconceived understandings.
The process of recording the initial observations and the reflection and re-reflection 
can be considered in relation to Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle summarised in the 
flow diagram in the previous chapter (Crotty 1998). A consideration of the findings 
in relation to this will be included in the discussion chapter.
The important issue in formulating the detail of this method is to consider its- 
relevance to the research question. Would a description of the therapy in terms of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle provide information that would be relevant to the 
question of whether psychotherapy is possible with a person with dementia?
Although it is unlikely to provide a definitive answer, the findings are a presentation 
of what the trainee therapist observed during the course of the therapeutic relationship 
and illustrate the researcher’s response to the question. The phenomenological- 
hermeneutic approach described in this chapter is concerned with illustrating 
‘meanings’ in contrast to methods that are intent on providing a definitive answer to a 
research question. Research concerned with producing definitive results is focused on 
formulating a ‘cultural meaning’ or general statement where the phenomenological- 
hermeneutic approach is intent on illustrating the potential for an alternative response.
The phenomenological-hermeneutic approach outlined in this chapter is consistent 
with an idealist approach since it is concerned with illustrating the researcher/trainee 
therapist’s view of what took place in the therapeutic relationship. However the 
presentation of this view in the form of a study invites the reader to make their own
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judgement on the findings in relation to the research question. This study obliges the 
researcher to make a response, to give his view, on whether therapy is possible with a 
person with dementia given the chosen experience of working in weekly therapy with 
K. The underlying philosophy of the method suggests that this claim can only ever be 
an individual view, and in fact promotes the value of this individual response in terms 
of a research approach. There is a further dimension to this phenomenological- 
hermeneutic approach where the findings are produced as an invitation for the reader 
to a make a judgement in relation to the question being asked.
The method used in this study is dependent on the description given to the term 
psychotherapy in chapter three. Freud, as has been stated, acknowledged the 
difficulties in providing a definitive description of psychoanalysis since it was subject 
to an individual interpretation in practice. The researcher has acknowledged the 
difficulty in defining psychotherapy and provided a description of the theory that has 
influenced his practice in an attempt to provide a basis for the term psychotherapy as 
it us used in the study. The findings are a description of how the psychotherapy 
progressed over time with K, who was the subject of the case study. The answer to 
the question of whether psychotherapy is possible is intended to emerge out of the 
description of the therapy. The reader is invited to make this judgement when reading 
the findings of this study. If the reader is engaged in the therapy, maybe even 
identifying when the trainee therapist might have said something different, there is a 
sense of this relating to the question of the possibility of therapy. The suggestion of an 
alternative response within the psychotherapy, perhaps even a different orientation 
would imply that the reader has moved beyond the question of ‘possibility’ and is 
exploring the practice of psychotherapy with a person suffering from dementia.
The following chapter presents the findings of the study as part of the method 
described in this chapter, and represents an account of over three years of 
psychotherapy between the researcher/trainee therapist and an-other person.
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Chapter Five - Findings
This chapter will outline findings arising from weekly meetings with K a person 
whom the researcher, at the time of writing, had seen as a trainee psychotherapist for 
over three years. A background to the meetings will be followed by a detailed 
consideration of a series of contextual issues that the researcher feels had an important 
influence on the findings of the study. This chapter represents a depiction of stages 
one and two of the phenomenological hermeneutic method outlined in the last chapter. 
The trainee psychotherapist wrote notes following the meetings with K and this 
represents the first stage of the method. The notes were often written in haste and in 
the first person and this is continued throughout the chapter acknowledging the 
personal context to the reflection and subsequent re-reflection. The notes from the 
sessions are quoted throughout this chapter in italics and stage two is a re-reflection 
on this initial accoimt having had the benefit of supervision.
The data from the first stage is integrated into an overall representation of the trainee 
psychotherapist’s view of the meetings with K. This view is identified as a re­
reflection on the trainee psychotherapist’s initial understanding represented by the 
notes and corresponds to the second stage in the research method. This re-reflection 
is seen as an opportunity to see beyond the imposition of pre-understandings that will 
have influenced the initial representation in the form of the notes. The process of re­
reflection has been assisted by the provision of fortnightly psychotherapeutic 
supervision that was an ongoing commitment on the researcher’s part for the duration 
of the meetings with K. The process of discussing this in supervision has assisted the 
process of re-reflection and consequently has been an important influence on the 
findings presented in this chapter.
The trainee psychotherapist was also having a twice-weekly psychoanalysis, which is 
also likely to have exerted an influence on the reflective processes, for example the 
use of transference and counter-transference. Furthermore, the ongoing exploration of 
the trainee ’s own transference is likely to have a direct impact on the reflections 
made in the notes and the ability to re-reflect on these in presenting the findings in 
this chapter.
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5.1 Background to the Meetings
K is an 85-year-old woman who has been resident in a nursing home for about three to 
four years. She had moved into the home to be with her husband, who suffered from 
severe dementia, as the nursing home specialised in this type of care. At the time K 
entered the home she was not in need of care, and it was her husband that needed 
nursing care. K did not want to be separated from her husband, so she shared a room 
with him at the nursing home. A few months before the begimiing of the meetings,
K’s husband died.
After her husband died not only was she faced with this loss but also the dilemma of 
where she was going to live. Although she had not really been in need of care when 
she was admitted with her husband there was a feeling amongst the staff of the 
nursing home and K’s relatives that she had physically and mentally deteriorated in 
the interim period. K had a house that she owned with her husband that she could 
have returned to once her husband had died but her son and daughter did not think 
that K would cope living on her own. These issues formed the initial basis for 
offering the meetings. The nursing staff suggested to K that it might be a good idea to 
discuss these concerns with someone.
The trainee psychotherapist works for a small family run company that runs two 
medium sized nursing homes. K was resident in one of these homes and the trainee 
psychotherapist works as a nurse manager in the other. The patient care within the 
two nursing homes is run independently from each other, so although the trainee 
psychotherapist was nurse manager of one of the two homes he had no involvement 
with the nursing care of the residents in the home where K lived. The staff working in 
the nursing home in which K was a resident were aware that the trainee 
psychotherapist was the nurse manager of the other home owned by the company.
The researcher had worked in this dual role, as a trainee psychotherapist in one 
nursing home and nurse manager in the other previously (Greenwood & Loewenthal 
1998) and it appeared not to create any overlap in professional boundaries. The staff 
at the nursing home in which K was resident asked the trainee psychotherapist to
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consider meeting her since she appeared to be struggling to cope with the issues 
relating to her husband’s death and the dilemma over where to live.
5.2 The Beginning of the Meetings with K
16.12.98
The meetings began with a session that was something of an introduction. I explained 
that I was a trainee psychotherapist and that if she wanted we could meet, if she 
wanted, on a regular basis to speak about any concerns or problems that she was 
facing. K was very pleased with the prospect of meeting me on a weekly basis so I 
asked her about the expectations she had for our meetings,
K spoke a great deal.
She appeared anxious to discover whether I thought she had ‘it’ (dementia). She told 
me that she had been in hospital to have a scan, and that ‘they’ said that she had not 
got it, and she just wanted to know if she had it or not. She asked me, towards the end 
of the session, if  I could find out whether she had it or not. It put me in a difficult 
place at the time, as I did know that she had been diagnosed as having the early stages 
of dementia
K spoke about her husband, and how she was admitted to the nursing home with him, 
and he had subsequently died. She then went on to describe how she met her husband 
and how he had introduced himself to her at a dance. He was very persistent with his 
interest in her and when she told him that she was engaged he said to her:
‘.. .that it could easily be broken.’
K was beaming with pride as she recited this experience. I was struck by a sense of 
admiration for this man who had the confidence to make such an introduction. This 
meeting with me was also an introduction so it suggested a potential comparison or 
was it an invitation? And did she provide this type of inferred invitation for her 
husband to make this brave advance? There was a strong sense of inevitability in her 
decision to break off the engagement with this other man, (the thought of being called
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by the surname of this other man made her laugh). K said that although she had 
initially worried about whether the decision to break off the engagement was the right 
course of action, she soon came to realise that it was, because the man she chose to 
marry turned out to be an excellent husband and father.
K appeared to want to try and tell me as much as she could about herself in this first 
session and she went on to speak about an illness that she had suffered as a child:
‘I had double pneumonia and pleurisy5.
This illness was apparently very serious and had been life threatening in the early 
stages. K told me that the illness had first exhibited itself one afternoon while she was 
playing outside with her friends. The other children came running in to tell her 
mother that K had collapsed. The doctor was called and K appeared to have a very 
high opinion of him and she spoke about his dedication. The doctor informed K’s 
mother that the illness was serious but that K would be better off being nursed at 
home. He had straw laid outside the house so that the carts going by would not 
disturb K’s sleep. She proudly described how her mother had given up her bed for K 
and had sat by her bedside, sleeping in the chair. K went on to explain that her father 
had caught the illness as well and that the doctor insisted that he be taken into the 
cottage hospital as her mother would never be able to manage nursing the two of them 
at home. K’s father went into the hospital and presumably made a good recovery 
because she did not mention his illness again.
K described how she remained frail and did not eat well for some time. She had lost a 
lot of weight and her eldest brother used to say that if she walked over a drain she 
would be in danger of falling down between the grate.
K spoke about her father and how he had been so supportive during the break up of 
her first engagement; he agreed to contact her fiance to call off the wedding. Since her 
fiance was in the army and posted abroad this meant that K’s father had to inform his 
regiment that the engagement was ended. As she told me how her fiance had been 
informed of the end of their relationship I was struck by how harsh this must have 
been for this man posted far away from home. These feelings I was experiencing
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might well have been provoked by the guilt K appeared to be conveying about the 
way the engagement was ended which she seemed to be showing in the smiles and 
hesitation that interrupted her account.
K’s father had also been there to help her in deciding whether she was right to marry 
her husband. He had asked her whether she was ‘sure’ that she wanted to get married 
and had given her the impression that he would have supported her if  she decided 
against proceeding with marriage to her eventual husband. K generally gave me the 
impression that her father was an understanding man.
IC also associated her husband with this quality of understanding that she had 
experienced with her father, if they ever had marital argument he would come to her 
and say it was his fault and she would respond by claiming that she had been at fault. 
However, it was her husband that took the initiative to ‘make-up’. She gave the strong 
impression that her husband was very understanding and loving and that they had a 
good marriage.
At the start of the session she appeared to struggle to hear anything that I said but by 
the end she was able to hear me mainly just reflecting back what she had been saying. 
This may have been as a consequence of relaxing and feeling more at ease as the 
session progressed. She did by far the majority of the talking. We discussed how the 
meetings should proceed and agreed to meet on a weekly basis.
I was struck by how she had spoken about her life in such detail in this first meeting 
and also how the story had taken my interest. There was also a strong feeling of 
satisfaction in appearing to have foimd a patient to work with that was so relevant to 
my research question; I could not believe my good fortune. However what had 
appeared fortunate at the outset in terms of the research disguised some of the 
potential difficulties that were to be experienced in the meetings with K.
From this first session the meetings developed through certain phases.
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5.3 Phase one: Medical Diagnosis and Research
The early part of the meetings appeared to be constrained by the contextual issues 
associated with the study such as the trainee psychotherapist’s involvement in the 
research and the implications of the patient’s diagnosis of dementia. The meetings 
were taking place in a nursing environment that was specialising in care for people 
with dementia. The label of this illness confronts a person on entering the building, 
where many of the residents are ‘wondering’ along the corridors and around the 
lounges.
I have underlined the word above since I intended to write -wandering- but made a 
mistake that was only picked up when a colleague (Robert) pointed this out to me. 
This left me wondering whether this was just poor spelling or whether it indicated 
something else. ‘Wondering’ in relation to a person with dementia is an important 
theme in the written work preceding this study (Greenwood & Loewenthal 1998, 
Greenwood et al 2001). This theme continues into this chapter presenting the 
findings of three years of meetings with a person diagnosed with dementia and the 
‘wondering’ about the relationship that is being explored. There is also a sense that 
the ‘wondering’ becomes the main theme to emerge from the findings and becomes a 
response to the question of the possibility o f  therapy with a person with dementia. The 
‘wondering’ becomes paid of a willingness to consider psychotherapy as a process of 
discovering otherness as opposed to focusing therapy on intentionality (Levinas 
1984), as discussed in section 2.5. The struggle involved in allowing the ‘wondering’ 
to be part of the therapeutic relationship, described in this chapter, and how 
intentionality inhibits this as a possibility is an underlying theme of this chapter.
People that visit a care setting specialising in dementia care often comment on the 
confrontation that strikes them as they enter the home. In the nursing home where the 
meetings took place the resident’s can walk where they want to within the building 
and most who avail of this freedom appear to do so in an aimless way, hence the term 
‘wandering’. When a visitor enters this care setting they may well experience a 
resident walking up and speaking to them, the conversation is usually ‘confused’ and 
difficult to comprehend. A regular visitor may well get used to such an experience 
and might develop a tendency just to smile and not pay a great deal of attention to
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what has been said or become anaesthetised to the reality that it is a person who is 
speaking to you. The meetings with K took place in a specialist nursing home caring 
for patients with severe dementia so that the symptoms and the implications of such a 
diagnosis were brought into the therapeutic relationship by simply walking into the 
home to meet K.
This section considers how contextual issues (such as the setting, the label of 
dementia and the association of the meetings with a research exercise) imposed on the 
relationship. The influence of these factors appeared to be most evident in the early 
meetings.
The following are examples from the notes taken after the meetings and it appeared 
that there was powerful contextual issues exerting an influence on the time spent 
together: -
6.1.99
... Three times she told me about the fa c t that her house had been broken into, as a 
result her son and son-in- law had rigged up a device to turn the lights in the garage 
on i f  the gate was opened and they were not in. The house that she had given to her 
grand son, and that he was re-decorating.
This story would be revisited on an almost weekly basis. The house was not occupied 
since K had been living in the nursing home and it had been targeted by some thieves 
who must have been disturbed by something or someone because there was very little 
taken. She appeared very proud of the ingenuity that her son and son-in-law had 
demonstrated in installing this device to prevent a repetition of the break-in.
At a much later date a colleague (Del) suggested that the repeated account of the 
‘break-in5 might reflect on what was happening in the meetings with me, I might be 
seen as breaking in to her story. This type of free association with what K was 
presenting appeared to be inhibited by the association of repetition with the label of 
dementia. It was difficult to listen to the words spoken by K because of the focus on 
the repetition.
210
The account of the break-in was always followed by an explanation of how her 
grandson was buying the house from her and how this had caused a certain amount of 
discontent in the family since there were other grandchildren.
13.1.99
...K  spoke about Arthur, her husband, dying at the Nursing Home, there was a lot o f  
repetition about his death and that as a consequence the experience o f  his cremation, 
she now wanted to be cremated when her 'time came ’. K  maintained that she wanted  
to die so that she could be with her husband. She seem ed content to tell me these 
things again and there didn V seem to be any value in telling her that she had already 
to ld  me this.
28.1.99
K  still repeating the same information about the death o f  her husband, about her son 
and daughter. Spoke about a head ache, andflashing around the eyes- which made 
me think about the confusion [not surprising that my thoughts are drawn at this stage 
o f  the meetings to the underlying pathology, o f  the questioning o f  her in her illness -  
added later] Feeling that she was more forgetful than normal, and this was probably  
because I  was looking fo r  it more.
These are examples of how I was healing K in the early stages of our relationship. I 
was conscious of the repetition and even expected it. I was listening to a person with 
dementia. I think this way of listening has been influenced by my experience of 
nursing this client group. The potential effect that the nursing experience might exert 
is illustrated in the extract above, where the headache is seen in terms of some 
physical symptom that is making K more forgetful. Instead of listening with an ‘open 
mind’ (Freud 1911:359), there is a potential for perceiving the experiences with K in 
terms of some notion of dementia rather then a person with their own story. There is a 
sense that this experience decreases the sensitivity and attentiveness of the listening.
A type of hollow and tolerant listening emerges from an approach that is influenced 
more by the diagnosis of dementia than an attempt at a relationship with a person.
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An example of this type of listening can be seen in the way the issue of K’s house was 
described by her and how I responded. As mentioned previously, the account of K’s 
house was repeated many times, the incident of the break-in was followed by an 
account of how she had given the house to her grandson, and that he had moved in 
with his girlfriend. On the advice of her son and daughter, K’s grandson had arranged 
a mortgage to buy the house. K told me that her grandson had been redecorating the 
house and had invited her to see it. She decided that to visit her home would be too 
painful. She also described, and repeated many times, how her husband’s clothes were 
still being kept in a wardrobe of the main bedroom in the house. The more this story 
was repeated and the longer the period that elapsed, it became more difficult for me to 
imagine that K ’s grandson had left a wardrobe full of his grandfather’s clothes in the 
main bedroom of a house that he had just bought. However, even though these 
questions arose for me I made no attempt to speak of this with K. I was hearing 
repeated accounts as a symptom of dementia rather than a personal account of K’s 
experience.
I wrote the following thoughts after a supervision session:
Supervision
How was she saying the issues that she repeated, was there something in the saying? I  
had not been listening to this because I heard the repetition -  the Short Term memory 
loss.
This note followed a discussion with my supervisor exploring how I was working 
with the repeated stories such as her husband’s clothes and the house, described 
above. The suggestion made in supervision was that I should be more attentive to the 
way that K spoke and described whatever she said rather than being preoccupied with 
an understanding associated with the diagnosis of dementia. The stories might in this 
case be seen as a form of free association. Freud (1925:24) states the following in 
relation to free association:
Instead of urging the patient to say something upon some particular subject, I now 
asked him to abandon himself to a process of free association -  that is, to say
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whatever came into his head, while ceasing to give any conscious direction to his 
thoughts...
The process of free association implies allowing a subject, in this case K, to speak and 
engaging with the repetition in the theme. This approach provides an opportunity to 
be attentive to what is being said and as Freud (1925:25) goes on to say, ‘be able from 
the patient’s allusions to infer the unconscious material’.
I was listening and accepting the repeated stories because this was my preconceived 
understanding of what a person with dementia does, rather than being attentive to 
what was being said.
The issue arises as to whether the problems experienced in the therapy at this stage 
were associated with a lack of experience in working with someone with dementia 
and/or my status as a trainee psychotherapist. Would a psychotherapist have 
experienced a similar difficulty in listening to K? This question is difficult to address 
within the constraints of this study since the findings are subject to the trainee status 
of the therapist. However the method adopted in this study is designed to present an 
illustration of the experience of meeting K and issues that arise such as whether a 
trained psychotherapist might have been more effective or that a certain interpretation 
could have been made at a particular time suggest that the reader is engaging with the 
account of the meetings. It might also be argued that engaging the reader in this way 
also provides a basis for addressing the research question. If a trained psychotherapist 
could address the problems illustrated in this depiction more effectively then this 
might have implications for the possibility o f  psychotherapy.
At this stage in the meetings I was reminded of a film staring Bill Murray called 
‘Groundhog day’, where the main character is caught in an apparent never ending 
circle of repetition. Early on in this endless repeating he appears to enjoy the 
advantages o f knowing what was going to happen next, but he soon finds this 
overwhelming and becomes bored and detached. I think that working with someone 
that you have labelled as ‘cognitively impaired’ can bring about a way of listening 
that is more about coping with this endless repetition than about being in a 
relationship that is about really listening to the other. The repetition had apparently
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become embroiled with a pre-understanding of what to expect from a person with 
dementia, and an inability to move beyond this to challenge and explore the 
underlying content of what was being said.
Ferenczi (1900:9) suggests that an early assumption about a patient can influence the 
way they are heard and seen:
In my opinion, the main source o f  error in diagnosis is bias. When we examine a 
patient fo r  the f ir s t time, our attention is drawn most particularly by this or that 
privileged  symptom and at that precise moment, a mysterious psychological process  
leads us almost intuitively to a diagnosis, solely on the basis o f  the symptoms that had  
seem ed to us the most significant.
Moreover, in the course o f  additional examinations, we no longer are able to 
maintain a real objectivity, and consequently, we perceive everything in terms o f  the 
diagnosis, which we had previously established.
I had made the assumption that K was confused and that repetition was part of the 
symptoms associated with this so that I no longer listened with the same attention that 
I might give someone else in a therapeutic relationship. This inability to listen became 
inverted into a questioning of K’s competency as a psychotherapeutic patient, the 
following is an extract from my notes after four sessions: -
But from Freudian/analytic perspective it is the quality of the ego that dictates the 
potential for therapy, and this might be questioned if the repetition can not be worked 
with in K case, would she be able to hear my questions (on the other side can I hear 
her through the ‘expectation’ of her ‘difficulties’ in hearing and responding) about the 
repetition this is the question. I am saying that we need to develop the transference so 
that she can hear -  might be that she can already hear and it is my reticence that 
prevents me but it is only four sessions long.
This struggle to move on from the grasp of the contextual issues in the meetings 
continued through the first eight or nine months and remained an issue for the 
duration of the relationship. I discussed these issues in supervision and as a
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consequence found that I began to over compensate for the approach I had previously 
taken.
The following extract from the notes demonstrates how the repetition of stories began 
to provoke a need to make profound links: -
2nd session after summer break, 8/99
She is filling  the time with much that she has to ld  me before... When she was telling 
me about breaking o ff the engagement with Tom, she had previously been telling me 
about her husband dying, and wanting to fo llow  him & how her children did not want 
her to go, and d id  not want to hear her talk like this, it made a kind o f  link between 
her being left by Tom to go abroad, she d id  not want him to go, her Father sa id  they 
could not marry until he came back. After he was away a year she met her husband & 
got her Father (an Army barber) to ‘cut o f f  the engagement, I  asked her why she go t 
her Father to do it, she sa id  that she could not do it. I  said to her a little later, that he 
was the ideal man to ‘cut off' the engagement, she laughed, but I  had to repeat 
myself... back to the link, as I  was thinking about her being left, left by Tom and she 
could not wait, then left by her husband and wanting to follow, so I  sa id  “you have 
mentioned the story about Tom quite a few  times, I  wonder i f  it is because there is a 
link with being left by your husband? ” My impression was that K  d id  not get what I  
was saying.
These notes highlight how the repeating stories about her past motivated me to find a 
link or issue in the material. The links I was making were seldom ever acknowledged. 
I would have to repeat them several times. The importance of this side of the 
relationship was very much revolving around me. The failure to acknowledge the 
links I was making bought me back to my questioning of K’s competency for 
psychotherapy. This could reflect as much on my own difficulties with hearing 
beyond the diagnosis of dementia as with any specific issue relating to K. I raised the 
following issues in my notes at the time: -
The whole process raises lots o f questions:
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1. Why am I  so keen to make a link, and I  seem to need her to hear it, because I  
repeat it, even the comment about the \cut o f f  and its link to her Father’s 
profession.
2. I  assume that she does not understand, or comprehend and that automatically 
takes me down the line o f  ego competency etc. Could it not be on a different level, 
away from  the Dementia issue, that she couldn't simply hear what I  was saying, or 
d id  not want to respond... whatever!
3. She appears to express genuine satisfaction at coming to she me, why is that not 
enough!
4. Am I  caught up in som ething!...of course.
While reflecting on the contextual issues that have been discussed something emerged 
that confirmed a great many of the issues that have been raised in this phase of the 
meetings. I had, without really being able to recognise the potential significance, 
introduced a routine of phoning the nursing home to remind K that I was coming. It 
had slipped into a routine because of the ease of using a mobile phone, although it has 
subsequently been suggested that perhaps this might have been a consequence of 
something in the transference or counter-transference. The issue came tp my attention 
because of observations like the following: -
Next week she was not available, but I  did not ring her 1st, was this my wish not to see 
her?
21.10.99
Must begin with some refections on the last session which was missed, 1 turned up at 
WH, I  had not rung. K  did not arrive on time. So I  went to her room, knocked, no 
answer, repeat etc. Staff to ld  me that she had been ill the day before, they offered to 
get key and enter. I  sa id  no, I  thought that it would not be good to get involved in 
that.
Discussing this with my supervisor, I  wondered whether something was being covered  
up here, other reasons, as I  had changed the routine o f  ringing her first. I  hadfelt 
pushed fo r  time and then made the decision that I  wouldn’t stay. Was this another way
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o f  saying that I  wanted to miss the session. The usual routine was to ring first; I  d id  
not, so it does not seem fa ir  to say that K  did  not remember, because she routinely did  
not need to, because I  always rang first. She had shown me on a number o f  occasions 
that she remem bered the previous session or that she looked fo rw ard  to the session  
etc.
The issues around the last ‘m issed’ session were important fo r  to d a y’s session, 
because I  rang first, but she was still 5 minutes late. I  thought as the time went by 
that she has done this on purpose. When she finally came she sa id  'you've been 
neglecting me ’ her face was very sad  looking, she did  not want to talk, she appeared  
hurt. I  sa id  that I  had come last week, and couldn ’t get in (which I  sa id  with great 
difficulty). ' Oh ’ she said, ‘ I  am very dea f, she d id  not seem to be swallowing my 
excuse. Or was that ju s t me trying to make it fee l better.
The session then seem ed to be about the repeated stories, I  thought as she was saying  
them that there was a need to start again, to hear all the stories again. But maybe 
that was my own response to feeling that I  had let her down (These feelings stayed  
with me all day).
K produced a powerful regressive type experience for me; I was struck throughout the 
day with feeling of inadequacy and negativity. I discussed them in personal therapy 
and some interesting thoughts about my therapeutic relationship emerged. It was 
clear that my part in these events started with the not allowing IC the opportunity to 
take responsibility for remembering the session, and this denied us the opportunity to 
explore her ability to meet this responsibility. As Ferenczi (1921:187) states: - 
‘analysis demands no activity from the patient except punctual appearance at the 
hours of treatment5. Something about not allowing her the opportunity to fail, or just 
assuming that she would fail which is congruent with the assumptions I was making 
about her in the repetition, and linking that with my experience of this ‘type5 of 
patient. But as well as the chance of failure there was no opportunity to succeed and 
the order with which I have covered this consideration may also speak about an 
underlying expectation of the potential for failure.
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The time of the session had been changed, which was negotiated and agreed, but in 
not phoning I had changed the relationship. The explanation of K’s sense of neglect 
might be seen as a very cnormal’ reaction from a patient/client where a therapist 
changes the conditions of the relationship without discussing it with them -  she was 
upset4 you’ve been neglecting me’. As I described in my notes: -
I  was treating her like a 'demented'patient; she was behaving like the 'normal 
patient ’ being mistreated/neglected. Because, although it is hard, and I  am fighting to 
admit this as I  write, I  d id  want the session to be cancelled, I  was in a hurry, and I  
sabotaged the meeting which she was looking forw ard  to, it was important and not 
surprisingly the effect was to influence the follow ing sessions. Out o f  therapeutic 
failure comes insight -  Ferenczi. More and more this research question appears to 
raise the therapists problem s rather clients.
Ferenczi (1900) observes that where there is therapeutic failure an opportunity for 
insight is produced. During this stage of the meetings, where the relationship was 
overwhelmed, particularly on my part, with the contextual issues that I have outlined, 
there were indications that something was trying to emerge. In the session, reported 
previously, where K accused me of neglecting her she went on to talk about her 
parent’s burial again as the following extract from the notes illustrates:
Ifound this a difficult session, same stories until she talked again about burial; ' I  
don ’t like those deep holes ’; a t this stage I  fe lt  I  should ask her about this. Why I  fe lt  
able to do this today and not before, is not clear to me, maybe because I  wanted to 
change, 'tr y ' the repetitive nature o f  the content, but why?
'Why do you fee l like that about the deep holes, I  had to repeat this a few  times.
7 d o n ’t know, I  never have... my mother and father were buried’ I  suppose it is not 
surprising that she would associate feelings o f  her parents death with the experience 
o f  the hole and have intense dislike o f  them, and look fo r  something different fo r  her 
husband. I  asked her about her parents ju st once and it d id  not develop on this 
occasion. But I  d id  get a sense that something had opened up (the hole had  
illustrated the gap-added later), this still being centred around the repeating stories. 
But we have a relationship, Ifee l able to ask her the question that I  was not able, 
probably as a result o f  my own neurosis to ask, o f  this Lady, probably counter
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transference etc. But through what we are both experiencing something is growing, I  
think. For my part, that I  had *let her down ’, fo llow ed me around all day (which is not 
surprising as it is with me potentially all the time-added later), into a sense o f  
insecurity in the classroom, the sense o f  inadequacy, that I  thought I  had been 
working through, it had caused a regressive experience in me, and then into D e l’s  
room, that they had something against me, Robert was upset with me -  all these 
issues! Were these a consequence o f  this experience with K, evoking a high degree o f  
insecurity around the issue o f  ‘letting down ', surely this can be linked to my own 
issues with my Mother. Ill
It appeared that the relationship with K had produced a very personal response in me.
I had been exploring the relationship with my mother in personal therapy and it 
seemed that issues relating to this were very immediate as a consequence of this 
experience with K. I had been examining feelings of insecurity and the need for 
personal affirmation and linking this with my mother. The feelings of ‘neglect’ and 
disappointment that I was experiencing with K were producing a very real and 
personal response in me. These feelings were nothing to do with -a person with 
dementia-; rather they were a personal response to K. I was experiencing counter­
transference in my relationship with K.
I was beginning, I think, to see into the gap of my practice and there appeared to be a 
possibility to develop a different type of relationship than had existed to this point. 
This was about something other than research and dementia. My previous experience 
would appear to have exerted a significant influence on the way I was able to hear and 
react to what was being spoken. The pre-understanding that was part of a nursing 
training and subsequent work experience caring for people suffering from dementia 
made it difficult to hear K and to react accordingly. This appeared to be enforced by 
the setting, where the presence of so many people suffering from dementia made it 
difficult for anyone to meet without being subject to a barrage of pre-understanding. 
Moran (2000: 278) states the following accoimt of the work of Gadamer, which 
appears relevant here:
For Gadamer our ‘prejudices ’ do not constitute a wilful blindness, which prevents us 
grasping the truth; rather they are the platform  from  which we launch our very
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attem pt a t understanding. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, understanding is a raft 
floating on a sea o f  prejudices. The term 'prejudice ’ in English and in German 
(vorurteil) contains the notion o f  a 'prejudgement'', o f  a decision which as already 
been arrived at and which is carried along.
In recognising the potential for prejudice or pre-understanding in this experience with 
K, as with any other, there appears the possibility of allowing some thing else to 
emerge.
5.4 Phase 2: Transference
The issue of the transference in the relationship developed out of a sense that an 
oppressive impasse had developed, as outlined in the last section. The meetings 
appeared to be opening up an opportunity to relate to IC and go beyond the pre­
understandings associated with the term dementia. The following section showed how 
jokes about sexuality and other experiences suggested the existence of a transferential 
relationship associated with her husband and father. This relationship identified the 
strong need for K to have companionship and not to be alone, and explored the place 
that her husband had left in her life. It also highlights counter transferential issues 
that had the potential to provoke me to a personally motivated response.
The consideration of transference and counter-transference developed from my 
observation of K’s expression of sexual innuendo, this provoked me to think about 
how it was difficult for me to think about sexuality and someone this age. This 
difficulty appeared to be associated with a concern about linking IC’s sexuality with 
me, and acknowledging reciprocity in feeling. To acknowledge that an expression of 
desire can provoke sexual feelings in the object of the desire is not a startling 
revelation. However, if the person expressing sexual desire is eighty-three then there 
is a different context to the experience. The possibility of a sexual context to this 
meeting appeared to be embraced through jokes, whether this was by K or a member 
of staff.
These issues were evident very early in the relationship but got lost: -
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19.1.99
H ad some thoughts about the work so far, particularly about times where K  
mentioned things about, wanting her husband, my wife being poten tially upset with 
her because we were meeting -  sexual innuendo. A sense that she is recognising the 
absence o f  a relationship in her life with a man since her husband died. The sexual 
implication o f  that.
The jokes about the way our meetings might appear to others were recurrent: -
28.1.99
She also made reference to the staff, and taking their husbands o ff them, and also 
another innuendo a t the end that my wife would be upset with her. I  fe l t  that I  should 
ask her i f  she made those types o f  comments because she missed her husband, but did  
not fe e l able to say this at this stage. The sexual implication seems lost in the joke fo r  
her or is it?
I have a sense of acknowledging the underlying humour, because it is often a theme 
that re-occurs in a care setting with this client group. There is a sense that this is the 
only way sexuality can be accepted into the conversation. There appears to be a sense 
that sex and the older person cannot be taken seriously. K exemplifies this type of 
sexual inhibition. But as I became the target for the jokes about stealing partners etc. 
it became evident to me that there was a distinct implication to this positioning of me, 
and others in relation to K, and that was that she no longer had a partner and a living 
focus for her sexuality. An alternative needed to be excused by a comment 01* 
explanation, which devalued this possibility.
The issue of sexuality in this therapeutic relationship appears distorted by a burden of 
repression. Freud conceived repression as the means by which the ego harnesses 
unwanted libidinal cathexis from exhibition in the outside world. The ego becomes 
the mediator between the instincts and social propriety; the unacceptable becomes 
trapped in the unconscious by means of repression. However, Freud (1915a: 570) felt
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that this did not extinguish the instinct and that it would likely find expression in the 
form of another activity or even a neurosis:
Under the influence o f  the study o f  the psychoneuroses, which brings before us the 
important effects o f  repression, we are inclined to overvalue their psychological 
bearing and to forget too readily that repression does not hinder the instinctual 
representative from  continuing to exist in the unconscious, from  organising itse lf  
further, putting out derivatives and establishing connections. Repression in fa c t  
interferes only with the relation o f  the instinctual representative to one system, 
namely, to that o f  the conscious...let us make clear that it is not even correct to 
suppose that repression withholds from  the conscious all the derivatives o f  what was 
prim ally repressed. I f  these derivatives have become sufficiently fa r  removedfrom  the 
repressed representative, whether owing to the adoption o f  distortions or by reason o f  
the number o f  intermediate links inserted, they have free access to the conscious.
It would seem plausible to imagine that the jokes were a potential means of relieving 
the anxiety associated with these repressed sexual feelings. The humour was then a 
tolerable ‘derivative’ of a libidinal instinct that was not bearable in its original form.
The staffs sexual innuendoes were targeted at K and myself, and the ‘joke’ revolved 
around the possibility of a sexual relationship between K and me. In the previous 
section the possibility was raised of a maternal counter-transference, that K had 
evoked feelings in me that were associated with my mother. This observation 
provoked a consideration of the sexual feelings that might be embracing this counter­
transference. Freud (1923:638) described the underlying sexuality that exists between 
a child and his/her mother in the Oedipus complex, with original emphasis on the 
male child:
A t a very early age the little boy develops an object cathexis fo r  his mother, which 
originally related to the mother's breast and is the prototype o f  an object-choice... the 
b o y ’s sexual wishes in regard to his mother become more intense and his father is 
perceived as an obstacle to them.
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Freud (1923:642) makes the resolution of the Oedipus complex, and the subsequent 
identification with one of the parents, the precipitate of the ego ideal or super ego:
Clearly the repression o f  the Oedipus complex was no easy task. The ch ild ’s parents, 
and especially his father, were perceived  as the obstacle to a realization o f  this 
Oedipus wishes; so his infantile ego fortified  itselffor the carrying out o f  the 
repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself... The super-ego retains the 
character o f  the father
Freud (1923) goes on to say that the stronger the complex and the more authoritarian 
its dissolution the more likely that the individual will internalise a powerful and 
oppressive ego ideal. Freud (1914a) gave a cultural basis to this ego ideal by 
suggesting that the internal identification dynamic associated with the ego ideal 
formed the basis of establishing moral censorship within society. Freud states 
(1923:643),
Social feelings rest on identification with other people, on the basis o f  having the 
same ego ideal.
So emerging from the observation of a maternal counter-transference is an association 
of repressed early sexual object choice. Freud (1923:643) considered that these 
underlying feelings associated with the Oedipal complex, could be significantly 
influential in affecting broader social and cultural views:
Religion, morality, and a social sense-the chief elements in the higher side o f  man- 
were originally one and the same thing. According to the hypothesis which I  pu t 
forw ard  in Totem and Taboo they were acquired phylo genetically out o f  the father 
complex: religion and moral restraint through the process o f  mastering the Oedipus 
complex itse lf and social feeling through the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that 
then remained between the members o f  the younger generation.
In the context of this case the attitude of K and the staff in the nursing home towards 
the whole issue of sexuality in the meetings with me appeared subject to a sense of 
‘taboo’, it was provoking anxiety and requiring relief in the form of a joke. One
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member of staff particularly, seemed to find it necessary to comment on the fact that 
K and I were meeting by saying CK you going off with that nice young man again?’ 
What appears an innocuous comment appears to reflect a strong cultural theme 
relating to issues of sexuality in the elderly. These types of comments were repeated 
so many times, by different people, that it seemed to identify the strength it has within 
popular opinion. This was confirmed by a conversation I had recently with a trained 
nurse at a different nursing home following an assessment that was carried out on a 
93-year-old lady. The assessment contained a section on issues associated with the 
client’s sexuality. The trained nurse felt that is was ridiculous to ask questions about 
sexuality in relation to a person who was this age. The assessment did lack sensitivity 
but this did not warrant the total exclusion on the grounds of age.
There is a sense that the irritation, perhaps controlled anger, that I felt when the staff 
directed this type of attitude and comment towards K and I as we went into the room 
for a ‘session’ indicate an attempt to repress the inherent sexual context to this 
relationship. Experiencing the intensity of K ’s desire for me, even if the ‘me’ might 
be who I represent for her, was moving and arousing. This is an awkward and 
uncomfortable feeling as it challenges the way one is ‘supposed’ to relate to an elderly 
person.
In the following extract from my notes, I have recorded an incident where IC indicates 
the importance of our relationship: -
7/10/99
K  began by saying that she had been thinking in bed last night, about whether she had  
this A lzheim er’s disease and she decided that she would ask me. ‘He w ill tell me the 
truth, I  don't mind, I  would rather know, have go t it? ’
N o m > she had not mentioned this fo r  sometime, and the previous occasion had made 
me fee l awkward, especially given the nature o f  my research question. But I  did  not 
fee l awkward this time, whether this related to the change in our relationship-there is 
a sense o f  more o f  a meeting. A going beyond the exploration o f  the issue in the 
research and the ‘set up ’ in the meetings. Whether this can be described in
2 2 4
transference terms, or not, a sense o f  meeting in the transference, but it is an intimate 
meeting and all the indication are o f  a sense o f  exploring the loss, feelings etc. o f  her 
husband in me. But she was asking me something very important to her, something 
she fe lt her fam ily had avoided, would not tell her. How would I  react?
It is clear that I represented a place of trust and it has a sense of being in a space that 
she has always needed, that is to have person that can be referred to who will have a 
reliable response. This is enforced by the following observation in the notes, where I 
am reflecting on how it is much easier to respond to this question of whether she has 
‘it’ or not.
But this was easier this time...why? Well because I  did not fee l a responsibility to tell 
her, why because ju s t because a consultant had pushed a dementia diagnosis onto 
her, influenced no doubt by her fam ilies desire to keep her where she was, and the 
environment o f  the home, does not mean that she will end up like the other people  
here (interesting given the later developments- added later). So I  fe l t  a security in 
saying that I  did  not know, but there is more than this I  had developed a relationship, 
that included parts o f  behaviour that might described as Dementia, i.e. repetition, etc. 
but also included many o f  my own flaws, such as overwhelming the meeting with 
preconceptions that were m otivated by something that had nothing to do with the 
relationship, and we had been moving towards a relationship that was1 about what 
was really involved in the two o f  us meeting, her story my story and a relationship 
developing out o f  this and the whole diagnosis issue was a part o f  the story, but not 
the story in itse lf
It was beginning to be clear that something was emerging between us, this had been 
difficult to identify because of the issues/preconceptions that surrounded this 
relationship. But it was becoming evident that she was positioning me in a place that 
I think might be associated with other relationships in her life. This was the 
beginning of the experience of transference between us. The opening up of these type 
of thoughts in me, as the trainee psychotherapist was associated with the recognition 
of what was between K and I, and seemed to be a movement beyond the context. 
There seemed to be the emergence the possibility of a therapeutic relationship.
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She often compared and positioned me in relation to her husband, as the following
examples illustrate: -
16/3/00
...she says I don’t want another relationship, however she says this all the time. I 
wondered if she might be directing this to me transferentially, representing her 
husband, father etc/ super ego, and asking for permission to fulfil this desire, at an 
unconscious level, is it O.K to have these feelings.
When K  would say that she d idn ’t want another relationship she generally fo llow ed  
this with an innuendo directed at me or a joke about how she might run o ff and have 
an affair with one o f  the fem ale care s ta ffs  partner. This would always be explained 
as p a r t o f  the fun that she had with the staff within the home. These occasions were 
distinctly flirtatious and the jokes ’ about affairs were in stark contrast to a 
commitment not to have another relationship follow ing the death o f  her husband. She 
was describing how she ‘teased ’ the staff about running off with their partn er’s but it 
made me wonder whether there was also some teasing being directed at me. As I  write 
this I  am reminded o f  the account that K  gave o f  how she met her husband. He asked  
her out and she to ld  him o f  her engagement, but he \\>as not deterred and told her that 
this could easily be broken. In the relationship with me she told me that she did  not 
want another relationship but proceeded to f lir t and tease me. Was she expecting me 
to be as persuasive as her husband?
25/5/00
This week ‘you ’re ju s t like my husband, you talk and act ju s t like him ‘
Later ‘You’re like my Father’
She spoke about home, and had seen her daughter and son.
The positioning of me in relation to her husband was emphasised more clearly in this 
example from the case notes. (Transference of authority as one dimension on to 
companionship) The relationship with me appeared to identify the importance of 
companionship for K, and the need to fill the void left by the death of her husband.
She spoke about not wanting to be left alone. K made a close friend with one of the
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patients in the nursing home, which became an important relationship for her 
providing the companionship that seemed to be an important part of her relationship 
with her husband and this appeared to be part of the feelings that she was 
experiencing with me. Then the other lady left the nursing home to go home. This 
provoked a great deal of issues for her associated with the loss of her husband and 
being left alone.
The theme of a need to be ‘with’ someone rather than left alone, continually repeats in 
different ways with her husband, children and the people around her. This appeared to 
relate to her relationship with me through her commitment to meet weekly and how 
this had provided a basis for her to re-experience feelings associated with her husband 
and father. This could also be recognised in some of the feelings she expressed 
towards the nursing home. K lives in a family run nursing home, my family perform 
various tasks within the establishment. I do not work at this home, other than seeing 
patients for psychotherapy, but the associated link is there and K is aware of it. This 
context added further depth to the transferential issues provoked between us, as the 
following extract indicates:
24/8/00
She went on to talk about how wonderful we all were, ‘ I think I will take on your 
family name’ she said ‘what name will I ,... ‘ Well I’ll take your name, don’t tell your 
wife, what will I be called then’. I told her my surname.. .it was very powerful sense 
of sexual desire, I did not know what to say, these feelings were around for her I am 
sure, I think, very strong feelings of transference.
She also asked me to make sure that (a little later at the very end o f  the session) she 
was buried with her husband -  make sure Joy and Barry carry out her wishes, they 
have sa id  that they would, at f ir s t they sa id  no -  she had not said  this to me before. 
Previously the no was about ' them not wanting to hear her talking about her wish to 
die, I  sa id  this to K. She sa id  I  think they w ill but will you do this fo r  me, make sure 
they do what I  want and bury me with him. Very moving session ended.
These were very strong and intense feelings being experienced in this session. I was 
powerfully affected by the feelings that IC directed towards me. She appeared to be
227
touching a part of her feelings that was very real to her and conveying this to me in a 
powerful and provocative way.
21/9/00
K  touched my knee quite a few  times towards the end o f  the session... She made some 
jokes about us having an affair, when she stood up to go, she sa id  ‘do not tell your  
wife ’. She came so close I  thought she was going to kiss me and when I  opened the 
door, Madeline on my instruction had pu t an ‘engaged’ sign on the door, because o f  
the position o f  the opened door it came between us and ju st at eye level. She sa id  ‘yes  
th a t’s good  we are engaged, don ’t tell you wife ’.
It appeared to me that her sexuality was strongly associated with her desire not to be 
alone, and that it was at this level of companionship her relationship with her husband 
was centred. The experience of this life threatening illness as a child, to which K 
referred to on frequent occasions, appeared to create an anxiety about being alone.
She had been required to spend a considerable amount of time on her own through 
both the intense period of her illness and into her rehabilitation. However she did 
describe the dedication and companionship that her mother had given her during this 
experience. Loneliness appears possibly associated with the prospect of dying alone, 
and might be associated with the terror of being in the deep hole all alone.
A further aspect of this transferential relationship became evident to me through the 
experience of sitting and listening to K repeating the accounts of incidents and 
experiences in her life. I listened to the repeating stories conscious of the issues that 
were raised in the first part of this chapter associated with my preconceptions about 
the diagnosis of dementia and the influence of the research. The potential for a 
therapeutic relationship to emerge appeared inhibited by explaining the repetition in 
terms of a medical diagnosis of dementia. However, despite acknowledging the 
potential interference of the diagnosis I was still left with the experience of sitting 
with K repeating the same accounts of her experiences and appearing to be very 
tolerant of the repetition. I was putting up with it, I did not make it clear to her over 
time that she had been repeating the same material. When talking about her husband 
with her it appeared that this was a place that might have been transferred on to me:
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29.6.00
K  had started  the session complaining o f  feeling very ‘down ’ she had a headache and  
she linked the pain back to when she had been seriously ill with pneumonia and  
pleurisy.
Her husband was mentioned again and the experience o f  jilting the man that she had 
been engaged to. She explained that this man, who was very nice, had been posted  
abroad fo r  a three-year term and that she d id  not want to go and she d id  not want to 
be left alone. He had wanted to get married before he went away '. A s the childhood 
illness had been mentioned earlier in the session, I  was reminded o f  how I had fe lt  a 
link might exist between K ’s feelings o f  isolation and loneliness and her experience o f  
serious illness as a child.
I  wondered whether some o f  these feelings associated with a need fo r  companionship 
had been more immediately present in our relationship, since I  had m issed the 
previous session because I  was away a t a conference and also a  frien d  o f  K ’s with in 
the home had gone home. So I  asked whether she was feeling ‘down ’ because o f  the 
missed session and the absence o f  her friend, she ju s t replied by saying ‘maybe ’ to 
this question but did go on to talk about her children being there fo r  her and very 
caring and considerate and how she wanted to be buried with and particularly on top 
o f  her husband.
I had linked the absence of her friend and the missed session because, as stated 
earlier, I had suspected that the relationship with her friend provided the 
companionship that compensated for what she had lost with her husband and this also 
was associated with her relationship with me. The fact that we were both absent for 
her at the same time might have been difficult for K.
I felt that K gave me a clear answer to my question over whether she was feeling 
‘down’ about the session we had missed by describing her son and daughter’s 
commitment to her and also the desire to re-united with her husband. Perhaps by 
speaking about the jilted fiance she was warning me not to neglect her? I wondered 
also how much this had been part of the relationship with her husband, K had been
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given her husband a clear indication of how she needed him to be there for her, and 
not to go off abroad or something similar. I was left feeling that the fear of isolation 
and loneliness that K appeared to me to have exerted a demand on her relationships 
and that I was experiencing this during the session described above.
The weekly meetings appeared to provide K with the type of secure relationship that 
had been important for her. The interest I had shown in being there to listen to her 
speaking each week provoked a comparison for her with the relationship with her 
husband:
19.10.00
K  spoke about her husband... 'he looked a t me, as you are looking at me now ’, how  
much does this sum up what is going on between us!
I appeared to be acknowledging the feelings that K was directing towards me and it 
seemed that I had been drawn into a very tolerant and patient response to her. This 
response could and probably was influenced by my own feelings in relation to 
maternal issues that form part of my personal therapy. However, as I reflected on the 
position I was taking in relation to K and relating this to my own experience during 
supervision and personal therapy I became increasingly convinced of the importance 
for K of this secure, steady and patient paternal relationship. It seemed evident to me 
that the patient and understanding listening that I had been drawn to provide her in our 
sessions, for whatever reason, seemed to be provoking feelings in K that were part of 
her relationship with her husband and prior to that her father.
16.11.00
Notes written following supervision.
K  appeared very well, bright responsive. She told me about an incident with Mrs. B. 
When she had taken another p a tien t’s cushion and was sitting on it, ‘she wets ’, so K  
to ld  her to give it back and Mrs. B got upset. 1 sa id  that this reminds me o f  the other 
occasions when she fe lt  the need to intervene on someone e lse ‘s behalf and that this 
had landed K  in confrontational situations. Now K  did  not ‘hear ’ what I  had said, I
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had to repeat it about 6-7 times and still K  d id  not hear or appear to understand what 
I  was saying. I  was left feeling  that this was- 'd id  not ’ -  or 'would n o t ' hear me! 
Because she had heard more before, we have spoken about this before. This irritated  
me, and I fe lt uneasy about what I  was doing in the session. Listening to the same 
material, which might have been presented in a unique way, but I  had heard it before, 
so many times. When I  spoke about this with my supervisor it was very clear that 
transference was around in the session., [that I  d id  not challenge fo r  such a long time 
on the repetition, was this an acting out o f  the transference, because it appeared from  
her description o f  her husband, that he would never challenge her- added later]., she 
refers to her husband and poin ts a t me ‘a shirt and tie like that and yes that some 
slight smile ‘ these references to me and the idealisation o f  my fam ily made the session  
appear to be focused on her intimacy with her husband and thus making the sessions 
very important. We have worked through a great many feelings fo r  her, about her 
husband, the wish to die to be with him, the missing him, this has been a great deal o f  
the focus o f  the time... I  fee l that experience o f  transference needs at this stage to be 
acknowledged as a p a rt o f  our relationship with me, that I  should tell her that she has 
told me this before. Am I  becoming influenced by a  cliched view o f  who she is, o ld  
lady etc., not able to confront her with her repetition, so Isa y  nothing? Or is the 
pow er o f  the transference in counter transference, a sense o f  being unable to 
challenge her?.. [This might have provoked a maternal issue fo r  me, making it difficult 
to take this forw ard  - added later]..
This extract from my notes appeai-s to indicate how the transference and counter 
transference had become a very active part of the meetings. K described the incident 
with Mrs. B, but she appeared unwilling to hear my response comparing it with 
previous incidents where she had been drawn to protect one of the patients. It was as 
if she did not hear me, which could be the simple answer because she did have 
hearing problems. But it appeared to me at the time that this was more than just 
hearing problems because she was able to hear me at other times and this appeared to 
be something different than difficulty in hearing because she made no attempt to even 
acknowledge that I had said anything. I wondered whether I was not playing the part 
properly and consequently had been ignored. The type of listening that she appeared 
to want was not associated with making links with other occasions where she had 
behaved in a similar way, it seemed that she wanted someone to listen and respond to
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what she was saying and feeling at that moment. As she described her husband to me 
previously, this is what she was used to and this is what her husband would have 
done. The irritation that I was feeling and the need to repeat what I had said so many 
times probably originated from my own issues in relation to my mother.
This experience of the transference between K and I provided the opportunity for a 
potential therapeutic relationship that was more than a trainee psychotherapist sitting 
and talking with a person diagnosed with dementia, which is how it had felt at times 
when K repeated the same material. There is a strong indication that I was provoking 
her to experience or re-experience feelings that related to other relationships in her 
life. This provocation was not isolated to K, I have acknowledged the way that K had 
provoked a counter-transference in me. The relationship between K and I was 
acknowledging the ‘response’ that Levinas (1981,1984) assumes as part of being with 
an-other. Moran (2000:337) offers the following interpretation of Levinas:
His main poin t is that the ‘other ’ is not another me, nor is it something defined by its 
relationship with me, but rather something or someone completely other and unique. 
The other is incommensurate with me. Moreover, the other, as that which calls me, 
calls fo r  a response from  me...
The feelings that I appeared to provoke in K and how I responded to her, that might 
be described as transference and counter-transference in psychoanalytic terms, could 
be seen as examples of the call being made to respond to the ‘other’ referred to above. 
Perhaps the meetings were engaged in trying to explore an understanding and a 
recognition of this response. The experience of being in a relationship where contact 
with another person brings about a particular response or set of feelings provides the 
opportunity to acknowledge the other person in their ‘other-than-me-ness’ to be able 
to induce this reaction. This would not just be about what was being seen in the other 
person that related to oneself, but to go further and recognise the person that has 
provoked this response as someone separate and also capable of being provoked 
themselves. The fact that this therapeutic relationship had entered into the speculation 
and exploration of our responses to each other suggested that it had become more than 
just an insular interpretation of how a person with dementia might behave in a therapy 
setting.
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5.5 Envy and Jealousy
The strength and depth of the transference for K was demonstrated by the way she 
described what the other resident’s thought of her meeting me on a weekly basis. She 
felt that they were very jealous of her getting my attention. The following extract from 
my notes illustrates that this concern about others around her and their jealous feelings 
extended to other important relationships for her.
24/8/00
K  had been given a bunch o f  sweet peas from  the garden, 'what were all the others 
thinking, me being the only one to have the flow ers ’, she said this with quite a smug 
smile. When she sa id  this it linked fo r  me with what she had sa id  earlier and on many 
other occasions that the others were jea lous o f  her fo r  going into a room to speak to 
me, 'Women are funny like th a t’. There was a third link that emerged in this session. 
She spoke about Nan, a patien t that she described as over 100, and she had often 
spoken o f  her husband who was older than her and that he still managed to visit her.
K  sa id  on this occasion that she fe lt  that Nan was jealous o f  her because she and the 
husband go t on well. I  sa id  ' it seems that these feelings may be very much your own 
because it seems to me that a lot o f  the people here might not be able to fee l jea lous  
about these things to the some extent as you fee l it ’. She replied, 'maybe your right, I  
do fee l like that, and I  always have \
The response K gave to me was spontaneous and did not require repeating and this 
was not the normal pattern of interchange between us, so when it did occur it struck 
me as more significant. I had felt awkward about saying that I (wrongly as it turned 
out) thought that her concerns about the jealous feelings towards her might be 
ungrounded because the other residents were too confused to even know that she was 
seeing me. Also that they would not have noticed that she had been the only resident 
to receive flowers or that Nan would not notice that her husband was friendly with K.
The difficulty that I had in reflecting these thoughts to K was influenced by the 
assumptions I was making about a person with dementia. I only knew about the other 
patients from seeing them as I walked into the home to meet K. I could not help
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linking my previous experience of this client group with what I saw and jumping to 
the conclusion that there was a projection from K onto these patients. I was in effect 
projecting my own pre-understanding of dementia onto the way that I heard K. The 
fact that the other patients were too confused to meet K’s expectation was in a sense 
irrelevant for the meetings with K as it was the projection of these feelings onto the 
people around K that was the issue more appropriate for a psychotherapy session. I 
had tried to encourage K to think about the possibility that the threatening feelings of 
jealousy that she experienced from the other people around her were really apart of 
her that she had pushed or projected into the way she was seeing the people around 
her. This seemed very obvious to me as it seemed particularly unrealistic to expect 
the other patients to think in the way K was suggesting, as it appeared that they did 
not have enough grasp of the present to meet K ’s expectations. It felt obvious to me 
that K was putting those jealous feelings in place.
However it seems apparent to me in reflecting on this experience some time after that 
the assumptions I have made are indicative of the place I have taken up in relation to a 
person with dementia. The clarity that I had at the time concerning the unrealistic 
expectations that K had of the confused people around her appeared to be strongly 
associated with the feelings I had experienced with K associated with her diagnosis.
As I write this I still want to say that despite this K was stili expecting a considerable 
amount of insight from a group of severely confused patients.
Despite acknowledging a tendency to project this pre-understanding onto K, I felt 
something had emerged from the session above, because I felt the K had 
acknowledged, despite me confronting her with my pre-understandings, that she had 
been putting her own feelings onto others around her. K said the following as 
recorded in the case notes above, * I do feel like that, and I always have’. My 
understanding of this was that she had acknowledged a tendency to think about people 
around her to be talking about her and watching and to be scrutinising her every 
move. This is how it had felt listening to her speak about the way she felt the people 
around her had been watching and talking about her and the observation that I had 
made about their ability to meet these expectations had made it easier to see.
However, this provides a neat fit to my understanding of the situation and the meaning 
of K’s response to me and she could easily have been placating me by saying ‘maybe
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you’re right’ while acknowledging to herself that she knew these patients better than 
me.
Associating terms like jealousy and projection in relation to K made me think of 
Klein’s work on the death instinct, I was drawn to a further reflection on the response 
K made in the extract above, 7 do fee l like that, and I  always have '.
Klein’s theory developed from Freud’s (1920) view that every individual was 
embroiled in a conflict between life and death instincts (Hinshelwood 1994). Klein 
(1932:126) states:
It is difficult to say a t what time the fusion o f  the destructive and libidinal instincts 
occurs. There is a good  deal o f  evidence fo r  the view that it has existed from  birth 
and that the tensions caused by need merely serves to strengthen the sadistic instincts 
o f  the infant. We know, however, that the destructive instinct is directed against the 
organism itse lf and must therefore be regarded by the ego as a danger. I  believe it is 
this danger, which is fe l t  by the individual as anxiety. Therefore anxiety would  
originate from  aggression.
Freud’s original conception of the death instinct identified an externalising of this 
potential self-directed destructive force. An infant would therefore experience this 
force as a threat from an external object. Klein (Hinshelwood 1994:136) developed 
this further by describing how this external threat became identified with an ‘object 
that is intent on keeping the subject alive’. Hinshelwood (1994:140) distinguishes 
between the ‘manoeuvre’ where the subject attributes hatred to an external object that 
‘hates the subject to live’ and the alternative where the external object supports the 
subject to live. Hinshelwood (1994) suggests that Klein described ‘envy’ as an attack 
on anything that is the source, or support, of life. So Klein distinguishes between the 
primary death instinct in the form of a self-destructiveness and ‘envy’ which is a 
redirection of this instinct to the source of life in others originating from a direction of 
aggression towards the mother.
The nursing home and its staff looked after K and feed her so it would appeal* an 
obvious representation of the good mother object that she had internalised and this
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good, life sustaining, object could also be seen in me representing the dependable and 
trusted father. When she was in possession of these objects in the form of meeting me 
and feeling liked and wanted in the nursing home by the staff she appeared to feel 
quite threatened by the other patients and a potential target for their envious attacks. 
Klein (1957) goes on to describe how jealousy develops on from envious attacks on 
the source of life. The progression to feelings of jealousy directed towards an object 
presupposes the acceptance that there is something good (a good mother) to desire. IC 
appeared to believe that the other patients in the home were experiencing these jealous 
feelings toward her because she was popular* with the staff and matron of the home 
who appeared to represent her internalised good object.
Hinshelwood (1994:143) states:
This jealousy, however painful, is a progression towards a state o f  mind in which 
appreciation ( if  not y e t love) begins to show itse lf and grows stronger within the 
mixture o f  feelings. This positive regard, buried in jealousy, is a step towards 
mitigating the aggression, and shows the strengthening o f  loving feelings.
The identification of the jealous feelings in the other patients could well have been a 
projection of her potential for jealous feelings should someone threaten her 
internalised good object. For K it appeared that when she had possession of the good 
these jealous feelings are projected on to the other as an expectation that the other 
should feel this way, since she is in the possession of the good object at the time of 
acknowledging their jealousy. I am reminded of the time she described having her 
mother to herself, when she was very ill as a child, a story that there were very few 
weeks that she did not refer to. The possession of her mother was, arguably, so total 
that her father was sent way to hospital in order to allow K to have her all to herself. I 
am drawn also to an observation of my 3 year old son who has a toy that all the other 
children want to play with, even though he is not playing with it all the time he can 
not bear to share because the jealous feelings that this would provoke are too much for 
him. As a consequence he appears to sit in the presence of the other children’s jealous 
feelings in the comfort that they have the jealous feelings and he has the object.
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K told me how she tried to be helpful around the home and collected the cups and 
dinner plates after meals. This was very important to her and it was her job. There is 
a sense that this maybe linked to a need to ‘do’ something for someone, who is 
probably her mother (explored further in the next section). A resident called Ivy 
decided to collect the plates as well; K felt that this was a jealous attack with 
similarities to the example described above where another person wanted her ‘toy’ . A 
competitive edge to collecting plates ensued culminating in dinners being removed 
before the person eating had finished their meal.
28/9/00
Session began w ith account o f  an incident w ith Ivy, who had been physically  
aggressive with her before; she said that because Ivy had taken meals away fro m  
patients that had not finished, that the rules had been changed preventing her fro m  
perform ing this task, which she had enjoyed. Ivy was therefore responsible fo r  her 
loosing a jo b  that she enjoyed. Ivy then took a tray back to the kitchen, so she 
confronted her, and Ivy became aggressive, and a confrontation developed.
The consequence of this competition was that the matron removed the task from both 
of them. K was very annoyed with Ivy for having bought this about and particularly 
concerned that the matron, who appeared to represent her mother for her, thought that 
she had not performed her tasks satisfactorily. It was, as such, an attack on her object, 
since she was performing these tasks to encourage positive attention. It provoked 
considerable anxiety for K and made her feel vulnerable and confrontational.
5.6 Love guilt and reparation
A theme began to emerge while considering Klein (1998) ‘Love, Guilt and 
Reparation’ in relation to K which was later to prove quite an imposition on the 
meetings. It related to the idealised view of her parents that K had described during 
our sessions together. K repeated a story about her serious illness during her 
childhood that appeared to be illustrating the way she perceived her mother. K felt 
that her mother had been there for her at all times during her illness, sleeping in a 
chair by her bedside during the crisis point of the illness. K also described her father 
proudly presenting him as dependable figure in her life. He had also suffered from
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double pneumonia and pleurisy as well but was admitted to the local cottage hospital 
rather than being nursed at home, as the local Doctor did not feel that K ’s mother 
could cope. It created a powerful picture of K being ‘held’ safely through this crucial 
period of her life.
This impression that K had given me about her mother and father became associated, 
for me, with the following extract, repeated again here, from the case notes: -
20.10.1999
...she talked again about the depth o f  burial, T don 7 like those deep holes ’, and at 
this stage I f e l t  I  should ask her about this... ‘Why do you fee l like that about the deep 
holes', (1 had to repeat this a few  times). I  don ’t  know, I  never have...my mother and 
fa the r were buried ’ I  suppose it is not surprising that she would associate feelings o f  
her parents death w ith the experience o f  the hole and have an intense dislike o f  them, 
and look fo r  something different fo r  her husband, (the hole had illustrated the gap 
le ft by the loss o f  her parents, perhaps)
On another occasion, when she spoke about her dislike for the deep hole created for a 
burial she associated these feelings with images of rats and mice. As was noted in the 
case notes the image of the hole could be seen as the gaping hole that her parents left 
in her life when they died.
However it was the image of the rats and mice that appeared to provoke a 
consideration of Kleinian theory and the awfulness that was ‘down there’ , particularly 
the image of the mice and rats. These images could be associated with the feelings of 
hatred and aggression identified by Klein (1933, 1937) in the early development of 
the child; Klein (1933:249) states,
In  penetrating to the deepest layers o f  the ch ild ’s m ind and discovering those 
enormous quantities o f  anxiety -  those imaginary objects and those terrors o f  being 
attacked in a ll sorts o f  ways - we also lay bare a corresponding amount o f  repressed 
impulses o f  aggression, and can observe the causal connection which exists between 
the c h ild ’s fears and its aggressive tendencies.
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Klein (1933:250) attributes these powerful internal feelings to Freud’s theoiy on the 
death instinct that manifest an innate internal self-destructive force:
In  order to escape fro m  being destroyed by its own death instinct, the organism  
employs narcissistic, o r self-regarding lib ido to force the fo rm er outward, and direct 
it  against its objects. Freud considers this process as fundamental fo r  the person's  
sadistic re lation to his objects.
Klein (1937) described a theory that saw the unleashing of this internal striving for 
personal destruction outwards, a projecting out, targeting object’s that were most 
likely to be their parents. The most likely target for this concept of Kleinian projection 
would be the mother, because of the intimate life giving relationship that stems from 
the mother’s role of breast feeding (but also including mothering sustained by bottle 
feeding (Klein 1937:307)), there is an association towards the mother of a force for 
life and this is linked to the nutritional giving of the breast milk (Klein 1937). The 
baby, according to Klein, is not able to differentiate between self and other at an early 
age, and thus projects out the internal destructiveness towards the external life force 
represented by the mother. Consequently, the child’s mother becomes a target for the 
internal hatred and aggression associated with the death instinct.
The externalisation of the death instinct is also a defence against the potential for self- 
destruction that is generated internally; if the aggression is not projected out it might 
be directed at the child itself. The turmoil that results from the conflict between the 
life and the death instincts within a baby results, according to Klein, in the dynamism 
of this projective defence. Klein (1937:308) states,
Love and hate are struggling together in the baby’s mind; and this struggle to a 
certain extent persists throughout life  and is liable to become a source o f  danger in  
human relationships.
The defence, therefore, is an externalisation of a force towards self-destruction which 
leads to the primacy of the internal life force, if what remains outweighs the force 
towards self-destruction. Klein (1933:251) maintained that the innate life and death 
instincts varied in intensity between individuals, which consequentially affected the
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degree to which an individual was susceptible to a need to for the defensive reaction 
associated with projection.
The process of development for Klein (1935: 272) is associated with an increasing 
acknowledgement by a child of the existence of the other in a separate and imattached 
form,4 characteristically the depressive is filled with sorrow and anxiety for the 
object, which he would strive to unite again into a whole’ . This emerging recognition 
of the other is associated with a growing anxiety for the depth and power of the 
destructive forces directed towards the (m)other. The recognition of otherness allows 
the identification by the child of the (m)other as a person who loves, and in a sense 
the recognition of the ferocity of the destructive forces previously aimed against an 
object of love. This realisation, according to Klein (1937), provoked a sense of ‘guilt’ 
in having tried to destroy an object of love.
K ’s parents had provided her with a good, apparently an ‘ideal’ , experience of 
parenting. This idealised experience creates, according to Klein, an internal phantasy 
of mothering. As a consequence of this internalised phantasy there is an unconscious 
striving to ensure that she was this ‘ideal’ for her own children. This appeared 
congruent with the account she described to me; her children remain devoted to her. 
According to Klein (1937) this attempt to recreate the ‘idealised’ mother was 
generated form an overpowering sense o f ‘guilt’ , as described above, which 
developed in relation to her mother. Klein felt that being overpowered by this sense 
of guilt could have a significant influence in the way a~person behaved throughout 
their life. The accounts that K gave me of the relationship that she had with her 
children and with other people began to open up the possibility that this Kleinian 
(1937) concept of ‘reparation’ might be paid of her experience. The following 
extracts from the case notes attempt to interpret the account in the context of this 
theory o f ‘reparation’ .
The idealisation of K ’s parents has already been described; throughout the accounts 
that K made of her children it was important for her to emphasise to me that her 
children thought she was the ‘best mother in the world’, her daughter had bought a 
mug with this on it, and even when it broke she replaced it with the same inscription.
J bought her fresh flowers every week, even though K told her not to spend so much
240
on them. Both these public exhibitions of love could well be seen in the context of 
the theory of reparation. The constant expression of an idealised parent ensures that K 
is not provoked by the possibility that she has not lived up to her mother. She has 
repaired the damage by ensuring that she is a good mother to her children.
21.9.00
J  and B w ould buy it  fo r  her because she could not afford it. On reflection this also 
had a place in the session fro m  another perspective, because even i f  the patients do 
not care about her, she s t il l has J  and B. (This theme repeats in la ter session-added 
later). They bring her flow ers and they are prepared to bring her anything that she 
needs (and it  seems that it  is this that she needs -  someone to acknowledge her and 
show her that they love her, w ith in the K leinian explanation i t  m ight be about the 
need to show they love her, to a llow her to deal w ith the feelings o f  g u ilt that at times 
overwhelm her, when the acts o f  reparation are not acknowledged, and she needs to 
hear that she has not k illed  o f f  a ll her loved ones by her hate.
Thus it could be suggested that her mothering was focused on defence against the 
anxiety provoked by the ‘guilt’ , this defence exhibited itself by a need to provoke 
ostentatious exhibitions of love from her children. The potential implication of this is 
that her children fail to develop any sense of independence as they are constantly 
drawn to meeting this need for their mother. They also are unable to tolerate the 
feelings of hate that they have experienced in relation to their mother, and are in 
danger of being consumed in the same cycle; the neurosis consequently repeats.
A consistent theme has been the desire expressed by K to help people that she 
perceived as needing assistance.
16/3/00
Session repeated the issue o f  concern that K  fe lt  towards others who appear worse 
o ff  This week it  was N a n ’s husband, who is over a 100, is he getting enough to eat? 
Made me think, because I  was reading it  at the time Klein, G u ilt p312, making 
reparation as p a rt o f  love, might this be associated with K  relationship w ith her
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parents (  which is very d ifficu lt to explore as they are idealised -  added later), g u ilt 
acting out as a concern and sympathy fo r  others
“ we p lay  a p a rt o f  a good parent and behave toward the person as we fe lt  our parents 
d id ”  K le in  (1998:317)
“ thus by reversing a situation, namely in acting towards another person as a good  
parent in phantasy we recreate and enjoy the wished fo r  love and goodness o f  our 
parents. ”
Klein identifies a link between the type of behaviour exhibited by K in the form of a 
deep concern for this frail man, but also in the repeated accounts of how she felt a 
need to help the other patients in the nursing home. Also the need to help the staff in 
the nursing home. This type of feeling and behaviour appeared to have a place in this 
Kleinian conception of reparation, in that they could be seen as external expressions 
of this inner need to be behaving as the good parent, as the ideal mother.
The following extract from the case notes invites a further consideration of the 
reparation theory
29.6.00
K  greeted me at the door o f  our room, by showing me the bruises on her arm, 'Ivy d id  
this to me...she shouldn ‘t be here'
She had not started a session in this way previously. M y understanding o f  this 
incident developed as time went on. Ivy was 'pushing ’ the o ld  Ladies around, te lling  
them what to do, and K  to ld  me that she pushed her h a lf  way across the room and 
threw her in to the chair. She repeated this account several times in the session, and  
the resentment at Ivy 's behaviour became evident (the bossing, and pushing o the r’s 
around) it  had rea lly upset her ‘ she must have been a school teacher ’, I  wondered i f  
she had had a bad experience w ith a School teacher but she said that she had not.
But the harsh description and the power showed by Ivy towards the demented patients 
made me wonder i f  she had stood up fo r  'children ’ and to ld  Ivy to stop and that it had 
provoked the incident. As the session went on K  confirmed this and she spoke o f  the 
dislike she had fo r  Iv y ’s behaviour. I  cou ldn ’t  help thinking about the way K  spoke
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about the discip lin ing o f  her children, and I  reflected back to her the sense I  had that 
she fe lt  defensive towards the ‘vulnerable pa tien ts ' as i f  they were her children', and  
she had acknowledged this sense o f  protectiveness in a previous session. I  d id  not 
need to make a connection w ith her own children, as K  mentioned herself the way she 
disciplined Barry and Joy herself, saying that her husband never lifted  a finge r 
against the children, he was the perfect Father etc ...
K had become incensed by Ivy’s behaviour, and protective towards the patients that 
she had been drawn towards.
A further confirmation of this theory of reparation was illustrated when K confronted 
a patient in the lounge who was bullying, as she saw it, a rather helpless patient. The 
following extract from the case notes describe the incident and some of the perceived 
implications:
7/9/00
A member o f  s ta ff to ld  me on the way to the Session that - K  was like she was before! I  
smiled and d id  not get involved in a conversation. K  was in her dressing gown and I  
thought she would say that she d id  not want to meet, but she didn ’t.
She to ld  me that she had been kicked by patient while trying to protect another from  
being h it by a ’new ’ patient. I  said, 'you do seem to get yourse lf in to these situations 
K \  She then went on to say that on returning to the lounge the fo llo w in g  day no one 
remembered to ask how she was, ‘They d id n ’t care ’ and K  was very upset by this. I  
asked her why it  could have been that they d id  not ask how she was. K  said that she 
d id  not th ink they liked her. I  asked her i f  there might be another reason but she d id  
not know. M y thoughts were that these patients were very confused etc, why should 
they remember. I f e l t  like te lling her this stra ight away but it  d id  not fee l right. K  
went on to say that she could not go out any more, because she wears a pad  (  an 
incontinence pad) now. This had been a big thing fo r  her, that ‘they ’ a ll wear pads 
and she d id n ’t and this was why R (the matron) let her go out. But now she was 
wearing one she went on to say that she had asked fo r  one to wear at night, because 
she was w orried  about wetting the bed, something she had not done before . I  said
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‘so you are wearing the pad  because you want to to be safe she said, I  tried  to lin k  
this w ith what she had said about going out, but she wouldn ’t hear it.
There appeared to be a need in K to have her benevolent actions recognised, and there 
is a sense that this is congruent with the process that Klein described. If the actions 
are about a need to alleviate the anxiety associated with the guilt she feels towards her 
idealised mother, then if the actions are not acknowledged there are no compensatory 
feelings of relief and the anxiety is left. There is a sense that the anxiety will be 
enhanced by this lack of appreciation by the other residents in the nursing home. It 
appeal's that this might be emphasised by the clear regression that K describes in her 
need to wear a pad, in a sense a potential physical symptom to the internal turmoil 
caused be this incident. This anxiety has bought about physical regression, or at least 
a sense of it.
Although it seemed possible to interpret K ’s story with reference to Klein the 
consequence was that other possibilities were being excluded as attention focused on 
hearing and experiencing what was happening in the meetings in the context of a 
psychoanalytic theory. So the meetings were being mediated through a pre­
understanding of Kleinian theory and this was influencing how I was experiencing K. 
This linked with the problems described with the first stage of the meetings where the 
pre-understanding of the diagnosis of dementia appeared to interfere with the 
relationship with IC.
By seeing K as someone with dementia prevented the possibility of the seeing her as a 
‘person’ . The term dementia is defined in chapter two, and the description and 
explanation of the symptoms comes with the label and leaves very little room for the 
possibility of the ‘person’ . The term’s ‘transference’ and ‘reparation’ provide an 
interesting way of seeing what might be happening between two people in therapy and 
relating it to a persons’ experience, but as soon as these ideas are in place it appears to 
impede any other possibilities from emerging.
Mannoni (1987:47), a Lacanian analyst, using an example of the work of Erikson 
(1965) states the following:
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IfE rikson , owing to his in tuition as a clin ician, was able to escape fro m  a narrow ly  
medical attitude in which inquiries bear on facts rather than on being, it  is the fa te  o f  
other theories, not yet rescued fro m  certain philosophical tenets inherited fro m  the 
nineteenth century, to be prevented fro m  a p roper understanding o f  a case by their 
ideas about theory. We see them asking questions o f  human “ re a lity ’’ and o f  
behaviour, divided as they are between b io logical determinism and cu lturalist 
theories. Explanations are given at points where the “facts ’’ ought not be described 
but queried, so as to reveal the subject’s question.
Maimoni (1987), by focusing on the work of Erikson, indicates how the application of 
theory within psychotherapy can extinguish any contact with the subject and how she 
felt that Kleinian theory was particularly caught up with this problem.
Loewenthal (2002) suggests that what is important is when the person who is the 
patient meets the person who is the health care professional. The potential for this 
meeting is reduced by the imposition of an objectifying theory, the relationship could 
become ‘bogged down’.
The potential alternative to the imposition of the knowing theory is a meeting with the 
uncertainty of not knowing. Loewenthal (2000) suggests that Kierkegaard (1944:55) 
is speaking of the ‘dizziness’ that is a paid of acknowledging possibilities as opposed 
to the imposition of a probability when he describes ‘dread’ :-
...D read is the dizziness offreedom, which occurs when the sp irit would posit the 
synthesis, andfreedom then gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness 
to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom succumbs. Further then this psychology 
cannot go and w il l not. That very instant everything is changed, and when freedom  
rises again it  sees that it  is guilty. Between these two instances lies the leap, which no 
science has explained o r can explain.
The dread that Kierkegaard describes might be the place of not knowing, even the 
original question of the research. The question is posed but unanswered. The ‘spirit’ 
looks to establish a certainty in the form of a ‘knowing’ , and this is described as a 
‘leap’, from the dread of not knowing to the security of knowledge.
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If you enter into therapy questioning the competency of the patient to have therapy -  
therapy will never take place because you are not open to the ‘other’ , you have closed 
down the opportunity and the ‘possibilities’ . Only when you are open to the potential 
of the otherness of the other that therapy will take place, that you will allow the 
possibility of otherness. Early in the sessions, and to a degree (hopefully less) 
continually the research/diagnosis/ involvement in the nursing home interfered with 
the appreciation of the potential that is there in any other to be ‘other’ . The potential 
to be ‘other’ is shut down by asserting a ‘there’ in that potential place. The ‘there’ 
takes the form of an understanding that explains and removes the chance of a 
possibility to emerge. The ‘there’ is easier because it saves the effort of listening, it 
closes down the possibilities, as there is no room for possibilities because the T  
knows.
The interpretation of K ’s story by integrating Kleinian theory on reparation opened a 
new range of possibilities in listening to K but it also, in its positioning of the story, 
has the danger of closing down any further possibilities. Consequently, a set of 
different labels like ‘guilt and reparation’ replaces the pre-understanding associated 
with the diagnosis of dementia, and as a result K is still not heard.
The term 'dread' appears to embrace the infinite of possibilities, which can evoke 
anxiety by provoking uncertainty, but in the 'dread' Kierkegaard (1944) sees the 
possibility of freedom. In an attempt not to be - dread-full - psychotherapy is want to 
'posit the synthesis' to 'grasp at finiteness'. On the contrary psychotherapy should be - 
dread-full -, it should allow for a 'leap' into the realm of possibilities. Surely it is in the 
realm of dread that the infinite of 'Otherness' is possible, it is not what I see (a trainee 
psychotherapist) as being there in the diagnosis or the theory, and it is the 'Other' than 
me. In the recognition of this Levinas (1984) sees a possibility of a 'relation'.
So accepting interpretations of K ’s story in terms like ‘dementia’, ‘reparation’ and 
‘guilt’ becomes a very intellectualised way of seeing another that in fact fails to see 
‘otherness’ but rather sees ‘my view of otherness’ . I had developed a relationship that 
allowed K the opportunity to speak about her feelings and this had progressed from 
the early preoccupation on my part in seeing her as a ‘person with dementia’ rather
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than a person. However, if the Kleinian theory becomes more than a possibility and 
develops into the only way of seeing K ’s story it is as if the ‘person with dementia’ 
becomes replaced by a ‘person as defined by Klein’ .
Levinas (1984) suggests that a person cannot be identified and described by the type 
of theorising attempted through this interpretation of Klein. This is an expression of 
my intentionality, the trainee psychotherapist’s view of what is there. Levinas (1984) 
would appear to be suggesting that the person, who is other than me the trainee 
psychotherapist, could be seen in a fleeting moment before this otherness is 
rationalised and posited into a theory. The therapy then becomes more concerned 
with opening up an opportunity for K to see the otherness of people around her rather 
than seeing other people as an extension of oneself. K describes how the other 
patient’s are jealous of her, which they might be, but this could also be a part of her 
that she is putting in their place or projecting on to them which prevents her from 
seeing them as other then her. In the same way that my suggestion that these residents 
were not capable of perceiving the type of jealous feelings that K was suggesting 
might be a projection of my difficulty in seeing a resident in this home as anything 
other than a person(s) with dementia. In the above extract from the notes, where K 
described how she was now wearing a pad at night just as she thinks all the other 
residents are doing, is this something of a recognition by her of their otherness or a 
further extension of her projection onto others?
5.7 The Great Escape
K ’s health deteriorated in the Autumn 2000, she had flu and an infection in her leg. 
The meetings went through a phase of interruptions because of her health that seemed 
to affect her mood. She become very morose and cancelled a number of sessions 
because she did not feel up to it. I would visit the home and she would cancel the 
session in person saying that she would try the following week. I suggested the 
possibility of meeting to discuss these feelings but she was adamant that she was not 
well enough.
I was visiting the nursing home in November to see another patient and a member of 
staff asked me if I could speak to K, as she was ‘out of control’ . I did not want to get
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involved in this type of spontaneous situation but on the other hand it seemed 
inappropriate at that moment to refuse. So I told the member of staff that if K agreed 
to see me that I would meet with her. IC decided that she did want to speak to me.
I asked her what was wrong and she said ‘no one likes me here’ . She was very 
agitated and her face was gaunt and pale. I asked her to explain and she told me that 
none of the residents had asked after her to see if she was feeling better, that they 
were not interested in her. This put me in a difficult position because I was not 
convinced that there was many, if any, that would have known that she was ill in the 
first place. I choose not to say this to her. She spoke about going home that she could 
look after herself. During our last few sessions she had spoken about feeling settled at 
the nursing home and not wanting to go home. So I mentioned this but she simply 
responded that ‘you can change your mind, and I have’ . It was spoken in a cold and 
detached tone. We sat in silence for some time, and it was a difficult silence. I felt it 
was important to let her feel that I was prepared to give her time and that as a 
consequence that she felt cared for, I reminded her that we had a session in a couple 
of days time. We had spent about forty minutes together and I had to leave for 
another appointment. She remained withdrawn but she appeared to me to be a little 
less agitated, but I had no sense of having any significant impact on her. But she did 
agree to see me for our next session to discuss her feelings. This left me a little more 
reassured although it was clear that things remained very difficult for her but I had no 
sense of what had caused this state of mind. However, I found it difficult not to 
imagine that this was associated with deterioration in her dementia. It was very 
difficult to hear her through these thoughts and this was made worse by her apparent 
unwillingness/inability to communicate.
That evening I was informed that K had gone missing and I asked to assist in the 
search. In this type of emergency situation I was left with no alternative but to help in 
the search because of my position within the organisation. It was a dark, windy and 
cold evening. It had been raining for some time and IC had been last seen 2-3 hours 
before. The police and family had been notified.
I went looking for K in my car. After driving for little while I saw a stationary police 
car with two police officers standing near to IC but not actually speaking to her. I
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stopped and after introducing myself to the police officers was told that they could get 
very little information from K and that she would not come with them. 1 told them that 
I would speak to her and by mutual agreement they decided to go as there presence 
appeared to be exaggerating K ’s anxiety. I tried speaking to K but she did not 
respond to me in a way that acknowledged who I was, but did agree to take cover in a 
nearby shelter. She appeared not to know what was going on or who I was and she 
looked very frail and cold. She appeared to have fallen at some stage as her clothes 
were covered in mud. By this time colleagues from the nursing home had arrived, but 
she would not agree to return to the home. I tried to persuade her to change her mind 
but she appeared to be completely detached from the reality of the weather, her 
physical condition and was completely intransigent. I was aware of the options that 
were available to us in dealing with this situation and decided to precede them by 
telling K that she ‘had’ to come with us. I took her arm and she looked at me 
hesitating for a moment, but whether she sensed my resolve or was just too tired is not 
clear, but in the end she simply moved forward without resistance and got into a car 
and was taken back to the nursing home.
This incident left me with concerns that a boundary had been crossed that would have 
implications for our therapeutic relationship. I wrote the following entry in my notes 
at the time:
I  wondered whether this would be a p o in t o f  no return fo r  our therapeutic 
relationship. I  discussed it  w ith D  (colleague) and out o f  this conversation i t  became 
clear that these thoughts o f  mine might be associated with the ‘other side ‘ o f  care that 
I  had become involved in by fin d ing  her and bringing her back to the nursing home. 
These concerns that I  had seemed not to be about the therapeutic relationship that 
had been developing between us but more fro m  a type o f  paternal authority associated 
with running a care setting, a sense that K  was in the hands o f  ‘professionals ’. The 
speculation and deliberation over whether this incident would mean that the meetings 
should end presupposes that I  would know ‘what is best and that it  would not be a 
subject fo r  discussion betM>een K  and I. D  suggested that the mutual experience may 
have a very positive impact on the meetings and the only way to f in d  out was to be 
open to the possibilities.
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These possibilities were excluded in the short term as K’s mental health deteriorated 
rapidly and she was admitted into a psychiatric hospital for ‘assessment’ . The 
admission in to hospital imposed a two-month break on our meeting. During this time 
it was not certain that she would be returning to the nursing home or that if she did 
that it would be appropriate to continue our meetings. She eventually did return and 
decided to continue with our agreement to meet on a weekly basis.
When we finally recommenced the early sessions were marked by the lack of 
reference to the night when she walked out of the nursing home. On a few occasions, 
where it was appropriate in relation to what K had been speaking about, I got the 
opportunity to mention the break imposed by the hospital admission in the hope that 
this would open up an opportunity to speak about what I called ‘The great escape’ . I 
decided that it was important that K spoke about her attempt to leave the nursing 
home and that I should not ask her about it. When she discussed the hospital 
experience, which she enjoyed, it was to tell me that she met Ivy, the patient that she 
had competed with to collect the plates at the nursing home, who had been admitted to 
hospital some time before. Despite their differences in the past she told me that it was 
a relief to recognise a face and that she got on with her very well. She said that it was 
good to be home but she missed the friends she had made in the hospital. K spoke 
about things that I had heard before about the illness as a child and her father and 
Mother also she was preoccupied with a forthcoming assessment for her hearing. She 
wanted to get a hearing aid so she could hear what people said which was poignant for 
me because I was not hearing what I wanted to hear from K. I was busy reflecting on 
whether the omission of any reference to the escape implied that either we could go 
on or that it was a block that I needed to inteipret when she finally made reference to 
her attempt to leave the nursing home. She told me that Joy, her daughter had been 
asking her why she had ‘gone-off on her own and asked her not to ‘ever do anything 
like that again’ . K appeared proud of her daughter’s concern. She asked me if I knew 
of the incident because she had been describing it as if I knew nothing about it. I told 
her that I did know about it but I did not mention my involvement in the events.
I was left with mixed feelings about her referring for the first time to that night when 
she walked out of the nursing home. The fact that I was not included made me wonder 
about the stare she had given me that evening when she got into the car, had she or
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hadn’t recognised me at that moment? When I had been trying to encourage her to 
return to the nursing home outside in the pouring rain she had referred to me in way 
that implied that she knew who I was and this was confirmed by the police officer’s 
who had decided to leave the scene confident that they were leaving her with someone 
she knew.
After this first occasion of speaking about these incidents the account of them became 
more vivid and detailed, one extract from my notes outlines her recollection:
I  don 't know what came over me, I  wasn ’t thinking straight, I ’l l  never do anything like 
this again, I ’ve prom ised Joy and B arry. I  remember walking out the do when some 
v is ito r ’s were going, I  suppose they thought I  was visiting someone else. I t  was very 
cold and dark and I  have never been so scared in a ll my like. The w ind  was blow ing  
the trees and ju s t kept walking. I f e l l  in a ditch and I  don Y Imow how I  got out, but I  
did. Then as I  was walking a man in a car stopped and asked me i f  I  wanted to get in 
and I  refused. Joy said that i t  was luclcy that I  d id  not get in because we don Y laiow 
who that man was and what he might have done to you. Joy was very upset by this. I  
ju s t kept on walking and I  remember two policemen. I  don Y know why I  d id  it, I  was 
so cold and I  was wet through and frightened. I ’ve promised never to do anything like 
i t  again, but I  can Y remember why I  d id  it, I  ju s t remember walking out into the rain.
K was very concerned about the worry that she had given her children and also that 
her behaviour was spontaneous and she was not sure whether she could keep her 
promise of not doing something like this again as it had happened without any 
warning. K was emphasising how content she was at the nursing home, and this was 
linked with the commitment not to do the same thing again, it was as if she was trying 
to instil this commitment into herself.
5.8 Towards an ending
K appeared to experience a physical set back and appeared to become very frail. I 
tried not to get too involved in matters relating to her physical care and avoided 
conversations with other staff that related to this. However, it was difficult not to 
notice that the staff were having to do more for her, and that she was dependent on
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them for personal care. On one occasion I found her on the floor and had to get help. 
This period of ill health imposed another long interruption on our meetings, and 
during this time there were periods when it appeared that she might not recover.
K did recover and we started meeting again. I had always seen K early in the morning 
but we had to change the time because her increased physical dependency made her 
reliant on staff and this meant that she was not ready to see me at the original time.
So we met later in the morning. K would be sitting in the lounge when I entered the 
home and she would wait there until she saw me and then follow me down to the 
room where we met.
K spoke intermittently about that night when she walked out of the nursing home, and 
she would mention how she was fortunate not to have got into the car with the man 
that stopped and opened the door. On several occasions I asked her what she was 
thinking about to make her want to leave on a cold dark night. But she would always 
reply that she did not know. Then I began to realise that the man that had stopped to 
offer her a lift was me. I did not admit to this as soon as I realised but the account 
repeated on several occasions and I asked her about the person she saw on one 
occasion but she did not appear to link him with me. I felt drawn to tell her, whether 
this was honesty, genuineness 01* a counter-transferential urge to be recognised by her 
is difficult to identify. In the end I succumbed and admitted that it appeared likely 
that I was the figure that she had felt so threatened by during her ‘great escape’ . K ’s 
response was to say, ‘was it really you, I did not know you were there, I don’t 
remember that at all’ .
K was missing quite a few sessions due to her health and these would be cancelled on 
the day of the session in person, ‘I don’t think I can talk today, maybe next week’ .
The frequency of these missed sessions increased. I explored this in supervision and 
as a consequence decided to suggest that we stop meeting but allow her the possibility 
of meeting in the future.
I  rea lly  miss my husband, at nights I  s it and look at his p icture and wish I  could be 
with him. I fe e l lonely it  helps to be able to come and speak to you and the s ta ff are 
rea lly good here. I  know I  w il l be a lrigh t but I  do miss him.
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K said this at the session following supervision and it did not appear to be the right 
moment to consider finishing. But K would vary dramatically from week to week. In 
the following few weeks she told me how by meeting me at this time she would lose 
her seat in the lounge. This became an issue for her to such extent that she could not 
speak of anything else. This was literally the case when she said nothing for about 
twenty minutes, and then said that she wanted to finish because she did not want to 
lose her place in the lounge, and got up and left. But there seemed to be something 
more to this, more a case of finding her place, and that was not with me, it was sitting 
with the others in the lounge where she appeared to feel secure. I had one final 
session with her where we agreed that it appeared to be the right time to break-off 
from meeting weekly. It was also agreed that she could see me again if she wanted at 
some time in the future. The session and our agreement to meet on a weekly basis 
ended at this point.
i
On reflection K ’s health appeared to dictate the inevitability of the ending, but there is 
also a sense that the basis of the relationship changed after the ‘great escape’ and her 
admission into hospital. It may be that this experience reasserted the dominance of 
dementia in our relationship. K ’s health appeared to dictate what went on between us. 
It may also be that the transferential basis to the relationship never really recovered 
from the impact of finding her in the middle of the night and talcing her back to where 
she had been trying to leave.
5.9 Summary
This chapter has explored a trainee psychotherapist’s account of weekly meetings 
with a person diagnosed with dementia. A series of stages have been described that 
correspond to the trainee psychotherapist’s understanding of what was happening in 
the meetings. There is no attempt to indicate whether there is a particular stage in the 
meetings that provides a basis to answer the question of whether psychotherapy is 
possible with a person with dementia. It is intended that the answer to the question of 
possibility will emerge for the reader by engaging in the account of the meetings. The 
phenomenological-hermeneutic approach illustrated in this chapter is concerned with 
illustrating ‘meanings’ in contrast to methods that are intent on providing a definitive 
answer to a research question. Research that is focused 011 generating a definitive
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result is caught up in formulating ‘cultural meaning’ or general statements where as 
the phenomenological-hermeneutic approach is intent on illustrating the potential for 
an alternative response.
The case described in this chapter illustrates how the meetings appeared to be 
hindered by the influence of the diagnosis of dementia. It was noted that this made it 
difficult for the trainee psychotherapist to relate to K as a person separate from the 
label of dementia; she was being heard in terms of repeating stories and an inability to 
manage her time. It was the recognition that this relationship was provoking a 
transferential response from both K and the trainee psychotherapist, which suggested 
that there was something more to the account than just a trainee psychotherapist and a 
‘person diagnosed with dementia’ meeting on a weekly basis.
In the second chapter (2.4.5) the approach to psychotherapy in this study was outlined 
and the influence of the continental philosophy of Levinas (1967, 1981, 1984) was 
acknowledged where therapy is seen to embrace terms like ‘otherness’ and 
‘relatedness’ . From this perspective therapy is seen as an opportunity to explore a 
person’s relationships with others and whether there is a possibility to be ‘other’ in a 
relationship with them; where ‘other’ is seen by Levinas (1984) as being related to the 
non-intentional and prior to recognition and understanding.
K ’s relationship with the trainee psychotherapist and with the people around her 
formed part of the account presented in this chapter. The imposition of the pre­
understandings associated with the diagnosis of dementia and then the reflection on 
Kleinian theory appeared to impede the trainee psychotherapist’s potential to see K in 
the non-intentional. It appeared that K often saw the trainee psychotherapist as a 
representation or projection of her own understandings associated with her father and 
husband. This projection of intentionality also might have been part of the way she 
saw the other resident’s in the nursing home as potentially threatening and envious of 
her. The fact that the trainee psychotherapist found it difficult to see the other 
resident’s in the nursing home as capable of what K wanted to attribute to them may 
well have been part of a projection on his part. This therapeutic relationship did 
appeal* to be engaged in exploring K ’s relationships and how she related to the world 
around her.
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The end of the meetings with K appeared to be associated with her declining health 
but it might also have been as a consequence of K recognising that the trainee 
psychotherapist was someone other than her projection on to him. The meeting that 
took place between K and trainee psychotherapist, when she had left the nursing home 
in the middle of the night, may well have developed into the opportunity for her to 
recognise that the trainee psychotherapist and the other patient’s in the nursing home 
were something ‘other’ than the way she had seen them previously. She now wanted 
to sit with them and the meetings were preventing her from doing this. Perhaps the 
request to wear an incontinence pad, despite apparently not needing to, was a 
recognition of the others around her and the desire to sit amongst the other resident’s 
and not lose her seat paid of a changing perspective on her relationships with the 
people around her.
This chapter has carried out the second stage of the research approach by analysing 
the trainee psychotherapist’s notes. The following chapter will consider the findings 
in this chapter and provide a further interpretation of the data in the third stage of the 
research approach.
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Chapter six -  Discussion and Conclusion
This study began by exploring the term dementia and outlining some of the treatments 
and therapies that are currently used and identifying a place amongst these for 
psychotherapy. The term psychotherapy was explored and an approach influenced by 
the ideas Emmanuel Levinas (1967, 1981, 1984) was identified as the basis for the 
trainee psychotherapist’s practice in this study. A phenomenological/hermeneutic case 
study approach was chosen as the research method for this study. The findings were 
presented as the trainee therapist’s representation of the experience of meeting K on a 
weekly basis for over three years and were intended to provide an opportunity for the 
reader to consider the question: is there a possibility o f psychotherapy with a person 
with dementia? One of the issues that a reader of the findings in this study is being 
asked to consider is whether the account of the meetings that took place between K 
and the trainee therapist demonstrate that ‘psychotherapy’ is or is not possible with a 
person with dementia. This might well depend on the reader’s own definition of the 
term ‘psychotherapy’ and the extent to which the arguments here convince the reader 
that a valid definition of psychotherapy has been presented and illustrated in the 
findings.
A summary of the findings will be outlined in this chapter and the implications for the 
research question are considered with reference to the work of Buber (1987), 
Heidegger (1927) and Levinas (1967, 1981, 1984). The discussion concludes that 
psychotherapy based on the work of Levinas is inhibited by the assumptions 
associated with a diagnosis such as dementia. Nevertheless it is argued that there was 
sufficient detail in the findings to suggest that the approach presented in chapter five 
indeed represented the possibility of psychotherapy with a person diagnosed with 
dementia. However, it is also argued that the possibilities of psychotherapy would be 
enhanced without the label of dementia.
6.1 Reflection on practice
The findings were presented so that the reader could decide whether therapy had taken 
place in the meetings between the trainee therapist and K. This decision by the reader
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could possibly take two potential routes, either recognising that therapy had taken 
place in relation to the actual depiction of the meetings or by suggesting how the 
trainee therapist may have worked in an alternative way at any particular stage of the 
account presented. By suggesting an alternative strategy for the trainee therapist, the 
reader could be seen to endorse the possibility of therapy, otherwise it would appear 
more appropriate to use a critical observation as confirmation that therapy was not 
possible.
The main findings developed in this chapter relate to how the diagnosis of dementia 
inhibited the possibility of therapy taking place in the account of therapy that is 
presented and how the setting appeared to enhance the diagnosis. An additional 
finding to emerge relates to how issues of sexuality in the relationship between the 
trainee therapist and K were inhibited by what appeared to be a kind of cultural 
resistance to acknowledging the association of sexuality with an elderly person in this 
study.
The culture of care within the nursing home where the meetings took place also 
appeared to exert an influence on both trainee therapist and the patient in this study.
K repeatedly joked about the underlying potential sexual connotations associated with 
sharing a room with a younger man, who was the trainee therapist, for just under an 
hour a week. There were jokes from members of staff as K and the trainee therapist 
walked to the room where they were meeting. The comments appeared well meaning 
but they highlighted a need to associate humour with any sexual connotation to our 
meeting. It appeared that a cultural ‘taboo5 (Freud 1913) was in place impeding the 
sexuality between K and the trainee therapist developing as part of a therapeutic 
relationship.
The trainee therapist’s nursing experience exerted a considerable influence on the 
course of the relationship in the meetings. The constant repetition of the same stories 
proved to be a feature of this relationship and the trainee therapist was drawn to 
perceive this as typical behaviour for a person diagnosed with dementia. However, it 
was noted that there was potential for any therapist to be influenced by a pre­
understanding of the dementia given the nature of the therapeutic setting. It was
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necessary to move beyond this pre-understanding in order to explore whether 
psychotherapy was possible.
Thoughts about transference and counter transference in the context of this 
relationship became part of a second phase of the meetings, which needed to reflect 
beyond the many cultural and contextual issues associated with the term dementia and 
setting for the meetings with K that had inhibited this type of reflection.
The experience of the meetings with K in the setting of a nursing home could be 
considered in relation to Heidegger's hermeneutic circle (Crotty 1998:98), described 
in chapter three (3.7), (similar version in Figure XV below). Where the process begins 
with an innate conception of Being (Forestructure), and then the experience of the 
institutional and cultural influences (existential) that impose on a person in their need 
to be in the world. Buber (1987) would conceive this in terms of an ‘ I-If relation 
where the T  becomes subjected to the ‘they’ , the way things are rather than open to 
the possibilities of the specific moment. The T  in the relationship described in this 
study becomes insulated to the other T  through the culturally determined meanings 
that are part of being-in-the-world. In this specific case this exhibits itself in the 
acceptance of the repetition, the jokes about sexuality and intimacy and the struggle of 
the trainee therapist to consider it possible for this patient to plan her own time.
From this emerged the possibility to identify a different type of T ,  illustrated by K 
showing that when given the chance she could remember the day and time of the next 
meeting. A  person emerges from the set of givens with a story and a set of desires. 
Thus a movement around the hermeneutic circle describes a picture of pre-existing 
knowledge and expectation that mediate how the world can be seen. At the same time 
the possibility of seeing things a different way, recognising different possibilities, this 
becomes the existence that Heidegger describes as Dasein, the search and the 
associated endeavour becomes the opening up of Dasein and the ‘there being’ in the 
world. (Heidegger 1927). Thus being is not associated with a passive observation of 
the world but is conceived around the ‘being-in-world’ and the struggle to find 
meaning rather than any issue of the autonomy of that meaning. This approach to 
ontology was influenced by the ideas of Hegel, as was identified previously in chapter 
three (3.3).
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Existential (Culture/diagnosis)
(Enter Nursing Home) 
Forestructure
(Death/Leave)
Being
Dasein
K ’s Hermeneutic Circle Figure XV
The admission into the nursing home could be attributed its own hermeneutic circle
with K ’s (any patient) previous experience represented by the Forestructure. They are 
immediately subject to a whole new world with its own culture and language; the 
nursing home has its own specific culture in the form of routines, institutional 
understandings and networks of power and relationships. Individuals take up a place 
within this world depending on the nature of their forestructure (e.g. patient, trained 
staff, carer, and medical staff) and the culture dictates how they are treated and 
perceived within this world.
The accoimt of the transference within this therapeutic relationship appeared to 
identify a part of the relationship that was emerging through some of the stereotypes 
that had been imposing themselves on the meetings. There is a certain amount of care 
needed in acknowledging this because transference is associated with psychoanalytic 
technique and consequently can be seen and subsequently imposed on a therapeutic 
relationship in a similar way to the cultural norms that had hindered the early stages of 
this relationship. However even acknowledging this issue the observation of the 
transference in this relationship illustrates moments when the meetings emerged from 
the dictatorship of the ‘they’ and allowed something to emerge which was concerned 
with K and the trainee therapist. The struggle to look past the dominant view or
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explanation provides an opportunity for the T  to emerge. It is the existence in the 
world that includes the view of ‘they’ and the potential for the emergence of an T  
that forms the Dasein that Heidegger describes.
6.2 The findings and psychoanalysis
The ‘transference’ between the trainee therapist and K was an important part of the 
findings of this study. It would appear* to this researcher to be appropriate to consider 
psychoanalysis in the context of the meetings with IC given psychoanalytic association 
with the term transference, starting with Freud (1905: 234). As was noted previously 
in chapter two (2.4.2), the problem for psychoanalysis in relation to an illness like 
dementia is that it is associated with a process of degenerative neurological function. 
Sinason (1992) illustrates this in the account of her work with a person suffering from 
dementia, where the treatment was described as ‘supportive’ rather than 
‘transformational’ . The ‘transformational’ approach would be associated with a more 
mainstream approach to psychoanalysis. There were a lot of factors that might 
demonstrate that the account highlighted in this study was concerned with ‘support’ . 
The meetings began as a consequence of the death of K ’s husband. There was a strong 
sense for the trainee therapist that the transference feelings evoked in K in their 
relationship helped her to deal with the loss of her husband. This had additional 
significance, as it appeared that her husband had filled the void left by her father. The 
relationship also appeared to provide support in her experience of her own sense of 
deteriorating health. The problem that is raised by Sinason is not that the supportive 
role is not appropriate, but rather that there is a need to identify a difference in therapy 
depending on neurological competence without a reference to the person. So 
psychoanalysis with a person suffering from dementia is seen as ‘supportive’ rather 
than ‘transformational’ because this individual has a diagnosis of dementia and this 
assumption is prior to any reference to a specific relationship with an analyst or 
therapist.
The problem faced by psychoanalysis is accentuated by a consideration of the third 
section of the findings relating to the interpretation of Kleinian theory in relation to 
this case study. There appears, according to this researcher, to be a reasonable 
association between the material that emerges and the potential for K to be influenced
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by a desire for reparation as a motivating factor within her relationships. However the 
boundary between the ‘neat fit’ and the ‘ fit up’ by the trainee therapist appears 
difficult to identify. The trainee therapist’s account emphasises how the association 
with this theory made it difficult to hear K ’s story any differently. It was as if the 
experience became overwhelmed by another dominant discourse in the same way that 
the diagnosis imposed itself overtly in the early stage of the meetings. There is a 
sense that this theoretical construction becomes associated with the ‘existential’ part 
of the Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle (Figure XV). It potentially excludes the 
possibility of listening for an alternative because it envelops the experience with a 
comprehensive explanation. There is no potential for the living experience that 
Heidegger describes in Dasein since the passivity of the theory puts the experience in 
a specific place. Heidegger describes being in terms of an activity of searching, a 
being-in-the-world of Dasein that allows being to emerge from the grasp of the 
the(or)y / they.
6.3 Embracing ‘intellectual bewilderment’
The use of the theory of guilt and reparation in explaining K ’s experience influences 
the position that the trainee therapist takes within the relationship, especially as this is 
the account that is being presented as the basis for the research in this study. By 
adopting this explanation there is an assumption that this is possible, that one person 
is able to interpret and explain another person’s behaviour and experience. The 
introduction of this theory into the account of the relationship between K and the 
trainee therapist identifies a point at which the meetings is directly influenced by the 
issues raised in the methodology section concerning idealism and realism. Is it 
possible for one person to observe another and make a judgement about what is there? 
If the description is part of the observer’s own picture of what is there and not a claim 
to represent reality then it is not so problematic. From a Kantian perspective, the 
painting that emerges as a representation of what is seen by an observer may be of 
interest to other people but the picture is ultimately the creation of the artist. The 
trainee therapist produces the story that explains K ’s experience, and this may be of 
interest, but there is no way of establishing that this corresponds to reality.
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The use of case study by Freud provides the rationale to question research methods 
and psychotherapeutic technique in the same way since Freud described 
psychoanalysis, as was stated previously in chapter three (3.0), as a research method. 
The picture painted by the researcher, as described above, could be compared with the 
account of a dream that Freud (1911a) used to explore a patient’s imconscious using 
symbolic interpretation. The patient’s account of their dream becomes the subject for 
an analysis with the analyst who represents the face of reality or truth. The dream, 
from this analytic perspective, has a meaning that can be determined. I f the symbolic 
representation of the dream can be constructed into a theory that is representative of 
the objects and truths in the external world then the patient, with the help of the expert 
analyst, might be able to bring the dream into an external conscious perspective.
Freud (1914:523) saw a work of art like the dream, as a problem to solve or a truth to 
uncover,
...some o f  the grandest and most overwhelming creations o f  a rt are s t il l unsolved 
riddles to our understanding. We admire them, we fee l overawed by them, but we are 
unable to say what they represent to us....possibly, indeed, some w rite r on aesthetics 
has discovered that this state o f  intellectual bewilderment is a necessary condition 
when a w ork o f  a rt is to achieve its greatest effect. I t  would be only w ith the greatest 
reluctance that I  could bring m yself to believe in any such necessity.
So is this conception of therapy ‘subject-object’ , where the subject is the patient and 
the therapist represents the objective truth; or is it ‘subject-subject’, where one view 
of the world comes into contact with another? Is therapy a comparison of two 
paintings or an examination of how a painting relates to reality? Heidegger appears to 
be saying that the process of comparison is the Dasein, the act of comparing the 
paintings is what characterises existence. Therapy from this perspective is more 
concerned with helping the person to be a better painter rather than pointing out what 
is wrong with the painting in relation to the ‘real’ painting. This issue would appear to 
have important implications for conceiving the meetings described in this study. If 
psychotherapy is primarily concerned with establishing ‘truth and knowledge’ and 
solving the riddle that Freud describes above then it seems difficult to conceive that 
the meetings described in this study could escape the powerful influence of the culture 
surrounding dementia and age. The picture painted of dementia in the theoiy section
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of this study strongly indicates that the body of evidence suggests that a person with 
this diagnosis will become progressively incapable of an active involvement in 
psychotherapy.
The above quote from Freud, is taken from an article written about the statue of 
Moses by Michelangelo, where he states that some writer’s ‘on aesthetics’ think a 
work of art can only be appreciated in the realm of the unknown. Freud finds this 
position difficult to accept. It might be suggested that Heidegger and Buber are the 
writer’s ‘on aesthetics’ as applied to this discussion. The solution of the riddle in 
relation to a person, the imposition of an objective truth, would represent the 
oppression of the ‘they’ and the ‘greatest effect’ would be achieved by continuing the 
search for the ‘ I ’ in the form of the subjective. As Freud says in the above *.. .this 
state of intellectual bewilderment is a necessary condition when a work of art is to 
achieve its greatest effect’ . It is this state of bewilderment that Heidegger conceives as 
the basis for the ‘ I ’ , however it is just such a position that Freud would find difficult 
to accept.
If ‘ intellectual bewilderment’ is seen as an appropriate approach to therapy then the 
process would be more concerned with exploring the riddle rather than attempting to 
solve it. The first stage in the meetings described in the findings can be seen as being 
caught up in process directed at solving the riddle. The dementia diagnosis is 
dominated by a medical culture as described in chapter two. This medical culture is 
associated with the identification of disease and its treatment, which might be seen as 
directed towards solving the riddle o f  dementia, in the terms used by Freud. When 
primacy is given to the diagnosis then it could be said that the therapy focuses on the 
riddle at the expense of meeting a person. This point can be developed further in 
relation to this account of the meetings with K. A focus on solving the riddle  could be 
identified in the use the Kleinian theory of ‘death and reparation’ also if one identifies 
transference as simply a form of ‘resistance’ instigated by the ego (Freud 1915b) 
rather than the expression of a person. Freud (1920:605) states the following:
The phenomena o f  transference are obviously exploited by the resistance which the 
ego maintains in its pertinacious insistence upon repression; the compulsion to 
repeat, which the treatment tries to bring  into its service is, as it were, drawn over by
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the ego (cling ing as the ego does to the pleasure princip le). A great deal o f  what 
might he described as the compulsion o f  destiny seems intellig ib le on a ra tiona l basis; 
so that we are under no necessity to ca ll in a new and mysterious motive to explain it.
It is clear from the last sentence quoted above that Freud conceived transference 
in terms of the ‘riddle’ or ra tiona l in te llig ib ility  (words taken from last sentence of the 
above quote) rather than the emergence of the T  from the passive oppression of the 
‘they’ . The account of transference that is described in this study would not 
demonstrate the possibility of therapy in itself from an analytic perspective, since the 
expectation is that transference is a widely experienced phenomenon not unique to a 
therapeutic relationship.
The trainee therapist describes how the transference appeared to assist K in dealing 
with the loss of her husband. According to Freud (1917:587), the death of K ’s 
husband meant the loss also of an object for the focus of her libidinal ‘cathexis’ .
There is an indication from the account of the sessions that the relationship with her 
husband developed from a transfer of the cathexis previously directed to her Father.
The relationship with the trainee therapist might have provided the opportunity for a 
displacement of this object love onto an alternative object. There is a sense that this 
alternative might be conceived as the ‘institution’ she now lives in. K continually 
acknowledged the importance of the nursing home and the staff, she often described 
them as ‘her staff and she regularly described how important the matron of the home 
was for her. The association of the trainee therapist with the husband and father and 
also his links with the nursing home may have allowed this transition to take place. It 
might also explain the need for K to move on from this relationship and end the 
weekly meetings. However, as easily as this description can explain the relationship, 
it could also be suggested that the transferential relationship between the trainee 
therapist and K prevented her from having the opportunity to mourn the loss of this 
object. The weekly sessions provoking an expression or externalisation of object 
cathexis that prevented K from having the opportunity to come to terms with the loss 
of her libidinal object. Symington (1986 145-6) states:
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In  a state o f  mourning a person loses interest in the outside world, has no interest in 
fo rm ing  a new love relationship, and turns away from  activities that are concerned 
with the lost object o f  love.
The therapeutic relationship might be seen as a provocation of phantasy and a 
prohibition of the opportunity to turn away from the activities associated with the lost 
object o f  love.
An issue that arises in relation to this reflection on the transference with K is whether 
the importance of the above discussion on mourning is the emergence of K out of the 
questioning and exploration or whether the real importance should be given to the 
potential for transference to form a significant part of her treatment. The emergence of 
being from the search rather than an answer appears to have a lot in common with 
Heidegger’s (1927:48) conception of ‘Dasein’ . As has been described, being for 
Heidegger emerges out of a sense of ‘being-ness’ , the process of defining being 
defines being. K ’s being-ness is revealed in the looking rather then settling for the 
definition. The concept of psychoanalysis as a treatment, as Freud conceived it, is 
based on the need to solve the riddle and to find ‘the’ answer; an approach based on 
the realism of science that assumes that there is one answer to the riddle.
The ‘riddle-solving’ approach is likely to be associated with treatment criteria 
identifying the degree of dementia that can benefit from therapy. Once these criteria 
are in place its seems difficult to imagine escaping from the type of difficulties 
associated with the first phase of the case study. The diagnosis imposing serious 
obstacles to its success. However, it appears clear that the issue of the diagnosis 
would impose a difficulty regardless of the orientation because of the cultural 
influences exerted on both the trainee therapist and the subject, but perhaps there is 
more of a chance without a preoccupation with the riddle. Where the criteria for 
practice are in place identifying the boundaries for treatment, being cannot emerge 
because the ‘riddle’ solver has already seen ‘I f  coming and consequently has no 
space for ‘Thou’ . The subject has been superseded by the identification of an object 
and there is no space in this picture for ‘I-Thou’ (Buber 1987).
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6.4 From egology to Levinas’s non-intentional
The sense of being described by Buber (1987) in the T-Thou’ comes into existence by 
the observation or meeting with an ‘other’ . This relation is not simply the product of 
consciousness seen as an egology, as Levinas (1967:61) describes ‘the 
phenomenology of Husserl’, but comes about as a consequence of a meeting. Levinas 
states (1967:64):
The I-Thou relation consists in confronting a being external to oneself, i.e., one which 
is rad ica lly  other, and recognizing it  as such. This recognition o f  otherness, however, 
is not to be confused w ith the idea o f  otherness. To have an idea o f  something is 
appropriate to the I - I t  relation.
So if the otherness is produced by the T  it becomes a constructed theorem and 
consequently is associated with the ‘I-It’ , in the domain of 'idea-lism’ . So an ‘I-Thou’ 
relation with IC is not drawn from the picture of her as conceived by the trainee 
therapist it develops out of the relation between the two. A therapist’s account, which 
presents a picture of what might be an ‘I-thou’ relation, should not focus on 
describing the ‘Thou’ because the account would inevitably stagger into the realm of 
the ‘I-It’ .
In the findings chapter the following extract from the trainee therapist’s notes was 
included:
21/9/00
K  touched my knee quite a few  times towards the end o f  the session... She made some 
jokes about us having an affair, when she stood up to go, she said 'do not te ll your 
w ife ’. She came so close I  thought she was going to kiss me and when I  opened the 
door, M o n  my instruction had p u t an 'engaged’ on the door, because o f  the position  
o f  the opened door it  came between us and ju s t at eye level She said 'yes tha t’s good 
we are engaged, don ’t  te ll you wife ’ .....
This remains a very spontaneous and moving moment where the conversation and the 
feelings from the session were suddenly enforced by the door opening and our
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engagement being declared. There is a strong sense of both K and the trainee 
therapist being aware of the ‘ I-thou’ relation at this moment. This account is included 
in the findings chapter (5.4) under the title of transference where it forms part of the 
evidence suggesting that the trainee therapist provoked feelings associated with other 
relationships in K ’s experience. As this example is woven into a confirmation of the 
pre-existing psychoanalytic theory of transference it could be seen to be more 
associated with Buber’s (1987) ‘I-If relation rather providing the opportunity to 
reveal the ‘I-Thou’ ; it detracts from what has been experienced by K and the trainee 
therapist. The experience has been assimilated into the knowledge of the ‘they’ at the 
expense of the ‘Thou’ . The moment of spontaneity shared by K and the trainee 
therapist has been traded in to confirm what has been described as transference. This 
description does not reflect any unique quality but rather emphasises the commonality 
of experience that becomes the basis for theory formation.
This shared experience is not just a subjective monologue produced by the trainee 
therapist it is the meeting of two people under an ‘engaged’ sign outside a room where 
they had been speaking together. This incident had significance for K  and the trainee 
therapist because it related to something that had been taking place in the meetings. 
Levinas (1967:65) states:
The relation cannot he identified w ith  a ‘subjective ' event because the I  does not 
represent the Thou but meets it. The meeting moreover is to be distinguished fro m  the 
silent dialogue the m ind has w ith itself; the I-Thou meeting does not take place in the 
subject but in the realm o f  being.
This ontological perspective is not conceived as something objectively perceived by a 
person, something that is out ‘there’ , it is rather an event, a meeting, a relation. It is 
not the moment when a therapist understands a patient, understanding their story, it is 
the moment when the therapist or the client becomes aware of the presence of the 
other. Some psychoanalysts have highlighted the importance of the relationship in 
technique, moving away from the blank-screen or ‘evenly-suspended attention’ 
emphasised by Freud (1911) towards the need to develop a relationship with the 
analysand. Symington (1986:249) describes how Ronald Fairbaim felt that a 
relationship was the vital ingredient to the success of analysis:
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He thought therefore that the actual relationship allowed the possib ility  o f  a new 
beginning, and that it  provided an emotional contact that was not available to the 
person in childhood'.
This stress on the relationship is still embroiled in identifying how things are and the 
related theory that develops from this perspective, but it does highlight the recognition 
of a need to relate to the ‘other’ in analysis.
Levinas (1967) states that the interval between I and thou can not be identified as 
similar to that which exists as space in the solar system, which exists in isolation of 
the I or the thou. Since the identification of the space ‘between’ the two terms is 
unique to there conception in relation to one another. The interval between the ‘I ’ and 
the ‘Thou’ is also inseparable from the I’s story, ‘ yet is more objective than any other 
type of objectivity’ (Levinas 1967:61), precisely because of that personal adventure. 
The ‘Between’ is constituted in the meeting and is always ‘fresh’ and ‘novel’ in 
association with each new relation. It is the ‘betweenness’ that constitutes the being 
and man is the point of convergence, ‘Man must not be construed as a subject 
constituting reality but rather the articulation of the meeting.. .Man does meet he is the 
meeting’ . (Levinas 1967: 65)
According to Levinas (1967:66), Buber’s I-thou envisages the movement towards the 
‘Thou’ and the emergence of ‘betweenness’ but that man is also capable of a 
movement away from the ‘Thou’ and it is then the conception of an ‘anonymous’ 
world is conceived. He states:
By this double movement, man is situated at the centre o f  being and philosophy is 
identified w ith anthropology. But he is not in the centre in so fa r  as he is a thinking  
subject, but w ith respect to his whole being, since only a total commitment can be the 
realisation o f  this fundamental situation.
It is only when the person identifies themselves in relation to all that is not themselves 
that an understanding of being can emerge. Man becomes whole in relation to another 
self rather than a process centring on themselves. It is the conception of Man capable
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of distance and reiatedness, rather than the focus of the perception of all that is ‘there’ 
that illustrates the ideas presented by Buber, according to Levinas (1967)
In relation to K, the diagnosis of dementia and the research agenda are both factors 
that inhibit the possibility of moving towards a meeting and the possibility of being 
emerging from this movement towards. The diagnosis is a part of the alienation that 
comes about by moving away from a meeting and is about seeing what is there. From 
what is there you can see that it is not possible for ‘being’ to emerge, as there is no 
room for the thou to exist since I t  has already been seen.
At times in the meetings there was evidence that both K and the trainee therapist were 
open to the ‘Thou’ . Maybe this ‘I-thou’ meeting could be seen in the experience of the 
other as a real possibility, away from theory and closer to the moments that ‘touched’ 
since they constructed the unique moment of the ‘between’ that, according to Buber 
(1987), emerges only out of a meeting between I-thou. There are factors that inhibit 
the ‘betweenness’ and this should be seen as the alienating factors of moving away, or 
maybe that is also about the running away involved in K ’s disappearing from the 
nursing home, the running away from the potential and opportunity of Being  
emerging. So the possibility of therapy with a particular person could be seen as 
dependent on the ability of both to move towards each other.
The account of the meetings with IC illustrate moments when moving towards was 
difficult for both K and the trainee therapist. But there is a strong sense of seeing the 
mutual difficulty in this process of moving towards, rather than conceiving it in terms 
of a problem caused by the failing mind of a person with dementia. The establishing 
of boundaries for the treatment of dementia, dependent on the degree of symptoms 
associated with dementia, can be seen from the I-thou perspective as having moved so 
far away so as to prevent the possibility of meeting to emerge. Levinas (1967:66) 
exploring Buber’s I-thou relation states:
The I-thou relation is a relation o f  true knowledge because it  preserves the integrity o f  
the otherness o f  the Thou instead o f  relegating the Thou to the anonymity o f  the It.
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In acknowledging the ‘Thou’ , Levinas is saying that a word is directed towards the 
other, and so this demands a ‘response’ . He states (Levinas 1967:66):
I t  is impossible to remain a spectator o f  the thou, fo r  the very existence o f  the Thou 
depends on the ‘w o rd ’ it  addresses to me. And, it  must be added, only a being who is 
responsible fo r  another being can enter into dialogue w ith it.
Levinas introduces the term ‘responsibility’ in the reference above, which is 
significant in distinguishing his work from Buber. The being that is created by 
directing the ‘Thou’ towards the ‘other’ is forced to respond, a mutual respons(e) -  
ibility, that emerges in response to thou-ness. Out of the recognition of the otherness 
of the other, the potential for the ‘Thou’ , the direction of this call to otherness in the 
‘Thou’ demands a response. Therefore ‘responsibility’ is the most important aspect of 
the potential for otherness, since without the response their can be no other, it 
becomes an observed world, the response demonstrates the presence of a ‘Thou’, of 
another potential, so ‘Thou5 is in the response that is being created.
In the absence of a response from the ‘other’ the world becomes a view or perception 
of the ‘ I’ , who is the one who is observing. However the ‘ I ’ who observes has a 
responsibility for the response of the ‘other’ that is being observed, according to 
Levinas (1984). It would be easy to obseive what is there in the form of an internal 
perception but requires more of a response by the observer to look for a response from 
the ‘other’ being observed. A description of what took place in the meetings with K 
could take the form of what the trainee therapist perceived to have experienced. The 
account by the trainee therapist would inevitably be in the realms of the ‘ I-it’ without 
the trainee therapist taking responsibility for looking for the response of the.other, 
appealing to the other for a response, the other in this case would be IC. Therefore, the 
response to the other needs to come first otherwise the ‘I ’ gets lost in the anonymity 
of the ‘it’ , as appeared to occur at times to IC in being lost in terms like ‘dementia’ .
For Levinas (1967:67) ‘Truth...is not grasped by a dispassionate subject who is a 
spectator of reality, but a commitment in which the other remains in his otherness’ . 
Truth is borne out of the commitment to the otherness of the other, it is not a 
reflection on commitment, but the act of committing to the other.
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Levinas states (1967: 70):
The thing which is merely given and which I  can dominate belongs to the sphere o f  
the It. But the specific in which the artist, fo r  example, confronts the thing in creating  
a w ork o f  art, may be construed as a response to an appeal, and therefore, as a 
meeting.
The diagnosis of dementia given to K can be seen as the means to ‘dominate’ (taken 
from the above reference) leaving no space for a ‘response’ to an appeal to meet 
which in a sense was there each week that was spent sitting in a room together.
Levinas (1967,1984) acknowledges the importance of the work of Buber and 
Heidegger in identifying ontology and epistemology as in the realms of the ‘there is’ 
rather than in the consciousness of the observer, that is, in the world rather than in the 
mind. However, Levinas objected to the inherent inequality of an ‘ I-thou’ relation. It 
is the T  that creates and confirms the existence of the ‘Thou’. So the position of the 
T  and ‘Thou’ are distinctly different and not interchangeable. It is the ‘I ’ that 
determines the existence of the ‘Thou’ . Levinas states (1967:72):
... i f  the se lf becomes an I  in saying Thou, as Buber asserts, my position as se lf 
depends on that o f  my correlate and the relation is no longer any different from  other 
relations: it  is tantamount to a spectator speaking o f  the la n d  Thou in the th ird  
person.
Levinas suggests that a relation is more than this spiritual quality that Buber attributes 
to it, this ‘spiritual friendship’ . It omits access to the rawness of human contact and 
the effect this has on a conception of ‘otherness,’ .
Levinas (1967) describes how the movement from the subject-object relation to the I- 
thou implies a progression from an image of consciousness to that of existence, as it 
creates a space between. Buber maintains, according to Levinas (1967), that the 
authenticity of the dialogue between the I-thou relation emanates from consciousness. 
Levinas (1967:73) feels that a ‘theory of ontological knowledge based on the nature of
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the ‘space’ existing in the sphere of betweenness should indicate how the relation by 
itself, apart form its term, differs from consciousness’ . Buber (1987) conceives a 
definition of being that opens up the potential for a relation with the external, that is 
based on the recognition of ‘otherness’ , an externality that is other than I, and a 
relation that is about contact in the external with the other, described in the in I-thou. 
But the basis of this conception is giving primacy to consciousness, which makes this 
an idealist construction, which can be traced back to Kant (3.1.5).
According to Levinas (1984:77) western philosophy has always been preoccupied 
with the supremacy of consciousness over knowledge and truth:
Throughout the whole o f  history o f  Western philosophy, contemplation o r knowledge 
and the fi'eedom o f  knowledge are inspirations fo r  the m ind ( I ’esprit). Knowing is the 
psyche or pneumatic force  o f  thought, even in the act o ffee ling  or w illing. I t  is to be 
found  in the concept o f  consciousness at the dawn o f  the modern age w ith the 
interpretation o f  the concept o f  cogito given by Descartes in his second mediation.
This study follows this tradition, the findings are the product of the thoughts and 
observations of the trainee therapist. The weekly meetings have been recorded by 
means of an account provided by the trainee therapist. These thoughts have been 
harnessed into a study that directly links the trainee therapist’s consciousness to an 
attempt to add to the body of knowledge that relates to the subject of the study. 
Philosophers have varied the relationship between the mind and the external world, 
but the supremacy of the ‘I* remains assumed.
Levinas states that Husserl establishes the existence of world independent of 
consciousness, but ‘he continues to base his theory on representation, the 
objectivizing act’ .(Levinas 1984:78). The establishing of truth through the power of 
consciousness establishes being. As a consequence being asserts itself into the 
position of absolute and ‘is master of its own nature as well as of the universe and 
able to illuminate the darkest recesses of resistance to its powers’ (Levinas 1984:79).
Levinas describes how Merleau-Ponty shows that the T  that formulates the world is 
implicated in its constitution by its own presence, ‘ it is present in the world as it is
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present in its own body, an intimate incarnation which no longer purely and simply 
displays the exteriority of an object’ (Levinas 1984:79). The constituted world of the 
T  includes a description of the body of the T , the body of the subject immersed in 
the world, face to face with the T  in the splendour of a representation of the world.
If I put my hand in front of me and next to the computer screen my representation of 
this includes a description of my own hand. I have been incorporated into the world 
of my own representation. In the process of this description the T  is discovered in its 
own description in the world. An observation of the observer that affirms the 
supremacy of the observation.
Levinas describes this ‘consciousness of consciousness’ that confirms the supremacy 
of consciousness by recognising it in the world, by a seeing the hand as ‘my hand’ and 
its association with the description of the world as ‘A non-intentional consciousness 
operating, if one may put it like this, unknowingly as knowledge, as non-objectivizing 
knowledge...A ‘non-intentional’ consciousness to be distinguished from 
philosophical reflection, or the internal perception’ . (Levinas 1984: 79).
Intentional consciousness is compared by Levinas with a ‘transcendental ego’ , which 
is thrust out as reflective observation producing themes and ‘grasping’ out inclusively 
at the possibilities where the non-intentional becomes explicit. In the example of the 
hand in front of the computer screen the intentional conscience gave the appearance of 
plausibility and understanding by putting this into an explanation and description that 
could be understood and conceived by others. This can also be seen in the context of 
this study, with the trainee therapist’s perspective being thrust forward in the form of 
findings in a research study that embraces a reflection on him in relation to another. 
Levinas states (1984:80):
The obscure context o f  whatever is thematized is converted by reflections, or 
intentional consciousness, into clear and distinct data... The critique o f  introspection 
as trad itiona lly  practised has always been suspicious o f  a modification that a 
supposedly spontaneous consciousness might undergo beneath the scrutinizing... and 
has seen this as a vio lation or distortion o f  some sort o f  secret.
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Levinas having identified that an intentional and pre-intentional consciousness, or a 
reflective and pre-reflective, poses the question of whether it is possible to draw this 
distinction. Where the intentional/reflective is concerned ‘the envelopment of 
supposition in a notion, the potentiality of what is considered possible within the 
horizon’ is compared with the ‘intimacy’ of the non intentional/ pre-reflective ‘which 
is duration itself.
Levinas (1984:80) suggests that this pre-reflective self-consciousness ‘ is less an act 
than a pure passivity’ and goes on to say:
This is not only due to its being-without-having-chosen-to-be or its f a l l  into confused 
w orld  o f  possibilities already realised even before any choice might be made, as in  
Heidegger’s Geworfenheit. I t  is a 'consciousness ’ that signifies not so much a 
knowledge o f  oneself as something that effaces presence o r makes it  discreet
Levinas is identifying this non-intentional consciousness with more emphasis than the 
type of empirical implication identified by Heidegger. The abstract association of 
ontology with experience described by Heidegger, the-being-in-the world, is 
considered more in parallel to consciousness than as a means of its definition.
Levinas states that phenomenology incorporates the duration of time taken up by the 
non-intentional as part of reflection, built into a reflective process.
As the image of the hand next to the computer has been included in an intentional 
depiction the hand still remains separate and thus being outside the influence of the 
will or ego, according to Levinas (1984:80-81), ‘and exactly like the ageing process 
which is probably the perfect model of passive synthesis, a lapse of time not an act of 
remembrance5.
Levinas (1984:81) describes this non-intentional consciousness as ‘mauvaise 
conscience: it has no intentions, or aims, and cannot avail itself of the protective mask 
of a character contemplating in the mirror of the world a reassured and self positing 
portrait’ . This is the nakedness ‘afraid of the insistence of the identical ego.. .it dreads 
the insistence in the return to self that is a necessary part of identification’ .
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Perhaps the in ferio rity  o f  the mental is o rig ina lly  an insufficient courage to assert 
oneself in one ’s being or in body o r flesh. One comes not into the w o rld  but into 
question. (Levinas 1984:81)
The non-intentional is therefore a moment before being overrun or usurped by 
intentionality, overrun by the sovereignty of the I, or that which claims the right to say 
I. Levinas states (1984:81):
In  its non-intentionality, not yet the stage o f  w illing, and p r io r to any fau lt, in its non- 
intentional identification, identity recoils before its affirmation. I t  dreads the 
insistence in the return to se lf that is a necessary p a rt o f  identification.. . I t  has not yet 
been invested w ith any attributes o r ju s tifie d  in any way. This creates the reserve o f  
the stranger o r ‘sojouner on earth ’...perhaps the in feriority  o f  the mental is o rig ina lly  
an insufficient courage to assert oneself in one’s being or in body or flesh.
The non-intentional is the moment before being able to think and comprehend what 
stands before you. Levinas (1984:82) suggests that this has more in common with 
‘passivity’ :
However, it  is in the passivity o f  the non-intentional, in the way it is spontaneous and 
precedes the form ula tion  o f  any metaphysical ideas on the subject, that the very 
justice o f  the position w ith in being is questioned, a position which asserts itse lf w ith 
intentional thought, knowledge and a grasp o f  the here and know.
Levinas identifies the place of the non-intentional as a form of passivity that precedes 
intentional thought that emanates from consciousness and the ego. He suggests that 
the spontaneity of the non-intentional prior to the grasping of intelligible thought with 
the onset of the intentional, brings the relationship of the intentional into question.
The consequence of this calling into question is an associated call for a response. 
According to Levinas (1984:82), the pre-existence of the non-intentional means that a 
person is drawn to a response:
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Language is born in responsibility. One has to speak to say I, to be the f ir s t  person, 
precisely to be me (moi). But, fro m  that point., in affirm ing this me being, one has to 
respond to one’s righ t to be.
Levinas (1984:82) is suggesting that at the point of being called to respond, to say I, 
there is also a calling into question of the persons right to say I in relation to another 
person. He asks the question, drawn out of the influence of Hegel, of whether ‘My- 
being- in-the world’ has been at the expense of an other, ‘whom I have already 
oppressed or starved’ . The face represents the other, according to Levinas, but it 
means more than just the superficial mask that covers it, but is immediate to the I.
This mask hides ‘extreme exposure, defencelessness, vulnerability itself. Levinas 
(1984:83) states:
From the beginning there is a face to face steadfast in its exposure to invisible death, 
to a mysterious forsakenness. Beyond the v is ib ility  o f  whatever is unveiled, and p r io r  
to any knowledge about death, m ortality lies in the Other.
Levinas (1984:83) suggests that in the face of the Other, who is to be seen in front of 
us, there is a demand on the I, a pleading to take note of the inevitability of their death 
that they appear to be unable to see or acknowledge.
The other m an’s death calls me into question, as if, by my possible fu tu re  indifference, 
I  had become the accomplice o f  the death to which that other, who cannot see it, is 
exposed...The Other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face 
summons me, calls fo r  me, begs fo r  me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and 
calls me into question.
The ‘summons to responsibility’ is an individual demand made by the other who is sat 
opposite at that moment. It is not, according to Levinas (1984:84), an impersonal 
generality and states:
\
This is the anteriority and chosen nature o f  an excellence that cannot be reduced to 
the features distinguishing or constituting ind ividual beings in the order o f  their w orld
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or people, in the role they p lay  on history's social stage, as characters, that is, in the 
m irro r o f  reflection o r in self-consciousness.
Levinas (194:85) distinguishes this position from the phenomenology of Heidegger, 
suggesting that the responsibility in the face of another is not about a turning back 
towards oneself in the face of the other mans ‘being-for-death.. .It extends beyond the 
ontology of Heideggerian Dasein and the bonne conscience of being in the sight of 
being itself.
What is suspended is its ideal p rio rity , which wipes out a ll otherness by murder o r by 
all-encompassing and totalizing thought... The ego is the very crisis o f  the being o f  a 
being... in the human domain. A crisis o f  being, not because the sense o f  this verb 
might s t ill need to be understood in its semantic secret and might ca ll on the powers 
o f  ontology, but because I  begin to ask i f  my being is justified, i f  the Da o f  my Dasein 
is not already the usurpation o f  somebody else’s place.
The I  that deals out the vision of the world and is the foundation of idealism is placed 
in the proximity of the other is challenged by Levinas not to turn back towards itself 
in the form of a confirmation, but to face the other who demands a response. My 
presence in the face of the other calls me into question in my ‘usurpation of somebody 
else’s place’ . Levinas (1984:85) states:
This question has no need o f  a theoretical reply in the fo rm  o f  new information.
Rather it  appeals to responsibility, which is not a practica l stopgap measure designed 
to console knowledge in its fa ilu re  to match being. This responsibility does not deny 
knowledge the ab ility  to comprehend and grasp; instead, it is the excellence o f  ethical 
prox im ity  in its sociality, in its love without concupiscence. The human is the return to 
the in ferio rity  o f  non-intentional consciousness, to mauvaise conscience, to its 
capacity to fe a r injustice more than death, to pre fer to suffer than to commit injustice, 
and to p re fer that which justifies being over that which assures it.
Levinas (1981:89) proposes ‘starting with sensibility’ and this is more concerned with 
‘proximity’ rather than a turning back into oneself in the form of a conscious
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J‘knowing’ , ‘Proximity appeal’s as a relationship with the other, who cannot be 
resolved into ‘ images’ or be exposed in a theme’ . Levinas (1981:116) states:
la m  unique and chosen; the election is in the subjection. The conceptualization o f  
this last refusal o f  conceptualization is not contemporaneous w ith this refusal; it  
transcends this conceptualization. The transcendence separating itse lf fro m  the 
consideration that conceptualizes it, diachrony o f  subjectivity, is my entry into the 
proxim ity  o f  the neighbour.
6.5 The implications of the non-intentional
The differentiation of the intentional and non-intentional appears to have significant 
implications for this study. In chapter two (2.4.5) the ideas of Levinas were 
considered in terms of therapy (Gans 1997), where the focus of the approach was 
directed towards relationships in the external world rather than a preoccupation with 
the intentional in the form of ego or consciousness. The focus is directed to the 
external and the ‘meeting’ with the other prior to the turning back into some concept 
of ‘self. The researcher is reminded of a previous study (Greenwood & Loewenthal 
1998) that focused on short-term therapy with a person with severe dementia. The 
subject of this study was not able to communicate verbally in a way that the trainee 
therapist was able to understand. There was a moment in the course of these meetings 
when the subject offered the trainee therapist his cup of tea as if he were unsure that 
the cup of tea were his own or belonged to the trainee therapist. What he appeared 
sure of was that there was only one cup and that there were two of us and by taking 
this for himself that this would leave me with nothing to drink. At this moment there 
appeared to be real reiatedness between the trainee therapist and a man with severe 
dementia. It was a moment between two people that was not for either about turning 
back inside oneself.
In relation to the meetings with K much of her experience with the other residents was 
turned back towards herself and placed in perspective to her own experience. The 
resident’s behaviour appeared to be given interpretations that bore more relation to the 
K ’s experience than the external reality. There was a sense that she was turning it 
back towards herself and away from the others themselves.
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The dilemma that emerges in describing this observation and some of the attempts 
made by the trainee therapist to relate to these issues with IC, is that the writing and 
the thinking of these thoughts in relation to IC is in a sense an intentional response to 
the experience that took place between K and the trainee therapist. The non- 
intentional gets lost in the intentionality inevitably associated with compiling a 
subjective account of the externality of the non-intentional. If therapy is to be about 
the non-intentional, about opening up the possibility of a real proximity in relating to 
the other it needs to be focused on the betweemiess of therapist and client. There is a 
sense that the writing of an account of the transference between K and the trainee 
therapist misses the point if it tries to put it into some sort of perspective, as this 
inevitably implies that the trainee therapist has turned away from the rawness of the 
moment into the sanctuary of understanding. If therapy is to be about the non- 
intentional the therapist needs to be staying with the feelings rather than hiding in the 
intentional, which can sometimes be uncomfortable, but this is part of what is 
happening between. It is the experience of a relationship that turns towards rather 
than away that provides the best opportunity for therapy from this non-intentional 
perspective of Levinas.
There is something ‘missing’ in the world that is described as known, something that 
speaks more about the ‘knower’s’ insecurities in themselves rather then the 
description of the known. The picture loses the terror and the dread if all that is seen 
is recognisable. The researcher conceived the following as a means of comprehending 
the non-intentional:
I  cannot bear to be naked, naked in the face o f  what is before me, so I  need to 
‘clothes ’ it  down and wear a sense o f  truth and knowing. That I  'know ' you speaks as 
much o f  me as i t  does o f  the *knowing ’.
One implication of identifying Levinas’s non-intentional as the location for therapy is 
to call into question the link that Freud made between research and psychoanalysis. 
This link is associated, as has been said, with a focus 011 the ‘riddle’ . This approach 
positions the therapist as the ‘riddle-solver’ and consequently assumes a turning away
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from the therapeutic relationship back towards the consciousness of the therapist and 
towards the intentional.
The dilemma can be seen to have gone full circle in relation to a case study account of 
psychotherapy. A subjective account of therapy was seen as an inadequate tool for 
describing what had taken place since it is dependent on what one person saw. The 
legitimacy of this critique of a case study approach depends on whether it can be 
demonstrated that it is possible describe what is actually ‘there’ . Questions were 
raised in chapter three (3.0) as to whether it is ever possible to really describe what is 
there, leaving the possibility that we are just creating a painting to allow a 
comparison. It would appear difficult if not impossible to demonstrate that what is 
observed corresponds to what is there in the world. From this perspective emerged a 
potential rationale for the account of the meetings produced for this study. The 
rationale was developed through the ideas of Heidegger who linked ontology with the 
process of being or the actual painting of pictures, suggesting that being is the process 
of painting and comparison and not associated with the search for the best painting. 
The account that is presented demonstrates that a focus on a theory and diagnosis does 
exclude the potential for K to be an T ,  and that by continuing to ask the questions 
allows a space for K to emerge as an ‘ I’ . The space has been created by the ‘I ’ in the 
form of a challenge to dominate meaning and knowledge but it is not a space for an ‘ I ’ 
it is a space for ‘Thou’ as it is dependent on the ‘I ’ to make it. It is a space created by 
the intentional according to Levinas that turns away from the proximity of the other 
and real relatedness. The ‘Thou’ is the face of the other that the ‘I ’ can bear and not 
the immediacy of the other, which, according to Levinas, calls the T  into question.
The case study approach conceived around the trainee therapist’s observation and 
subsequent account of the meetings was drawn from a traditional approach to 
reporting clinical work. It was observed that Freud used this approach in an attempt 
to provide a scientific basis for psychoanalysis. Freud felt that the case study could be 
used to highlight the type of experience that could be validated by the process of 
repetition. The type of observations made in the case studies could be validated by 
repetition within the practice of psychoanalysis generally. Kazdin (1982), as 
discussed in chapter three (3.2.4), identified the problems with depending on the 
therapist’s clinical account of therapy for research data. The main criticism from the
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traditional research perspective is the dependence on subjective accounts that form an 
inadequate basis for generalisation. However, this critique of clinical case study was 
seen to be problematic since the arguments directed against it originate from 
traditional objective research criteria and these were seen to be unrealistic, 
particularly as a basis for generalisation in the field of human observation. The report 
of human behaviour will always be dependent on the subject observation of another 
human taking on the role of observer. Emerging from this impasse is the ideas of 
Polanyi and tacit knowledge. This ‘working’ empirical view of knowledge creation 
identifies working, common sense knowledge as the basis of experience. Knowledge 
about the world emerges from living in it and trying to solve practical problems as 
they present themselves and conceived in this way Freud’s case studies provide an 
effective method of exploring the practicalities of psychoanalysis and developing 
inferences in relation to the psyche.
As stated previously in chapter three (3.3.7), Heidegger links epistemology with 
ontology in the conception of Dasein. The process of searching for a working 
empirical understanding is identified with being-in-the-world. The process of being 
emerging from the world is compared with Buber’s ‘ I-thou’ . Levinas acknowledges 
the importance of identifying the ‘I ’ as part of a conception of a world filled with 
other’s, a real world as opposed to the idealist world described by Kant which is never 
any more than the sum of an individuals imagination. Levinas distinguishes, as has 
been stated above, between two qualities of I-ness, the intentional and the non- 
intentional. The non-intentional has the potential to be dominated and overrun by the 
intentional. According to Levinas, experience offers an occasional glimpse of another 
person’s world and it is in these moments that the T  can appreciate the otherness of 
the world. There is a contact with the other person and their idealism and in the 
community of this experience otherness is opened up which is the being-in-the-world. 
This glimpse of otherness can potentially become just a part of one person's view of 
the world, a product of the intentional, a focus on the way people define themselves. 
This is the point at which Levinas is critical of Buber. The non-intentional that 
Levinas identifies in the ‘ I-thou’ is lost through the supremacy of intentionality. In 
defining I-ness, otherness has been incorporated into a rational and conscious 
depiction of the world that is owned by the T  and so impedes or excludes the place 
for another ‘I*.
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The approach to the meetings provided in this study was intended to provide an 
opportunity to explore a glimpse of the non-intentional. It proved difficult for this to 
happen because the intentional, represented by the I-ness of both the trainee therapist 
and K, were drawn towards enforcing the intentional rather than meeting the other. 
There was, in a sense, an oppression of intentionality dictating how things were which 
made it difficult to stay with the momentary stare of the otherness that is the non- 
intentional. The glimpse of the other appeared to provoke the insecurities that 
surrounded K ’s sense of herself and so she remained committed to her own perception 
of the other rather than open to the challenge of the non-intentional, although there 
were occasions when K acknowledged this. The following extract is taken from the 
case notes where K describes how she had been given some flowers in the lounge and 
that she was concerned about how jealous the other residents sitting there would feel 
of her:
K : “ what were a ll the others th ink ing , me being the only one to have flow ers  " When 
she said this it  linked fo r me when she had said earlier that the others were a ll jea lous  
o f  her going into the room w ith me each week.
K : “ Women are funny like that. ”
There was another link, that came to mind, K  had spoke about Nan, one o f  other 
patients and that she had been speaking to her husband and that Nan had fe lt  jea lous  
o f  her.
I  said: “ could some o f  these feelings be your own? Although I  don ’t Imow the people 
concerned, I  wonder i f  there are many residents here able to fee l jea lous about these 
things to the extent you fee l it?
To my surprise she responded immediately,
K : “  Maybe you are right, I  do fee l like that and I  always have, yes because... ”
K  went on to te ll me about the time her husband had got lost in the home and had 
ended up in another women's bedroom. The ‘o ld  lady ’ as K  described her to ld  K  that 
that it  was her husband. K  described how she had pu lled  him away and resolved to 
keep a closer eye on him.
She had confirmed the lin k  by her own example, but she seemed to have lost the 
immediacy o f  the observation in the detail o f  the story, and went on to speak o f  
something else.
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There is a sense of K acknowledging that her own internal jealous feelings prevent her 
from seeing the other as separate to her and genuinely ‘other’ . So that in the above 
example the other residents are not allowed to be unaware or disinterested in both the 
significance of her receiving flowers and the weekly meetings she had with a trainee 
therapist.
The difficulties associated with non-intentional relatedness appear accentuated in this 
environment by the influence that the cultural factors, stated previously, exert on the 
intentional for both the trainee therapist and K. The way the trainee therapist saw K 
was constantly mediated through a kind of oppression of expectation. The setting of a 
nursing home for the weekly meetings, where over 40 people with dementia were 
cared for together, appeared to exert an influence on the relationship that inhibited the 
emergence of aspects of the non-intentional. The potential for otherness and 
relatedness was constantly being excluded by the security of the ‘known’ in the form 
of the diagnosis. The repetition in the early stages of the meetings was excused 
because of the expectation that this was usual behaviour from a person with dementia. 
Any glimpses of the non-intentional in the meetings with K were inhibited by the 
strength of the intentional in the form of what appeared to be ‘known’ by the trainee 
therapist or K ; for example either the pre-understandings associated with the a 
diagnosis of dementia or K ’s assumptions about the people around her.
6.6 Researching the non-intentional
The questions raised in chapter three concerning human observation and knowledge, 
especially in relation to psychotherapy, led the researcher to undertake a case study 
approach using a phenomenological hermeneutical method based on the work of 
Heidegger to examine the clinical material. The data collected was taken from the 
trainee therapist’s account of the meetings. The approach chosen identified a role for 
research in the process of producing meanings in the hermeneutic tradition advocated 
by Heidegger, discussed previously in chapter three (3.3.7), rather than being focused 
on the discovery of a truth associated with more science based methods. The 
meanings produced by the research being assessed for the quality of the explanation 
rather than any expectation that they provide a definitive factual account of what has
283
been ‘seen’ . From this perspective a clinical case study provides the opportunity to 
open up the potential for multiple meaning descriptions, this could be from the 
researcher, the subject of the case study and who ever reads the account. This 
approach allows for the potential of a challenge to accepted understanding, therefore 
encouraging the emergence of different meanings from an observation. Some of the 
accepted understandings relating to dementia and psychotherapy were presented in the 
theory chapter, and the case study presented the opportunity not to test these theory’s 
and confirm or deny there understanding, but it provided a chance to produce 
meanings and understandings in relation to what had been seen.
The findings showed how the diagnosis of the dementia and the related culture of the 
home where the meetings took place enforced a burden on both participants that in the 
end appeared to be to great too bear. The account of the meetings with K appeared to 
describe occasions when the relationship touched the non-intentional; this was made 
difficult to develop and explore because of the rationality of the intentional. The 
intentional influence on the study was exerted through the research and in the 
imposition of psychotherapeutic theory on the meetings with K as well as in the 
moments when K was absorbed into the trainee therapist’s own story in what might be 
called counter transference.
If the intentional explanation of the meetings becomes a burden and the research is 
about producing meanings it appears that a contradiction arises between the practice 
and the process behind the depiction. It is evident from the explanations provided in 
relation to Levinas’s differentiation between the intentional and the non-intentional, 
that meanings are the product of the observer’s conscious observation of what is 
before him/her. Therefore the account produced by the trainee therapist is the product 
of the intentional; hence it will struggle to describe the non-intentional. The non- 
intentional for Levinas is before the describing of it; it is in the face of the other 
before the T  can write about it. This raises the question of whether this by definition 
excludes the case study approach presented, since it is an account of the intentional as 
seen by the trainee therapist. The approach to therapy based on the ideas of Levinas 
and the non-intentional would appeal* to exclude the possibility of researching it.
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However, Levinas assumes the existence of the intentional in order to define the 
existence of the non-intentional; the intentional needs to be seen in order for there to 
be something to go before. It is only by acknowledging and accepting the intentional 
that the place of the non-intentional becomes a possibility. The account that is 
presented here, with the apparent burden of the intentional provides the basis for a 
glimpse of the non-intentional, and the possibility for others to be aware of the 
struggle for a relationship based on the ideas of Levinas. So the case study account in 
this study does not exclude the possibility of the non-intentional it allows it be 
recognised, even if this recognition is apparently by means of its exclusion.
It is considered that case study gives a potentially valuable description in which the 
interaction of the intentional and the non-intentional can be considered while 
acknowledging the influence of the trainee therapist’s intentional thought. By 
focusing on an intentional account of therapy it is possible to see where the non- 
intentional has or has not been given the opportunity to exert an influence on the 
intentional. If psychotherapy, as conceived from the ideas of Levinas, were to be 
possible with a person with a diagnosis of dementia it would appear essential that the 
therapy is not focused on a ‘dementia sufferer’ . For psychotherapy to be possible ‘the 
person’ needs to be recognised, the face of the other in the non-intentional moment 
prior to acknowledging some of the potential symptoms of dementia. This case study 
has indicated the difficulty in attempting this relationship. There was a pressure on K 
to acknowledge that she had ‘got i f  which was exerted on her simply living in a home 
specialising with care for people with dementia and this also influenced the trainee 
therapist to relate to the dementia sufferer rather then the person, away from this 
intentionality. It appeared to the trainee therapist that the meetings ended because K ’s 
condition had deteriorated or the burden of trying to have a relationship where the 
intentional is so potentially oppressive became too much to beat* for both the trainee 
therapist and K. This burden was so heavy it ended up that neither could speak.
It would appear evident from this example that criteria designed to assess the potential 
for psychotherapy based on an appropriate categoiy of dementia would accentuate the 
difficulties experienced. The decision to offer therapy to a person with mild to 
moderate dementia excludes the potential for the non-intentional since therapy is 
being focused at dementia sufferers, categories are being enforced without allowing
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the person an opportunity to meet the therapist. The response provoked by being with 
another, in this case K, becomes the expression of the trainee therapists own 
conscious projection rather then a genuine reaction to the face of the other.
6.7 Conclusion
This section will summarise the main findings of the study and suggest areas for 
future research that have emerged as a consequence of carrying out this study. The 
researcher will also reflect on the implications that this study has for psychotherapists 
in general and the potential use of case study method in further research into 
psychotherapy is discussed.
The completion of this study involved a seven-year investigation into the possibility 
of psychotherapy with a person with dementia. In the early stages of the research a 
prominent person in a psychotherapy organisation, who was also a psychiatrist, 
expressed his dismay and even sympathy at the subject of this study. It was clear that, 
in his opinion, offering psychotherapy to a person with dementia was not a 
worthwhile exercise. During this period that type of response has become far less 
prominent, other psychotherapists do not appeal* as surprised by the prospect of 
working with this client group. This is, of course, just a subjective observation and 
the impression may well have been conditioned by involvement in the study and also 
the fact that colleagues around the researcher will have got more used to the subject 
area and so developing this broader impression. Even taking this into account there is 
a sense that opinion is changing and this may well relate to the increased interest there 
has been in the provision of dementia services. There is far more interest in therapies 
for dementia than was the case at the outset of this study. As a consequence it would 
appear important to put the provision of psychotherapy to this client group to the test 
in order to identify the potential opportunities for practice. It has become clearer to the 
researcher, as a consequence of this study, that the association of a term like dementia 
to a person who is considering psychotherapy makes the meeting potentially more 
problematic for both the therapist and the client. Furthermore, the more persuasive 
the intentional is (e.g. label/diagnosis/theory/psychotherapeutic modality) the greater 
the likelihood that the therapy based on what Levinas (1984) describes as the non- 
intentional, will be inhibited by persuasive explanations and understandings.
286
This chapter has highlighted the significant effect that the diagnosis imposed on to the 
study. These effects appeared to be accentuated by the culture of care within the 
nursing home setting. An aspect of the wording of the question has become some 
significant as the research has progressed. The study has examined the possibility of 
psychotherapy with a person with dementia, and it is evident to the researcher that the 
order of the wording at the end is very significant in the provision of psychotherapy to 
this client group. The therapy needs to be with a ‘person’ . It would seem that many 
of the problems described in this study are as a consequence of the dementia 
superseding the person. The care setting made it more difficult to meet K without 
being overwhelmed by the diagnosis. There is a sense that the ending of the therapy 
with K was as much a consequence of being subject to the influence of the diagnosis 
and its prominence in the culture of care as it was a result of the interaction between K 
and the trainee therapist. The medical discourse dominates this care setting, providing 
an explanation for the behaviours of patients, as was described in the theory section. 
The explanations that fill the gaps in what is known about a person with dementia are, 
according to this researcher, a result of what Levinas (1981, 1984) terms the 
intentional. It would appear that the greater the plausibility and consequential 
acceptance of the explanation the more difficult it becomes to meet the person.
The effect of the intentional on the possibility for meeting a person has an implication 
for research. The whole concept of research is a product of the intentional. The 
different methods described, whether they are derived from a realist or idealist 
perspective, are linked to what Levinas calls an ‘egology’ . Whether this egology 
produces ‘a’ meaning or ‘the’ meaning there is an assertion from the person to the 
world. Whether an assertion can be expanded to include the whole and claim to 
equate to reality is not at issue. So if a research study is focused on the intentional 
then it might be conceived as an inappropriate means of exploring what Levinas 
(1981,1984) calls the non-intentional. However, as was described in the last chapter, 
Levinas develops the term non-intentional as a pre-existence in relation to the 
intentional. The non-intentional exists before the speaking of it, as a person starts to 
speak then the intentional evolves in the words. Before the verbal expression there 
exists, according to this researcher’s understanding of the non-intentional, the 
humanness of a response to another person before the thought of doing and saying it.
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However, the thought or intentional was needed by Levinas as a means to define the 
pre-existence of the non-intentional. Research seen in this context could be seen as a 
necessary endeavour in order to illustrate the existence of the non-intentional. The 
glimpses of the non-intentional, of a meeting with a person rather than a diagnosis, 
only become evident by looking and focusing, which is inevitably the consequence of 
the intentional. This might be taken one step further by recognising that when the 
intentional, in the form of knowledge and understanding, becomes accepted and 
dictates, then there appeai-s less room to acknowledge the pre-existence of some thing 
that is not tangible and based on responsiveness. Where the intentional is more fluid 
and concerned with the searching for possibilities and meanings there is more scope 
for allowing a place for a pre-existent human reaction or response to another to 
emerge. This response may take the form of a call to reflect on what has been 
provoked by the presence of the other in the form of questioning the T  and 
demanding a response. According to Levinas (1981, 1984), it is the ability of the T  to 
respond to the call from the other that is the basis of his use of the term responsibility.
The findings of this study suggest two significant implications for psychotherapy in 
terms of inappropriate use of theory and clinical labels. Firstly, the way that theory 
could exclude the potential for K to be seen without being overwhelmed by pre­
understandings. The power of the theory to explain an observation results in the 
exclusion of a potential to conceive anything other than the resulting explanation and 
hence excludes the possibility of recognising the non-intentional. The existence of the 
theory excludes pre-existence by its plausibility and potential to explain everything. 
Where the theory is seen in the context of a possibility, as part of an approach to 
looking rather than an identification of fact, then there is an increased chance of 
glimpsing the non-intentional as described by Levinas. This relates to Lacan’s 
(Benvenuto & Kennedy, R. 1986) conception of a signifying chain rather than the 
determination associated with the signified and related claims of truth. If knowledge is 
a chain reaction rather then an explosion of truth then the non-intentional is less likely 
to be ‘blown-away’ .
The second implication for psychotherapy relates to the potential implications for the 
use clinical labels. Psychotherapy often works closely in association with medicine,
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whether this is as a result of a direct intervention within a medical setting (hospital, 
clinic etc.) or simply a referral from a general practitioner (GP). This study highlights 
the potential difficulties that might arise where a medical diagnosis or a specific 
medical setting imposes on a psychotherapeutic relationship. The example 
highlighted in this study suggests that individual psychotherapists need to recognise 
the potential for their pre-understandings and associations with a particular diagnosis 
to influence the therapeutic relationship. Understandings within a therapeutic 
relationship that are linked with a medical diagnosis are associated with what Levinas 
(1981, 1984) describes as the ‘ intentional’ and, according to the findings in this study, 
have the potential to prevent the possibility of contact with the non-intentional in a 
therapeutic relationship.
The findings and conclusions from this study open up the possibility of further study 
in relation to this client group. The quantity and success of more directive research 
potentially increases the need for further research aimed at allowing the possibility for 
the glimpses of the non-intentional, of a person rather than a diagnosis. At the outset 
of this study other options were considered that in hindsight might have avoided some 
of the dilemma’s experienced in this study. The therapy provided in a care setting 
imposed a considerable dynamic on the relationship between K and the trainee 
therapist. The relationship was subject to this constraint and so made it important to 
experience and reflect on this, however it might be important to design a study that 
was constructed away from this type of care setting. One of the proposals that were 
considered at the planning stage of this study was a project that looked at the therapy 
offered to people with dementia living in the community. This type of project may 
offer an interesting comparison to the study that was subsequently carried out.
The findings of this study could also be seen as an opportunity to re-examine the 
culture of care within a care setting like the nursing home where the therapy took 
place. The difficulties that were experienced in the therapeutic relationship described 
in this study are potentially there for any relationship for residents, staff and relatives 
associated with this care setting. The experiences described in this study could 
provide the basis for a re-evaluation of care practices and an educational programme 
for all those associated with care and caring.
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